Musa (1983) describes Operation Gibraltar, which “envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruption of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually” (35–36). (Operation Gibraltar was to be followed by Operation Grand Slam, which involved a full-scale assault in southern Kashmir employing regular troops, tanks, and support from the Pakistan Air Force.) Musa admits that the force that Pakistan infiltrated was large, consisting of some “7,000 Mujahidin from Azad Kashmir. Most of it was given some guerilla training within the short time available before it was launched. It was armed with light machine guns and mortars, besides personal weapons, and was equipped with wireless sets” (36). He even concedes the extent to which the Pakistan military regulars were employed in this operation. Pakistan’s calculations were wrong in every respect. Not only did Operation Gibraltar fail to ignite an enduring insurgency in Kashmir, but India also responded against Pakistan’s expectations by widening the war, launching an attack in the Pakistani Punjab. Despite fully acknowledging Pakistan’s actions leading up to the war, Musa’s account—like many others—ultimately blames the start of what he calls the first major Indo-Pakistan war on India.
Pakistani authors paint India as the aggressor. First, they characterize the limited skirmish in the Rann of Kutch as the result of Indian aggression. This incident took place over several months in late 1964 and early 1965, prior to the execution of Operation Gibraltar and the slide to war. The Rann of Kutch is a marshland adjacent to the Arabian Sea; India and Pakistan disputed the demarcation of the border in this area. Scholarly and journalistic accounts of this conflict describe skirmishes breaking out between the Indian and Pakistani forces patrolling the area, with fighting rapidly escalating to a brigade-sized battle. Most observers decline to declare India or Pakistan the clear and obvious aggressor (Chari et al. 2001; Lamb 1991; Nawaz 2008a; Schofield 2000). Others, such as Sumit Ganguly (2001, 41), argue that Pakistan initiated a limited probe in the disputed area to “test Indian mettle.” However, in Pakistan’s military publications India appears as the clear aggressor—as Schofield (2000) notes, Indian accounts make comparable claims about Pakistan. Most scholars agree, though, that the Indian response was tepid and that this likely bolstered Pakistan’s unwarranted confidence that Operation Gibraltar could be launched without sparking a wider war.
In Pakistan’s account, Indian aggression in the Rann of Kutch was but a harbinger of a larger intent to fight Pakistan. Pakistani accounts contend that the actual war did not begin until India moved across the international border. From Pakistan’s optic, sending regular and irregular troops across the line of control in Kashmir to foment insurgency and to attack Indian forces did not constitute an act of war. According to the anonymous 1978 essay in the Pakistan Army Journal, “The Indian Army has launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression against Pakistan on September 6, 1965 … with a view [to] achieving surprise and catching the Pakistan Army unaware” (“The Pakistan Army” 1978, 7–8). The author describes the Indian move as “an undeclared attack [that] was a great shock to the entire nation as it was not only against all canons of international law, but also against the norms of international morality and military ethics” (8). Thus, for Pakistan there is no sanctity of the line of control. The only fair Indian response to Pakistani moves across the line of control is a counteroffensive that is limited to the line of control. For Pakistan, movement of regular and irregular fighters across the line of control is not tantamount to an act of war; rather, it is the expansion of the conflict across the international boundary that is the threshold for war. This seems to be an optic peculiar to Pakistan’s military personnel: most international observers found Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar to have been an act of war.
Ayub’s words on the first day of the Indian offensive across the Line of Control have cast a long shadow over Pakistani understandings of the war and of the security competition with India. He told the Pakistani public that “Indian aggression in Kashmir was only a preparation for an attack on Pakistan. Today [the Indians] have given final proof of this and of the evil intentions, which India has always harbored against Pakistan since its inception” (Haqqani 2005, 48). Official Pakistani accounts of the 1965 war aver that nothing Pakistan did prior to India expanding the conflict across the international border could, in any way, be construed as starting the war.
