by Daniel Wrinn
Only seventeen wounded Japanese soldiers surrendered.
The Singapore Guns
The world media claimed that the four 8-inch naval guns used as coastal defense guns by the Japanese were captured from the British at the fall of Singapore.
British writer William Bartsch visited Tarawa in 1977. Writing in his magazine, After the Battle, Bartsch examined each of the four guns and discovered the markings indicating manufacture by Vickers, a British ordnance company. The Vickers company presented Bartsch with records that the four guns were part of a consignment of twelve 8-inch, quick-firing guns, sold in 1905 to the Japanese during their war with Russia.
Further investigation at the Imperial War Museum revealed that no 8-inch guns were captured by the Japanese at Singapore. Tarawa’s guns came from an older and far more legitimate transaction with the British.
The 8-inch guns that fired the opening salvo in the Battle of Tarawa were not a factor in the contest. Earlier bombing raids probably damaged their fire control systems. Rapid counter-battery fire from American battleships took out their big guns in short order. Colonel Shoup wrote that the 2nd Marine Division was fully aware of 8-inch guns on Betio as early as mid-August 1943.
In contrast, Shoup’s division intelligence reports, updated nine days before the landing, discounted any other reports that the guns were 8 inches. They insisted that they were probably no more than 6-inch.
The fact remains that many Marine officers were unpleasantly surprised to experience significant caliber near-misses assaulting the amphibious task force on D-Day.
LVT-2 Amphibian Tractors
The LVT-2, also known as the Water Buffalo, improved upon the initial amphibious vehicle, the LVT-1, also known as the Alligator. A redesigned suspension system, rubber-tired road wheels, and torsion springs guaranteed a smoother ride and improved stability. The power train was standardized with that of the M3A1 light tank. This gave the Water Buffalo greater power and more reliability than its predecessor. With “W” shape treads, it had better propulsion on land and in the water. Unlike the Alligator, the Water Buffalo was armored, which caused it to weigh significantly more. The Water Buffalo carried 1,400 pounds less cargo than the original LVT-1, but it kept its cargo safe from incoming fire.
In June 1942, the Water Buffalo entered production but did not see combat until Tarawa in November 1943. Marines used a combination of LVT-1s and LVT-2s in the Betio assault. Fifty LVTs used at Tarawa were modified in Samoa just before the battle. They installed 3/8 inch boiler plates around the cab for greater protection against shell fragments and small arms fire. Despite losing thirty vehicles to enemy fire at Tarawa, the improved armor was promising and led to the innovation of further armored LVTs.
The LVT-2(A), Buffalo II, requested by the US Army, was a version that saw limited use with the Marine Corps. The LVT-2(A) had a factory-installed armor plating on the hull and cab to resist heavy enemy machine-gun fire. This LVT version appeared identical to the Water Buffaloes except for the armored drivers’ hatches. With armor fortification, the Buffalo IIs could function as assault vehicles in the lead waves of an amphibious landing. When introduced to the Marine operations on New Britain, these armored amphibious vehicles provided an excellent service.
Over 3,000 LVT-2(A)s and LVT-2s were manufactured during World War II. These combat vehicles were valuable assets to the Marine amphibious assault teams throughout the Pacific. They transported thousands of troops and tons of equipment. Still, the LVTs had overall design and operational deficiencies. For example, the vehicles lacked a ramp: all troops and equipment had to be loaded and unloaded over the gunwales. This caused problems in regular use and was hazardous during an enemy opposed landing.
This would be one of the leading factors to further develop amphibian tractors in the LVT family during the war.
Sherman Medium Tanks
The 2nd Marine Division was assigned one company of M4-A2 Sherman medium tanks for Operation Galvanic. The fourteen tanks were deployed from Noumea in November 1943, onboard the Ashland. They joined Task Force 53 en route to the Gilberts. Each of these 34-ton, diesel-powered Sherman tanks were operated by a crew of five. They had a gyro-stabilized 75mm gun and three machine guns. Marines had no opportunity to train or operate with their new offensive assets until the D-Day chaos on Betio.
