World War II Pacific: Battles and Campaigns from Guadalcanal to Okinawa 1942-1945 (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  The 3rd Marine Division, under General Allen H. Turnage, had received their baptism of fire on Bougainville in November 1943 and spent the remaining months on Guadalcanal training and absorbing casualty replacements. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, organized on Guadalcanal, was also a veteran outfit. One of its infantry regiments, the 4th Marines, was formed from a disbanded raider battalion who’d fought in the Solomons. The III Amphibious Corps was prepared to land over 53,000 Marines, soldiers, and sailors.

  General Takashina, commanding the Japanese 29th Infantry Division, waited for the attack and was sure it would come, but he didn’t know from where. The 29th served in Manchuria until it was sent to the Marianas in February 1944. Its 18th Regiment fell victim to an American submarine, the Trout, and lost 2,237 of its 3,000 men when the transport was sunk. They reorganized on Saipan, and the 18th Infantry Regiment took two infantry battalions to Guam together with two tank companies.

  Another regiment from the 29th, garrisoned on Tinian, the 38th Infantry, arrived on Guam in March. Other major Japanese defending units were the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment and the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade formed on Guam in March. With supporting troops, the Japanese defending forces numbered 11,000 men. Add to these 5,000 naval troops of the 54th Keibitai Guard Force and 2,000 naval airmen reorganized as infantry to defend the Orote peninsula.

  General Takashina was in overall tactical command of the 18,000 Army and Navy defenders. His immediate superior was General Obata, commanding the 31st Army also on Guam, but not intentionally. Obata was trapped on Guam by the American landing on Saipan after making an inspection trip to the Palau Islands. He left the defense of Guam to Takashina.

  It was no secret to the Japanese that the Americans planned to assault Guam. The invasion of Saipan and month-long bombardment by ships and planes left only the questions of when and where. With fifteen miles of potential landing beaches along the west coast, the Japanese couldn’t be very wrong no matter where they decided to defend.

  Tokyo Rose said they expected the Americans. On board ship, American troops heard her pleasant, beguiling voice on the radio while she made threats of dire things waiting to happen to the invasion troops. But she was never taken seriously by any of her American “fans.”

  General Kiyoshi Shigematsu, attempting to bolster the morale of his 48th Independent Mixed Brigade, told his men: “the enemy is overconfident because of his successful landing on Saipan. They are now planning a reckless attack on Guam. We have an excellent opportunity to annihilate them on the beaches.”

  Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of Japan, also had feisty words for his commanders: “The fate of Japan depends on the result of your operation, inspire the spirit of your officers and men to the very end. Continue to destroy the enemy gallantly and persistently—alleviate the anxiety of the emperor.”

  Fifty years later, a former Japanese lieutenant wrote of the incredible American invasion fleet offshore had “paved the sea” and recalled what he thought on July 21: “this is the day I will die.”

  W-Day in the North

  The 3rd Marine Division troops landed practically into the lap of General Takashina’s U-shaped command post. The CP cave was carved out of sandstone cliff that overlooked the Asan-Adelup beachhead. Its looming heights dominated the beaches where the 3rd and 21st Marines were headed in for their assault.

  W-Day on July 21, 1944, started as a beautiful day. But it soon turned hazy as the violent clouds of dust, smoke, and fire fountained into the sky. At 0805 an observer shouted into his microphone: “First wave on the beach.” At 0833, the same man confirmed the battle was on and announced: “Troops ashore on all beaches.”

  The 3rd Marines struck out on the far left of the 2,500-yard beachhead toward Bundschu Ridge. Also known as Chonito Cliff, it had high, difficult ground that needed to be taken before the final beachhead line or the first goal of the landing could be achieved. The 21st Marines went straight up the middle. They advanced inland, securing the line of cliffs and defending them until the division caught up and could expand the beachhead outward. The 9th Marines landed on the right flank near Asan Point and moved inland over patties and across lower and easier to traverse hills, but all part of the same formidable enemy held ridgeline.

