World War II Pacific: Battles and Campaigns from Guadalcanal to Okinawa 1942-1945 (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  The 3/6 Marines would pass through the lines of Major Jones’ 1/6 Marines to have a fresh Battalion lead the eastward assault. The 2/6 Marines would land on Green Beach and move east to support the 3/6. All available tanks would be assigned to the 3/6. Colonel Shoup’s 2nd Marines, with the 1/8 still attached, would continue to assault the Japanese re-entrant strongpoints. The remaining 8th Marines would be shuttled to Bairiki. The 4/10 would land its heavy 105mm guns on Green Beach to increase the howitzer battalions’ firepower that was already in action.

  Imperial Japanese soldiers began vicious counterattacks during the nights of D +2 and D +3. Major Jones believed his exposed forces would be the target for any Banzai attacks and took his precautions. He gathered his artillery forward observers and naval fire control spotters. Jones arranged for field artillery support starting from seventy-five yards from his front lines to 500 yards out, where naval gunfire would take over. Major Jones put Company A to the left of the airstrip and Company B on the right along the south shore; while he worried about the 150-yard gap across the runway to Company C, he realized there was no solution. Jones used a tank to bring up stockpiles of small arms ammunition, grenades, and water to be kept fifty yards behind the lines.

  At 1930, the first Japanese counterattack began. Fifty Japanese soldiers snuck past Major Jones’ outposts through thick vegetation and penetrated the border between the two companies south of the airstrip. Major Jones’ reserve force was composed of his headquarters’ cooks, bakers, and admin people. They contained the penetration and killed many Japanese in the two hours of close-in fighting. Direct and intense fire from the howitzers of the 1/10 and 2/10 stopped the Japanese from reinforcing their penetration. By 2130, the lines were stabilized, and Jones placed a company one hundred yards to the rear of his lines. All he had left was a composite force of forty Marines.

  At 2300, the Japanese attacked Jones’ lines again. They made a loud disturbance across from Company A’s lines. Clinking canteens against their helmets, taunting Marines and screaming Banzai, while a second force attacked Company B in a silent rush. The Marines repelled this attack but used their machine guns, revealing their positions. Major Jones requested a full company from the 3/6 to reinforce the 2nd Marines to the rear of the fighting.

  The third attack came at 0300. The Japanese moved multiple 7.7mm machine guns into nearby wrecked trucks and opened fire on Marine weapons positions. Major Jones called for star shell illumination from the destroyers in the lagoon. A Marine sergeant crawled forward against this oncoming fire to lob grenades into the improvised machine-gun nests. This did the job and silenced the battlefield once again.

  Three hundred Japanese launched a frenzied attack at 0400 against the same two Marine companies. The Marines repulsed them with every available weapon. Japanese soldiers were caught in a murderous crossfire from the 10th Marine howitzers. Two destroyers in the lagoon, Sigsbee and Schroeder, opened up on the Japanese flanks. Waves of screaming attackers took vicious casualties but kept coming. Groups of men locked together in bloodied hand-to-hand combat. PFC Jack Stambaugh of Company B killed three Japanese soldiers with his bayonet before an officer beheaded him with a samurai sword. Another Marine jumped in and knocked out the Japanese officer with his rifle butt. The acting commander of Company B, First Lieutenant Norman Thomas, reached Major Jones on the field phone and said: “We’re killing them as fast as they come at us, but we can’t hold out much longer. We need reinforcements.”

  Major Jones replied: “We haven’t got them. You’ve got to hold.”

  The Marines lost 42 dead and 114 wounded in the wild fighting—but they held. In less than an hour, it was all over. The supporting arms never stopped shooting down the Japanese, either attacking or retreating. Both destroyers emptied their magazines of 5-inch shells. The 1/10 Marines fired over 1,400 rounds that night. As dawn broke, Marines counted over 200 dead Japanese within fifty yards of their lines. An additional 130 bodies laid beyond that range, badly mangled by naval and artillery gunfire. Other bodies laid scattered throughout the Marine lines. Major Jones had to blink back his tears of pride and grief as he walked his lines. One of his Marines grabbed his arm and said: “They told us we had to hold, and by God, we did.”

