17 Cal. Docs Scot., ii, 1689
18 If the case of Michael de Miggel is not unique, it is interesting that there is no record that the execution of Wallace was followed by a rush of people anxious to dissociate themselves from him. The nobles, of course, had already made their peace with Edward and were collaborating with the English.
19 Cal. Docs Scot., ii, 455.
20 Barrow: Robert Bruce, 121.
21 It was not until 1 August that Surrey reached Berwick.
22 Seventh Book. Barron, op. cit., 60–62, argues that Harry confuses Wallace with Murray and it was the latter who was at Aberdeen, joining with Henry de Lathom, the English sheriff of Aberdeen, who had gone over to the Scots.
23 Bower, ii, 171.
24 Docs Illus. Hist. Scot, ii, 198.
25 Edward neglected no source for the levying of troops. On 11 April 1298, for example, he invited ‘criminals and vagrants’ to serve with him. Cal. Docs Scot., ii, 38. Geoffrey Entredens, pardoned because of his service in the Scottish war, was but one of many guilty of ‘homicides, robberies, and outlawry’ and other assorted crimes before Edward offered them a kind of respectability. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 199. The effects of such a policy of recruitment may be seen both at Stirling and Falkirk. In the latter case, it came close to bringing defeat for the English king when he found he could not rely on the Welsh contingent in his army.
26 Book XI.
27 He had, in fact, been ordered to resume his appointment in Scotland on 14 June. Edward’s continued confidence in this unwilling warrior is not easy to explain. It was disastrous at Stirling, yet Edward did not dismiss Warenne. For a man of such reputation as a soldier, Edward did not show himself more astute than his son and successor. Edward II, at least, was capable of wise military appointments, most notably in the case of Andrew de Harcla who, however, made the fatal mistake of recognising his monarch’s futility. It was Harcla who inflicted the most serious reverse suffered by Robert I, at Carlisle in 1315. Lanercost, 230.
28 On the role of Brian Fitzalan in Scotland there are references in Powicke, 597 and n., 604, 686 and n., & 13n.; Barrow: Robert Bruce, 49, 50, 108.
29 Docs Illustr. Hist. Scot., ii, 230.
30 He was, however, astute enough not to embark on any adventures against the Scots on his own initiative.
31 Kightly, 164.
32 Guisborough, 301.
33 Maxwell trans. 163.
34 Stevenson, ii, 202.
35 See Prestwich: Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, 1996, passim.
36 McNair Scott, 45.
37 Guisborough, 300.
38 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 313.
5
The Time of Power, 1298
‘William the Conqueror’
Posterity has found that the battle of Stirling was not decisive.1 In that it did not end the war with England, that was certainly true. But in this it was no different from other great battles of the Scottish struggle for independence, however bloody they were. After Dunbar and Falkirk, the former a victory of the professional over the amateur, the other accomplished with a great slaughter of Wallace’s army, the Scots, seemingly crushed, did not succumb. After Bannockburn, with Edward II revealed at a terrible cost to his men as the incompetent he was, militarily as well as politically, it took a further fourteen years to bring peace. The bitter momentum of the war which began in 1296 was not to be so readily halted, the legacy of hatred not so easily forgotten. The personalities and motives of the leading figures – Wallace, Edward I, Bruce, Edward II – were such as to ensure a continuation of the war whatever the current situation. Suffering intensified determination. A reverse led to revival.
But if Stirling was not decisive, its impact on the war and on the psychology of both sides cannot be denied. It was revolutionary in its concept and in its effects, more so even than Bannockburn. The leadership on the Scottish side was of a kind not seen before. Wallace and Murray had broken the canons of warfare as they were then understood; theirs was a challenge to the military establishment both in England and in Scotland itself. Whatever their quarrel, the natural leaders on both sides of the Border shared the same creed. It was no longer possible, after Stirling, to pretend that that creed had survived in its entirety. It is Wallace and Murray who, to modern eyes, appear the professionals. The characteristics which the two commanders exhibited before and during the battle – an appreciation of terrain, selection of position, patience, an iron discipline, improvisation, realistic appraisal and recognition of the moment – were those one would expect to find in their opponents, with the experience of war in Wales and France on which to draw. Wallace and Murray were, after all, in a situation unknown to them: the handling of a large, potentially undisciplined army. Their experience had been of the leadership of small, mobile groups for which success was measured in minor gains. Their confidence verged on brashness; it was justified by events. No one, whether Scots or English, could be ignorant either of their ability or of what the future held in military terms.