  The 3/9 Marines took intense fire from the front and right flank near Asan Point and called in tanks for help. One company got to the ridge ahead of the others and threw the enemy off balance, making the regiments advance easier. The 9th Marines smashed through their initial objectives quickly and had to slacken their advance as to not thin out the division’s lines.

  The 21st Marines, in a stroke of luck later called unbelievable, found two unguarded defiles on both sides of the regiment’s action zone. The 21st climbed straight to the clifftops and formed a bridge covering both defiles. This allowed the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to form a bridge covering both defiles while the 1st Battalion swept the area underneath the cliffs.

  The 12th Marines were swiftly landed on the beach with their burdensome guns and equipment. The 3rd Battalion was registered and firing by noon. By1620, every battery was in position and ready to support the offensive. According to Captain Austin Gattis of the 12th Marines: “We must attribute the success of our regiment setting up so quickly to training—because we’d done it over and over. It was an efficiency learned and practiced and it always gave the 12th a leg up.”

  On the left flank, the 3rd Marines got the worst of the enemy resistance. They took intense artillery and mortar fire coming in on the beaches, as well as advancing through the toughest terrain. Japanese machine gun fire laced with interlocking bands made the approaches to the steep cliffs deadly. The enemy defenders knew how to use their weapons well. Japanese troops would roll grenades down the escarpment onto the Marines. Snipers found protection and refuge in the countless folds and ridges of irregular terrain. The ridge tops were arrayed like breastworks of some nightmarish medieval castle. As if ten Japanese soldiers on top could hold off a hundred Marines below.

  Japanese Lieutenant Kenichi Itoh wrote in his diary that even with a terrible bombardment he felt secure his countrymen could hold and possibly even win. He later wrote about that eventful day in July 1944, after the war. Lieutenant Itoh thought it was all a bad dream, and “absurd” to think that his forces could ever have withstood that onslaught.

  On W-Day the 3/3 Marines were on the extreme left flank of the line facing Adelup Point. Marines seized territory in their zone with support from tanks and half-track-mounted 75mm guns. A little nose projecting from Chonito Ridge held up the regimental advance. Company A, under the command of Captain Geary Bundschu was able to secure a foothold within 100 yards of the promontory crest, but failed to hold their position in the face of intense machine gun fire. Captain Bundschu called for corpsmen and stretchers. He also requested permission to disengage, but his request was refused, and he was ordered to hold what he had.

  The attack was ordered to continue in the afternoon under cover of a massive 81mm mortar barrage. No 2nd Battalion companies could gain any ground beyond what they already held. The Japanese 320th Independent Infantry Battalion fought fiercely and held fast.

  Two hours later, Company A was ordered to make another attack, according to a Marine Combat correspondent: “When the attack at 1700 went off, there was no change. The Marines made little progress. Company A attacked again and again and again. They reached the top but failed to hold. After Captain Bundschu was killed, his company slid back to their former positions.”

  Throughout the days of brutal fighting, Marines attempted to envelop the Japanese in a pincer movement using companies A and C. On regimental orders, the assault started at 1100—but got nowhere at first. Company A got to the top but was thrown off. Company E advanced slowly. But after several probes into the Japanese resistance, Marines found the enemy was weakening.

  By 1900, Company E Marines reached the top above Company A’s position. The Japanese had finally pulled back. A further Marine advance co
nfirmed the enemy’s withdrawal.

  W-Day in the South

  In the south, near Agat, in spite of a favorable terrain for the attack, the 1st Brigade, led by General Lemuel C. Shepherd, encountered intense enemy resistance at the beachhead. Much more than the 3rd Division found on the northern beaches. Japanese machine gun and small arms fire, along with two 75mm guns from a concrete blockhouse with a four-foot-thick roof, greeted the invading Marines as the LVTs churned ashore.

  The blockhouse had been well camouflaged and not spotted before the landing as a bombing target. As a result, Japanese guns knocked out twenty-four amtracs carrying elements of the 22nd Marines. The W-Day assault forces’ first hours on the southern beaches posed a major problem.

