World War II Pacific: Battles and Campaigns from Guadalcanal to Okinawa 1942-1945 (WW2 Pacific Military History Series)

by Daniel Wrinn

  Despite the dire intelligent predictions and their own combat experience, the troops’ landing was a cakewalk—almost unopposed. Private First Class Eugene Sledge’s mortar section began singing “Little Brown Jug” at the top of their lungs. He later wrote how he couldn’t believe his good luck: “I didn’t hear a single shot all morning. It was unbelievable.”

  Many Marine veterans expected enemy fire at any second. Later that day, General del Valle’s LVT got stuck in a pothole en route to the beach. “It was the worst twenty minutes I’d ever spent in my life,” the general later wrote.

  That morning continued to deliver pleasant surprises to the assault force. No mines along the beaches, the main bridge over the Bishi River was still intact, and both airfields were lightly defended. Marines took Yontan Airfield at 1300 while soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division had no problem securing nearby Kadena.

  After securing the assault beaches, the landing force left plenty of room for the follow-on forces. Division commanders accelerated the landing of artillery battalions, tanks, and reserves. This massive buildup was hampered by a few glitches. Four artillery pieces went down when their amphibious trucks foundered along the reef. Several other Sherman tanks grounded on the reef. The 3/1 Marines arrived at the transfer line by 1800 but spent an uncomfortable night in their boats because enough LVTs were not available for the last leg at that hour. While only minor inconveniences, by the day’s end, the Tenth Army had 60,000 troops ashore and occupied an expanded beach eight miles long and two miles deep.

  The landing was not bloodless. Snipers wounded Major John Gustafson, CO of the 3/5 Marines, later that afternoon. Other men went down to enemy mortars and machine-gun fire. But the Tenth Army’s entire losses (including the hard-luck 2nd Division) were 159 casualties with twenty-eight killed.

  This was less than ten percent of casualties suffered by V Amphibious Corps on the first bloody day of Iwo Jima.

  Battle of Yae Take

  The assault force’s momentum did not slow down after the Tenth Army broke out of the beachhead. The 7th Infantry reached the east coast on the second day. On the third day, the 1st Marine Division secured the Katchin Peninsula and cut the island in two. By now, elements of the III Amphibious Corps had reached their objective initially thought to require eleven days. Colonel Victor Krulak, 6th Marine Division operations officer, recalled General Shepherd’s orders: “Plow ahead as fast as you can. The Japs are on the run.”

  Krulak thought: Well hell, we didn’t have them on the run. They weren’t there.

  The 6th Division swung north, while the 1st Marine Division moved to the northwest—their immediate problems stemming not from the enemy but a slow supply system still processing on the beach. The reef-side transfer line worked well for troops but not for cargo.

  Navy Seabees worked to build a causeway for the reef. At the same time, the 1st Division demonstrated their amphibious know-how learned on Peleliu. They mounted swinging cranes on powered causeways and secured craft to the seaward side of the reef. When boats pulled alongside, cranes lifted nets filled with combat cargo into open hatches of waiting LVTs and amphibious trucks. This worked so well that the division divided its assets within the Tenth Army.

  Beach congestion slowed the logistical process. Both Marine divisions used their replacements as shore party teams. Inexperience combined with a constant call for new replacements caused traffic control problems in establishing functional supply dumps and pilferage. This was not new. Other divisions in earlier operations had had the same problems. The quickly advancing divisions desperately needed bulk fuel and motor transport—but these were slow to land and distribute.

  The undeveloped road network on Okinawa made this problem worse. Colonel Ed Snedeker, CO of the 7th Regiment in the 1st Marine Division, wrote: “The movement from the west coast landing beaches on Okinawa across the island was difficult because of the rugged terrain. It was physically exhausting for personnel to be on the transports for such a long time. This also presented an initial impossible supply problem in the Seventh’s zone of action because of the lack of roads.”

  General Mulcahy brought the Tactical Air Force command post ashore on L +1. Operating out of crude quarters between Kadena and Yontan Airfields, Mulcahy closely watched the Seabees and Army-Marine engineers progress repairing the captured airfields. A Marine observation plane was the first Allied aircraft to land on April 2. Two days later, the airfields were ready to accept fighters. By the eighth day, General Mulcahy could accommodate medium bombers and assumed control of all ashore fleet aircraft.

  Mulcahy’s fighter arm, the Air Defense Command, was established on shore under the command of Marine General William Wallace. Graceful F4U Corsairs of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG 31) flew in from escort carriers. Wallace tasked them with flying combat air patrols over the fleet to tackle the vicious mass of kamikaze attacks plaguing the fleet. Most Marine fighter pilots’ initial missions were combat air patrols, while (ironically) Navy squadrons on board escort carriers handled the close air support jobs.

  At dawn, Marine Corsairs took off from the airfields and flew combat air patrols over the far-flung fifth fleet. They passed Navy Hellcats coming in from the fleet to support the Marines fighting on the ground. Other air units poured into the two Army airfields: night fighters, torpedo bombers, and an Army Air Forces fighter wing. The Okinawan airfields were not safe-havens. They received nightly artillery fire from long-range bombing the entire first month ashore. But the two airfields remained in operation around the clock. They were an invaluable asset in support of Operation Iceberg.