Pakistan’s account of the 1971 war also paints India as the clear aggressor. This position is not as indefensible as it is for the prior two wars. Most accounts of the war, such as Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War (2001), Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan’s Memoirs (1993), Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi’s 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldiers Narrative (2002), among numerous other essays in the professional journals, concede that consistent government malfeasance sowed the seeds of discontent in East Pakistan and that the crimes (of omission or commission) of Gen. Yahya Khan, Z. A. Bhutto, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made the war inevitable. Most also concede that West Pakistani political elites never reconciled to the principle of one man, one vote, because it would allow the ethnically and politically cohesive East Pakistan to dominate politics. Such frankness is typified in the account of Lt. Gen. A. A. A. Niazi, who was the last governor and martial law administrator of East Pakistan under Yahya Khan and the last unified commander of the Eastern Military High Command. (It was Niazi who ultimately surrendered to India.) Niazi (2009) describes these conditions and reveals the extent to which the Bengalis were reviled due to their supposed Hindu characteristics:
The West Pakistanis … were concerned that the Bengalis, if given majority representation to their population in the federal set-up, would eventually edge them out. They were also apprehensive about the Hindu influence in Bengali politics. With twenty per cent of the population being educated Hindus, and given their dominance in all facets of life, who could have stopped them from dictating the national policies? The government would be formed by Bengalis, the iron fist in the velvet glove would be that of the Hindus. To ensure that the Hindu influence was nullified, the parity system was evolved, meaning equal representation between the two wings. This was aimed at protecting the interests of the West Pakistanis from exploitation by the Hindu-controlled Bengalis (34).
Pakistani military authors also admit that the military used excessive force in its effort to put down the growing insurgency, even though they differ on whether or not this use of force was ultimately justified.
However, even Pakistani military authors who are most candid about the chain of errors that brought about the war ultimately blame India for enabling the insurgents. This is in part because Bengalis were seen as nonmartial and incapable of mounting any sort of offensive on their own. Ali (1992) wrote with surprise that the “derided Bengalis performed well and much beyond expectations” (56). The author of the 1978 essay “The Pakistan Army” acknowledges that the roots of the war were indigenous to East Pakistan but claims that India exploited Bengali grievances for its own ends. On this point, the author is surely correct. The Indians did exploit the situation in East Pakistan. Lt. Gul Hassan Khan (1993) takes a similar approach when he notes that by September 1971 “India’s intervention was a foregone conclusion, unless we managed to deescalate the conditions in East Pakistan,” and he admits with chagrin that Pakistan’s leadership did not “appreciate how seriously India would take it upon herself to get involved in our dilemma and ensure that the turmoil in the East be precipitated” (284–285).
These narratives of the wars with India distort the truth about which actions precipitated the wars, exculpate Pakistani military leadership for its disastrous planning, and sustain the myth of an innocent Islamic Pakistan perpetually targeted by an insolent Hindu India resolved to destroy it.
MOTIVATING THE ARMY FOR WAR
Pakistan’s defense literature also seeks to use
Islam, the ideology of Pakistan, and the trope of the two-nation theory to motivate its officers and men to fight an enemy that has always been conventionally superior. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002), in his discussion of officer training at the Pakistan Military Academy and other institutions, such as the National University of Science and Technology, notes that underlying these educational programs “is a strong grounding in general Islamic teaching including the concept of Jihad. This is inevitable in a Muslim country: the concept of Jihad is an important pillar of Islam” (82). In fact, to ensure that soldiers have a solid understanding of the “concept of Jihad,” teaching it has become an “integral part of training in the armed forces” (ibid.). Cheema sees this as necessary because Pakistan confronts the larger, better equipped Indian Army and must therefore rely on a “great measure of moral superiority which encompasses a high degree of professional competence, in-depth study of modern concepts and doctrines of war, better leadership and inspired ideological orientations” (ibid.).19 The use of Islam to debase and demean the enemy also bolsters the army’s will to fight. During the civil war of 1971, the commander in chief and president of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, motivated his soldiers by calling the Mukti Bahini (the Bengali guerillas) a “Kaffir” army against which the Pakistan Army was waging a legitimate jihad (Cohen 1984, 87).