The medium Sherman tanks joined Wave 5 of the ship-to-shore assault on Betio. The tanks weaved through the gauntlet of Japanese fire without incident. Five were damaged when they plunged into hidden shell craters in the murky water. Onshore, the Marines’ lack of operating experience with medium tanks proved costly to the remaining Shermans. Commanders ordered the tanks inland to attack targets of opportunity, unsupported. All but two tanks were quickly knocked out of action. Salvage crews worked non-stop each night, stripping severely damaged tanks to keep the others operational.
The Marines had now learned to use these tanks with an integrated team of covering infantry and engineers. With these new tactics, the Sherman’s proved invaluable to Major Ryan’s seizure of Green Beach on D +1, attacks on D +2, and the final assault on D +3. Early in the fight, Japanese 75mm anti-tank guns were deadly to the Shermans. But once these enemy weapons were neutralized, the defenders could do little more than shoot out the periscope with sniper fire.
Colonel Shoup was disappointed by the squandered deployment and heavy losses of the Shermans on D-Day but was tempered by a subsequent admiration for their tactical role onshore. Shoup also wrote that the “so-called crushing effective medium tanks, as a tactical measure, was negligible in the operation.” He believed that no one should place any faith in eliminating fortifications by running them over with a tank.
Marine commanders agreed that the Shermans rendered their light tanks obsolete. Medium tanks were easier to get ashore, and they packed greater armor and firepower. By the war’s end, the American ordinance industry had manufactured over 48,000 medium Sherman tanks for use by the Marine Corps and US Army in all combat theaters.
Operation Backhander
1944 Battle for Cape Gloucester
Introduction
Early on the morning of December 26, 1943, Marines stood ready off the coast of Japanese-dominated New Britain. The outline of the mile-high Mount Talawe was just visible in the twilight. American and Australian cruisers shattered the early morning calm with ammunition flying from their destroyers’ guns. The 1st Marine Division, was commanded by Major General William H. Rupertus, arriving from the recently finished Guadalcanal Campaign. The men steeled their nerves, waiting for daylight and the signal to assault the Yellow Beaches near Cape Gloucester.
Fire support ships blazed away for ninety minutes. They attempted to neutralize entire areas rather than destroy pinpointed targets because the dense jungle concealed most of the individual Japanese fortifications and ammunition dumps.
At dawn on D-Day, Army airmen joined the bombardment. B-24 Liberator bombers flew at such an altitude that the Marines could barely see them. They dropped five-hundred-pound bombs on the beaches, scoring a hit on one of the enemy fuel dumps at the Cape Gloucester airfield—releasing a fiery geyser that leapt hundreds of feet into the air. A squadron of B-25 medium bombers and A-20 light bombers followed them, attacking from a lower altitude, hammering the Japanese antiaircraft batteries.
US B-25 Mitchell Bombers
Then the attention shifted to the assault beaches. Landing craft carrying two battalions of the 7th Marines started toward the shore. An LCI (Landing Craft, Infantry), with multiple rocket launchers, took positions on the flank of the first wave bound for each beach. They unleashed a hellish barrage, keeping the Japanese troops pinned down after the destroyers and cruisers shifted their fire to avoid putting the assault troops in danger.
At 0745, Higgins boats brought the first wave toward Yellow Beach 1. They grounded onto a narrow strip of volcanic sand that measured just under five hundred yards from one end to the other, bringing the 3rd Battalion Marines’ lead elements. Two minutes
later, the 1st Battalion landed on Yellow Beach 2. Separated by a thousand yards of jungle and a seven-hundred-yard shoreline. Neither battalion encountered any organized resistance. The Marines used a smokescreen that drifted across the beaches. This hampered the later waves of landing craft and blinded Japanese observers on Target Hill overlooking the beachhead. No enemy manned the log-and-earth bunkers that might have raked the assault force with deadly fire.