Which of the two was the more responsible for the victory at Stirling has exercised historians.2 Underlying the discussion there has been a preference to see in Murray rather than in Wallace the genius which won the battle. The origin of this preference resides in the simple but understandable equation that Murray’s presence on the Scots side meant victory, his absence, at Falkirk, defeat. In the debate on the relative positions of Murray and Wallace, little note has been taken of two aspects of Murray’s career which are to his credit. The first is his ability to adapt his methods to circumstances. It is too easily forgotten that his background and military experience predisposed him to just that sort of mentality which brought disaster to the Scots at Dunbar; that he was able to see the need for different methods upon his return to the north after his escape from Chester speaks well for his adaptability. The second is that, despite his origins, he recognised the talents of Wallace, a man who was his social inferior. Murray’s achievement at Stirling, like Wallace’s, was shared. The similarities in their campaigns before the battle are enough to suggest that their relationship was the unique one of two men of contrasting backgrounds who, in military matters if nothing else, thought alike. We cannot know what if any influence each would have had on the other if Murray had lived after Stirling, although it is tempting to speculate. Would Murray, by virtue of his social position, appear a more attractive leader than Wallace to the magnates? Could the dual leadership which functioned so well at Stirling survive a new set of circumstances? If we have no answers to such questions, we can aver that Wallace continued, after Stirling, to demonstrate the same qualities of leadership which he, like his colleague, possessed before their historic meeting. Murray’s achievement was great, but it is idle to attempt to extend it beyond the obvious point. Wallace had much to do without Murray; that he did it shows him for the man he was.
The wound which Murray had received at Stirling was ultimately fatal.3 It was not until November, however, that he died, and until that time his name is associated, as will be seen, with that of Wallace. Whether he was able to play an active role must be doubted. The established assumption4 is that he played such a role, but that assumption may owe more to sentiment than to reality. The colossal impact of Stirling required immediate action if it was not to be lost. It is perhaps significant that it is Wallace who is portrayed as the man who undertook, as it were, the necessary physical labour of benefiting from the victory. We would not expect the seriously wounded Murray to carry out the sweep across the south of Scotland which occurred after Stirling. This obvious fact has not always been sufficiently acknowledged. Murray did not lose his authority because he was incapacitated, but he must have had not merely a different but a less demanding part than his colleague and friend. Warenne, it will be recalled, had fled the field at Stirling. Tweng, whom he had left with Sir William FitzWarin, in charge of the castle,5 could not long hope to hold it. When they surrendered it to Wallace because of a lack of provisions, he showed himself
as chivalrous as Bruce, who has always been considered a paragon in this regard. He recognised the courage of Tweng and allowed him to live, as he did FitzWarin. A third man bore the name of Ros. He too Wallace spared, for this was the brother of that Robert de Ros whose defection to the Scots at the beginning of the war had endeared him to the Scots as it endeared him to historians. Wallace was not, then, ignorant of that code by which others laid such store. It was a revealing incident.
