Maj. S. S. A. Naqvi, in a 1973 essay titled “Motivation of Armed Forces Towards our Ideology,” puts forth a similar argument when he contends that “the ideology for the country draws its strength from an Islamic system and Islam is a source of energy for our national goals” (58). Writing in the aftermath of the loss of East Pakistan, he attributes Pakistan’s “recent decline” to the “erosion of the spirit which created Pakistan” (ibid.). Maj. Mohammad Ali’s 1991 essay, “An Analytical Study of Situation in Sindh,” offers a similar prognosis and diagnosis. As suggested by the title, the author both seeks to describe the nature of the violence that gripped Sindh in the later 1980s and early 1990s and propose some remedial approaches to stem it. Ali provides a commendable account of the province’s numerous and daunting challenges, which include social disparities, historical underdevelopment, and an influx of illegal immigrants, many of whom “are associated with narcotics, weapons, smuggling, and other illegal activities” (85). After having suggested several sensible and practical remedies, such as law enforcement measures, increasing the independence of the judiciary, and redress of legitimate grievances, he ends with a clarion call for the “Revival of the spirit of the Pakistan movement” and the “adoption of Islamic strategy and avoidance of other state models” (87).
In 1991, Air Commodore Inamul Haq published an exhaustive volume titled Islamic Motivation and National Defence in which he emphasizes these points as well when he argues that “only the love for brotherhood in Islam can consolidate and create a strong homogeneous and unified society. Our ideology alone can contribute to greater unity” (27). Haq argues that Pakistan needs “a rejuvenation of our faith and ideology” for the purpose of “regaining our lost dignity, ensuring our territorial integrity and increasing our political and economic independence” (29).
In 2000, Lt. Col. Asif Mahmood offered a similar view in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2000, the first published following Musharraf’s coup. The entire volume is dedicated to the role of the armed forces in rebuilding Pakistan. Mahmood’s essay exemplifies the belief in the ameliorative role of Islam as an ideology, arguing that the political elites of Pakistan have failed to implement the ideology of Pakistan, to the nation’s detriment. Indeed, the linked tropes of civilian ineptitude and military competence are recurrent themes in Pakistan’s defense literature, particularly during periods of military rule. Mahmood dilates on the importance of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology, which, he asserts, puts “forward a set of universal principles and cultural values, given by Islam for the guidance of mankind. … Islam eliminates national, ethnic and racial differences” (113). Echoing decades of writers before him, he avers that “Islam and Pakistaniat should have served as the national philosophy and driving force for social integration, national resolve and preservation of national sovereignty. Unfortunately, up to the present, it has neither been interpreted nor implemented as such (114).”16 For Mahmood, this is a serious problem because Pakistan’s varied regions will remain unified only if Islam serves as the basis of Pakistani nationalism.
Pakistan’s defense literature assumes an intimate connection between the quality of Pakistan’s society and the quality of the troops, as already suggested. Pakistan’s army is rooted in society; thus, the army must work to improve the qualities of the society from which it draws and also to exclude the less salutary attributes of that society. This recurrent theme across more than six decades of defense writings is captured in a 1992 essay by Brig. Jamshed Ali, in which he notes, “National culture and military performance and achievements are closely inter-linked. An army mirrors the true state of its society and is as good and as bad as the people who constitute it” (59). Given the numerous problems of the civilian world, “The armed forces must at all times maintain a state of cultural purity and mirror the idealistic virtues of an army steeped in Islamic military traditions. It must remain apolitical, isolated from societal ills and other pervasive malpractices” (ibid.). (The call for the force to remain “apolitical” is typical among writings in the early years of restored democracy; it recedes once the army again intervenes in politics.) Given the uncivilized world of the civilians, “It is only by maintaining an integrated, cohesive and puritanical military system that the armed forces can retain their pristine, tradition oriented military way in a liberal society” (ibid.).
