by Daniel Wrinn
Army trucks loaded with supplies came ashore from the LSTs. Logistical plans called for these vehicles to move forward as mobile supply dumps, but the swamp forest proved impossible for the wheeled vehicles. Drivers abandoned their trucks to avoid being left behind when the ships moved out from the threat of Japanese bombers. The Marines built roads and corduroyed them with logs or shifted the cargo onto the amphibian tractors. Even with this enormous effort, the convoy still got underway with over 100 tons of supplies left on board.
While the cargo and reinforcements crossed the beach, the Marines advanced inland and encountered the first real Japanese resistance. On December 26 at 1015, the 3/1 Marines pushed ahead, forced into a column of companies by a swamp on the left flank that narrowed the frontage.
The Japanese opened fire from camouflaged bunkers, killing the commander of Company K and his executive officer. These sturdy Japanese bunkers proved impervious to the bazooka rockets, which failed to detonate in the soft earth covering the structures. And the 37mm guns could not penetrate the logs protecting the Japanese defenders.
An LVT-1 Alligator that had delivered supplies for Company K attempted to crush one bunker—but got wedged between two trees. Japanese snipers killed the tractor’s two machine gunners before the driver could break it free. When the tractor lunged ahead, it caved in one bunker, silencing enemy fire and enabling Marines to isolate the three others and destroy them—killing twenty-five Japanese. A platoon of M4 Sherman tanks joined in to lead the advance beyond this first strongpoint.
Japanese troops of the 1st Debarkation Unit provided the initial opposition, but Matsuda had alerted his nearby infantry units to converge onto the beachhead. A Japanese battalion moved into position late in the afternoon on D-Day. They were opposite the 2/7 Marines who clung to a crescent-shaped position with both flanks protected by marshlands.
After sunset, only muzzle flashes pierced the darkness as the firing intensity increased. The Japanese were preparing to counterattack. Amphibian tractors could not make supply runs until it was light enough to avoid the fallen tree trunks and roots when navigating through the swamp forest. Before dawn, Lieutenant Colonel “Chesty” Puller, the XO of the 7th Marines, organized the men of the service company and regimental headquarters into carrying parties. He loaded them with ammunition and waded with them through the dangerous swamp. Only one misstep and a Marine carrying bandoliers of rifle ammo or containers of mortar shells could slip, stumble, and drown.
When the regimental commander reinforced the Marines with Battery D, of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion, Colonel Puller had the men leave the 37mm guns behind and carry the ammunition instead. A guide from headquarters met the column that Puller had pressed into service. He led the Marines forward through a blinding downpour, driven sideways by a monsoon gale. Obscured landmarks forced the heavily laden Marines to blindly wade onward. Each man clung to the belt of the man in front. Not until 0805, over twelve hours after the column started its march, did the Marines reach their goal, put down their loads, and take up their rifles to fight.
The 2/7 Marines had been fighting for their lives since the first storm struck. A curtain of rain prevented mortar crews from seeing their aiming stakes. The battalion commander described these men firing as just “guessing by God’s will.” Mud got into most of the small arms ammo and jammed machine guns and rifles. Marines abandoned their water-filled foxholes while the defenders hung on fighting.
At dawn, Japanese soldiers moved toward the right flank of the 2/7 Marines, attempting to outflank them. They were possibly forced into that direction by the Marines’ defensive fire. When Battery D arrived and moved into the threatened area, they forced the Japanese to break off their action and regroup.
Defense of Hell’s Point
The overall plan for the 1st Division Marines’ maneuver called for Combat Team C to take and hold a beachhead at Target Hill. Combat Team B would advance on the airfields. Due to the enemy build-up to prepare for the attack, General Rupertus requested the release of the division reserve, Combat Team A, to reinforce the Marines. The Army agreed and sent the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions in support.
The division commander landed them on Blue Beach, three miles right of the Yellow Beaches. By using Blue Beach, this placed the 5th Marines closer to Cape Gloucester and the airfields. Not every element of Combat Team A received these orders. Several units touched down on the Yellow Beaches instead and moved on foot to their planned destination.