  General Roy Geiger unleashed the 6th Marine Division to sweep north while the 1st Division hunted down and destroyed small bands of enemy guerrillas in the center of the island. Riflemen rode topside on tanks and self-propelled guns streaming northward against the fleeing enemy. Not since Tinian did Marines enjoy such invigorating mobility. On April 7, Marines seized Nagano, the largest town in northern Okinawa. The Navy swept for mines and deployed Underwater Demolition Teams to breach obstacles and open the port for direct seaborne delivery of crucial supplies.

  Corporal James Day with the 22nd Marines was impressed at the momentum of the operation. He wrote: “Hell, here we are in Nago. It wasn’t tough at all. Up until that time, our squad hadn’t lost a man.” The 22nd Marines continued north through a rugged and broken country. They reached Hedo Misaki at the far end of the island on L +12 after advancing fifty-five miles from the landing beaches at Hagushi.

  The honeymoon was coming to a swift end for the rest of the 6th Division. Northwest of Nago, on its bulby nose, the Motobu Peninsula jutted out into the East China Sea. In a six mile area around the 1,200 foot Mount Yae Take, Colonel Takesiko Udo and his Kunigami Detachment were in prepared defensive positions. The delaying tactics were over. Udo’s force comprised two thousand seasoned troops from the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. He had two rifle battalions, a regimental gun company, and an anti-tank company at his disposal.

  Mount Yae Take was a defender’s dream. Steep vines tangled with dense vegetation. Japanese troops booby-trapped the approaches with mines and mounted 20mm machine cannons and heavier weapons deep inside their caves. According to Colonel Krulak: “They were just there. They weren’t going anywhere. They were going to fight to the death. They had a lot of Navy guns that came off disabled ships. They dug them way back in holes where their arc of fire was not more than ten degrees.” An artillery battalion of fifteen Marines had the misfortune to lay their guns directly within the narrow arc of a hidden 150mm cannon. “They lost two howitzers before you could spell cat.”

  The battle of Yae Take was the first real fight for the 6th Marine Division. Five days of difficult and deadly combat against a determined enemy. The 4th and the 29th Marines earned their spurs here. They developed teamwork and tactics, putting them in a good position for the long, bloody campaign ahead.

  One aspect of General Shepherd’s success in this battle stemmed from his desire to pl
ace proven leaders in command of his troops. On the 15th, Shepherd relieved Colonel Victor Bleasdale (a decorated World War I Marine) and installed Guadalcanal veteran Colonel William Whaling as the commanding officer of the 29th Marines. After an enemy sniper killed Major Bernard Greene, commanding the 1/4 Marines, Colonel Alan Shapley assigned his own XO, Colonel Fred Beans (former Marine Raider), as his replacement.

  The ferocious fighting continued with three Allied battalions attacking from the west and two from the east. They were protected against friendly fire by the steep pinnacle separating them. Logistics were essential in this fight. Every Marine (from private to general) who climbed that mountain to the front lines carried either a 5-gallon water can or a case of ammo. All hands coming down the mountain helped carry the stretchers of wounded Marines. On April 15, a company of the 2/4 Marines took sixty-five casualties—including three consecutive company commanders.

  The next day Marines secured the ridge with the help of the battleship Tennessee’s 14-inch guns and Marine Corsairs low-level pocket bombing.

  Colonel Udo and his troops from the Kunigami Detachment died to the last man. On April 20, General Shepherd announced the Motobu Peninsula was secured. His Marines had earned a precious victory, but the cost did not come cheap. The 6th Marine Division suffered 757 wounded and 207 killed in the battle.

  In his journal, an impressed General Oliver Smith wrote: “This northern campaign should dispel the belief held by some that Marines are beach-bound and not capable of rapid movement. Our Marines raced over rugged terrain and repaired roads and blown bridges while successfully opening new unloading points. They reached the island’s northern tip—over fifty miles away from the landing beaches—in fourteen days. Followed by a seven-day campaign to secure the Motobu Peninsula.”

  The 77th Infantry Division landed on the island Ie Shima and seized its airfields during the battle for Motobu Peninsula. On April 16, Major Jones’ recon Marines paved the way by taking a small islet 6,200 yards offshore called Minna Shima. Here, soldiers positioned a 105mm battery to support onshore operations. The 77th needed plenty of fire support to fight the 5,000 enemy defending the island. The Army soldiers overwhelmed them in six days of hard fighting at the cost of 1,100 casualties.

  A popular war correspondent named Ernie Pyle, who’d landed with the Marines on L-Day, was shot in the head by a Japanese sniper. Marines and soldiers alike grieved over Pyle’s death just as they’d done six days earlier with the news of FDR’s passing.

  Typhoon of Steel

  The 1st Marine Division fought a different campaign in April than their sister division to the north. They spent their days processing refugees and their nights on ambushes and patrols. Snipers and guerrillas exacted a steady but small toll.

  The “Old Breed” Marines welcomed this style of low intensity. After many months in the tropics, they found Okinawa refreshing and rustic. Marines were concerned about the welfare of the thousands of Okinawan refugees streaming in from the heavy fighting.