  Completing the Task

  Japanese counterattacks during the nights of November 22 and 23 broke the back of their defense. If they’d remained in their bunkers until the bitter end, the enemy could have taken a higher toll of Marine lives. Rather than facing an inevitable defeat, over 600 Japanese soldiers chose to die by taking an offensive night action.

  After the bloody counterattacks during the night, the 2nd Marine Division still had over five more hours of tough fighting on Betio before the island could be conquered. Later in the morning General Smith sent this report to Admiral Hill on the Maryland: “Enemy counterattack was defeated decisively. Last night destroyed bulk of hostile resistance. Expect complete annihilation of all enemy on Betio this date. Recommend you and staff come ashore to get information on type of hostile resistance which will be encountered in future operations.”

  After a preliminary bombardment, the fresh troops of the 3/6 Marines weaved through Major Jones’ lines and began their attack to the east. The Marine assault tactics were now well refined. The 3/6 Marines made rapid progress, led by tanks and combat engineers with flamethrowers and high explosives. Only one well-armed bunker, along the north shore, provided any substantial opposition.

  The 3/6 Marines took advantage of the heavy brush along the south shore and bypassed the obstacle. They left one rifle company to encircle and eventually overrun it. Momentum was with the Marines. The remaining Japanese troops seemed dispirited. By 1300, the 3/6 reached the eastern tip of Betio and inflicted over five hundred Japanese casualties at the loss of only thirty-four Marines.

  Lieutenant Colonel MacLeod sent a report that summarized the Japanese defenders’ collapse in the eastern zone that followed their counterattacks: “At no time was there any determined defensive. We used flamethrowers and could’ve used more. Medium tanks were excellent. Light tanks did not fire one shot.”

  The hardest fighting of the fourth day was on the border of Red Beach One and Two. Colonel Shoup directed the combined forces of the 1/8 and 3/2 against the re-entrant strongpoint. The Japanese in these positions were the most disciplined and deadliest on the island. In these bunkers, Japanese anti-boat gunners had thoroughly disrupted over four different battalions’ landings and almost killed General Smith the day before. The seaward approaches to the strongpoints were littered with bloated bodies and destroyed LVTs.

  Major Hays finally received his flamethrowers and began the attack with the 1/8 from the east, making steady—painstaking progress. Major Schoettel was eager to atone for what may have been perceived as a lackluster performance on D-Day. Schoettel attacked and pressed the assault with troops from the 3/2 from the west and south. Completing the circle, Colonel Shoup ordered a platoon of infantry and two 75mm half-tracks out to the reef, keeping the enemy pinned down from the lagoon.

  The exhausted Japanese defenders either fought to the end or committed hara-kiri. The 1/8 Marines had been attacking this fortified strongpoint ever since the bloodied landing on the morning of D +1. In only forty-eight hours, the 1/8 Marines fired over 55,000 rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammo. The real damage was done by the engineers’ special weapons, and by direct fire from the 75mm half-tracks. After the Marines captured the largest concrete pillbox position near the beach, they could approach the remaining bunkers more safely. It was all over by 1300.

  When the fighting was still underway, a Navy fighter plane landed on Betio’s airstrip and weaved around the Seabee trucks. Marines rushed over to the aircraft to shake the pilot’s hand.

  At 1245, Admiral Hill and his staff came ashore. The senior naval officers were impressed by the great strength of the Japanese bunker system. They realized the need to reorganize bombardment strategies. Hill praised the Marines for making such a landing and called Betio
a “little Gibraltar.”

  When Colonel Shoup reported to General Smith that the ultimate objectives had been seized, Smith shared the excellent news with Admiral Hill. Between them, they had worked together to achieve this victory. They drafted a message to Admiral Turner and General Holland Smith announcing the end of organized resistance on Betio.

  Working parties were organized to identify the dead. Many of the bodies were so severely shattered or burned that it was difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. The stench and decay of death was overwhelming. War correspondent Robert Sherrod wrote: “Betio would be more habitable if the Marines could leave for a few days, and the million buzzards swirling overhead could finish their work.”

  Chaplains accompanied burial teams equipped with bulldozers. Administrative staff worked diligently to prepare accurate casualty lists. Even more casualties were expected in mop-up operations over the surrounding islands including Apamama, also known as Abemama Atoll. A distressing report was issued that over one-hundred Marines were missing. The changing tides swept many bodies of the assault troops out to sea. One of the first pilots ashore reported seeing dozens of floating corpses miles away over the horizon.

