World War II Pacific: Battles and Campaigns from Guadalcanal to Okinawa 1942-1945 (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  FDR, an expert in manipulating public opinion, kept a lid on the outcry by emphasizing the troops’ sacrifice as symbolized by Joe Rosenthal’s Suribachi flag-raising. While this photograph was already famous, Roosevelt made it the official logo of the Seventh War Bond Drive. He ordered the six flag raisers be reassigned home to boost morale, but three out of those six men had already been killed in the fighting on Iwo Jima.

  The Joint Chiefs studied Iwo’s losses. No one questioned the objective: Iwo Jima was an island that had to be secured to launch an effective strategic bombing campaign. The island could not have been bypassed or leapfrogged. There was evidence the Joint Chiefs considered using poison gas during the planning phase. Neither the US nor Japan had signed the international cessation on poison gas, and there were no civilians on the island. The US had stockpiled mustard gas shells in the Pacific Theater. When FDR read the report, he shot down the idea. He publicly stated that the United States would never make first use of poison gas. This left the landing force with no other option but a frontal amphibious assault against the most heavily fortified island the United States had ever faced.

  The capture of Iwo Jima provided other strategic and symbolic benefits. Marines raised the flag over Suribachi the same day MacArthur entered Manila. The parallel captures of the Philippines and Suribachi were followed immediately by the invasion of Okinawa—accelerating the pace of the war and bringing it at long last to Japan’s doorstep. These three campaigns proved to the Japanese command that the Allies had the capability and will to overwhelm even the most resolutely defended islands. Honshu and Kyushu would be next.

  The capture of Iwo Jima delivered immediate benefits to the strategic bombing campaign. Marines fighting on the island were reminded of this mission repeatedly as crippled B-29s flew in from Honshu. Securing and rebuilding Iwo’s airfields increased the operating range payload and survival rate of the big bombers. The monthly tonnage of high explosives dropped on Japan by the B-29s based in the Marianas increased eleven-fold in March alone. On April 7, eighty P-51 Mustangs took off from Iwo, escorting the B-29s bombing the Nakajima aircraft engine plant in Tokyo.

  The great value of Iwo’s airfields was that they could be used as emergency landing fields. By war’s end, 2,252 B-29s made forced landings on Iwo. These forced landings included 24,765 flight crewmen. Many of these men would have perished at sea without Iwo’s safe haven. According to one B-29 pilot: “whenever I landed on that island, I thanked God for the men who fought and died for it.”

  General Kuribayashi proved to be one of the most competent field commanders the Marines had ever faced. His expert understanding of simplicity and economy of force made maximum use of Iwo’s formidable terrain. He deployed his mortars and artillery with great skill and commanded his troops with an iron will—to the end. He was a realist. With no hope of naval or air superiority, he knew he was doomed from the start. Allied forces took five weeks to breach every strong point and exterminate his forces on the island.

  Iwo Jima was the pinnacle of Allied amphibious capabilities in the Pacific. The sheer magnitude of planning the assault and sustaining the landing forces made Operation Detachment an enduring model of detailed planning and violent execution. The element of surprise was not available. But the speed of the landing force and the toughness with which assault units withstood the withering barrages amazed the enemy defenders.

  Colonel Wornham of the 27th Marines said: “The Iwo landing was the epitome of everything we’d learned over the years about amphibious assaults. Bad as the enemy fire was on D-Day, there were no reports of ‘Issue in doubt.’”

  Colonel Galer compared his Guadalcanal experience to the battle on Iwo: “then, it was can we hold? On Iwo, the question was simply, when can we get this over?”

  While the ship-to-shore assaults were impressive, the actual degree of amphibious effectiveness was seen in the massive, sustained logistical support which flowed over the treacherous beaches. Marines had all the ammunition and flamethrower refills they needed around the clock. They also had many less obvious necessities that marked this battle differently than its predecessors. Marines on Iwo had enough quantities of whole blood, most donated two weeks in advance, flown in, refrigerated, and always available.