Cohen’s (1984) and Cheema’s (2002) observations are amply supported by the professional military journals studied for this effort. One of the important themes of this literature is that the conflict with India and the need for war is not simply about territory. Col. Saifi Ahmad Naqvi, in an essay for the 1994 Pakistan Army Green Book, devotes a section to the concept of “Motivation through Religion.” Here he reminds his readership that Pakistan is an “ideological state based on the ideology of Islam,” and thus “the existence and survival of Pakistan depends upon complete implementation of Islamic ideology in true sense. If the ideology is not preserved then the very existence of Pakistan becomes doubtful” (184). This is germane to the army’s mission because the army is “responsible for defence of the country to safeguard the integrity, territorial boundaries and the ideological frontiers for which the country owes its existence” (ibid.). For this reason, Naqvi argues that “the indoctrination of the officers and men is an undisputed requirement. For this purpose knowledge of religion and propagation of its teaching should be imparted in an organized manner down to the soldier level … Its message raises the morale and cultural level of its followers, and promotes social order, unity and intellectual hygiene” (ibid.).
This was not a new message, as evinced by the 1973 publication of Maj. Syed Shahid Abbas Naqvi’s essay “Motivation of Armed Forces: Towards Our Ideology.” In this essay, the author argues that all soldiers should be taught “the fundamentals of Islam and the Muslim ideology. The syllabus for basic instruction should include ‘why’ and ‘how’ about Muslim rise and fall. They should know why battles like ‘Uhad,’ ‘Khaibar,’ and ‘Khandaq’ were fought” (61). After the soldier completes this basic “ideological training,” soldiers should next be “infused with the spirit of Jehad. At this stage of training a grounding has to be given to the soldiers to develop their courage with a strong will to defend this country. They should be given a cause to fight for” (ibid.). (Naqvi apparently does not view territorial defense alone as adequate motivation.) In an attempt to reinforce the religious nature of the battlefield, Naqvi argues that “terminologies like ‘Foxland’ and ‘Blue Land’ [akin to red teaming and blue teaming in the US context] should be replaced by terms like ‘Kafirs’ [nonbelievers] or ‘Mushriks’ [apostates] and ‘Muslims’ ” (ibid.).
Many writers for Pakistan’s professional publications use the notion of jihad to describe the defense of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity. Saifi Ahmed Naqvi (1994), however, reminds his readers that, beyond being galvanized to perform these defensive tasks, “the best motivation for a Pakistani soldier is to be a dedicated Muslim to fight for the cause of Islam and to preserve unity and sovereignty of the homeland which is considered to be the citadel of Islam” (185). Musharraf used similar language in 2001 when, dressed in full military regalia, he addressed the nation after the December 2001 Jaish-e-Mohammad attack on the Parliament in New Delhi and concomitant massive Indian mobilization of forces along the border. He attempted to reassure Pakistanis that their armed forces were prepared to successfully fend off any Indian aggression. In doing so, he described Pakistan as the fortress of Islam (“Pakistan Islam ka qila hai”) (Ahmed 2013, 2). The selection of the word citadel is itself instructive. In both English and Urdu (qila), this word is by definition a garrison community peopled by soldiers and civilians alike who are prepared to launch an armed defense against aggressors. Citadels or garrisons were also established by empires to guard their frontiers (2–3). By evoking this language, Pakistani officers and soldiers are fighting not simply to defend the frontiers of Pakistan but that of Islam itself.
