Blood Upon The Snow

by Martin Ganzglass

  7) The Battle of Brandywine was fought on September 11, 1777. It was a terrible defeat for the Americans, unfortunately the first but not the only disaster to occur on that date in our history.

  General Howe repeated the overall tactics he had employed successfully at the Battle of Brooklyn in August, 1776. He kept Washington confused as to the main point of his attack, pinning down the bulk of the American Army at Chadd’s Ford across Brandywine Creek with a sufficient force of British troops under General Grant and Hessians under General Von Knyphausen (the very same units which had menaced the American Army at the Shore Road in Brooklyn).

  Howe himself, led several thousand men in a wide sweep of the American lines, crossing the Brandywine well up from Chadd’s Ford and falling on the American right flank around four p.m. in the afternoon. Basically, after fierce fighting, with the Americans putting up stiff resistance although there were gaps in their lines on the right due to hasty positioning and inability of the Continentals to maneuver quickly while under fire, the right flank was turned and the Americans were forced to retreat. At Chadd’s Ford, the Americans also were forced to retreat before the advancing troops of Generals Grant and Knyphausen as their position was untenable with their extended right flank crumbling.

  Accounts of the losses vary. According to one source, the Americans suffered 200 killed, 500 wounded and 400 captured, along with eleven cannons, including newly arrived guns from France. More importantly, the British were now in position to capture Philadelphia. British losses were estimated at 89 killed, 488 wounded and six missing. (Savas and Dameron, “A Guide to the Battles of the American Revolution.”) Chernow, in his voluminous biography, “Washington, A Life,” gives the same numbers. (Ron Chernow, “Washington, A Life,” p. 305). General Henry Knox, in his account of the battle to the President of the Council of Massachusetts, wrote on September 18th that from “the most particular inquiry I have been able to make, [the American losses] will not exceed seven hundred or eight hundred killed, wounded and missing, and ten field pieces.” He assured the President that “from my own observation and the opinion of others, their loss must be much greater than ours.” (Drake, “Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox, pp. 49-50.)

  McGuire states the official British and Hessian casualty lists claimed 93 dead and together with the wounded and missing a total of 587 casualties. Howe reported the American casualties were 300 killed, 600 wounded and nearly 400 captured. Other British sources estimated American losses at close to 2,000. (McGuire, p. 269.) One British officer wrote: “Orders Wass Given for to Review the ground and Beruie the dead and the Surgens to attend the Wounded. The Enemy had 502 dead in the field. We had 39 beried the Next Morning. The Wounded In not as yet asserted. We took 400 Prisners that Night and the Next Day.” (McGuire, p.269.)

  General Grant observed: “General Sunset saved the Rebell Artillery & prevented a pursuit, but they retreated in the utmost confusion to Chester & many of them never stopt till they got to Philadelphia.” (McGuire, p. 261.)

  Chapter 11 - Philadelphia in Turmoil 1) A few days after the battle, Dr. Benjamin Rush, under a flag of truce, was admitted to the British camp, along with other surgeons to treat the wounded American soldiers now held prisoner. It was General Howe who initially proposed doctors be sent, due to the large number of American wounded. (McGuire, p. 270.)

  Rush was a signer of the Declaration of Independence and a prominent physician. During the Revolutionary War he wrote “To the Officers in the Army of the United States: Direction for Preserving the Health of Soldiers,” which was published and widely used.

  While in the British camp he met with some of their Army Officers as well as Philadelphia Loyalists who had joined the British. One British Officer wrote that after acknowledging the completeness of the Americans’ defeat at Brandywine, [He] “declared that all possibility of accommodation much less satisfaction was as remote the day after the battle as it ever had been since the declaration of independence; before which they all (both whigs & tories,) agree that a few concessions on our side [the British Government] would have put an end to the whole business.” (McGuire, p. 271.)

  2) Around midnight on September 11th, General Washington having brought the retreating Army to Chester, wrote to John Hancock in Philadelphia: “Sir: I am sorry to inform you that in this day’s engagement, we have been obliged to leave the enemy the masters of the field.” (Chernow, p. 305.) He tried to cast the defeat in more positive terms and advised Hancock, and thus the Congress, that:“Our loss of men is not, I am persuaded, very considerable; I believe much less than the enemy’s. . . Notwithstanding the misfortune of the day, I am happy to find the troops in good spirits; and I hope another time, we shall compensate for the losses now sustained.” (Chernow, p. 305.)

