Animals and Women Feminist The

by Carol J Adams

  Why do the wood frogs sing so absurdly in the spring, out of tune and out of sync? In the summer, when they hop around on the forest leaves, so light- and shadow-mottled you can barely see them, they ’ re silent. But in the spring every one of them sings, and each has a different song. Why?

  One morning as I walked through the woodland park behind my house, I heard them singing, and so I decided to ask. I made a place for myself at the edge of a vernal pond, pushing the raspberry canes aside and stretching out on the bank. This was apparently a suspect move, because the frogs became very, very quiet. But so, curiously enough, did everything else. Even I was quiet. I watched the surface of the pond, and I watched the leaf litter in the woods, and I looked upward at the pallid blue sky, and I peered down into the muddy chocolate water, where mosquito larvae and salamander eggs lay in clusters. I imagined myself a deer, bent low to drink from the streamfed trickle that the pond would soon become. I imagined myself a raccoon, sensitizing my fingers by dipping my paws in the water, a raccoon ’ s idea of an aperitif . I imagined myself me, the scent of newly thawed earth in my nostrils — but then, of course, I remembered I was me.

  “ Cuhr-roawk, ” said a frog, and another answered “ Curh-romph. ” My heart gave a little lurch, and just then I saw an amazing thing: a leaf had popped out on the raspberry cane nearest my cheek, and a mushroom had sprung up under the maple across the pond. Then a shiny brown frog drifted to the surface, as casually as you please, just as though she were a stick that had broken free of some underwater anchor. I lay still, belly down and legs splayed out; she did the same, but she was floating, and the movement of the water eased her toward me. We looked back and forth at each other, the sun warming our backs. Then another frog croaked, “ Cree-ukha, ” startling us both, and this time I saw a salamander egg begin to hatch. Can this be, I thought? The frog in front of me gave a little “ ahh-ruk, ” and I swore I heard a rush of sap in the tree. “ Would you do that again? ” I asked her, as politely as I could, and sure enough, she gave forth another little “ ahh-ruk, ” and this time I was quite certain I heard the sap rise higher. And then another frog went “ ahhroo-roak, ” and a trout lily burst into bloom.

  And so it went: cuhr-roawk, and there was another raspberry leaf! Cuhr-romph, and out came a mushroom. Cree-ukha, and a salamander egg hatched. Ahh-ruk, and the sap rose. Ahhroo-roak, and the forest was bursting with trout lilies.

  The shiny brown frog drifted downstream a bit, basking in the sun, looking, perhaps, for a tree that needed her. Nice work if you can get it, I thought, better even than making theory. But like theory, it must get tiring. And with that, I lay my cheek on the sweet damp earth and slid into a nap.

  * * *

  Notes

  It would be impossible to identify all the conversations and exchanges that contributed to this essay. Still, I know that my thinking in this area has been challenged and sharpened by a number of my students — most notably Neysha Stuart, Karen Villemaire, and Linda Clark — and by my friends and colleagues Judy Anhorn and Gail Wheeler. Marti Kheel has heard every idea and example in this article in some form or another, and has been an inexhaustible source of ideas and examples of her own. She deserves much credit, then, for anything that seems insightful, wise, or provocative; the pedestrian thinking, however, is entirely my own.

  1. I owe the notion of narrative and template, with text creating text, to Judy Anhorn.

  2. There are a number of excellent works on the history of environmental consciousness and attitudes toward nature. In particular, I recommend Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon, 1983); and Max Oelschlaeger, Contemporary Wilderness Philosophy: From Resourcism to Deep Ecology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). Former Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan summed up the traditional position when he stated his own worldview: "I believe that man is at the top of the pecking order. I think that God gave us dominion over these creatures" (Ted Gup, "The Stealth Secretary," Time, 25 May 1992, 58).

  3. Although it seems paradoxical that animals may be killed at the whim of their "owners" but not treated cruelly, the explanation is simple: acts of brutality, or even exposure to those acts, have long been considered demoralizing to humans . See the discussion of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and its founder Henry Bergh in Gerald Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods: A History of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals (New York: Scribner ’ s, 1972), 95 – 106, esp. 105.

  4. In a letter responding to an excerpt from Jeremy Rifkin ’ s book Beyond Beef, which had appeared in the Utne Reader, the editor of a meat industry journal took exception to a half dozen facts ranging from the weight of the world ’ s cattle to the percentage of methane gas attributable to them. Rifkin responded by elaborating on the initial information to "prove" that beef consumption is indeed harmful to humans. At the conclusion of his response, he stated the Beyond Beef Campaign ’ s goal: to reduce U.S. beef consumption by at least 50 percent "to improve our health, preserve the environment, alleviate world hunger, and decrease animal suffering" (emphasis added; Utne Reader , May/June 1992, 8 – 9). This was the only time in the whole exchange that the concern of any nonhuman being was raised. For those of us who believe that animal suffering is the central issue, the relegation of animals ’ concerns to fourth place is at best disingenuous and at worst a reflection of the low regard in which they are held.