Consistent with this effort to impress Pakistani men in uniform with the conviction that they are serving national, ideological, and religious goals, the literature also seeks to situate Pakistan’s men in arms within a larger tradition of great Islamic warriors (Chohan 1998; Haq 1991; Malik 1963, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; Majeed 1994; Pathan 1963). Thus, Pakistan’s martial traditions are described as drawing on thousands of years of great Islamic generalship and conduct of war, predating both the British period and independence. Ali (1992) explained:
Islam plays a vital and extremely pivotal role in the military culture of our soldiers. Our country’s ideological foundations have a dominant motivating impact on the soldiers. As a role model, they look up to the rich heritage and martial traditions of Islam as inherited from the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.). If properly channelised this aspect of our military culture is a big combat multiplier for it enjoins patritism [sic], honour and commitment to cause. The ongoing renaissance of Islam and the radical changes brought about since 1947 in our customs and traditions have had a salutary effect on our military culture. The Islamic heritage serves as a useful platform and framework for the junior and senior leadership to exercise their command functions (57–58).
Other authors echo these ideas. For example, Lt. Col. M. Safdar Iqbal (1966) advocates terbiyat (religious education) for the Pakistani soldier. He implies that such education comes naturally to a soldier, as his religious training begins at birth when he first hears the azan (the call to prayer). Iqbal believes that “under higher direction, this ‘Terbiyat’ in the armed forces, is being conducted in a more systematic and purposeful manner. The officers and the men, the leaders and the led are rediscovering greater meaning and significance, nobler aims and ideals” (12). Most importantly, the author concludes, terbiyat will prepare the Pakistani soldier to act in accordance with Islam even when he is outnumbered and confronted by a better equipped enemy. To emphasize this point, he includes a quote from the Quran (a frequent habit of authors in Pakistan’s professional journals): “Those who fight in His way and get killed, do not call them dead! They are alive and get their victuals from their Allah, but you do not understand. Those who die in the way of the Lord, shall go to paradise and live there forever; those who survive shall be amply rewarded, both here and in the hereafter” (15). Maj. Gen. Askari Raza Malik, writing in the 1992 Pakistan Army Green Book: The Year of the Senior Field Commander, stresses that the “important character traits of the successful field commanders” derive exclusively from Islam. In fact, “physical courage is only a fruit of moral courage. … For a Muslim, the concept of shahadat [martyrdom] has, to much chagrin of others, grown into such a strong institution that is both marvelous and awe inspiring. What can the enemy do to a person who is over-anxious to embrace death” (78).
In a 1998 essay, Col. F. J. Chohan agrees that Islam should be the basis of the army’s indoctrination. Moreover, “The love of Jehad and to be called a Ghazi or Shaheed is ingrained and embodied in the hearts of our Jawans” (55). For Chohan, motivation of the Pakistani
military “is not a mere function of pay, good administration, training and equipment. The material aspects are … vital for the sustenance and maintenance of an individual but these are not the real energizers … behind the behavior of a Muslim. The main motivation of a Momin [faithful Muslim] comes from the strength of his own inner faith in Allah as well as his action as oriented in the light of the knowledge revealed through the exemplary behavior of our Prophet (Peace be upon him)” (61).
Frequently, references to early Muslim campaigns are used to bolster the morale of officers and men because in many cases the early Muslims were outnumbered by their foes. This has obvious relevance to the contemporary security competition with India. Col. Bashir Ahmad provides an illustrative example of this genre in his 1963 essay titled “Morale: From the Early Muslim Campaigns.” The author explains that “there are no finer examples in history of the influence of morale on the decisions of battle than those found in the early Muslim campaigns” (6). One of the most frequent references is to the Battle of Badr,20 where, according to the author, 313 Muslim civilians—the vast majority of whom had little experience with warfare—prevailed against 1,000 seasoned soldiers equipped with armor, 700 camels, and 100 horses. The author notes that “a force three times superior in number, ten times better equipped and far superior in battlecraft had been defeated by its opponents. Morale alone was the cause of this success. Success did not go to the side with larger numbers, better equipment, more experience and greater skill. It went to the belligerent with better morale” (7; see also Chohan 1998).
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