  3) General Knox’s letter began: “My dear girl will be happy to hear of her Harry’s safety; for, my Lucy, Heaven, who is our guide, has protected him in the day of battle. You will hear with this letter of the most severe action that has been fought in this war between our army and the enemy. Our people behaved well, but Heaven frowned on us in a degree. We were obliged to retire after very considerable slaughter of the enemy: they dared not pursue a single step. If they advance, we shall fight them again before they get possession of Philadelphia; but of this they will be cautious. My corps did my great honor: they behaved like men contending for every thing that’s valuable.” (Drake, p. 47.)

  How could both Generals Washington and Knox have so grossly overestimated the enemy’s losses? While Washington may have been tempted to over state the casualties to Congress, Knox surely had no such reason in writing to Lucy. And there was a wide discrepancy between the British casualties reported by the Americans and the British count of their losses. McGuire suggests that the American commanders were misled due to the manner in which many of the British troops fought. Soldiers in some British Regiments repeatedly dropped to the ground on a signal from an officer’s whistle as the Americans took aim, got up once the musket volley had been fired and charged with bayonets. (McGuire, p. 209, 259.)

  4) McGuire has a fascinating description of the ammunition used by soldiers during the War. “The ammunition was made up in paper cartridges, which had to be bitten open, resulting in the blackening of the soldier’s mouth, especially at the right corner as the teeth held and tore the cartridge while the right hand pulled it away, smearing the gritty powder across the face and hands. In the haste and chaos of fighting, powder also spilled into the soldier’s mouth, sometimes in large amounts if the biting was not done carefully- hardly possible in the heat of battle. A compound of potassium nitrate, sulfur, and charcoal, black powder is very salty and astringent. Together with the marching, shouting, and stress produced by battle, a maddening thirst was a constant companion of the combat soldier.” (McGuire, p. 265.)

  5) Thomas Paine wrote a stirring essay the day after the Battle of Brandywine which he signed “Common Sense.” It was published in the local papers and became known as “The Crisis # 4.” A clarion call for greater resolve and effort, Paine urged his fellow patriots not to despair, even though the ground where the battle had been fought was lost. He reminded his readers the Americans were fighting for a cause, not territory.

  “Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men, undergo the fatigues of supporting it. . . The event of yesterday was one of those kind of alarms which is just sufficient to rouse us to duty, without being of consequence enough to depress our fortitude.”

  After characterizing the British Army as “a band of ten or twelve thousand robbers, who are this day fifteen hundred or two thousand less in strength than they were yesterday,” he ended with a warning to General Howe:

  “You sir, are only lingering out the period that shall bring with it your defeat. . . . We are not moved by the gloomy smile of a worthless king, but by the ardent glow of generous patriotism. We fight not to enslave, but to set a country free, and to make room upon the earth for honest men to live in. In such a case w
e are sure that we are right; and we leave to you the despairing reflection of being the tool of a miserable tyrant.” (McGuire, p. 272.)

  6) Infections and disease were the major causes of death of wounded soldiers. First, infections were caused by the musket ball, bayonet or shrapnel. The balls were made of lead that expanded upon impact making the exit wound larger than the entry point and leaving lead fragments inside the soldier’s body. Second, the surgeons themselves contributed to the spread of infection. They used the same saws and instruments over and over again on all the casualties being attended to. The need for sterilization of surgical tools was unknown.

  In addition to the wound becoming infected, diseases in hospitals were rampant. The overcrowding in unsanitary conditions, led to the spread of typhus, typhoid fever, yellow fever, and measles and whooping cough. Straw bedding was not changed, even when the patient died. Soldiers lay in their excrement. Casualties were usually fed mush, soups or broth, from wooden bowls with the same spoon used for an entire ward.