READYING THE PEOPLE FOR ARMY DOMINANCE AND WAR
Pakistan fought wars with India in 1947–1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999 (in addition to numerous close calls and border skirmishes). With the possible exception of the 1971 war, Pakistan began each war and failed to decisively win any of them.17 Despite this record, the military must cultivate Pakistani support for the drain it places on national resources, its involvement in politics, its dominance in foreign policy, its staunch anti–status quo position vis-à-vis India, and ultimately war. This is no easy task given the toll that belligerent policies have taken on ordinary Pakistanis. Because the Pakistan Army—like all armies—recruits from among the population, it is very sensitive to how the citizenry views the organization. In fact, Musharraf was so discomfited by the International Republican Institute’s (IRI’s) 2007 polls showing widespread opposition to his rule that his government began harassing the organization and its staff in Pakistan. The Pakistani government’s intimidation worked: IRI no longer publishes the results of the surveys it conducts on behalf of the US Embassy (Sethi 2008).
Believing that Musharraf was responsible for degrading its standing, the army pressured him to step down as chief in an effort to preserve its corporate interests (Barker 2007; Gall and Sengupta 2007). When Kayani assumed the post he worked assiduously to improve army morale, which had taken a sustained beating during Musharraf’s tenure, and to rehabilitate the army’s image among ordinary Pakistanis, which had worsened dramatically during the same period. As one Pakistani journalist observed, under Kayani’s leadership, “the Army has consciously been working to redeem itself by overt displays of professional, nonpolitical conduct. It’s been given a fillip by its valorous operation against the Taliban in Swat and South Waziristan, its handling of the refugee crisis from Swat, and the rescue and relief efforts after the floods” (Ahmed 2010).
Articles in Pakistan’s professional military journals also use Islam, the ideology of Pakistan, and the two-nation theory to sustain popular appetite for unending conflict with India and the army’s continued dominance over Pakistan’s internal and external affairs. This dynamic manifests itself in several ways. First, throughout some six decades of Pakistani professional military publications, much ink has been spilled on excoriating civilian leadership. The entire 322-page Pakistan Army Green Book 2000, written in the wake of Musharraf’s military coup, is dedicated to celebrating the role of the military in saving Pakistan after civilian failures to do right by the nation. While the army clearly believes it is important to propagate this view among civilians, it is equally important to spread it among officers themselves, as most professional soldiers prefer to honor their oath to stay out of politics. Professional soldiers with whom I have interacted have often opined that managing the country distracts the army from its primary duty of war fighting.
In 1963, Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, who would go on to serve as Defence Secretary between 1973 and 1977, published The Story of Pakistan Army. Writing a mere five years after Ayub’s coup, Khan endeavors to justify Pakistan’s first break from parliamentary democracy. Unsurprisingly, he argues that the blame lay with politicians, many of whom “had been ignorant, vainglorious good-for-nothings, only able to influence the polling of votes—often by far from honest means” (193). Because these politicians were “devoid of any higher understanding of politics, their vision remained confined to their own limited spheres, and instead of striving for the greatness of the nation, they looked only for self-aggrandizement and personal gain” (ibid.). In contrast to these venal politicians, who sought to advance their own personal standing, the author depicts Ayub as hesitant to take control and resistant to the p
ublic’s growing demands for him to do so. Ultimately, given the brewing tumult in East Pakistan and endless political troubles in West Pakistan, “the army was called in to take over the country as soon as possible” to “avoid … a catastrophe” (194), and Ayub, a loyal soldier, answered the calls of the citizenry.
Decades later, Maj. Gen. Asif Duraiz Akhtar (2000), writing in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2000, echoed Khan’s sentiments. He contends that “our political leadership … has failed to provide requisite stability, show maturity and acumen. They could not capitalize on [the] Two-Nation Theory and consolidate the national integration” (1). In contrast, the “Army has tried to provide stability, pursued aggressive foreign policy … and developed a semblance of cohesion in the society based on Nationalism or Pan-Islamism” (ibid.). This undergirds his conclusion that the army’s “enhanced participation in decision making on national issues, even during the elected government’s tenure is considered to be the moral obligation of the armed forces” (ibid., emphasis added).
