The battle of Stirling was fought on 11 September. It was preceded by an intriguing intervention on the part of certain Scots nobles. The English reached the Forth in the first week of the month. On 9 September James the Stewart and Malcolm, earl of Lennox at the head of other nobles approached Warenne with the offer of arbitrating with the Scots who were stationed on the Abbey Craig. If Cressingham, as seems possible, demurred, Warenne was more agreeable. We can only guess at the motives of the nobles and whether they made a genuine attempt to carry out their promise. According to Lanercost, the Stewart at least was guilty of treachery. A more modern view suggests that the Stewart and his companions hoped to avert a slaughter of the Scots.36 If they approached Wallace, he would not be of a mood to put faith in them; Irvine was too close. The lords, in any case, returned to Warenne the next day to confess failure. Perhaps as a sop, they undertook to join him on the eleventh with forty knights.
As the lords left the English camp, an incident occurred which demonstrated the volatile nature of the situation. Guisborough tells what happened in these terms:
As they [i.e. the Scots] were leaving our camp that evening, they met a band of our returning foragers and began abusing them, and Lennox wounded a foot-soldier in the neck with his sword. When this was known to our army, everyone hurried to arm themselves, and they brought the wounded and bleeding man before the Earl of Surrey, crying out that vengeance should be taken that very night. But the earl replied, ‘Let us wait tonight, and see whether they keep their promise in the morning; then we shall better be able to demand satisfaction for this insult.
Warenne’s quaint belief in the knightly right to reply is faintly ridiculous to us. It is as incomprehensible as the exact role of the Scots lords. Wallace, as has been suggested, can have had no faith in them. They may, despite this, have acted after a discussion with him and Murray; the two commanders would not be unwilling to benefit from any delay which the lords could gain for them. It is difficult to believe that Lennox and the Stewart could hope to assume command of the Scots army, even if they had the courage. This was the time of Wallace and Murray. The lords did in the event have a further part to play in the battle of Stirling, but it was a minor one and far from heroic. Their force of cavalry was allocated no function in the plan which Wallace and Murray employed on 11 September. That plan appears to have been largely improvised, and was the work of men of a different mentality from the lords’. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that the contemporary accounts of the battle lay such emphasis on the involvement of the lords. If noteworthy, it is not surprising; we sense that the chroniclers are no more able to give credit to Wallace than they were in describing what had happened at Lanark.
On the evening of 10 September, having allowed the Scots lords to depart, Warenne had informed his officers that the army would cross the bridge the following morning. Amazingly, he slept in. Before he rose, the army began the crossing. In the account in Guisborough, from which so much of our information comes, some five thousand infantry had reached the other side of the bridge. As it was capable of taking only two men abreast, this manoeuvre could not have been speedy. Wallace and Murray, with a coolness remarkable in the circumstances, held fast on the Abbey Craig. The temptation to attack the English must have been great, but it was resisted. In their restraint it is possible to see the implementation of a scheme, which was at length put into effect. This, of course, is the accepted view. In this, Wallace and Murray intended from the beginning to throw their army down on the English as they crossed the bridge. If that is so, one wonders why they did not take this first opportunity. That they did not then launch the onslaught makes it likely that they had not yet decided to fight at all. Thus, they watched and waited. That part of the English army which had crossed did not remain over the bridge; it was recalled because Warenne had not yet risen. This failure of the English to consolidate their hold on the river-bank was a piece of good fortune for Wallace and Murray. If it is indeed true that five thousand infantry had made the crossing, that was a formidable force; it would have given the two commanders pause. The outcome of the battle might have been different, if indeed an engagement had taken place at all.