  Dr. Benjamin Rush stated: “Hospitals are the sinks of human life in the army. They robbed the United States of more citizens than the sword.” While a soldier had a two percent chance of dying in combat, this increased to twenty five percent if he was wounded and hospitalized. One statistic claimed that there were nine deaths from disease for every one from a wound received in battle. Eichner, L.G., MD, “The Military Practice of Medicine During the Revolutionary War (A paper presented at the October 2003 meeting of the Tredyffrin Easttown History Club.)

  7) Washington indeed did send “an express” message delivered by one of his aides to John Hancock around one o’clock in the morning of September 19th, recommending that the Congress leave “as the Enemy had it in their power to throw a party that Night into the City.” (McGuire, p.298-299.) Hancock wrote his wife that he “instantly gave the alarm, Rous’d the Members [of Congress] etc and after having fix’d my Packages, Papers etc in the Waggons and Sent them off, about 3 oClock in the morning I Set off myself for Bristol.” (McGuire, p. 299.) General Knox did not ride to Philadelphia to determine what munitions and supplies should be salvaged or destroyed. His fictitious presence is solely for purposes of the plot.

  8) There truly was pandemonium in Philadelphia as people prepared to flee. Thomas Paine recalled Philadelphia’s streets were crowded by so many people in the “moonlit streets, that the town resembled high noon on market day.” (Chernow, p. 306.)

  Congressman Henry Laurens described the scene as follows: “Thousands of all Sorts in all appearances past by in such haste that very few could be prevailed on to answer to the Simple question what News?” (McGuire, p. 299.) It turned out to be a false alarm. Two days later, John Adams wrote : “Congress was chased like a covey of partridges from Philadelphia to Trenton, from Trenton to Lancaster.” (Chernow, p. 306.) He despaired of Washington’s lack of leadership and asked “Oh, Heaven! Grant us one great soul! . . One active, masterly capacity would bring order out of this confusion and save this country.” (Chernow, p.306.)

  9) Tincture of myrrh or application of turpentine were applied to clean a wound and ward off post-operative infection. Whiskey was more commonly used and other topical applications were basilam powder and quinine. (Eichner, p. 30.)

  10) Knox is referring to the “Battle of the Clouds,” fought on September 16th about twenty miles west of Philadelphia. The battle, which began around 1 p.m. was going badly for the Americans. A torrential rain saved the Continental Army by turning the fields and roads into a thick mud, making any advance by the British impossible. (Savas and Dameron, p. 124.)

  Several days after the battle, Knox wrote Lucy: “After some days’ manoeuvring, we came in sight of the enemy, and drew up in order of battle, which the enemy declined; but a most violent rain coming on obliged us to change our position, in the course of which nearly all the musket cartridges of the army that had been delivered to the men were damaged, consisting of above 400,000. This was a most terrible stroke to us, and owing entirely to the badness of the cartouch-boxes which had been provided for the army.” (Drake, p. 50.)

  11) Washington was well aware of the need for solid intelligence about the British. When he was forced to abandon New York city in September 1776 he had no spy network in the city which became the British winter quarters. He was determined not to repeat this mistake.

  Knowing of the British focus on capturing the American’s capital, Washington instructed General Thomas Mifflin, a native of Philadelphia to establish a spy network in that city. The spies “are to remain among them under the mask of friendship.” The network was in place when General Cornwallis entered the city on September 26, 1777. (Nagy, John A., “Spies in the Continental Capital,” p. 41, 46.)

  Washington also ran his own spy network directly and individual commanders were encouraged to obtain information about the enemy in all ways possible. I have surmised that General Knox would have taken the initiative and recruited at least one well-placed spy in the city.

  Chapter 12 – Two Lives Entwined 1) At the age of twenty, Alexander Hamilton was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on March 1, 1777 and became an aide-de-camp to General Washington. Following the Battle of Brandywine the British waited a week before occupying Philadelphia. Washington took advantage of the delay and sent Hamilton into the city to requisition much needed supplies for his army such as blankets and clothing as well as cartridges. (Chernow, pp. 306-307.) Washington acting under emergency powers ordered the taking of critical supplies. The citizens received receipts for their goods but no payment at the time. I have surmised that Hamilton would also have seized bullet molds as well as the raw materials for making musket balls.