  The Agat assault was given the same thunderous naval gunfire support, which disrupted and shook the ground before the landings on the northern beaches. When the 1st Brigade assault wave was less than a thousand yards from the beach, hundreds of 4.5-inch rockets from LCI(G)s (Landing Craft Infantry, Gunboat) slammed into the strand.

  While the LCVPs, LVTs, and the DUKWs (amphibious trucks) were still offshore, there was virtually no enemy fire from the beach. Artillery observation planes reported no observed enemy fire. The defenders would respond in their own time. Because so many amtracs were lost as the assault waves neared the beaches, later in the day there would not be enough LVTs available for transferring men and supplies from boats to amtracs at Agat reef. The shortage of amphibious tractors would plague the brigade for days.

  The precision of the Japanese guns caused severe damage to the cargo and assault craft on the beach. This became a real concern for General Shepherd. Most of the soldiers and some of the Marines who came in after the first assault waves waded ashore with full packs in waist high water. They faced the danger of both underwater shell holes and enemy fire. By the time the bulk of the 77th Division waded in, these twin threats were not as great because the Marines onshore were spread out and could keep the Japanese occupied.

  The Japanese defenders prepared their defenses well—thick-walled bunkers and smaller pillboxes. On Gaan Point there were 75mm guns in the middle of the landing beaches. Crossfire from Gaan, coordinated with the machine guns on nearby Yona island, raked the beaches allocated to the 4th Marines. The 4th was tasked with establishing a beachhead and protecting the southernmost flank.

  After vicious fighting, the 4th Marines advanced onto low ground and cleared Bangi Point where bunker walls could withstand a battleship round. The 4th Marines set up a roadblock on Harmon Road leading down from the mountains to Agat. Previous operations had taught the Marines that the Japanese would be back in strength at night.

  After the Marines landed, they found an under-manned but excellent Japanese trench system on the beaches. While the pre-landing bombardment had driven many defenders back into their holes, they poured heavy machine gun fire and mortar fire down on the invaders. The preinvasion planning called for the Marine amtracs to drive a thousand yards inland before disembarking Marines. This tactic failed because of a heavily mined beachhead and anti-tank ditches along with other obstacles.

  But the Marines attacked with such overwhelming force that they broke through. And by 1030, the assault forces were over one-thousand yards inland. Now, the 4th Marines Reserve Battalion had finally landed after taking heavy fire from emplaced enemy forces. Marines worked on clearing bypassed bunkers using the now landed tanks. By 1320, the blockhouse on Gaan Point was eliminated by advancing to the rear and blasting the surprised enemy gunners before they could offer any resistance. By this time, General Shepherd was on the beach and had opened his command post.

  The 22nd Marines were battered by a hail of small arms and mortar fire when they hit their assigned beach. They suffered heavy losses in equipment and men during the first few minutes. According to Private First Class William Dunlap, the battalion’s beloved chaplain who had been entrusted with everyone’s gambling money to “hold for safekeeping,” had been killed. Marines never for a minute considered he was just as mortal as they were.

  The 1/22 Marines left their section of the landing zone and advanced to the shattered town of a gap where the battalion drove north and eventually sealed off a heavily defended road to Orote Peninsula, soon to be the scene of a major battle.

  The 2/22 Marines was in the center of the beachhead and hurried the 1,000 yards inland from the beach. The battalion could have taken one of its W-Day goals of securing the local heights of Mount Alifan—if American bombs and not fallen short and stalled their attack.

  The 1st Battalion moved into the ruins of Agat and secured it by 1020. While there was still minor small arms resistance in the rubble, by 1130 the battalion was also out on Harmon Road leading to the northern shoulder of Mount Alifan. As the Marines advanced, Japanese shells hit the battalion aid station, wounding and killing several members of the medical team and destroying supplies. It wasn’t until later that afternoon that the 1st Battalion finally received another doctor.

  On the right flank of the landing waves, the 1/4 Marines ran head-on into Hill 40 near Bangi Point—which had been thoroughly hammered by the Navy. The unexpected fierce defense on Hill 40 demonstrated that the Japanese recognized its importance, commanding the beaches where troops and supplies came ashore. It took tanks and the support of the 3rd Battalion to secure that position.