What was already, from the English point of view, farcical, grew worse. In keeping with his somewhat inappropriate code of honour, Warenne insisted on creating several new knights. Of these, Guisborough dolefully tells us, ‘many were to fall that day’. Warenne then ordered the crossing to begin. Once more those who had gone forward were called back, for it was seen that the Stewart and Lennox, set on a place in history, were returning. They had not brought with them the forty horsemen they had promised. This was interpreted as a good sign; the Scots, Warenne thought, were come to surrender. On the contrary, the lords had come to confess failure. As Guisborough relates, ‘they only made excuses, saying they could neither persuade their followers to submit nor even obtain horses or weapons from them’. Quite who these followers were we can only guess. If it is a reference to Wallace and Murray, it is ludicrous, since they were in no sense followers. If a mention of the retinue of the lords, their numbers were hardly sufficient to be of consequence in the battle to come.
Warenne was not yet done with talking. Despite the threat which Wallace and Murray posed from the height of the Abbey Craig, despite the admitted futility of the endeavours of the Scots lords and their brief but vicious treachery of the night before, he was not ready to fight. To Wallace and Murray he sent two Dominican friars. In Guisborough it is, noticeably, Wallace not Murray who is credited with a terse but famous rejoinder to Warenne’s demand for surrender: ‘Tell your commander that we are not here to make peace but to do battle to defend ourselves and liberate our kingdom. Let them come on, and we shall prove this in their very beards.’37
Wallace’s words before the battle of Stirling Bridge must surely rate with any in similar circumstances which have come down to us. Courage in battle, and at the moment of death, was much valued, and where evidence was lacking writers did not hesitate to invent the appropriate speech. This was particularly true of Greek and Roman historians; they saw nothing wrong in creating a set-piece address for the great figures with whom they were concerned. Polybius and Livy may be quoted as examples of this practice. It persisted much later. The Song of Roland, said to have been performed before Hastings by Taillefer, is illuminated by the words and deeds of Roland and Oliver and the twelve peers of France, who died at Roncesvalles. We may reasonably compare Wallace’s words to the Dominicans sent by Warenne with those, for example, put by Arrian into the mouth of Alexander the Great before the Granichus or with those attributed to Vercingetorix by Julius Caesar. The ability to choose the appropriate phrases was not given to all. King Stephen, at the battle of Lincoln in 1141, realising his limitations, allocated the task of inspiring his forces to Baldwin FitzGilbert.38 But Wallace, it appears, had no such inhibitions, and rightly so. Although, according to Guisborough, Wallace’s defiance was addressed to Warenne’s representatives, we may assume that is was delivered in a manner intended to carry to the Scots who would fight with him.
These splendid remarks do not, given the time at which they were uttered, invalidate the argument that Wallace and Murray had not at first necessarily been intent upon giving battle. They had seen the various actions of Warenne’s army, they knew of the approaches made by the Scots lords even if they did not necessarily approve of them; they knew now that they had nothing to fear. Their confidence was well placed. Below them the English, having failed to achieve a second Irvine, were at odds. That same Sir Richard Lundie who, angry and disgusted, had left the Scots camp at Irvine, put the cause for caution: ‘My lords, if we cross that bridge now, we are all dead men. For we can only go over two abreast, and the enemy are already formed up: they can charge down on us whenever they wish’.
Lundie foresaw what was to happen. Wallace and Murray were stationed on the southward-looking slope of the Abbey Craig at a distance to the north of one mile from the bridge over which the English, some
of them for the third time, were preparing to cross. Between the foot of the Abbey Craig and the northern end of the bridge was a causeway which ran over soft ground unsuitable for the heavy cavalry on which Warenne’s army relied for impact, both physical and psychological. Once the English had crossed, not only would it be difficult if not impossible to deploy the cavalry, but the infantry would be surrounded on three sides by the river as it formed a horseshoe loop. Lundie understood the double danger offered by Wallace and Murray; even if the crossing were unimpeded by the Scots – an unlikely eventuality – the chances of Warenne’s being able so to order his deployment in the face of an attack which would then, if not before, occur, were slight. Lundie, therefore, proposed that a detachment under his command move along the river and set upon Wallace and Murray from the rear. ‘There is’, he told Warenne, ‘a ford not far from here, where sixty men can cross at a time. Give me five hundred cavalrymen, then, and a small body of infantry, and we will outflank the enemy and attack them from behind: while we are doing that, the earl and the rest of the army will be able to cross the bridge in perfect safety.’