During periods of democracy, writers in Pakistan’s professional military journals sometimes offer more critical reflections on the role of the army in governance. Writing in 1993–1994, after the restoration of democracy that followed the death of Zia ul Haq, Lt. Col. Mahmud Akhtar takes a more ambivalent view of the impact of the army’s interventions. Assessing the causes of Pakistan’s “disintegration,” he identifies the early death of Jinnah, the assassination of the first prime minister, the demise of the Muslim League, the “mushrooming of various pseudo political parties at the behest of selfish politicians and bureaucrats; undemocratic policies and malpractices of governments in power and the delay in making the first constitution and last of all controversial role of judiciary and interference of armed forces in national affairs” (111). While he concedes that the absence of democracy and prolonged military rule have undermined the development of governance in Pakistan, he stops short of either criticizing the quality of governance provided by the generals or ruling out military interventions at all.
Islamic themes, the two-nation theory, and the ideology of Pakistan (Pakistaniat) were explicitly invoked to mobilize civilians as well as soldiers in Pakistan’s wars in 1965 and 1971 (Rizvi 2000a). This was not overtly the case in the 1999 Kargil War, because the official Pakistani position during the war was that only mujahideen irregulars were involved in the conflict. Nonetheless, Pakistani media coverage of the conflict inspired national pride that a handful of ragged but plucky holy warriors could tie up the Indian (read as Hindu) Army and inflict such heavy causalities. It was only after the crisis had passed that Pakistanis learned that no mujahideen had been involved; rather, the invaders were Pakistan Army troops and paramilitary forces from the Northern Light Infantry (Fair 2009b).
Equally important, the military attracts public support by describing the foe—inevitably Hindu India or its agents—as nonbelievers (kufar, pl. of kafir) and casting the conflict nearly exclusively in religious terms. Thus, conflict with India is portrayed as a jihad against nonbelievers who threaten Pakistan. This assumes, of course, that all of Pakistan’s wars have been defensive and that India is implacably dedicated to destroying it. This assumption is bolstered by Col. Syed Nawab Alam Barhvi in his 1991 essay titled “Iqbal’s Concept of Jehad,” in which he tells his readers that “Jehad is fighting against aggression, fighting to defend the territorial boundaries and national integrity, and to take up arms against aggressive enemies” (87; see also Naqvi 1973, 1994). Nor is this jihad merely a duty for soldiers; rather, “Jehad is a sacred duty. … It is obligatory for every man, woman and child. It has to be an all encompassing, cohesive effort of the entire nation, manifested through its Armed Forces” (Farooqui 1992, 23).
Unfortunately, because Pakistan’s ideology is fundamentally rooted in this absolute opposition to India, the struggle appears set to be perpetual. Pakistan’s military publications seem comfortable with this outcome. Maj. Qaisar Farooqui’s 1992 essay, titled “Islamic Concept of Preparedness,” exemplifies this concept of perpetual struggle: “if the conflict is everlasting between the believers and the non-believers, or in other words between the forces of light and darkness, the fight has to go on till one of the belligerent forces is completely wiped out” (15). According to the narrative established by the army and promulgated throughout Pakistani society, India is an inexorable foe. Hence,
Preparation for war is thus a sacred duty not only of an individual but of the entire Muslim Ummah; the Quranic message (read out on every passing out parade in the Pakistan military Academy, Kakul) enjoins upon all Muslims to take to the highest standards of preparedness, as it says, “And make ready your strength, to the utmost of your power including sinews of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah, and your enemies, and others besides them, whom you know not but Allah doth know. And whatever you expend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid until you and you shall not be treated unjustly.” (Al Anfal-60) … Islam does not visualize the total annihilation or complete extinction of the non-Islamic forces and people but ordains the Muslims to keep their enemies either subjugated or restrained (16).