Wallace had made no attempt to pursue Warenne, who was so desperate that his horse was allowed no time to eat between Stirling and Berwick and foundered on arrival there. Warenne had reserved his energies for escape rather than for battle. Wallace did, however, strike out for Berwick shortly afterwards, but turned away when faced by the English.6 Berwick, unwalled because of the economies ordered by Edward, which Cressingham had carried out so enthusiastically, now had little strategic value, but perhaps because of its fate under Edward, it exercised a continuing fascination for both sides. Its inhabitants expected the worst from the victorious Scots, whose bloodlust had not been sated by the carnage of Stirling; such as had not fled into England offered no resistance. The numbers of the force Wallace led to Berwick are not recorded, but it would not be, nor needed to be, large. His intention was in part to underscore his triumph and that of Murray, in part to clear the area of English. Berwick in all likelihood had fallen to the Scots within the month after Stirling7 but whether or not to Wallace himself is unclear.8 He did not at this time follow his appearance outside Berwick with a raid across the Border, although his reputation was now such that the inhabitants of Northumberland sought the safety of Newcastle.
The effects of Stirling were felt throughout Scotland. Dundee castle, from which Wallace had moved to Stirling, surrendered and was placed in the care of Alexander Scrymgeour, one of the many minor figures devoted to the end to the Scottish cause.9 Edinburgh and Roxburgh fell to the Scots but, as was true of Berwick, their castles remained in the hands of the English.10 But the capture of these towns and the burning of others south of the Forth11 was not the main preoccupation of Wallace at this time, however enthusiastically he may have participated in or encouraged these gestures of retribution. His mind was filled with a great ambition.
Wallace and, as far as known, the ailing Murray, had not lost sight of a primary and dominating concern: the restoration of Balliol. To encompass this it was necessary not only to destroy if possible the military power of the English, but to retain, in political terms, the name of Balliol as king of Scots. Stirling had gone some way towards achieving the first; it may be that such was the euphoria in Scotland that it was thought the battle was decisive. Wallace did not share that opinion but, if he worked towards the day when there would be a decisive battle, he turned his attention at the same time to the second aim. This called for other and more demanding qualities than those which had brought success in the recent great battle. At Stirling both Wallace and Murray profited from the innate attributes necessary in war. Now they (and after the death of Murray, Wallace alone) proved they possessed a genius in the political and diplomatic fields.
If Scotland was seized after Stirling with a renewed patriotism and a drive towards unity, it lacked the cohesion which a central government gave. Wallace, in the most revolutionary of his acts, supplied this. It is of him alone now that we must speak. To include Murray, even if, as we shall see, his name was associated with Wallace’s is quite wrong. Murray was in decline; within two months of Stirling he was dead, leaving behind a pregnant wife. She in time gave birth to a son, also Andrew, destined to be as devoted to the patriotic cause as his father. In the son, guardian of Scotland and victor at Culblean against the pro-English forces of David of Strathbogie in 1335, Barron purports to find evidence of ‘hereditary military genius’ in the Murray family.12 The strategy adopted by the son in the period 1332 to 1339 was, in Barron’s words, ‘of a nature very similar to that exhibited by his father in 1297, and was just as successful’.13 It follows, therefore, that for Barron Wallace was a ‘guerilla leader’, clearly a lower status, although Barron describes him as ‘great’.14 But Murray, Barron’s hero, was spared the test of time and circumstance, unlike Wallace. We cannot know what the elder Murray might have achieved, but with his removal from the scene, Wallace was unquestionably the governor of Scotland. To be such required skill and, let it not be forgotten, nerve. He stepped beyond the constraints imposed by his origins. In doing so he saved Scotland from the possibility, in time, of civil war, even in the face of a renewed threat from England. At the same time, however, he condemned himself to the hostility of the most influential of his fellow-countrymen as well as, of course, the hatred of Edward I.
One of the effects of Stirling had been the rediscovery by certain of the Scots lords of their patriotism. We saw that once Wallace and Murray had massacred the English vanguard, the Stewart and Lennox emerged both from the woods and their own hesitation to strike a blow for the Scottish cause. They were not alone of their kind. To the north the earl of Buchan, the Comyns, the earl of Strathearn and others were happy to be identified with the Scottish cause. More significant for the future was the reappearance of Robert Bruce, a somewhat mysterious figure after the capitulation of Irvine.15 He was again active in the south-west. Bruce prompted a retaliatory attack into Annandale of his former opponent, Robert Clifford, some time before Christmas. Clifford killed such Scots as he could lay hands on, burned ten townships, then retreated back into England.16 Warenne too found the courage which deserted him at Stirling, and took Berwick. The English were unwilling to undertake anything of more consequence before their king returned from Flanders. Indeed, Warenne would receive in the following February clear instructions that no major campaign against the Scots was to begin until Edward had returned to take personal command. The slight successes which the Scots lords were achieving in the face of moderate English opposition could lead to over-confidence and with it a renewed determination to take the government upon themselves.