If Lundie’s advice had been heeded, the outcome of the battle of Stirling must have been different. Wallace and Murray would have been forced to divide their army and would have lost the opportunity to attack the English, as they crossed the bridge, with sufficient strength. But if Warenne had lost the first and perhaps the best opening by calling back those troops who had established themselves over the river before he had risen from his bed, he now made another gross mistake. He allowed Cressingham, who had not so far been prominent, to intervene. The treasurer urged an immediate crossing and an attack upon the Scots. It was natural that Cressingham should be concerned about the cost of keeping an army in the field; he it was who had sent men home to England on the grounds of expense. He now used the same argument in support of the crossing. He rounded on Warenne who seemed about to agree with Lundie: ‘It will do us no good, my lord earl, either to go bickering like this or to waste the king’s money by vain manoeuvres. So let us cross over right away, and do our duty as we are bound to do.’ If Cressingham was a fool, his superior, Warenne, was even worthier of the title. He overruled Lundie and ordered the advance. For Lundie it is impossible not to feel sympathy. If the Scots at Irvine had lacked courage, the English at Stirling lacked intelligence. The words of Guisborough might well be his own:
Thus (amazing though it is to relate, and terrible as was to be its outcome) all these experienced men, though they knew the enemy was at hand, began to pass over a bridge so narrow that even two horsemen could scarcely and with much difficulty ride side by side – and so they did all the morning, without let or hindrance, until the vanguard was on one side of the river and the remainder of the army on the other. There was, indeed, no better place in all the land to deliver the English into the hands of the Scots, and so many into the power of the few.
What happened appears to us, with the benefit of hindsight, inevitable. Wallace and Murray watched the parade of the English on to the bridge. With that fine judgement which marks the exceptional commander, they released their infantry down the slope of Abbey Craig when the vanguard of the English army had almost made the crossing. The Scots, their patience rewarded, fell upon the vanguard as it attempted to debouch from the bridge. The vanguard was now cut off from the rest of the English army which was forced to watch from the far bank. The narrowness of the bridge made any move to reinforce those unfortunates already over the bridge impossible. Wallace and Murray had, with part of their force, blocked the northern end of the bridge. What the larger part of the English army saw was horrifying.
The Scots in their advance from the Abbey Craig would have gathered an immense momentum. This must have driven many of the English off the bank and into the river. Such as escaped this fate cannot have had time to offer any kind of concerted opposition. Their superior weapons could not be brought to bear in the crush. Retreat was impossible. One English version of events has Wallace break the bridge down at this point. Whether this is so, or whether Warenne, who had not crossed the bridge, had it destroyed to save himself and the larger part of the army, we do not know, but it did not matter. The Scots made great slaughter of the vanguard. A hundred knights and many infantry, perhaps as many as five thousand, died, either killed or drowned.
Among those who perished was Cressingham. If Warenne had not crossed the bridge, the treasurer had been less prudent. He had charged at the head of the vanguard, his mind no doubt filled with the dreams of that glory which the office of treasurer had denied him. Misguided, pompous, less than popular with his own army, he nevertheless met the sort of end which was more appropriate to such as Warenne. He was dragged down from his horse and died under the spears of the Scots infantry. In telling of his death, Guisborough does not spare him: ‘Of all the many who were deceived that day, he was deceived most of all.’ After the battle, the Scots, in a gruesome ceremony, flayed his obese body. Strips of his skin were sent throughout Scotland to proclaim the victory of Stirling. Other strips were used to make saddle girths. Tradition tells us that Wallace himself had a belt made for his sword from what was left of Cressingham’s skin.
Of those who escaped from the massacre, some swam the river. These were the Welshmen who fought, as always, without armour. The most famous of those who did survive was Sir Marmaduke de Tweng, the Yorkshireman. He refused to join the Welshmen as they swam the river and rode his horse through the Scots and over the bridge to safety. He, clearly, had seen the hopelessness of the situation very early, for the bridge was still intact. His courage and his continued devotion to the English Crown, first in the person of Edward I and then in that of the king’s son, ensured that his reputation did not suffer. The same could not be said of Warenne. He gave Stirling Castle into Tweng’s keeping and fled for Berwick with unseemly haste.