  Marines had mail call, clean water, radio batteries, fresh-baked bread, and prefabricated burial markers. The Iwo Jima operation was a model of interservice cooperation. Marine and Navy teams functioned efficiently together. The Navy earned the respect of the Marines on D -2 when a flotilla of tiny LCI gunboats fearlessly attacked the coastal defense guns to protect the Navy and Marine frogmen. Marines appreciated the contributions of the Coast Guard, Army, Red Cross, and embedded combat correspondents; all shared in the misery and glory of this battle.

  The US Military occupied Iwo Jima until 1968, when jurisdiction was transferred back to Japan. Seventy-seven years later, the island remains a military-only island. It is no longer a baren moonscape, but covered in rich greenery, yet two aspects of this battle are still controversial: inadequate preliminary bombardment and the decision to use piecemeal replacements instead of organized units to strengthen the assault forces. Both decisions were made in the context of several competing factors and were made by experienced commanders in good faith. Iwo Jima’s highest cost was the loss of so many combat veterans while taking the island. While this battle created a new generation of veteran heroes among the survivors, many proud regiments suffered devastating losses.

  Those veteran regiments had already been designated as crucial landing force components in the Japanese home islands assault—these losses had severe potential implications. It may have been these factors that influenced Holland Smith’s unpopular decision to withhold the 3rd Marines from the battle.

  To many exhausted Marines and commanders fighting on Iwo Jima, Holland Smith’s decision to withhold the 3rd Marines was unforgivable—then and now. But whatever his flaws, General Holland Smith almost certainly knew amphibious warfare better than anyone at the time.

  According to Holland Smith: “We had no hope of surprise, either tactical or strategic. There was little possibility for tactical initiative. The entire operation was fought on virtually the enemy’s terms. The strength, conduct, and disposition of the enemy’s defense required a major penetration of his prepared positions in the center of the Motoyama Plateau and a subsequent reduction of his positions in rugged terrain sloping to the shore on the flanks.

  “The terrain and size of the island precluded any Force Beachhead Line. It was a one-phase and one-tactic operation. From the time the engagement was joined until the mission was completed, it was a frontal assault maintained with relentless pressure by a superior force in supporting arms against a position fortified to the maximum practical intent.

  “We Americans of a subsequent generation in the profession of arms find it difficult to imagine a sustained amphibious assault under these conditions. In some respects, the fighting on Iwo Jima took the features of the Marines fighting in France in 1918. We sensed the drama repeated every morning on Iwo Jima after the prep fires lifted, when the rifleman, engineers, corpsman, flame tank crews, and armored bulldozers somehow found the fortitude to move out again into The Meatgrinder or Death Valley. Few of us today can study the defenses, analyze the after-action reports, or walk that broken ground without experiencing a sense of reverence for the men who fought and won that epic battle.”

  While the fighting was raging on Iwo, Admiral Nimitz said: “Among the Americans serving on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was a common virtue.” This line was chiseled into the base of Felix de Weldon’s giant bronze sculpture of the Suribachi flag-raising.

  On Iwo, Twenty-two Marines, four Navy corpsmen, and one LCI skipper were awarded the Medal of Honor for bravery during the battle—half were awarded posthumously.

  General Erskine put the Allied sacrifices into perspective during his remarks at the dedication of the 3rd Marine Division’s Cemetery on Iwo Jima: “Our victory was never in do
ubt. Its cost was. What was in doubt, in all of our minds, was whether there would be any of us left to dedicate this cemetery at the end. Or if the last Marine would die knocking out the last Japanese gunner.”

  Iconic Flag Raising

  There were two flags raised over Mount Suribachi—but not at the same time. On the morning of February 23, 1945, (D +4) Captain Dave Severance, Company E Commander, 2/28 Marines, ordered Lieutenant Harold Schrier to take a patrol and put up an American flag on the top of Mount Suribachi.