  2) The actual arrest of prominent Quakers was ordered by the Congress and the Supreme Executive Council and occurred around September 8, 1777. As the Battle of Brandywine was being fought, they were placed on wagons and transported first to Reading, Pennsylvania and ultimately to Winchester, Virginia. (McGuire, p. 272.) The action taken against them was based upon “false papers allegedly ‘found’ by General John Sullivan in New Jersey that hinted at a Quaker plot to aid the British Army.” (McGuire, p.273.)

  John Adams described the need to prevent Quaker treachery in a letter to Abigail Adams as follows: “We have been obliged to attempt to humble the Pride of some Jesuits who call themselves Quakers, but who love Money and Land better than Liberty and Religion. The Hypocrites are endeavouring to raise the Cry of Persecution, and to give this Matter a religious Turn, but they cannot succeed. . .American Independence has disappointed them, which makes them hate it.” (McGuire, p. 273.) So wrote the lawyer who had defended the British soldiers accused of firing on innocent civilians in the Boston Massacre on March 5, 1770.

  3) According to the British census that they made when they occupied the American capital: “there were 9,423 males and 12, 344 females for a total reported population of 21,767. [The normal population of Philadelphia was approximately 40,000.] The census found 5,360 inhabited dwelling places and 567 uninhabited dwelling houses, which had been deserted by the disaffected, for a total of 5,957 dwelling houses.” (John A. Nagy, “Spies in the Continental Capital” pp.46-47.)

  4) Both the British and Americans employed various forms of invisible ink for secret communications during the Revolutionary War. The ink formulas used solutions of bismuth, gallo-tannic acid or lead. Ink was made visible by use of reagents such as acid, heat or fire. One of the problems of using heat or fire was that it made the paper very brittle. The recipient of the secret message would thus transcribe the letter before sending it on. (John A. Nagy, “Invisible Ink-Spycraft of the American Revolution,” pp. 29-33.) Milk, lime juice and vinegar were also used when formulaic inks were unavailable.

  5) All kinds of ciphers were used by both sides during the Revolutionary War for secure communications and for secret messages. The most basic cipher used a simple substitute of one letter for another in the alphabet. One such alphabetic transposition used the letter n for a, m for b and so
on. (Nagy, Invisible Ink, pp. 51-52.)

  Another type of cipher used by the Americans, British, French and Hessians was called the pigpen cipher. It looked like a tic-tac-toe grid. The sender and recipient agreed upon the placement of the letters in each of the “pigpens” or boxes. Then, by drawing the position in the diagram where the letter was placed and a dot to indicate the letter in that box (no dot for the first letter, one dot for the second and two dots for the third) the sender could transmit a secret message. (Nagy, Invisible Ink, pp. 55-56.)

  6) Nagy refers to an instance in which coded messages were written on “tiny strips of paper. . . one quarter-inch wide and could easily be sewn in the seam of a garment or placed between a book’s binding and its cover, making detection nearly impossible.” (Nagy, Invisible Ink, p. 57.)

  7) Book codes were also commonly used by both sides, the trick being that both the sender and recipient had to possess the same edition of the same book. And a popular subset of book codes were dictionary codes. Entick’s Spelling Dictionary was readily available as was the same author’s New Spelling Dictionary. Sometimes, a fixed number was added to the page and word numbers in the book for additional security. For example, the first word in the first column of the dictionary appearing on page 139 would be written 149 /11, adding the number ten to both the page and word position. (Nagy, Invisible Ink, pp. 72-73.)

  8) The bells of Christ Church and the State House bell, which later became the Liberty Bell, were carted out of the city to prevent them from being captured by the British and melted down into cannons. (McGuire, p. 327.) I have assigned that task to Lt. Colonel Hamilton’s men but there is no historical basis for that.

  On September 24th, 700 wagons comprising the baggage train of the defeated American Army, along with 2,000 personnel arrived in the little, peaceful Moravian populated town of Bethlehem. Some members of Congress had arrived two days earlier on the way to Lancaster. Along with them “were the church bells from Philadelphia. . . and the wagon in which was loaded the State House bell [the Liberty Bell] broke down in the street and had to be unloaded. (McGuire, “The Philadelphia Campaign, Volume II-Germantown and the Roads to Valley Forge, p. 23.) [All future references to McGuire in the End Notes are to Volume II.]