While General Rupertus laid out plans to commit the reserve troops, Combat Team B advanced toward the airfields. Marines initially encountered light resistance but were warned of a maze of trenches and bunkers stretching inland from a promontory—earning the name Hell’s Point. Japanese troops built these defenses to protect the beaches where General Matsuda had expected the Allies to land. The 3/1 Marines attacked the Hell’s Point position on the flank instead of a head-on frontal assault. Overrunning this complex set of defenses proved a lethal task.
Rupertus delayed the attack to give the division reserve, the 5th Marines, time to come ashore. On December 28, after the 2/11 Marines and Army A-20s bombarded the dug-in enemy, the assault troops suffered another delay. They waited several hours for a platoon of M4 Sherman medium tanks to increase the attack’s intensity. At 1100, the 3/1 Marines moved ahead. Company I and the medium Sherman’s led the way. At the same time, Company A waded through jungle and swamp intending to seize the ridge’s inland point extending from Hell’s Point. Despite the obstacles in their path, Company A surged from the jungle at 1145, crossing the tall grass field until repulsed by intense enemy fire. By late afternoon, Company A broke off the attack. Attackers and defenders were short of ammunition and exhausted. The 2/11 Marines covered Company A’s withdrawal behind an onslaught of fire. By nightfall, the Japanese had abandoned their positions.
The attached Shermans with Company I collided head-on with the primary defenses fifteen minutes after Company A assaulted inland of the ridge. The Japanese had modified their defenses since the December 26 landings. They hacked fire lanes in the undergrowth, cut new gun ports and bunkers, and moved men and weapons to oppose the Allied attack along the coastal trail parallel to the shore instead of over the beach. The Marines advanced in drenching rain and encountered jungle-covered enemy positions protected by mines and barbed wire.
Medium Sherman tanks, protected by riflemen, crushed the bunkers and weapons inside. Company I drifted to the left flank during the fight, and Company K, reinforced with a platoon of Sherman tanks, closed the gap between the coastal track and Hell’s Point. This unit used the same tactics as Company I. A rifle squad followed each of the Shermans after the tanks cracked the twelve bunkers and fired inside. The riflemen killed anyone attempting to fight or flee. Nine Marines were killed and thirty-six were wounded in this assault while over two hundred and sixty Japanese died fighting.
After the Marines shattered the Hell’s Point defenses, two battalions of the 5th Marines joined in the airfield’s advance. The 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out in a column. In front of the Marines was a swamp only a few inches deep. The downpour increased the depth to over five feet making it hard for the shorter Marines. The 5th Marines lost time wading through the swamp. This delayed the attack while the leading elements chose a piece of open and dry ground to establish a perimeter while the remaining Marines caught up.
The 1/1 Marines encountered only scattered resistance—mostly sniper fire—as they weaved along the coast beyond Hell’s Point. Advancing with half-tracks carrying 75mm guns, artillery, medium Sherman’s, and even rocket-firing DUKWs, the 1st Marines held a line extended inland from the coast. The 3/1 Marines and the 2/5 Marines advanced on the flanks and formed a semicircle around the airfield.
Colonel Sumiya of the 53rd Infantry Regiment was the Japanese officer in charge of defending the airfields. On December 29, he fell back to gain time. Sumiya gathered the surviving troops for Razorback Hill’s defense, a ridge running diagonally across t
he southwestern approaches to the airfield. The 5th Marines attacked on December 30, supported by artillery and tanks. Sumiya’s troops had built sturdy bunkers, but the chest-high grass covering Razorback Hill did not stop the Allied assault like the jungle at Hell’s Point. The Imperial Japanese fought bravely to hold their position, even stalling the Marines’ advance. But the Japanese had neither the firepower nor the numbers to overcome. During the Japanese assault, one platoon of Company F beat back three banzai attacks.
Medium Shermans allowed the Marines to smash the remaining bunkers in their path and kill the enemy troops within. By nightfall on December 30, the Marine landing force overran the airfield defenses. At noon the next day, General Rupertus hoisted the American flag next to the wreckage of a Japanese bomber at Airfield No. 2—the larger of the airstrips.
