Caesar

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  The building of the fortified lines went on, Caesar still hoping to complete his encirclement so that Pompey would be forced either to escape by sea, to break through Caesar’s lines or to watch his army wither. Skirmishes and raids continued. The Pompeian archers and slingers took to shooting at or near the fires visible in Caesar’s lines. In response the soldiers sat or slept away from the flames, preferring to be concealed and cold rather than warm but at risk. Pompey then launched a series of major attacks on a number of sections of Caesar’s fortifications, testing their strength and probing for weak spots. One attempt to capture a key hill was repelled when Publius Cornelius Sulla-the dictator’s nephew, for his son Faustus Sulla was with the Pompeians-brought up two legions to reinforce the threatened fort. The Pompeians were routed, but Sulla chose not to counter-attack and exploit the situation. Caesar approved his caution as appropriate for a legate, since such decisions were the prerogative of the commander-in-chief. The Commentaries proudly reported the bravery of Caesar’s legionaries. In one sector three cohorts of the Ninth held off an entire legion supported by large numbers of allied archers and slingers. After a day of bitter fighting virtually every one of the defenders was wounded, although clearly a good number were still able and willing to fight. Most of the wounds were caused by missiles – 30,000 arrows are said to have been picked up within the fort after the last attacks had been beaten off. Four out of the six centurions in one cohort were hit in the face and lost an eye. The shield of one centurion, a man named Scaeva, had been hit by no less than 120 missiles. Other sources tell us that he was one of the men hit in the eye, but in spite of this wound and others to the thigh and shoulder, kept fighting. At one point he feigned a willingness to surrender and then, when the enemy rushed forward, killed one and lopped the arm off another. Scaeva and his men then stood their ground, their defiance so intimidating the Pompeians that none dared to advance against them. Scaeva may have served with Caesar for many years, possibly having been with him during his time as propraetor in Spain as well as the years in Gaul. Their commander now rewarded the entire cohort lavishly, doubling their pay, awarding decorations to many of them, issuing them with new clothes and – at the time this may have been the most valued, although we should never doubt the importance of pride for good soldiers-an extra grain ration. Scaeva was promoted to primus pilus, the senior centurion of the legion, and given a bounty of 200,000 sestertii. It was not his last service to Caesar, and in later years he seems to have become an equestrian and for a while led a unit of auxiliary cavalry that took his own name-the ala Scaevae.15

  The lines at Dyrrachium

  The attacks had been repulsed, but it was difficult for Caesar with fewer troops to hold a longer line than the enemy. The Commentaries claim that the Pompeians suffered around 2,000 casualties, including a number of centurions, one of whom was the son of a former praetor. In contrast Caesar lost only twenty dead, although even he implies that the number of wounded was substantial. It is questionable how soon Scaeva and many of his men would have been able to return to duty. After this burst of fighting Pompey’s men spent several days working hard to strengthen vulnerable parts of the line of fortification, raising the rampart to a height of 15 feet. Caesar countered by leading his army out for battle each morning and deploying in a line just out of catapult range of the enemy fortifications. Pompey felt that it would have lowered his own prestige and the confidence of his men if he did not respond, but formed his legions with the rear line of cohorts of the triplex acies only just in front of his rampart. He had no desire to fight, feeling that it was better to starve the enemy into submission. A battle was more likely to favour Caesar’s veterans than his own inexperienced legionaries, especially in the rough ground between the lines where it would have been difficult to exploit his superiority in cavalry. Caesar refused to give the order for an attack. The slope favoured the Pompeians, who would have had the additional benefit of support from missiles thrown or shot from the rampart behind them. Caesar contented himself with the knowledge that his soldiers would see this as a reluctance on the part of the Pompeians to face them on anything like equal terms. For the moment Caesar seems to have despaired of successfully negotiating with Pompey, but he made an indirect approach by sending an envoy with a personal letter to Metellus Scipio, who had arrived in Macedonia with the legions from Syria. In the meantime, to add to the pressure on Pompey, Caesar’s legionaries extended their fortifications to block the two approaches to Dyrrachium itself. Pompey had sent a force of cavalry by sea to land near the town. Around the same time he may have made an attempt to capture the town with a surprise night attack, possibly after a traitor had offered to admit his men. The attempt failed, but the additional fortifications made it even harder for Pompey’s cavalry to find sufficient fodder and after a few days they were taken by ship back to his main position within his own fortifications. By this time the horses were being fed mainly on leaves and reeds, since not enough proper feed could be brought by ships from Corcyra or even further afield.16