There was a postscript to the battle. We left the Stewart and the earl of Lennox after their report to Warenne on the refusal of Wallace and Murray to surrender. Now with the battle over and Warenne in flight, they reappeared on the scene. They had been spectators of the slaughter at the river, and it is not certain what use, if any, they had made of their men. Their target was the English baggage-train, the camp-followers, and other refugees from the battle. These were moving in the direction of Falkirk when the lords emerged from the shelter of the woods alongside the Pows and fell upon them. Many of the English were killed and large amounts of booty seized. It was the sole contribution of the Stewart and Lennox to the Scottish achievement of Stirling.
NOTES
1 For Machiavelli (op. cit., 202) this attribute ranked highest in the rules of military discipline. Clausewitz deals with the question, op. cit., book 1, chap. 3
2 Watson: Under the Hammer, 45.
3 If Wallace was present, it is difficult to see in what role. He could only have been there as the leader of an independent force gathered since Lanark or in the following of one of the magnates. The second of these possibilities is unlikely; in his own right, Wallace may well have had with him a considerable number of rebels, attracted by his success at Lanark and Scone. There is in any case no mention of him at Irvine. Had he been present, his departure would surely have been noted, especially if there had been a quarrel prior to that departure.
4 Cal. Docs Scot., ii, 908.
5 Lundie fought for the English at Stirling. See pp. 100–01 for the part he played.
6 Trivet, 357, describes him as ‘miles strenuus’.
7 Barrow: Robert Bruce, 120–21. Mackay: Robert Bruce King of Scots, 1974, 62, sees the Stewart as particularly responsible for this tactic. Barron, op. cit., 46, states categorically that the Scots ‘had been compelled to make peace’.
8 Guisborough, 299. See note 3 above for the suggestion that he already had a large force with him before as well as after Irvine.
9 This is in contrast to the leaders at Irvine. As late as 5 August, Wishart, Bruce, and the Stewart were still, for whatever reasons, haggling o
ver terms with the English: Barrow, Robert Bruce, 120 n. Douglas, in some respects a man of Wallace’s own temperament, having failed to provide hostages, was a prisoner, first at Berwick, where he continued to be ‘very savage and abusive’, then in the Tower of London, where he died. The Scots believed that he had been murdered.
10 It is fair to state that Bruce, at least, was in a difficult position in the negotiations, he was required to give his daughter, Marjorie, as a hostage. He was understandably reluctant and Wishart, with certain others, stood as a guarantor until he should produce Marjorie: Cal. Docs Scots, ii, 910.
11 Guisborough, 299.
12 Cal. Docs Scots, ii, 453. Cressingham had been instructed on 24 June to hold a colloquy with Percy and Clifford on the situation. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292–1301, 251.
13 On the significance of the forest or ‘Greenwood’ in outlaw legend, see Keen: The Outlaws of Medieval Legend, London, 1961, 1–8.
14 Fordun, 98
15 A different interpretation is placed on this aspect of Wallace’s methods by DNB. There, on p. 564, we read that Wallace ‘showed wisdom by associating with himself, when possible, representatives of those barons who encouraged by his success, supported him for at least a time’. Even here, however, we are left to draw the conclusion that the arrangement on Wallace’s side did not exclude harsh means, while the nobles, for their part, were ready to withdraw the support which he forced from some of them.
16 Michael de Miggel was captured by the English at Dunbar and imprisoned in Nottingham Castle. Cal. Docs Scot., ii, 742. He was still there on 23 September 1299, when arrangements were being made for him to be exchanged with James de Lindsey, then in Bothwell Castle. Cal. Docs Scot., ii, 1093. None of this – his endeavours on behalf of the Scottish cause in the early part of the war, the suffering which he underwent in an English prison – seemed, if Michael is to be believed, to weigh with Wallace.
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