The 1st Marine Division seized the objective for the Battle of Cape Gloucester. But the airstrips proved only marginal value to the Allies. Airfield No. 1 was overgrown with sharp, tall kunai grass. Craters from American bombs pockmarked the surface of Airfield No. 2. After its capture, Japanese hit-and-run planes added more bomb craters, despite antiaircraft fire from the 12th Defense Battalion. Army aviation engineers worked desperately around the clock to get Airfield No. 2 back in operation. This task took until the end of January 1944. Army aircraft based here defended against air assaults for as long as Rabaul remained an active Japanese airbase.
Crossing Suicide Creek
While Major General Rupertus directed the airfields’ capture, Brigadier General Lemuel Shepherd had come ashore on December 26 and took command of the beachhead. Shepherd had coordinated the logistics activity and assumed responsibility to expand the perimeter southwest and secure Borgen Bay’s shores. He used a shore party of engineers, transportation, and service troops to handle the logistics. The 3/5 Marines arrived on December 30 to help the 7th Marines enlarge the beachhead.
General Shepherd had limited knowledge of the Japanese deployments to the south and west of the Yellow Beaches. Thick vegetation concealed swamps, streams, ridgelines, trenches, and bunkers. The progress made toward the airfields showed a Japanese weakness in that area and a potential strength in Borgen Bay and the Yellow Beaches vicinity. To resolve the uncertainty of the enemy’s intentions and numbers, General Shepherd issued orders to probe enemy defenses on January 1, 1944.
Colonel Katayama commanded the 141st Infantry and prepared a counterattack. Katayama intended to hurl three reinforced battalions against the Allies at Target Hill. Japanese headquarters believed 2,500 Marines were now ashore on New Britain, 10% of the total. Colonel Katayama thought his force was strong enough to do this job.
Katayama waited and gathered his strength, giving Shepherd time to make the first move. Midmorning on January 2, the 1/7 Marines stood ready near Target Hill. The 2nd Battalion waited along a stream known as Suicide Creek. The 3/5 Marines advanced into the jungle to cover the 3/7 Marines on one flank. As the units pivoted, they would cross Suicide Creek to squeeze out of the 2/7th Marines and provide Shepherd with a reserve.
The change in direction through thick vegetation proved exceptionally difficult. In the words of one Marine: “You’d step from your line, take ten paces, and turn around to guide your buddy, and nobody was there. I can tell you it was a very small war and a very lonely business.”
The Japanese troops were dug in south of Suicide Creek. From there, they resisted every attempt by the Marines to cross the stream that day. This created a stalemate until Seabees from Company C built a corduroy road. They punched through the swamp forest behind the Yellow Beaches for the tanks to move forward and smash through enemy defenses.
While Marines waited at Suicide Creek on Sherman tanks, Katayama attacked Target Hill. He took advantage of the darkness. His infantry cut steps into the lower slopes so troops could climb more efficiently. The Japanese followed their preconceived plan, to the letter, of advancing up the steps and slipping past the Company A, 7th Marines’ thinly held lines. At midnight enemy troops stormed the strongest of the company’s defenses. Japanese mortars fired to soften the defenses and screen the approach. Still, they could not conceal the sound of the soldiers working their way up the hill, and the Marines were ready. While Japanese supporting fire proved to be inaccurate, one round did score a direct hit on a machine gun position killing the gunner and wounding two others. The injured Marines kept on firing their weapon until someone else could take over. This lone gun fired over five thousand rounds and helped stop the Japanese thrust, ending at dawn. The Japanese could not crack the 1/7 Marines’ lines or loosen their grip on Target Hill.
A dead Japanese officer on Target Hill had documents that cast a new light on enemy defenses south of Suicide Creek. On a crudely drawn map, Aogiri Ridge was discovered. This enemy strongpoint was unknown to General Shepherd’s intelligence section. Observers on Target Hill searched for the Aogiri Ridge trail network, but the jungle canopy frustrated their efforts.
Marine patrols on Target Hill found dozens of enemy bodies. They captured documents that, when translated, listed forty-seven killed Japanese and fifty-five wounded. Using field glasses to scan the jungle south of Suicide Creek, the 17th Marines finished the road to allow the Sherman tanks to test the stream’s defenses.
