The Life of Alcibiades
Page 7
was then “forced to lay his head on Socrates’ knee and weep.” 3 Alcibiades
weeps with regret because he fears that he lacks the necessary preparation
for the career he desires.
His discouragement, if it ever really existed, was not to last long. But at
the threshold of a political career full of great hopes and great disappoint-
ments, it offers a brief hint of what might have been.
3. We have the text from the rhetorician Aelius Aristides.
34 First
Interlude
What might have been never was. Alcibiades’s entry into politics, with
its long train of scandals, was where the waters divided; the current was
henceforth to carry Alcibiades to his fate, and far from the lessons of his
teacher.
Now we must leave Socrates and Plato. The historians take the stage,
primarily Thucydides. Alcibiades begins to act.
3
Political Debut
The Argive Alliance
The fi rst mention of Alcibiades in Thucydides’s work (5.43)—in history, in
other words—refers to the year 420 BCE. Thucydides’s introduction lacks
the personal charm found in Plato, but it goes straight to the heart of the
man’s character.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the context for this introduction, the
following conveys the spirit of the passage.
“Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades son of Clinias, a man still
young in years for any other Hellenic city, distinguished by the splendor of
his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not
that personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his opposition”
(5.43.2). The explanation, both clear and concise, continues, but what we
retain from this passage is the characteristic pride and ambition, conveyed
from the very fi rst mention of his name, and the emergence of two kinds
of themes, the rational ones, and the self-centered ones. Compounding
the problem, it is the latter that are dominant, the former being little more
than a kind of concession or acknowledgment of fortuitous coincidence.
36 Chapter
3
The word “ambition” is a highly charged one when we recall
Thucydides’s assessment of Pericles, in which he describes Pericles’s suc-
cessors as being more or less equals: “And each grasping at supremacy,
they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whim of
the multitude” (2.65.10).
This juxtaposition of contrasting motives—the future of Athens ver-
sus the promotion of self-interest—is found throughout the work of
Thucydides whenever Alcibiades is involved: in the Sicilian expedition
and later during the action in Asia Minor. We will have occasion to return
to this theme: Alcibiades acted solely out of self-interest. This is a point
that has already been made emphatically, and all that follows will serve
to repeat it.
Let me add that Plutarch himself (who obviously had read Thucydides)
also adopts this interpretation. After he refers to Alcibiades’s messy pri-
vate life, he states: “Nevertheless, it was actually by pandering to his am-
bitious longing for recognition that his corrupters set him prematurely on
the road of high endeavor; they convinced him that as soon as he took up
politics, he would not merely eclipse all the other military commanders
and popular leaders, but would gain more power and prestige among the
Greeks than even Pericles enjoyed” ( Life of Alcibiades 6.4).
Once the subject of politics was brought up, all the fl aws and insults
were erased as compared with the ambition that would lead him to the
pinnacle of success and the depths of disaster.
How would he use that ambition? And to what purpose?
First, he had to strengthen his position in Athens and take power. How
does one do that?
Athens functioned as a direct democracy. All citizens had the right to
speak in the Assembly. For someone from one of the great families, like
Alcibiades, this was particularly easy and normal. He had to do it. We
know that he spoke up to offer a gift of money to the city (on the occa-
sion when he released his quail): he was applauded and earned popular
approval. We also know that he supported Cleon’s effort that increased
the tribute paid by the cities of the empire.
But what could be expected to result from these endeavors? If one re-
ally wanted to play a role, he had to hold an offi ce. It should be remem-
bered that all public offi ces in Athens were determined by lottery, were
Political
Debut 37
collegial, and were nonrenewable. No democracy has ever taken such care
to avoid control by individuals and the establishment (as is apparently the
case today) of the “politics of personality.” No offi ce, no administrative
position, could lead to the slightest infl uence.
There was one exception. The highest leadership position, because it
entailed military responsibility, was elective and renewable. These were
the offi ces of the ten generals, elected by vote, once a year. There were
also a few fi scal offi ces, but they had little weight. The generals were the
true leaders of the democracy: Pericles had led the city as a general; he had
been reelected to the post fi fteen times. Moreover, among the ten generals
(each of whom had slightly different charges) one ranked higher than the
others. As Thucydides often remarked, “Pericles was general, with nine
others.” Often a famous or well-liked individual succeeded in getting his
friends elected. But that was not always the case.
Alcibiades intended to become general, and without delay. In fact, he
was elected in the same year, 420 BCE.
In these elections, as in the workings of the Assembly, nothing was
done according to party affi liation: there were no parties. There were,
however, political friendships, as well as dominant political tendencies.