  Staff Sergeant Lou Lowery, a Leatherneck magazine photographer, joined the patrol. After a short firefight, the 54” x 28” flag was attached to a piece of pipe found at the ridge of the mountain and was raised. This was the flag-raising that Staff Sergeant Lowery photographed. But this flag was too small to be seen from the beach below, and another Marine went on board LST 779 to get a larger flag. Then, a second patrol took this flag up to the top of Suribachi, accompanied by AP photographer Joe Rosenthal.

  In an interview after the war, Rosenthal said: “my stumbling on that picture was in all respects accidental. When I got to the top of the mountain, I stood in a decline just below the crest of the hill with Sergeant Bill Genaust, a motion picture cameraman (later killed on Iwo Jima). We watched a group of five Marines and a Navy corpsman fasten the new flag to another piece of pipe. I turned, and out of the corner of my eye, I saw the second flag being raised. I swung my camera around and held it until I could guess where the peak of the action was and then took the shot.”

  Some people accused Rosenthal’s second flag-raising photograph of being posed. According to Rosenthal’s postwar interview: “had I posed that shot, I would, of course, have ruined it. I would’ve made them turn their heads so they could be identified, and nothing like the existing picture would have resulted. This picture and what it meant to me—and it has a meaning to me—has to be peculiar only to me.

  “I can still see blood running down the sand. I can see those awful, impossible positions to take in a frontal attack on such an island, where the batteries opposing you were not only staggered up in front of you but also stood around you as you came ashore. The extraordinary situation they were in before they ever reached that peak. If a photograph can remind us of the sacrifices these boys made—then that was what made the photo important—not the man who took it.”

  Rosenthal took eighteen photographs that day. Afterward, he went down to the beach to write captions for his undeveloped film packs and, with other photographers on the island, sent his film out to the offshore command vessel. They were flown to Guam, where the photos were processed and censored. Rosenthal’s pictures arrived on Guam before Lowery’s and were processed and sent to the states for distribution. Rosenthal’s flag-raising picture became one of the most famous photographs ever taken in the war—or in any war.

  General Harry Schmidt

  Four veteran Marine generals led the assault on Iwo Jima. Each one of these generals received the Distinguished Service Medal for inspired combat leadership in this epic battle.

  Major General Harry Schmidt was fifty-eight years old when he was on Iwo Jima. He’d already served thirty-six years in the Marine Corps. Born and raised in Holdrege, Nebraska, he attended the Nebraska Normal College. His expeditionary assignments kept him from serving in World War I, but Schmidt saw considerable small unit action in China, the Philippines, Guam, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Cuba.

  Schmidt attended the Army Command and General Staff College and the Marine Corps Field Officer’s Course. During World War II, General Schmidt commanded the 4th Marine Division at Roi-Namur and in Saipan before assuming command of the V Amphibious Corps at the Tinian landing.

  On Iwo Jima, he commanded the largest force of Marines ever committed to a single battle. According to Schmidt: “it was the greatest honor of my life.”

  General Graves B. Erskine

  Major General Graves B. Erskine was forty-seven years old on Iwo Jima, and one of the youngest major generals in the Marine Corps. He’d already served twenty-eight years on active duty by then. A native of Columbia, Louisiana, he received a Marine Corps commission after graduating from Louisiana State University.

  Erskine immediately deployed to France for duty in World War I. He served as a platoon commander in the 6th Marines and saw combat at Chateau-Thierry, Soissons, St. Mihiel, and Belleau Wood. He was wounded twice and awarded the Silver Star. He served in China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Haiti in the interwar period.

  In World War II, Erskine was Chief of Staff to General Holland Smith during the Marianas, Marshalls, Gilberts, and Aleutians campaigns. He took command of the 3rd Marine Division in October 1944.

  General Clifton B. Cates

  Major General Clifton B. Cates was fifty-one years old at Iwo Jima. He’d served the last twenty-eight years in the Marine Corps. Cates was one of the rare Marine general officers who had held a combat command at the platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and division levels in his career.

  Cates was born in Tiptonville, Tennessee, and graduated from the University of Tennessee. In World War I, he served as a junior officer in the 6th Marines at Blanc Mont, Soissons, Belleau Wood, and St. Mihiel. He was awarded two Silver Stars, the Navy Cross, and a Purple Heart for his service and wounds.