On the afternoon of January 3, three Sherman tanks reached the creek. They realized the bank dropped off too sharply for them to negotiate. The engineers called in a bulldozer; they lowered its blade to gouge out the lip of the embankment. The Japanese realized the danger if the tanks could cross the creek and opened fire on the bulldozer, wounding the driver. A Marine climbed into the exposed driver seat until he was also wounded. Another Marine jumped forward, but instead of climbing onto the machine, he walked alongside and used its bulk for cover. He manipulated the controls with an ax handle and a shovel. By dark, he’d finished the job of converting the impossible bank into a ramp the Shermans could cross.
At dawn on January 4, the first Sherman went down the ramp and across the stream. As the tank emerged on the other side, Marines cut down two Japanese soldiers trying to detonate mines against the tank’s sides. Other Shermans followed, accompanied by infantry, and smashed open the bunkers barring the way. The 3/7 Marines surged across the creek and joined the other battalions on the far right of the line that crossed the jungle, concealing Japanese defenses at Aogiri Ridge.
Now across Suicide Creek, the Marines advanced on Aogiri Ridge, another name for Hill 150. The Marine advance rapidly took the hill, but the Japanese resistance in the vicinity did not stop. Enemy fire wounded the commanding officer of the 3/5 Marines and killed his executive officer. On the morning of January 8, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, the executive officer of the 5th Marines, took command of the 3rd Battalion. Walt continued the attack from the previous day. His Marines encountered savage fire, and through the thick jungle they moved up a steep slope. The battalion formed a perimeter and dug in as night approached. Sudden skirmishes and random Japanese fire punctuated the darkness. The determined resistance and nature of the terrain convinced Colonel Walt that he had a fight on his hands for Aogiri Ridge.
Drenching rain, mud, and rampaging streams blunted the shock action and firepower of the tanks. The heaviest weapon the Marines could bring forward was a 37mm gun. The 11th Marines hammered the crest of Aogiri Ridge while the 7th Marines probed the flanks. The 3/5 Marines advanced in the center, seizing a narrow segment of the slope. By nightfall, Colonel Walt reported that his men had “reached the limit of their physical endurance and morale was low. It was now a question of whether they could hold their hard-earned gains.”
The Marine crew of the 37mm gun opened fire to support the afternoon’s last attack. After only two rounds, four of the nine men handling the weapon were wounded. Colonel Walt called for volunteers. When no one responded, he crawled to the gun and pushed the weapon up the incline. After firing two more rounds and cutting a swath to the undergrowth, his third-round destroyed an enemy machine gun. From there, other M
arines took over, and the new volunteers cut down the enemy. The new 37mm improvised gun crew continued to fire canister rounds every few yards until they manhandled the weapon to the crest. From there, the Marines dug in 10 yards away from bunkers the Japanese had built on the crest of the reverse slope.
At 0130 on January 10, the Japanese charged through a curtain of rain, firing and shouting as they attacked. The Marines clinging to the ridge repelled this attack and the three others that followed, costing the Marines nearly all of their ammunition. Marine reinforcements scaled the muddy slope with clips and belts of ammo for the machine guns and rifles. Still, there was hardly any time to distribute the ammunition before the Japanese launched their fifth attack of the morning. Marine artillery decimated the enemy as the forward observers’ vision was obstructed by rain and jungle; fire was adjusted by sounds more than sight. They moved the 105mm concentration to within fifty yards of the Marine infantrymen.
A Japanese officer emerged from the darkness and ran toward Colonel Walt’s foxhole before fragments of a shell bursting in the trees cut him down. This was the climax of the enemy counterattack at Aogiri Ridge. The Japanese tide receded as daylight grew brighter. When the Marines moved forward at 0800, they did not find one living Japanese at Aogiri Ridge—now renamed Walt’s Ridge in honor of their commander, who received the Navy Cross for his heroic leadership.
Only one Japanese stronghold in the vicinity of Walt’s Ridge still survived. A supply dump along the trail linking the ridge to Hill 150. On January 11, the 1/7 Marines accompanied by two half-tracks and a platoon of light tanks eliminated the enemy resistance in four hours of fighting. It had been fifteen days of combat since the landings on December 26. It cost the division 182 killed and 640 wounded.