  The Japanese defenders were nearly annihilated in the battle. The Marines, supported by carrier aviation, naval gunfire, and Army Air Force units, killed 98% of the 4,836 enemy troops on Betio during the assault. Only seventeen Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner. The only Japanese officer captured in the fighting was Kiyoshi Ota. A thirty-year-old ensign in the 7th Sasebo Special Landing Force, from Nagasaki. Ensign Ota recounted that the Japanese garrison had expected landings along the southwest sectors instead of the northern beaches. He also believed the reef would have protected the Japanese defenders during the low tide.

  Before General Julian Smith announced the Marines’ victory at Betio, General Ralph Smith, his Army counterpart, reported: “Makin Taken.” In three days of hard fighting over on Butaritari Island, the Army had wiped out the Japanese garrison at the cost of 204 American casualties.

  Many exhausted and grimy Marines on Betio had been awake since the night before the landing. Captain Carl Hoffman later wrote in his memoirs: “There was no way to rest. There was virtually no way to eat. Most of it was close, hand-to-hand fighting, and survival for three and a half days. One of my men mixed me a canteen full of hot water, coffee, chocolate, sugar, he gave it to me and told me he thought I needed something. It was the best meal I’d ever had.”

  Marines were surrounded by the devastation on Betio after the fighting. Chaplain Willard walked along Red Beach One, now finally clear of enemy pillboxes, and scratched out a note to his wife: “I’m on Tarawa in the midst of the worst destruction I’ve ever seen. Walking along the shore, I counted seventy-six dead Marines staring up at me, half in and half out of the water. An LVT is jammed against the seawall barricade. Three waterlogged Marines lay dead beneath it. Four others are scattered nearby, and there is one hanging on a 2-foot high strand of barbed wire who doesn’t even touch the coral flat at all. What I see in this god-awful place I am certain is one of the greatest works of ruin wrought by any man.”

  Japanese forces in the Gilbert Islands took a bloody toll from the Marine invasion force. Japanese submarines arrived in the area during D +2. The I-175 sunk the carrier Liscome Bay with a torpedo as the sun rose on November 24 off of Makin. A horrific explosion—the flash was seen at Tarawa, over 90 miles away—the ship sank quickly, taking 644 souls with her to the bottom.

  The Marines conducted a flag-raising ceremony later that same morning. There were few surviving palm trees to select as a flagpole. A field musician played the bugle calls, and Marines all over the island stood and saluted. Each reckoning the cost.

  More good news came from the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company. They had landed on Apamama by rubber rafts from the submarine Nautilus. On the night of November 21, while the small Japanese garrison kept the scouts at bay, the Nautilus surfaced and fired its deck guns, killing many Japanese defenders—the rest committed hara-kiri. After the island was deemed secure, the 3/6 Marines took control of Apamama until other defense forces could arrive.

  On November 24, amphibious transports entered the lagoon and loaded Marine combat teams 2 and 8. Many Marines believed going back to a ship, after the carnage of Betio, was like going to heaven. Navy personnel were generous and kind. The Marines were treated to a full-scale turkey dinner served by Navy officers. Many Marines still suffered from post-combat trauma.

  The 2nd and 8th Marines were on their way to Hawaii, while the 3/6 Marines were on their way to Apamama. The 2/6 Marines were beginning their long trek through the other islands of the Tarawa atoll. Under Jones, the 1/6 Marines were the last infantry unit on Betio. Their work was tedious and heartbreaking. They buried the dead, flushed out the last of the diehard snipers, and hosted visiting dignitaries.

  General Holland Smith, the V Amphibious Corps commander, flew to Betio on November 24. He spent an emotional afternoon viewing the death and destruction with General Julian Smith. General Holland Smith was shaken by what he’d seen and the Marines’ sacrifices on the island. He concluded: “The sight of our dead Marines floating in the waters of the lagoon and lying along the blood-caked beaches is one I will never forget. Over the pitted, blasted island hung a miasma of coral dust and death, nauseating and horrifying.”