  5. The extension of moral considerability to animals and ecosystems is discussed below. For a discussion of ethical obligations toward biochemical processes, see generally Charles Birch and John Cobb, The Liberation of Life (Athens, Ga.: Environmental Ethics Books, 1990).

  6. For further elaboration on ecofeminist principles, see note 12 and the accompanying text.

  7. Feminist theory has been critical of rights and utility theories generally, largely because such theories are premised on an abstract individualism, do not take into account the context in which human lives are lived, and are indifferent to such values as compassion, trust, and generosity. For a more detailed analysis, see Moira Gatens, Feminist Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), esp. 122 – 35; Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), esp. 146 – 74; and Elizabeth M. Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women ’ s Movement," New York University Law Review 61 (1987):589 – 652. For a feminist critique of animal rights theories, see Josephine Donovan, "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 15, no. 2 (1990):350 – 75.

  8. I confess that this narrative was calculated; while the setting and "events" were real, my responses were invented to advance my argument, namely that narratives do not necessarily model good ethics.

  9. For a more detailed treatment of women ’ s stories and autobiographies, see the essays in Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck, eds., Life/Lines: Theorizing Women ’ s Autobiography (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

  10. David Ehrenfeld compares current models of game management to the linear systems approach used to manage large industrial systems like nuclear power plants, and suggests that a better, more ecologically astute model would be the complex systems approach used in air traffic control. See "The Management of Diversity: A Conservation Paradox," in Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle , ed. F. Herbert Bormann and Stephen R. Kellert, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

  11. Some of this debate is reviewed in Don E. Marietta Jr., "The Interrelationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics"; and in Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic, 117 – 27.

  12. See Warren, "The Power and the Promise," 139. Warren ’ s boundary conditions are similar to the ones set out here: an e
cofeminist ethic should generally (1) oppose domination; (2) be contextualist; (3) recognize diversity;(4) honor theory-in-process; (5) include the perspectives of oppressed persons; (6) deny the validity of "objectivity"; (7) emphasize such values as care, love, friendship, and trust; and (8) reject ahistoric abstract individualism. See also my article "Ecofeminism and the Politics of Reality"; for additional readings on ecofeminism, consult Carol Adams, ed., Ecofeminism and the Sacred, and the works discussed in my bibliographic essay "Remapping the Terrain: Books on Ecofeminism."

  13. In Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 1989), Donna Haraway discusses both the racism and sexism of much recent primatology, and the ways in which it could be done so as to advance the agendas of animals and humans other than the researchers. Barbara Noske ’ s Humans and Other Animals (London: Pluto, 1989) is an intriguing anthropological examination of animals, respecting and recognizing their "otherness" while examining language, culture, toolmaking, and the like. See also Daisie Radner and Michael Radner, Animal Consciousness (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1989).

  14. Patrick Murphy makes a similar point in "Ground, Pivot, Motion: Ecofeminist Theory, Dialogics, and Literary Practice," Hypatia 6 (1991), 152 – 53.

  15. Cronon (1992, 1374) claims this is the central difference between historical narrative and mere chronicles of events; I go further in calling it a compelling test of the value of a narrative.

  16. There have been a number of books and articles devoted to the notion of caring as a distinctly feminist ethic. Two useful anthologies are Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefleld, 1987) and Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, eds., Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). Joan Tronto ’ s Moral Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 1993) offers an excellent summary of work on caring, and posits a number of guidelines for an ethic of care. For a detailed ethic of care that manages to exclude animals from its purview, see Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); see also her exchange with Josephine Donovan in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16, no. 2 (Winter 1991):418 – 25. Rita Manning ’ s Speaking From The Heart: A Feminist Perspective on Ethics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992) develops an ethic of care that does include animals, but it is nonetheless incompatible with a strong animal liberation perspective.

  17. Ruddick ’ s work on attentive love draws on the writings of Simone Weil, especially as developed by Iris Murdoch. See Simone Weil, The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas (Mt. Kisko, N.Y.: Moyer Bell, 1977) and Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (New York: Schocken, 1971).

  18. Lisa Mighetto ’ s Wild Animals and American Environmental Ethics (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991) examines some self-conscious attempts by preservationists to make wild animals, especially wolves and bears, seem more like humans; see especially her chapters "Science and Sentiment" and "Working Out the Beast."

  References

  Adams, Carol J. 1990. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory . New York: Continuum.

  — — — , ed. 1993. Ecofeminism and the Sacred . New York: Continuum.

  — — — . 1994. Neither Man Nor Beast . New York: Continuum.

  Callicott, J. Baird. 1989. In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy . Albany: State University of New York Press.

  Cheney, Jim. 1989. Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative. Environmental Ethics 11:117 – 34.

  — — — . 1990. Nature and the Theorizing of Difference. Contemporary Philosophy 13, no. 1:1 – 14.

  Collard, Andr é e, with Joyce Contrucci. 1988. Rape of the Wild: Man ’ s Violence Against Animals and the Earth . Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

  Cronon, William. 1992. A Place For Stories: Nature, History and Narrative. Journal of American History (March): 1347 – 76.

