World War II Pacific: Battles and Campaigns from Guadalcanal to Okinawa 1942-1945 (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  The Guam operation took a month longer than planned. Someone else needed to plan the assault for the operation in the Palaus. A temporary headquarters, X-Ray Corps, under General Julian Smith was formed. The two main assaults of the southern Palaus campaign were assigned to the Army’s 81st Infantry (Angaur) and the 1st Marine Division (Peleliu-Ngesebus). The 81st Division was also tasked with placing one regimental combat team as a core reserve.

  While this separation of division level planning was convenient, it caused a gross imbalance of force allocation, neither recognized nor corrected as plans progressed. The 1st Marine Division had nine infantry battalions (8,000 Marines) to attack over 10,000 enemy defenders on Peleliu. General Mueller’s 81st Infantry Division had six infantry battalions (5,400 soldiers) allocated to attack 1,500 Japanese defenders on Angaur.

  The circumstances and the terrain between the two islands were also imbalanced. Peleliu was much larger and had a more complex landscape. The defensive fortifications were far more developed, and it offered fewer predictable landing beaches than on Angaur.

  Only the later rapid shifting of plans accounted for such force allocation imbalances not being corrected at the Corps or Expeditionary Troops level. The effect of these imbalances was magnified on September 17. Higher-level changes in these plans (naval decisions) took away all the III Amphibious Corps reserves.

  Operation Stalemate would be conducted by two divisions, one from the Marines, and one from the Army. In the Pacific since mid-1942, the 1st Marine Division was a combat-tested veteran organization that launched the first offensive landing in the Pacific on Guadalcanal.

  After a brief rest and recovery in Australia, and training newly joined Marines, the division made its second amphibious assault at Cape Gloucester (Operation Backhander) on New Britain on December 26, 1943. When the 1st Division landed on Peleliu on September 15, 1944, its regiments had officers and enlisted Marine veterans from both landings and fresh troops ready to fight. Before World War II ended, the 1st Marine Division took part in one last battle: Operation Iceberg: victory on Okinawa.

  General William Rupertus

  General Rupertus commanded the 1st Marine Division during their time on Peleliu. He’d been with the division since the beginning of 1942. As a brigadier general, he was General Vandegrift’s assistant division commander during the Guadalcanal campaign.

  He took command of the division at the start of Operation Backhander (battle for Cape Gloucester on New Britain) on December 26, 1943. Rupertus was commissioned in 1913 and commanded a Marine ship’s detachment in World War I. Following the Great War, he was assigned to duty in China and Haiti. After the Peleliu campaign, he was made Commandant of the Marine Corps schools in Quantico. On March 25, 1945, the general died of a heart attack while still on active duty, aged fifty-five.

  General Paul Mueller

  General Mueller commanded the 81st Division and was a graduate of the West Point class of 1915. He commanded an infantry battalion in France in World War I and during the interwar period had several infantry commands and staff billets. In August 1941, he took command of the 81st at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and trained extensively until his division was called to battle in Angaur and Peleliu.

  General Mueller served on active duty until retiring in 1954. He died ten years later on September 25 at seventy-one years of age.

  Army’s 81st Infantry Division

  The Wildcats formed in August 17 at Camp Jackson, South Carolina. They saw action in France at the Argonne in World War I. They were deactivated at the end of the war. In June 1942, the 81st was reactivated and sent to several Pacific training bases before their first combat assignment on Angaur.

  After successful operations on Angaur, they relieved units of the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. Once Peleliu was secure, the Wildcats trained for Operation Olympic—the invasion of Japan. But the Japanese surrendered after two atomic bomb attacks. Instead of invading Japan, the 81st became an occupying force. On January 30, 1946, the 81st Infantry Division was once again deactivated.

  Japanese Fighting Tactics

  After the December 1941 surprise attacks, Japanese military planners believed they could quickly secure an Asian empire in the Pacific. Japan would defend her territories until the bitter end. The Empire of Japan would tire and bleed out the Allies before negotiating Japanese dominance in the Pacific.

  This strategic concept was in line with the medieval Japanese code of bushido. The Japanese believed in their army’s moral superiority over lesser races. This led the Japanese to expect their 19th-century banzai tactics would bring them success. Experience and expectations clashed until their 1942 encounters with the Allies, particularly in the Solomon’s. It took several confrontations with the Allies to learn that modern infantry weapons and tactics would defeat them.

  To Allied troops, these Japanese misconceptions were disturbing but cost-effective. It was less costly and easier to mow down banzai attacks than dig stubborn defenders out of fortified positions.

  By the spring of 1944, these hard lessons had been understood in the highest levels of Japan’s Army Command. When General Tojo directed General Inoue to defend the Palaus deliberately and conservatively, he ordered Japanese troops to dig in and hunker down, making the final defense a costly and bloody affair.

  Naval Gunfire Support

  In many of the 1st Division Marines’ earlier operations (especially on Guadalcanal) they were on the receiving end of naval gunfire. At Cape Gloucester, the character and disposition of the Japanese defenses didn’t call for extensive pre-landing fire support, nor did following operations ashore.