  In the interwar years, he served at sea and in China. In World War II, he commanded the 1st Marines at Guadalcanal and the 4th Marine Division at Tinian. Three years after Iwo Jima, General Clifton Cates became the 19th Commandant of the Marine Corps.

  General Keller E. Rockey

  Major General Keller E. Rockey was fifty-six years old on Iwo Jima and a thirty-one-year veteran of the Marine Corps. A native of Columbia City, Indiana, he graduated from Gettysburg College and studied at Yale. Like his fellow division commanders, Rockey served in France in World War I and was awarded the Navy Cross as a junior officer in the 5th Marines at Chateau-Thierry.

  He earned a second Navy Cross for heroic service in Nicaragua. He also served in Haiti and had two years of sea duty. After spending the first years of World War II at Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington, in February 1944, General Rockey took command of the 5th Marine Division and prepared them for their first and last great battle of the war.

  Three other brigadier generals played a considerable role in the amphibious seizure of Iwo Jima:

  Leo Hermle, Assistant Division Commander of the 5th Marine Division.

  Franklin Hart, Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Marine Division.

  William Rogers, Corps Chief of Staff.

  General Kuribayashi

  According to Colonel Chambers, Battalion Commander of the 3/25 Marines, whose four days on Iwo Jima resulted in a Purple Heart and a Medal of Honor: “On Iwo, their smartest general commanded. This man did not believe in the banzai business. He ordered each Jap to kill ten Marines—and for a while, they made their quotas.”

  Chambers was referring to Lieutenant General Kuribayashi, Commander of the Ogasawara Army Group and Commanding General of the 109th Division. Tadamichi Kuribayashi was fifty-three years old on Iwo. He was from the Nagano Prefecture and served the Emperor as a cavalry officer since graduating from the Military Academy in 1914. Kuribayashi spent several years as a junior officer posted to the Japanese embassies in Canada and the United States. During the war in Asia, Kuribayashi commanded a cavalry regiment in Manchuria and a brigade in northern China. Later he served as Chief of Staff for the Twenty-third Army during the capture of Hong Kong.

  After returning from China, the Emperor chose Kuribayashi to command the Imperial Guards Division in Tokyo. When Saipan fell in June 1944, he was assigned to command the defense of Iwo Jima.

  Kuribayashi was a realist. He believed the crude airstrips on Iwo were a liability for the Empire. They provided nuisance raids against the B-29s but would undoubtedly draw attention from Allied strategic planners. The Iwo Jima airfields in Allied hands would pose a terrible threat to Japan.

  Kuribayashi knew he had only two options:
blow up the entire island or defend it to the death. Blowing up the entire island would be impractical, so he adopted a radical defensive policy. His troops would not use the suicidal banzai nor linear water’s edge tactics used in previous island battles. This caused a massive controversy at the highest levels—Imperial headquarters even asked the Nazis for advice on how to repel American invasions.

  While Kuribayashi made some compromises with his forces on the island, he fired eighteen senior army officers, including his chief of staff. Those who remained would implement Kuribayashi’s policy to the letter.

  The general knew he was doomed without air and naval support. Still, he proved to be a tenacious and resourceful commander. His only tactical error was in authorizing sector commanders to engage the Allied task force covering the UDT operations on D -2. This gift revealed to the gunners the masked batteries which would have slaughtered more of the landing force assault waves on D-Day.

  Controversial Japanese accounts reported Kuribayashi committed Seppuku (Japanese ritual suicide) in his cave near Kitano point on March 23, 1945—the thirty-third day of battle. General

  Holland Smith said: “of all our adversaries in the Pacific, Kuribayashi was the most redoubtable. Let’s hope the Japs don’t have any more like him.”

  Japanese Spigot Mortar

  One of the deadliest weapons faced on Iwo Jima was the 320mm spigot mortar. These gigantic defensive weapons were placed and operated by the Imperial Japanese Army’s 20th Independent Mortar Battalion.