  The generals came upon one site that moved all of them to tears. A dead Marine leaned against a seawall, his arm upright from his body weight. Just beyond his upraised hand on top of the seawall was a blue-and-white flag. A beach marker to direct succeeding waves where to land. General Holland Smith cleared his throat and said, “How can men like that ever be defeated?”

  Company D of the 2nd Tank battalion was the designated scout company for Tarawa’s 2nd Marine Division. Elements of these scouts had landed on the Buota and Eita Islands while the fighting raged on Betio. The scouts discovered a sizable Japanese force. On November 23, the 3/10 Marines landed on Eita. The battalion’s howitzers were initially intended to increase support fire on Betio. When the island finally fell, the artillery turned their guns to support the 2/6 clearing out the rest of the islets in the Tarawa Atoll.

  At 0500 on November 24, the 2/6 Marine landing team under Colonel Murray boarded boats from Betio and landed on Buota. Murray moved his Marines at a fierce pace, wading across the sandspits that joined the succeeding islands. Murray learned from friendly natives that a Japanese infantry force of 175 waited ahead on the larger island of Buariki. The lead elements of the 2/6 caught up with the enemy on November 26. After a sharp fire exchange in thick vegetation, Murray pulled his troops back. He positioned his forces for an all-out assault in the morning.

  The November 27, Battle of Buariki was the last engagement in the Gilberts. It was no less deadly than the preceding encounter with the Special Naval Landing Forces. Colonel Murray assaulted the Japanese defensive positions at dawn. He received supporting fire from Battery G before the lines became too intermingled in the melee.

  The fighting was not unlike Guadalcanal: hand-to-hand brawling in the tangled underbrush. The Japanese did not have the elaborate defenses found on Betio. But the Imperial Naval soldiers took advantage of as much cover and concealment as they could. They made every shot count and fought to the death. All 175 of them were killed. Colonel Murray’s victory came at a high cost. 32 Marines killed and 60 more wounded. The next day, the Marines crossed to the last islet and found no more Japanese defenders. General Julian Smith announced on November 28 that the remaining enemy forces on Tarawa had been wiped out.

  Admiral Nimitz had arrived on Betio just before General Julian Smith’s announcement. Nimitz noted that the primary Japanese defenses were still intact. He had his staff diagnose the exact construction methods the Japanese used. In less than a month, an identical set of pillboxes and bunkers were built on naval bombardment islands in the Hawaiian island chain.

  Admiral Nimitz presented a few of the many to come
combat awards to the 2nd Division Marines. The Presidential Unit Citation was awarded to the entire division. Colonel Shoup received the Medal of Honor. Major Crowe and his XO, Major Chamberlin, received the Navy Cross, as well as Colonel Amey, Major Ryan, and Corporal Spillane--the LVT crew chief and St. Louis Cardinals prospect, who caught the Japanese hand grenades in midair on D-Day before his luck ran out.

  While some senior officers were jealous of Colonel Shoup’s Medal of Honor, General Julian Smith knew whose strong shoulders carried the critical first thirty-six hours of the assault. Shoup recorded in his combat notebook: “With God and the Navy in support of the 2nd Marine Division, there was never any doubt that we would take Betio. For several hours, however, there was a considerable haggling over the exact price we would pay for it.”

  Significance of Tarawa

  The high cost of the battle for Tarawa was twofold: the Marine casualties in the assault, followed by the nation’s despair and shock after hearing the battle reports. At first, the gains seemed small. The “stinking little island” of Betio was eight thousand miles away from Tokyo. But the practical lessons learned in the complexity of amphibious assault outweighed the initial public outrage.

  Casualty figures for the 2nd Marine Division and Operation Galvanic were 3,407. There were 1,027 dead Marines and sailors. An additional 88 Marines were missing and presumed dead, and 2,292 Marines and sailors wounded. Guadalcanal’s campaign cost a similar number of Marine casualties—but spread over six months.

  Tarawa losses happened in 76 hours. The killed to wounded ratio at Tarawa was excessive and reflected the savagery of the fighting. Overall, the casualties among the Marines engaged in the fight was around 19%. A steep but acceptable price. Many battalions suffered much higher losses. The 2nd Amphibian Tractor Battalion lost half of their men. This battalion also lost 35 of the 125 LVTs on Betio.