  The naval gunfire Guadalcanal veterans were exposed to often damaged planes and installations onshore. Its effect on the dug-in Marines was sobering and scary, but rarely destructive.

  During the planning for Peleliu, division staff had no trained naval gunfire planner. When one arrived, he was hindered by a cumbersome communications link back to higher headquarters.

  General Holland M. Smith’s FMF (Fleet Marine Force) in Honolulu would provide essential targeting information for the division’s plan. The FMF would also plan and allocate available gunfire resources to the targets deemed necessary by the division staff planners.

  This preoccupation with the ongoing Marianna’s campaigns and illness of Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, the naval gunfire support group commander, further limited and constrained preparations. Heavy enemy ammunition expenditures in the Marianas also reduced the available ammunition for the Peleliu operation.

  During the delivery of Allied preparatory fires, there was no Japanese response. This persuaded Oldendorf to report all known targets destroyed and to cancel any further preparatory fires scheduled on D +3. An unintended benefit of this change in naval gunfire resulted in more shells being available for post-landing support.

  But the costly effect of this inadequate naval gunfire support was that the flanking positions north and south of the landing beaches were destroyed. The selection of naval gunfire targets could have been done more thoroughly. Colonel “Chesty” Puller, the 1st Marines commander, specifically asked for the destruction of positions dominating his landing on his division’s left flanks.

  This failure was paid for in blood, bravery, and time during the battle for the Point.

  After D-Day, there were several instances of well called and delivered naval gunfire support. Night illuminations during September 16 and the destruction of two significant blockhouses were effective support for the Ngesebus landing.

  Reef-crossing Tactics

  Peleliu’s coral reef would not permit landing craft within 700 yards of the beach, so the landing craft deposited tanks at the reef’s edge. The depth of the reef’s edge allowed the tanks to operate in most areas without being submerged.

  A plan was devised to form tanks into small columns, each led by an LVT. As long as the amphibious tractor was grounded on the reef, the tanks could follow. When an LVT encountered a depth that floated it, tanks were halted whil
e the amphibious tractor felt for a more suitable, shallow path. This brought the tanks onshore in small columns as quickly as possible. This tactic was crucial for timely employment of armor onshore before D-Day was over.

  Two other reef crossing innovations were used on D-Day. Several amphibious trailers were towed behind landing craft, and later, at the reef’s edge, they were towed in by the LVTs. Once onshore, trucks pulled them the rest of the way in. This allowed for vital supplies to be brought into points in the rear of the fighting.

  Newly available cranes were placed on barges near the reef’s edge. They lifted nets full of ammunition and other essential supplies from boats to tractors at the transfer lines. Crawler cranes were landed early and positioned by the shore party to lift net loads from LVTs to trucks for a swift forward delivery.

  Conquest of Peleliu

  Was the seizure of Peleliu necessary?

  What were the advantages to the US war effort from securing Peleliu?

  It assured the absolute domination of all the Palau Islands. It also added to the security of General MacArthur’s right flank as he continued westward with his Philippines campaign. Within the Palaus group, the conquest destroyed enemy facilities that survived Admiral Mitscher’s destructive strike in March 1944.

  Securing Peleliu also ensured a total denial of support to Japanese forces from the submarine base at Koror. Reducing the already waning enemy submarine capability east of the Philippines.

  The Allied position on Peleliu contributed to neutralizing 25,000 enemy troops in northern Palau. The Peleliu landing did not contribute to the RLT 323’s (regimental landing team) unopposed seizure of Ulithi. Admiral Halsey had earlier believed his forces could seize Ulithi without first taking Peleliu.

  The most significant visible benefit of a subdued Peleliu was its use as a link in the flight path and communication lines from Hawaii to the Philippines. It was convenient but not a necessity.

  Survivors of the Indianapolis during the July 29, 1945 sinking were saved indirectly by the seizure of Peleliu. After delivering atomic bomb parts to Tinian, the ship was heading for the Philippines when it was torpedoed. The Indianapolis sunk in twelve minutes. There was no received report of the contact or the sinking. Four days after it sunk, the 316 survivors (from a crew of 1,197) were spotted by a Navy patrol bomber flying out of Peleliu. This sighting directly led to the rescue and most likely would not have happened but for the Allied occupation of Peleliu.

  Price of Peleliu

  Marine Casualties were 6,526. This included Navy doctors and corpsmen with 1,252 killed. The Army’s 81st Division had 3,088 casualties, 404 were killed in action. Total US troop casualties were 9,616 (1,657 killed) on Peleliu, Angaur, and Ngesebus

  The Japanese were successful in implementing their bleed and delay strategy. Their actions cost them an estimated 11,000 casualties (all but a small portion killed). Only 202 prisoners of war were captured, and of them, only nineteen were Japanese military (twelve Navy and seven Army). The rest were Korean laborers. Statistically, less than two out of every thousand Japanese military defenders were captured.

  The bloody battle at Peleliu was a warning for the remaining Allied operations being conducted across the Pacific. Even with total naval and air superiority and a four to one troop advantage—the conquest of Peleliu cost one Allied casualty and 1,590 rounds of ammunition per Japanese soldier killed or driven from his position. A couple of months later, the attacks on Iwo Jima and Okinawa would confirm this grim calculation.