The Yellow Beaches on the north coast of the peninsula pointed west toward Cape Gloucester. Codenamed Operation Backhander, this access point was the primary objective: two airfields at the cape’s northwestern tip. By capturing the airfields, the 1st Marine Division would allow Allied airmen to step up attacks on the Japanese fortress at Rabaul, three hundred miles away at the northeastern edge of New Britain—the opposite end of the long, crescent-shaped island. The capture of these Yellow Beaches was vital for the New Britain Campaign, but two additional landings also took place. The first occurred on December 15, landing at Cape Merkus on Arawe Bay along the south coast. The second at Green Beach on the northwest coast, also on December 26.
The Cape Merkus landing was across the channel from the islet of Arawe. Its purposes were to disrupt motorized barges and other Japanese small-craft moving men and supplies along the southern coast of New Britain and to divert attention from Cape Gloucester. The Marine amphibian tractor crews used the slower and more vulnerable LVT-1 Alligators and the new armored LVT-2 Water Buffaloes to carry soldiers from the 112th Cavalry to make landings on Orange Beach at the western edge of Cape Merkus.
The destroyer Conyngham provided fire support enhanced by rocket equipped DUKW’s (a 2.5-ton, six-wheel, amphibious truck known as duck) and a submarine chaser designated as the control craft. A last-minute bombing silenced the beach defenses and enabled the LVT Water Buffaloes to crush enemy machine guns that survived the opening bombardment.
Two diversionary landings by soldiers paddling ashore in rubber boats were less successful. Savage enemy fire forced one group to turn back just short of its objective on Orange Beach, but the other gained a foothold on Pilelo Island and killed the small group of Japanese defenders. Enemy airmen reported the assault force approaching Cape Merkus. Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul attacked within two hours of the landing. The Japanese executed sporadic airstrikes throughout December with diminishing ferocity. They ultimately shifted their troops to meet the threat in the south.
Then there was the secondary landing on December 26. Battalion Landing Team 21 was a 1,500 man assault force, from the 2/1 Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Masters. They started toward Green Beach supported by American destroyers Smith and Reid with their 5-inch naval gunfire. LCMs (Landing Craft, Medium) carried amphibian trucks, driven by soldiers, fitted with rocket launchers. They fired from the landing craft as the assault force attacked the beach. The first wave landed at 0750, with two others closely following ashore. The Marines carved out a beachhead 1,200 yards wide and 500 yards inland, encountering no opposition. Their mission was to sever the coastal trail that passed west of Mount Talawe and prevent Japanese from reinforcements reaching the Cape Gloucester airfields.
Following the coastal trail proved more difficult than expected. The local villagers tilled and cleared garden plots, leaving them for the jungle to reclaim. This left a maze of trails—some fresh, some faint—but most led nowhere. The Japanese did not take advantage of the confusion caused by the path tangling until early morning on December 30. They attacked the Green Beach force and took advantage of the heavy rain that muffled sounds and reduced visibility. When the Japanese began their assault, the Marines called down mortar fire within 20 yards of their defensive positions. A battery of the 11th Marines was reorganized as an infantry unit because the cannoneers couldn’t find suitable targets for their 75mm howitzers.
Gunnery Sergeant Guiseppe Guilano materialized at critical moments and fired a light machine gun from his hip. His bravery and cool disdain for danger earned him a Navy Cross. While some Japanese troops penetrated the position, a counterattack led by Company G drove them off. This brutal fighting cost the Marines six dead and seventeen wounded. Ninety Japanese soldiers perished, and five surrendered.
Establishing the Beachhead
The Japanese had a mixture of combat and service troops in western New Britain. They used motorized barges to shuttle cargo and troops along the coast from Rabaul to Cape Gloucester. They utilized their fleet of trawlers and schooners enhanced by destroyers from the Japanese Navy for any more extended movements.
Japanese troops that defended western New Britain were known as the Matsuda Force. General Iwao Matsuda was a military transportation specialist and a commander of an infantry regiment in Manchuria. When he arrived in February 1943 on New Britain, he took control of the battle-tested 141st Infantry from the Philippines conquest and additional antiaircraft and artillery units. Matsuda established his headquarters near Kalingi, the coastal trail northwest of Mount Talawe, five miles from the airfields at Cape Gloucester. He ultimately changed his location to reflect his tactical challenges.