  Pompey realised that his own army was suffering as much, perhaps even more than the enemy, and decided that he needed to seize back the initiative once again. An opportunity came with the desertion of two Gaulish noblemen, the brothers Roucillus and Egus. They were the sons of one of the main chieftains of the Allobroges from Transalpine Gaul and had served with Caesar for many years, leading a contingent of tribal cavalry with some distinction. Characteristically he had rewarded their loyalty well, making them senators, probably within their own tribe, although some have preferred to take the more natural reading of this passage to suggest that he had actually enrolled them in the Senate at Rome. It is certainly probable that the men were citizens. However, more recently the brothers had taken to siphoning off much of their men’s pay and also sending in false returns of the number of warriors they had to claim extra money and rations. In the end their own troopers went and complained to Caesar, who delayed making a formal decision, but privately spoke to them and warned them to stop these corrupt practices. The brothers realised that they had become unpopular and feared punishment in the future, so soon began to plan their escape. They borrowed substantial sums of money-the rumour was that they wished to make recompense to their men – and started buying up horses. A plan to murder the overall commander of Caesar’s cavalry was abandoned as impractical, so Roucillus and Egus then simply rode over to the enemy lines. With them went their household warriors, whose oaths of loyalty ensured that they must always follow their chieftains. Pompey was pleased, for up until this point no one had deserted from Caesar’s army during the entire campaign. He had them paraded around his lines and shown to the troops as a sign that the enemy must be weakening when two distinguished men chose to abandon them. Even more usefully the brothers had held senior positions and so were well acquainted with Caesar’s lines of fortification and the routine of his army.17

  Armed with this information, Pompey prepared for another major attack that was intended to break through Caesar’s lines and end the blockade. During the day his legionaries made wicker coverings for their helmets. These reduced the chance of the bronze glinting and so revealing their position when it caught the light, but also added further protection, taking some of the force out of a missile. This was especially important for stones flung from a sling or thrown by hand, which could concuss a man even without penetrating his helmet. The point chosen for the attack was the southernmost sector of Caesar’s lines where these came closest to the sea. Knowing that these were vulnerable, he had ordered the construction of an additional line behind the first, but work on this and on a wall at right angles to join the two together had not yet finished. Archers and light infantry, along with equipment for filling the enemy ditch and scaling the wall, were sent to the spot in boats. At midnight Pompey himself led out the main force of sixty cohorts. The attack began just before dawn and fell heavily on the Ninth, which was on duty in this sector. The Pompeians’ helmet covers proved very effective agai
nst flung stones, while the incomplete fortifications allowed the lines to be outflanked and quickly infiltrated. The two cohorts on the spot were driven off, and other units sent up in support failed to stem the rout and were quickly put to flight themselves. All save one of the centurions of the legion’s first cohort were killed and the eagle standard was only saved when its bearer flung it over the rampart of the nearest fort. It was not until Mark Antony brought up twelve cohorts from further along the line that the situation began to stabilise. Messages-many through a system of smoke signals that had been arranged to allow communication between the different forts in the line-summoned more reserves, accompanied now by Caesar himself. The fort was held, but the Pompeians controlled the positions closest to the sea and were building a camp there. They had punched a hole in Caesar’s line and would now be able to forage more freely over a wide area.18