Wallace’s seizure of the government therefore ensured unity. If it is difficult now to see an alternative to him,17 there were undoubtedly others among his contemporaries who thought themselves more suited to the role he henceforth had. The taking into his own hands of the reins of government is evidence, if any were needed, of his courage. It is evidence also of his selflessness. Intelligent as he was, he must have been aware of the chance to make himself more than governor. The suggestion must have been put to him. He resisted it. If by resisting the temptation he showed himself to be, as has been argued, ‘more conservative than the greater magnates’,18 history has not judged him a failure for that, but rather a man of honour. To have made himself king would have torn Scotland apart and left it the easiest of preys to Edward. Wallace knew this, fortunately for Scotland.
He was not yet given the obvious title, that of Guardian, by those he had led to victory over the English. Whether he sought it or was offered it and refused it, we do not know. He was careful, first with Murray and then alone, to employ in the documents he issued a formal, accurate description of his station as he saw it. From Haddington on 11 October the two wrote to the mayors and communes of Lübeck and Hamburg. The letter had a double intention. It informed the readers that Scotland, an independent kingdom again, had been won back by battle from the English. It was at the same time in the nature of the reopening of those Scottish trading connections with Germany which had been such a feature of the reign of Alexander III. In this important letter, almost certainly one of many on similar themes, the two commanders referred to themselves as ‘Andrew Murray and William Wallace, commanders of the army of the kingdom of Scotland, and the community of that realm’.19 When in November they issued a letter of protection to the abbey of Hexham, the formula was no different from that used earlier: ‘Andrew Murray and William Wallace, commanders of the army of the kingdom of Scotland, in the name of the famous prince the lord John by God’s grace illustrious king of Scotland, by consent of the community of that re
alm.’20 With Murray dead, Wallace saw no need to alter the style of greeting, save that he now described himself as knight and Guardian, both titles which he had been given by the time of the grant of a charter to Alexander Scrymgeour. As well as being entrusted with the responsibility for Dundee, Scrymgeour was given land, in return for which he was required to pay homage to Balliol and to act as standard bearer to the king. Even at this stage, March of 1298, Wallace, despite a later claim, had no intention to make himself ruler of Scotland. We can therefore see that he retained, beyond any question, his loyalty to Balliol and held himself to be acting with the agreement of the people of Scotland. That he actively sought both advice and consent is evident from one of the charges brought against him in 1305, that he called ‘parliaments and assemblies’. These conferred authority on the actions which he took. No less true, they emphasised his superiority over any pretenders to the position which he had earned since Lanark.
It was as the representative of the Scottish nation that he took an army on an extended raid into the northern counties of England. That nation demanded retribution from the English. It was not a desire from which he dissented. Under him there was in October and November 1297, a return to that savage and indiscriminate kind of warfare with which the Scots had opened the struggle against England. It was, indeed, a long-standing feature of relations between the two countries – and continued to be so for centuries after Wallace – that each side should indulge in destruction and killing for their own sake. Wallace needed neither excuse nor reason for the raid. It was an end in itself. The conduct of his troops, as will be seen, was such as to suggest that Wallace was bent on punishment. It was an emotion which the Scots understood. The need to lead out of a famine-stricken Scotland what must have been a considerable force in the search for sustenance may also have carried some weight.21 Equally important, however, would be the problem posed by the inactivity of the army of Stirling, successful, enthusiastic, perhaps over-confident. The north of England offered an easy target. The name of Wallace guaranteed a lack of opposition.
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