The Allies increased their threat to New Britain as 1943 wore on. Japanese headquarters at Rabaul assigned General Matsuda’s force to the 17th Division under Lieutenant General Sakai, recently arriving from Shanghai. Sakai’s division was attacked en route and lost two of their four transports to submarine torpedoes and mines. An Allied air attack nearly wiped out the third convoy. This deprived the Japanese defenders of three thousand replacement and service troops. Lieutenant General Sakai deployed the remainder of his forces to western New Britain under Matsuda’s tactical command.
The mid-December Cape Merkus landings caused General Matsuda to shift his troops to combat the threat. This redeployment did not account for the lack of resistance at the Yellow Beaches. Matsuda was familiar with the terrain of western New Britain. He did not believe the Americans would storm the small strips of sand that extended a few yards inland, backing up to a swamp. Matsuda did not know the American maps labeled the beaches as a “swamp forest.” Even though the aerial photography taken after the initial preliminary airstrikes revealed no shadow within the bomb craters—there was evidence of a water level high enough to fill these depressions to the brim. Matsuda knew the airfields were the obvious prize and did not believe that the Marines would plunge into the muck and risk becoming bogged down short of achieving their objective.
Matsuda forfeited the immediate advantage of opposing the Marine assault force at the water’s edge. Enemy troops were suffering the long-term indirect effects of eroding Japanese fortunes, beginning at Guadalcanal and New Guinea. The Allies dominated the skies over New Britain, blunted any air attacks on the beach at Cape Merkus beachhead, and bombed at will throughout the island. While the airstrikes did minor damage, except for Rabaul, they demoralized the Japanese troops suffering from medicine and supply shortages because of the submarine and air attacks. An ineffective network of primitive trails hugged the coastline and increased General Matsuda’s dependence on barges. The capture of Cape Merkus made his barges, convoys, and coastal shipping vulnerable to aircraft, and later to gunboats and torpedo craft.
The two battalions that landed on the Yellow Beaches crossed the sands and plunged through a wall of undergrowth into a swamp forest. A Marine could slog through knee-deep mud, step into a hole, and then end up damp to his neck. A Japanese counterattack while the Marines lurched through the swamp forest could have inflicted severe casualties. General Matsuda lacked the roads and vehicles to shift his troops in time to take advantage of the terrain. The Japanese defenders were immobile on the ground and tried to retaliate by air. A flight of enemy aircraft sent from Rabaul was intercepted by Army P-38s. Two Japanese bombers evaded the Army fighter planes and sank the destroyer Brownson with a direct hit, followed by an immense explosion. She took 108 crewmen with her; the rest were rescued by destroyers Daly and Lamson.
When the first Japanese bombers came into view, a squadron o
f Army B-25s flew over LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank) attacking targets at Borgen Bay, south of the Yellow Beaches. Gunners on board the LSTs opened fire at the enemy aircraft but mistook friend for foe and shot down two American bombers and damaged two others. The Allied planes, shaken by the experience, dropped their bombs too soon on the 11th Marines’ artillery positions at the left flank of Yellow Beach 1—killing one Marine and wounding fifteen others. A Marine battalion commander from the artillery regiment later wrote: “It was like trying to dig a hole with my nose as the bombs exploded. Trying to get down into the ground just a little bit more.”
By the afternoon of D-Day, the 1st Marine Division had established a beachhead. The 7th Marines’ assault battalions had pushed ahead and captured Target Hill on the left flank before pausing to await reinforcements. Two more battalions arrived during the day: Landing Team 31 came ashore at 0815 on Yellow Beach 1. They weaved through the 3/7 Marines and veered to the northwest, leading the way toward the airfields at 0845. The 2/7 Marines landed and waded through the swamp forest between the 1st and 3rd Battalions, expanding the beachhead. The next infantry unit was the 1/1 Marines, reaching Yellow Beach 1 at 1300 to join the 3rd Battalion advancing on the airfields. The 11th Marines, despite the accidental bombing, set up their artillery with the help of amphibian tractors. Some of the amphibious tractors brought the 75mm howitzers from the LSTs directly to the battery firing positions. Other tractors were used to break a trail through the undergrowth to pull the more massive 105mm weapons.