  On September 13, 1944, two days before D-Day, Admiral Halsey recommended to Admiral Nimitz that the Peleliu landing should be canceled. But by that time, it was too late: Peleliu would be added to the long list of brutal battles in which Allied forces fought, suffered, and ultimately prevailed.

  Seventy-seven years later, the question of whether Operation Stalemate was necessary remains debatable. The heroism and commendable conduct of the 1st Marine Division, its Navy corpsmen, and soldiers of the 81st Infantry on that miserable island will forever be written in blood.

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  Operation Detachment

  1945 Battle of Iwo Jima

  The Pacific Offensive

  March 4, 1945 was the second week of the Allied invasion of Iwo Jima. By now, the assault elements of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions were drained, and their combat efficiency was seriously reduced.

  The thrilling sight of the American flag being raised by the 28th Marines on Mount Suribachi had happened ten days earlier—a lifetime ago on Sulfur Island. The Amphibious Corps landing forces had already suffered 13,000 casualties, including 3,000 dead. The front was a jagged serration across Iwo Jima’s fat northern half. Smack in the middle of the primary Japanese defenses. The Allied landing force had to advance uphill against a well-disciplined, entrenched, and rarely visible enemy.

  In the center of the island, the 3rd Marine Division spent the night turning back a small, but determined, enemy counterattack, which found a gap between the 21st and 9th Marines. Savage hand-to-hand combat had cost both sides heavy casualties. The counterattack ruined the division’s preparation for a morning advance, but both regiments made gains against stubborn enemy opposition.

  In the east, the 4th Marine Division secured Hill 382 at the cost of their combat efficiency plummeting below fifty percent. By nightfall, it would fall another five percent. The 24th Marines, supported by flame-throwing tanks, only advanced one hundred yards before stopping to detonate two tons of explosives against enemy cave positions. The 23rd and 25th Marines entered the most challenging terrain yet—a broken ground with visibility less than a few feet.

  On the western flank, the 5th Marine Division took Hill 362-B (Nishi Ridge) at the cost of over 500 casualties. They’d engaged a sizeable enemy force throughout the night. While the enemy attacks lacked coordination, exhausted Marines were barely able to hold them off. Most rifle companies were now at less than half strength. The division reported the net gain for the day as “practically nothing.”

  The battle took its toll on the enemy garrison as well. Japanese General Tadamichi Kuribayashi knew his 109th Division had inflicted heavy casualties on the assaulting Marines, but his losses were comparable. The Allied capture of the critical hills the day before denied him his prized artillery observation sites.

  Kuribayashi’s brilliant chief of artillery, Colonel Chosaku Kaido, had been killed. Kuribayashi moved his command post from the central highlands to a large cave on the northwestern coast. Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo had reached him by radio that afternoon, but the general was in no mood for heroic rhetoric. He replied: “Send air and naval support, and I will hold the island. Without them, I cannot hold.”

  That afternoon, the combatants witnessed a glimpse of Iwo Jima’s fate. Through the overcast skies, a giant silver bomber (the largest aircraft yet seen), the B-29 “Dinah Might,” came in for an emergency landing on the scruffy island airstrip. Allied troops held their breath as the bomber swooped in and landed with a thud. Clipping a field telephone pole with its wing and rumbling to a stop three feet from the end of the strip.

  Pilot Fred Malo and his ten-man crew didn’t stay long. Every enemy gunner within range wanted to bag this prize. Mechanics made hurried field repairs, and the sixty-five-ton Super Fortress scrambled through a hail of enemy fire, returning to its base on Tinian.

  The battle of Iwo Jima raged for another twenty-two days and claimed 11,000 more Allied casualties and the lives of nearly the entire Japanese garrison. A historic and colossal fight between two well-armed veteran forces. This was the bloodiest and biggest battle in the history of the Marine Corps. But after March 4, leaders on both sides had no doubts as to the ultimate outcome.

  Oper
ation Detachment

  Iwo Jima was an amphibious landing where assault troops saw the value of the objective. They were finally within a thousand miles of the Japanese homeland—and contributing clearly in support of the Allied bombing campaign.

  This bombing campaign was a new wrinkle on an old theme. For forty years, Marines had been developing the skills to seize advanced naval bases in support of the fleet. In the Pacific War—especially at Tinian, Saipan, and now Iwo Jima—they secured advanced airbases to further the bombing of the Japanese home islands.

  Allied forces had waited for the arrival of the B-29s for years. These long-range bombers became operational too late for the European Theater—but they’d been hitting Japan since November 1944 with disappointing results. The problem wasn’t the planes or the pilots, but from a little spit of volcanic rock lying halfway across the path from Saipan to Tokyo—Iwo Jima.

  Radar on Iwo gave the enemy two hours’ advance notice of every B-29 strike. Japanese fighters on Iwo’s airfields would swarm and harass the unescorted Super Fortresses going in and especially returning to base. Enemy fighters picked off the B-29s crippled from antiaircraft fire. This caused the B-29s to fly higher and with a reduced payload.