There were also, during the course of this democratic regime, secret ene-
mies who remained loyal to the oligarchy and hoped to see it reestablished
someday. These would come to play a particular role a few years hence.
It was known that some people belonged to clubs, or hetaereiai, around
important people. However, anyone who expected to participate in poli-
tics was a supporter of democracy: the difference was mainly between
extreme and moderate democrats. Alcibiades oscillated between these
inclinations. Athenian politicians cared little about policies and general
principles. Alcibiades, as his later conduct would prove, cared even less:
he preferred opportunity to principle.
In politics, personal rivalries were consequential. Thucydides knew this
very well. At this time, many people talked about Nicias, who became a
natural rival of Alcibiades. Their views about internal politics differed very
little; but they took altogether opposing positions on the most important
question of the day, namely, external relations and the war with Sparta.
Athens and her allies had been at war with Sparta and the Pelopon-
nesian League since 431. The war had begun under the rule of Pericles. It
dominated Alcibiades’s entire youth.
Greece and the Aegean Sea
Map 1.
Political
Debut 39
It provided an opportunity to make his name and he did not let the
opportunity escape him. In the Symposium he tells, or Plato has him tell,
how he and Socrates had fought in the battle of Potideia, in the far north-
ern Aegean, in Chalcidice. It was the year before the war with Sparta
began. Alcibiades was wounded there and saved by Socrates. Alcibiades
demanded that Socrates should receive a medal of honor, but because
of Socrates’s entreaties, Alcibiades received it. The young aristocrat had
served in that battle as a foot soldier. Just a little later, in 424, he fought
at Delion, this time in the cavalry. Both battles enabled him to stand out.
However, the war was more than an occasion of brilliant conduct for
a young man like Alcibiades; it led him to make some critical decisions
about the conduct of his affairs.
It is important to see the entire Greek world then as divided into two
blocks: on one side, Athens, with its democracy and maritime empire; on
the other, Sparta, with its oligarchy and continental allies.
The confl ict had grown slowly in the middle of the fi fth century, follow-
ing the shared victory of the Greeks in the Persian Wars. Fifty years later,
Athens had added to its authority by transforming allies into subjects, and
by developing its fl eet thanks to the money they provided in the form of
an annual tribute. The reputation of Pericles’s Athens, her power, the con-
struction of the Acropolis, were all linked directly to this maritime empire.
And the Peloponnesian War resulted, specifi cally, from the fear sown by
her growing power in Sparta.
The two sides had been fi ghting for ten years: on one side was Athens,
ruling almost all the islands, and busy at home working to maintain the
regime of the democracy. On the other side was Sparta, a city-state ruled
by oligarchy, that led the Peloponnesian League and defended oligarchy
as much as possible. The league included all the peoples of the Pelopon-
nese except for two: the Argives and the Achaeans had been allies of
both sides.
For ten years these two blocs waged war throughout most of the Greek
world. The Peloponnesians regularly invaded Attica, and the Athenians
had won, in a pitched battle, a bridgehead at Pylos, in the Peloponnese.
Both sides also engaged in the affairs of their respective allied cities where
civil wars had broken out. The Athenians supported the partisans of de-
mocracy and the Lacedaemonians supported oligarchies. Their involve-
ment prolonged the confl icts and intensifi ed the violence.
40 Chapter
3
Finally, on both sides, there arose a desire for peace, and in 421 peace
was concluded. Both sides had reasons to want to come to terms. The
Athenians had managed to capture a certain number of Spartiates at Pylos
(that is, true Spartans, the elite, as opposed to Lacedaemonians, refer-
ring to a wider population), while on their side, the Lacedaemonians had
procured the defection of several allies of Athens, from the Chalcidian
peninsula. Having already crushed several defections, Athens feared they
would continue to grow. The peacemakers got to work in both cities: in
Athens, it was Nicias, and historians today call the peace of 421 “the
Peace of Nicias.”
Nicias’s importance among the supporters of the peace would only en-
courage Alcibiades to throw himself into opposition. From beginning to
end throughout his career, he would stand for Athenian ambition and im-
perialism; fi rst he opposed Sparta, but later he would take up other ideas
for conquest, always opposing Nicias.
Initially, he was able to exploit the fragility and ambiguities of the
peace. These were real. Naturally there were issues of reciprocal restitu-
tions, giving rise to arguments and delays; there were issues of the date
and order of restitution. But the biggest complications arose from the un-
happiness on the part of Sparta’s allies. Some had refused to vote for the
peace. Moreover, the terms had allowed for possible modifi cations if they
were agreeable to both Sparta and Athens; there was no mention here of
the allies, and they took offense. 1 There were two main consequences of
this: fi rst, it multiplied the delays and refusals of the restitutions, and sec-
ond, they considered unifying against Sparta.