  Devall, Bill, and George Sessions. 1985. Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered . Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith.

  Fineman, Martha Albertson, and Nancy Sweet Thomasden. 1990. At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory . New York: Routledge.

  Jay, Tom. 1986. The Salmon of the Heart. In Working the Woods, Working the Sea, ed. Finn Wilcox and Jeremiah Gorsline, 101 – 17. Port Townsend, Wash.: Empty Bowl.

  Kheel, Marti. 1985. The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair. Environmental Ethics 7:135 – 49.

  — — — . 1993. From Heroic to Holistic Ethics: The Ecofeminist Challenge. In Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, and Nature, ed. Greta Gaard, 243 – 71. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

  Leopold, Aldo. 1949. A Sand County Almanac . New York: Oxford University Press.

  Lugones, Mar í a C., and Elizabeth V. Spelman. 1986. Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism, and the Demand for “ The Woman ’ s Voice. ” In Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall, 19 – 31. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.

  Marietta, Don E., Jr. 1979. The Interrelationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics 1:195 – 207.

  Naess, Arne. 1973. The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements. Inquiry 16:95 – 100.

  — — — . 1989. Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle, trans. David Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  Plumwood, Val. 1991. Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy and the Critique of Rationalism. Hypatia 6:3 – 28.

  — — — . 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature . New York: Routledge.

  Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights . Berkeley: University of California Press.

  Rolston, Holmes, III. 1975. Is There an Ecological Ethic? Ethics 85:93 – 109.

  Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace . New York: Ballantine.

  Singer, Peter. 1991. Animal Liberation . New York: Avon.

  Tronto, Joan. 1993. Moral Boundaries . New York: Routledge.

  Vance, Linda. 1993. Ecofeminism and the Politics of Reality. In Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, and Nature, ed. Greta Gaard, 118 – 45. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

  — — — . 1993. Remapping the Terrain: Books on Ecofeminism. Choice (June): 1585 – 93.

  Warren, Karen. 1990. The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism. Environmental Ethics 12 (Summer): 125 – 46.

  8

  Karen Davis

  Thinking Like a Chicken: Farm Animals and the Feminine Connection

  Prologue

  In the mid-1980s I became interested in how the philosophy of deep ecology harmonized with the philosophy of animal rights. This happened during the time when my interest in animal rights was becoming increasingly centered on the plight of farm animals. Years earlier, an essay by Tolstoy that included an excruciating account of his visit to a slaughterhouse had opened my eyes to what it meant to eat meat. 1 After that, except for occasional fish, I stopped eating meat and drifted away from eggs. However, I continued to consume dairy products until a description of the life and mammary diseases of dairy cows ended my consumption of those products.

  I was well into my thirties and had been a semivegetarian for nearly a decade before I realized that a cow had to be kept pregnant in order to give milk or thought about the strangeness of continuing to nurse after infancy or of sharing a cow ’ s udders with her offspring, let alone shoving her offspring out of the way so that I could have all of her milk for myself. My growing preoccupation with the plight of farm animals did not particularly arise from the clear perception I now have of the exploitation of the reproductive system of the female farm animal, epitomized by the dairy cow and the laying hen. However, two important things happened, one through reading and the other through personal experience, to clarify my thoughts and, ultimately, my career.

  My readi
ng led me to two contemporary essays in which chickens are represented as a type of animal least likely to possess or deserve rights. One was by Carl Sagan. In “ The Abstractions of Beasts, ” Sagan argues against the view that, in the words of John Locke, “ Beasts abstract not. ” He shows that chimpanzees, at least, have demonstrated the ability to think abstractly through a variety of behaviors, including maltreating a chicken. A researcher watched two chimpanzees cooperating to lure a chicken with food while hiding a piece of wire. Like Charlie Brown to the football, the chicken reportedly kept returning, revealing that “ chickens have a very low capacity for avoidance learning, ” whereas the chimpanzees showed “ a fine combination of behavior sometimes thought to be uniquely human: cooperation, planning a future course of action, deception and cruelty ” (Sagan 1977, 108). Sagan poses the question whether nonhuman species of animals with demonstrated consciousness and mental ingenuity should not be recognized as having rights. At the top of the list are chimpanzees. At the bottom somewhere are chickens.

  The second essay derived from the field of environmental ethics. In “ Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, ” J. Baird Callicott draws upon “ The Land Ethic ” of A Sand County Almanac by Aldo Leopold to argue that domesticated and wild animals have differing moral statuses and that, similarly, individual animals and species of animals have differing moral statuses. Wild animals and species of animals have characteristics entitling them to a moral considerateness that is intrinsically inapplicable to the characteristics of domesticated and individual animals. The smallest unit of ethical considerability is the biotic community of which the individual “ nonhuman natural entity ” is a component of value only insofar as it contributes, in Leopold ’ s words, to the “ integrity, beauty, and stability of the biotic community ” (Callicott 1980, 324 – 25).