Under this view, the commitment to subjugating or restraining the non-Muslim enemy is not simply the purview of the military but rather the responsibility of all Muslims. Implicit in such writings is an exclusivist notion of Pakistani citizenship: how could Pakistan’s non-Muslims participate in this project?
Farooqui (1992), writing during the 1990s when Pakistan was undergoing yet another fiscal crisis following the imposition of US sanctions, argues that Pakistan must continue to expend resources on the military so that the army can defend the nation against its irreconcilable foe. He deploys the language of jihad to make his case, arguing that the preparation for jihad must be continuous and never-ending. “The preparedness [of the nation] has also to be perpetual. At times, the defensive effort might have to be made at the expense of important, essential needs of education, health and general welfare. The nation has to be prepared, mentally, physically, psychologically and intellectually to back up its defenders” (22).
Consonant with the defense publications’ consistent definition of jihad as a defensive duty of the Pakistan Army, the literature—buttressed by Pakistani school curricula and the media coverage of all wars—depicts India as the aggressor in all cases, irrespective of the conflict this creates with indisputable facts and scholarly accounts. It is useful to briefly recount here the claims for and narratives of the key Indo-Pakistan wars. With respect to the 1947–1948 war, it must be noted that many Pakistani military writers do not acknowledge that the conflict was an Indo-Pakistan war (see, e.g., Farooqui 1992; Rahman 1976). Curiously, many memoirs of senior generals—for example, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan (1993), Gen. Ayub Khan (2006), and Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi (2002)—do not even mention this war, even though they cover events immediately before and after.18 Many Pakistanis still do not concede the extensive involvement of civilian and military officials in the infiltration of lashkars into Kashmir, which began the 1947–1948 war. Those writers who acknowledge that there was a war tend to argue that it began after the Indians airlifted troops into Kashmir and forced Kashmir’s accession to India. Pakistani writers generally accept no culpability for creating the conditions that motivated the maharaja to sign the instrument of accession to India or to request Indian troops.
A typical example of this characterization of the 1947–1948 war is the 1978 essay “The Pakistan Army.” The anonymous author insists that the Pakistan government tried to find a peaceful solution to the emerging crisis on Kashmir but was frustrated at every turn by a belligerent and recalcitrant India, which wanted to foist a military solution upon Pakistan. In view of this imminent threat, the essay contends, “Pakistan decided in April 1948 to send a small element of Pakistan Army into Kashmir with orders to deter India from obtaining any decision by force of arms (“The Pakistan Army” 1978, 6). Pakistan’s official account of this war not only focuses on Ind
ia’s aggression but also consistently celebrates the courage and valor of the Pakistani forces, which held their own against a larger, more prepared force. For example, Maj. Gen. Muqeem Khan declares that “the Pakistan Army had performed its task admirably. It had done much more than it was expected or ordered to do. It did not go to conquer Kashmir, but was sent there on a purely defensive mission. It had, against overwhelming superiority in men, material and weapons, thwarted Indian designs” (Khan 1963, 116; see also “The Pakistan Army” 1978; Sattar 2007).
The 1965 war is described with similar narratives. Many writers for Pakistan’s military journals fully concede that Pakistan was vexed by India’s contention that Kashmir was not in dispute and by its corresponding attempts to integrate the state into the federation. Given these evolving realities, Pakistan sought “to keep the flickering flame alive by throwing occasional crackers in occupied Kashmir. [The Pakistan Intelligence Bureau] conducted some minor sabotage activities there, but these attempts also proved futile” (Musa 1983, 2). Gen. Mohammad Musa (who commanded the Pakistan Army during the 1965 war with India) acknowledged that Pakistan erroneously believed the time was right to commence a sustainable civil war in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistani planners were encouraged to believe that an insurgency was possible when the Moh-e-Moqadis, a hair from the prophet Muhammad, was stolen from Srinagar’s Hazratbal shrine in December 1963. When the public learned that the relic was missing, violent protests broke out throughout the state (New York Times 1963).
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