  The 2/22 Marines, before dark on W-Day, could see the 4th Marines from across a deep gully. The 4th held a twisted, thin line extending over 1,500 yards from the beach to Harmon Road, while the 22nd Marines held the rest of the beach at 5,000 yards long and 1,500 yards deep. General Shepherd summed it up to General Geiger on nightfall of W-Day: “casualties at about 350. Critical shortages of fuel and ammunition of all types. Enemy unknown. Think we can handle it. Will continue as planned tomorrow.”

  Support troops helped to ensure that Marines could stay on shore once they landed. The support troops struggled since daylight, trying to manage the flow of vital supplies to the beaches. As darkness on W-Day approached, a black unit, the 4th Ammunition Company, guarded the brigade’s ammunition depot ashore. During a sleepless night, these black American Marines killed fourteen enemy saboteurs sneaking into the ammo dump.

  Poor communications delayed the order to land the Army’s 305th Regimental Combat team for several hours. They were slated for a morning landing but there were no amtracs available, and the soldiers had to wade in from the reef. Some soldiers slipped underwater into shell holes and had to swim for their lives in high tide. When the rest of the 305th arrived on the beach, they were all soaked, and some were seasick.

  The Japanese Counterattack

  Colonel Suenaga commanded the 38th Regiment from his command post on Mount Alifan. He watched the Americans overwhelm his forces below. Desperate to strike back, he called General Takashina and asked for permission for an all-out assault to drive the Marines back into the sea. He’d already ordered his remaining units to assemble for a counterattack. Takashina was not receptive at first. He said the losses would be too high and the 38th Regiment would serve better defending the high ground and harassing the American advance.

  Takashina did eventually give his permission and ordered any survivors to fall back on Mount Alifan if the attack failed—which he was certain it would. Colonel Suenaga must have shared the general’s pessimism because he burned his regimental colors to prevent their capture before the counterattack.

  The focal point of the Japanese attack came from the south on Hill 40. The brunt of the fighting would fall to the 3/4 Marines. A battalion of still mostly intact Japanese from the 38th Regiment came north from reserve positions.

  Lieutenant “Stormy” Sexton’s Company K faced the brunt of the Japanese assault. Company K held, but barely. Sexton later wrote on that night’s fighting: “if the Japs could’ve captured Hill 40, they would have kicked our asses off the Agat beaches.”

  The Japanese had 750 troops hit Company K at 2115 with their main thrust coming from the left or eas
t of Hill 40.

  According to Lieutenant Sexton: “They found a gap in our lines and overran the machine gun which covered the gap. The Japs broke through and advanced toward the beaches. Some elements turned left on Hill 40 and assaulted Company K from the rear. We fought them all night long with our 200 men from Hill 40 and a small hill to the rear and northeast. At daylight, Marines counterattacked with two squads and two tanks closing the gap. Many of our men from Company K died that night. All 750 Jap soldiers were destroyed. That hill symbolized the whole hard-fought American victory on Guam.

  “All along the rest of the Marine front, and the reserve areas, the fighting was hot and heavy as the rest of the 38th attacked. Colonel Suenaga pushed his troops to attack again and again. In the light of our flares, I watched them get mowed down from machine gun fire. General Shepherd was no novice to Jap tactics. He’d expected this attack and was ready for them.

  “Jap reconnaissance patrols were numerous and around 2130 they tried to draw our fire and determine our positions. Suenaga was out in front of the center thrust, which began at 2315 after a brisk mortar flurry on the right flank of the 4th Marines. The enemy advanced in full force, charging with rifles carried at high port, yelling, and throwing grenades. Marines lurked in the dark shadows and moved across the skyline under the light of stars from the ships. Marines lined up hand grenades, waited, watched, and then reacted.

  “Japs were everywhere trying to bayonet Marines in their foxholes. They even got down to the pack howitzer positions in the rear of the front lines. It was the same for the 22nd Marines. A whole company of Japs got close to the regimental command post. The defense was held largely by a reconnaissance platoon led by Lieutenant Dennis Chavez, who killed five Japs at point-blank range with a Thompson submachine gun.