  Caesar built a new camp for a strong force facing the one built by Pompey’s men. In this area was another fort about half a mile from Pompey’s main camp. It had originally been built by the Ninth, but was subsequently abandoned when the layout of this sector of the fortifications was changed. Later, the site had then been occupied and modified by the enemy, but these had also left after a few days. Now, Caesar’s scouts reported that a Pompeian force, roughly equivalent to a legion in size, was moving towards this position. Later patrols confirmed that the old fort now housed a legion. Caesar felt that his opponent had left this unit exposed and sensed an opportunity to win a local victory that would help to balance the recent enemy success. He left two cohorts to guard his own lines and took the rest of the immediately available troops-some thirty-three cohorts, although these included the Ninth, which was still shaken and had lost many centurions-on a march that took them to the fort by a roundabout route. The deception was successful and Pompey was unaware of the threat until Caesar’s men had actually begun their attack. After a stiff fight the fort was stormed, the legionaries hacking apart the barrier of stakes that blocked its main gateway However, things then started to go badly wrong. Although Caesar’s men were past the outer wall of the fort, there was another smaller enclosure within this and the garrison managed to cling on within this protection. Meanwhile, the cohorts of the right wing were unfamiliar with this stretch of the line and got lost, following a rampart that led away from their objective when they mistook this for one of the walls of the fort. Although puzzled that they had not encountered a gateway, the units kept going, and were followed by Caesar’s cavalry. By this time Pompey had responded, launching an immediate counter-attack with the five legions working to fortify his new camp, their approach inspiring the survivors of the garrison to renewed enthusiasm. A large body of Pompeian cavalry also headed towards Caesar’s right wing, and the Caesarean horsemen dissolved into panic, fearing that their line of retreat back to their own lines would be cut off. The situation was confused, the panic quickly infectious. The right wing crumbled first, but as men saw this happening the rest of the attacking force also began to flee. Some men were trapped in the ditches around the camp as the cohorts dissolved into a mob and each man tried to force his way past his comrades. As the Commentaries put it, ‘everywhere there was chaos, terror and flight, so much so that when Caesar took hold of the standards carried by fleeing men and ordered them to stop, some spurred their horses past him without stopping and fled, while others in their fear even dropped their standards, and not a single one halted.’ This time Caesar was unable to steady the line as he had done at the Sambre and on many other occasions. The accounts from other sources report an even less heroic incident, claiming that one of the fleeing men actually tried to stab Caesar with the spike at the butt end of his standard. The commander was only saved because one of his bodyguards was faster and sliced off the man’s arm with his sword.19

  The attack had ended in costly failure, Caesar losing 960 soldiers, 32 tribunes and centurions, and a number of other senior officers. The Pompeians captured 32 standards as marks of their success, along with a number of prisoners. However, Pompey contented himself with repulsing the attack and made no attempt to assault Caesar’s lines. This was widely felt to have been a mistake, since his men were elated at a time when the Caesareans were badly demoralised. Caesar himself declared that the enemy ‘would have won today, if only they were commanded by a winner’. In the aftermath Labienus asked to be given charge of the captured legionaries and, mockingly calling them ‘comrades’, had them all executed in clear sight of the enemy lines. On the next day Caesar paraded his men and spoke to them, just as he had done after Gergovia. He reminded them of that earlier defeat and how that had been followed by their great victory He encouraged them with just how much they had achieved, confining a bigger enemy army for so long, and urged them to make up for yesterday’s failure by fighting all the harder in the next encounter. His reprimands were mild, as were his punishments, contenting himself with demoting a number of the standard – bearers. The soldiers greeted his appeal with enthusiasm and some of his officers even urged him to risk a battle. Caesar was less confident that his men had recovered sufficiently from the defeat, and may also have realised that there was no reason why Pompey should accept his challenge. It was clear now that the attempt to blockade the Pompeians had failed. The enemy had captured one end of his encircling line of fortifications and he did not have the resources to construct a new, inevitably longer line to box them in once more. Pompey’s army could now supplement the supplies brought by sea with those foraged locally Caesar knew that he had failed in his objective, but as he had told his men was determined to make sure that the campaign still ended in victory He decided to withdraw, marching away from the sea where it was so easy for his enemy to resupply During the night he sent one legion to escort his baggage train and large numbers of wounded men to Apollonia. An hour or two before dawn he set out with the rest of the army, apart from two legions who formed the rearguard and remained in the lines. These men sounded the normal trumpet calls that woke the army to a new day. The Pompeians were deceived, and the rearguard was able to follow and rejoin the main force. Pompey sent his cavalry in pursuit, but these were held off by Caesar’s outnumbered horsemen closely supported by 400 legionaries marching in battle order. After a few skirmishes the two armies broke contact, as Pompey did not chose to follow Caesar straightaway.20