That would have been a serious problem at any time; it was especially
serious in 421, because of Argos.
As has been noted, Argos had not joined the war with the Pelopon-
nesian League; in 451 it had concluded a thirty-year peace agreement with
Sparta, which was about to expire. It found itself free and could join either
Athens or Sparta, or even play a role in combining around itself the Spar-
tan allies who were not happy about the treaties.
All eyes were now on Argos. After the conclusion of the peace, the Cor-
inthians began negotiations with certain leaders of the city: Argos, they
1. Thucydides 5.29.2.
Political
Debut 41
told them, should “look after the safety of the Peloponnese.” To that end,
Argos should announce that “every city that is independent and values
its rights could, if it wished, ally with the Argives in a defensive pact.”
And it should designate leaders empowered to negotiate with these cities.
The Corinthians were hoping that many cities would rally out of hostility
toward Sparta. 2
What should Athens do? Nicias thought Athens should embrace peace
and come to an agreement with Sparta. He had set an example by returning
to Sparta its famous prisoners, those it had sought so strenuously. In doing
so, he had brought on himself the anger of many Athenians. 3 For his part, Alcibiades took the other side. He declared, from the beginning, that Sparta
“was not reliable.” It was seeking to take advantage of the treaty in order to
be fi nished with Argos and to oppose Athens again. Once his course of ac-
tion was fi xed, he would play the Argive alliance card with determination.
The Argive alliance was a grand idea and could claim illustrious ante-
cedents. Themistocles, when he was ostracized, took refuge in Argos at
the beginning of the century. Perhaps infl uenced by him, Argos and Man-
tinea became democracies. A little later, when the political alliance with
Sparta had failed, Athens had turned to an alliance with Argos. This was
an ally that could resist Sparta in the middle of the Peloponnese.
However, turning to Argos was a choice fraught with consequences.
Whereas Pericles had grasped the superiority of naval power, and whereas
the Athenian tradition, ever since the Persian Wars and Themistocles, had
been “to stick to the sea” (Thucydides 1.93.4), now comes Alcibiades
seeking to gain a foothold in the Peloponnese. Going even further, he de-
cides to “stick to the land” (Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades 15.) It represented
a break with tradition, an innovation, a bold stroke.
Plutarch adds that Alcibiades based his plan on the “o
ath of the
ephebes,” which vowed to make the borders of Attica grain and crops,
as if the agricultural lands belonged to them. It sounded good, but it was
not true. The actual text of the “oath of the ephebes,” carved in stone,
was discovered several decades ago; it says nothing of the kind. 4 Was this 2 . Thucydides 5.27.2.
3 . 5.35.4.
4 . See L. Robert, Études épigraphiques et philologiques (Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, 272), 296–307.
42 Chapter
3
a problem of communication? An intentional misunderstanding on Al-
cibiades’s part, always mindful of providing sources for his policies? Who
knows? One thing only is certain: the Argive alliance, by rejecting the im-
portant distinction between maritime and continental power, represented
a new direction that demanded an aggressive propaganda campaign. Al-
cibiades lost no time.
The fi rst among the Spartan allies to manifest their discontent and to
approach Argos were the cities of Mantinea and Elis. These cities had
caused problems between Athens and Sparta over the restitutions required
by the Peace of Nicias. This was Alcibiades’s opportunity.
It was at this point that Thucydides named Alcibiades for the fi rst time
and introduced him in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter.
He did so for the very good reason that Alcibiades was just then beginning
to make his diplomatic moves.
Alcibiades had friends in various cities, particularly in Argos, and he
sent a private message there inviting the people of Argos, Mantinea, and
Elis to come as quickly as possible to Athens to conclude an alliance. The
moment, he said, was right, and he himself would advance their cause
with all his might. He convinced them.
The people of Argos, persuaded by Alcibiades, bent to Athens’ side,
telling themselves that “the longstanding friendship of a city like Athens,
living like themselves in a democracy and possessing a powerful navy,
would be on their side in the case of hostilities” (Thucydides 5.44.1). They
sent their representatives: the business was going to work.
Alcibiades’s entry into politics was thus both bold and resolute. It
seemed he was bound to succeed. One will note that he had acted on his
own and, thanks to his friends in Argos, very privately. Thucydides is