  PHARSALUS, 9 AUGUST, 48 BC

  As Caesar’s army marched away from the enemy it moved into regions that had not yet been visited by foraging parties from either army By this time it was summer and the new grain crops had ripened sufficiently to be harvested by the hungry soldiers. Caesar was also rejoined by some of the detached troops, which helped to replace some of his losses. However, as news spread of his defeat at Dyrrachium, some communities decided that it would be a mistake to aid a leader who looked likely to lose the war. At Gomphi the city’s magistrates closed the gates and refused to admit his men. Caesar refused to tolerate this challenge. His army stormed the town, which was then sacked, the drunken soldiers killing, raping and plundering at will. The magistrates committed suicide. When the army moved away on the following day, some sources claim that its progress was more of a drunken revel than a disciplined march. Curiously, it was also claimed that the debauch greatly improved the health of many of the men who had suffered during the food shortages and heavy labour in the lines outside Dyrrachium. It was the first time since the start of the Civil War that Caesar had permitted his men to mistreat the population of a captured town, and was clearly a deliberate display of ruthlessness. Fear of suffering the same fate as Gomphi ensured that other cities and towns in the region all welcomed Caesar’s army.21

  Dyrrachium was undoubtedly a victory for the Pompeians and a mood of elation spread throughout their camp, for this was the first time since the beginning of the Civil War that Caesar had suffered a reverse. Most confident of all were the senior officers, who now felt that only decisive action was necessary to end the war. Afranius urged Pompey to use his naval power to take th
e army back to Italy, so that they could reoccupy Rome and take from Caesar any pretence that he represented the true Republic. Others, particularly men like Domitius Ahenobarbus, argued that Caesar was now at their mercy and should be brought to battle and crushed as soon as possible. Pompey remained more cautious and still had great respect for the fighting power of Caesar’s veterans. He had always planned to return to Italy at some point, but with Caesar still at large, he was nervous that it might seem as if he had been forced into another evacuation by sea. More importantly this would leave his father-in-law Scipio, who with his Syrian legions had still not yet reached the main army, at the mercy of Caesar’s larger army Pompey preferred to stay in Greece, but still believed that fighting a battle was both unwise and, at least at the moment, unnecessary. Better to shadow the enemy and wear them down by depriving them of supplies.

  This caution was not popular with his more distinguished allies. Ahenobarbus took to calling him Agammemnon-the King of Mycenae who had led the Greeks in the ten-year struggle at Troy – or ‘King of Kings’ and accusing him of prolonging the war to maintain his own supremacy. If Cicero, who had a deep affection for Pompey, openly spoke of the Civil War being a question of whether Pompey or Caesar would hold supreme power, then it is unsurprising that others were even more suspicious of his motives. With victory now eagerly expected in the near future, many men were looking to secure for themselves a generous share in the spoils. Some sent agents to Rome to buy them a grander house closer to the Forum-especially one that was owned by one of Caesar’s partisans. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Metellus Scipio and Lentulus Spinther were already bickering over who would succeed Caesar as Pontifex Maximus. Many of the leading Pompeians had themselves benefited from Sulla’s victory decades before, and now hoped to escape their debts and thrust themselves even further into the forefront of public life. Cicero found the mood of the camp sickening, and later made a grim pun on Cato and his associates’ name for themselves-the ‘good men’ or boni – by saying that there was ‘nothing good about them, apart from their cause’. He doubtless exempted Cato himself from this judgement, but the latter was not with the army, having been left in command of the garrison protecting Dyrrachium. Malicious rumour said that Pompey had given Cato this task so that he would be unable to influence events when Caesar was defeated. There was much in – fighting between the various leaders as well as their suspicion of Pompey. Afranius was accused of betraying the army during the Spanish campaign. Others squabbled over who should be permitted to stand for election in the next year. Domitius Ahenobarbus was more concerned with punishing not only Caesar’s supporters, but also those who had remained neutral in Italy. Pompey had never enjoyed the same unquestioned authority with which Caesar directed his own war effort.