  According to Private First Class Eugene Sledge: “The most pitiful things about the Okinawan civilians were that they were totally bewildered by the shock of our invasion, and they were scared to death of us. Countless times they passed us on the way to the rear with sadness, fear, and confusion on their faces.”

  Sledge and his companions in the 5th Marines could tell by the sound of the intense artillery fire to the south that the XXIV Corps had smashed into General Ushijima’s ring of outer defenses. Inside that first week, soldiers from the 7th and 96th Divisions figured out the riddle: Where the hell are the Japs? By the second week, General Buckner and General Hodge were aware of Ushijima’s intentions and the depth and range of his defensive positions.

  Along with minefields, caves, and reverse slope emplacements, the Shuri defensive complex contained the most large-caliber weapons the Allies had ever faced in the Pacific. These positions had mutually supporting fires from the adjacent hills and ridgelines—honeycombed with fighting holes and caves. Keeping a strict adherence to these intricate networks of mutually supporting positions required an iron discipline from enemy troops. The enemy’s discipline prevailed. Allied forces found themselves entering into savage killing zones.

  Japanese tactics along the front were to isolate and contain Allied penetration by grazing fire from supporting positions. Then, they’d overwhelm exposed troops with a storm of preregistered heavy mortar shells while enemy troops swarmed out of their tunnels and counterattacked. Japanese troops often shot down more Allied troops during their extraction from a fire swept hilltop than they did in the initial advance.

  General Buckner committed the 27th Infantry Division to the southern front. He had General Geiger loan him his corps artillery and 11th Marines to help beef up fire support. The XXIV Corps now had an additional four 155mm battalions, three 105mm battalions, and one 75mm pack howitzer battalion to add to the underway bombardment of Ushijima’s outer defenses. Colonel Fred Henderson took command of a field artillery group composed of a 155mm gun battalion and an eight-inch howitzer battalion (the Henderson Group), which provided massive fire support for the Tenth Army.

  It took time to build the adequate units of fire for field artillery battalions to support the mammoth, three-divisional offensive that General Buckner wanted. After a week of inactivity passed along the front, the Japanese made their own adjustments and prepared for the coming offensive.

  On L +7 (April 18) General Buckner moved the command post of the Tenth Army onshore, and the new offensive began the following day. It was preceded by a wicked preliminary bombardment (typhoon of steel) of twenty-seven artillery batteries, six hundred aircraft, and eighteen ships. But the enemy just burrowed deeper into their subterranean fortress and waited. They waited for the hellish pounding to stop. They waited for the Allied infantry to advance into their well-designed killing traps.

  On April 19, XXIV Corps executed the assault. They made some gains before getting thrown back with heavy casualties. The enemy extracted a heavy toll from Allied tanks—particularly those supporting the 27th Infantry Division. The fighting around Kakazu Ridge had separated tanks from supporting infantry by fire, and the Japanese knocked off twenty-two of them with everything from hand-delivered satchel charges to 47mm guns.

  This disastrous battle on April 19 gave the Tenth Army a dose of reality. The walk in the sun was over. Overcoming enemy defenses around Shuri would require several divisions, massive firepower, and much more time. General Buckner requested General Geiger give him the 1st Tank Battalion to help the 27th Division along the Machinato-Kakazu lines.

  General del Valle was livid and complained to Geiger: “They can have my division, but not piecemeal.” Marine tank crews and infantry trained together as a team. The 1st Marine Division had perfected tank-infantry offensive attacks in the crucible on Peleliu. Committing tanks to the Army without trained infantry squads would be catastrophic.

  Fortunately, Generals Oliver Smith and Roy Geiger made del Valle’s points crystal clear to General Buckner. The Tenth Army commander agreed to refrain from any piecemeal commitments of the Marines. On April 24, he ordered Geiger to designate one division as a Tenth Army reserve and make one regiment in that division ready to move south in less than twelve hours. Geiger gave the mission to the 1st Marine Division, and General del Valle advanced the 1st Marines south.

  General Buckner and his senior advisers seriously debated opening a second front with an amphibious landing on the Minatoga Beaches. The bloody fighting on the Shuri front helped him decide. As casualties piled up at a shocking rate, Buckner concentrated all of his resources on one front. On April 27, he assigned the 1st Marine Division to the XXIV Corps. Over the next three days, the division advanced south and relieved the shot-up 27th Infantry Division on the right flank. The 6th Division was ordered to prepare for a similar displacement to the south.

  The long battle for the southern highlands of Okinawa was now shifting into gear.

  Throughout April and wit
h unparalleled ferociousness, Japanese kamikazes punished Fifth Fleet ships supporting the operation. The aerial battles became so intense that the western beaches received a deadly, steady rain of shell fragments from thousands of antiaircraft guns in the fleet. There were no safe havens in this battle.

  Situation at Sea

  The Japanese strategy to defend Okinawa was to make the most of the nation’s shrinking resources and zealous patriotism.

  General Ushijima planned to bloody the Allied forces in a lengthy battle of attrition, while the Japanese air forces would savage the Fifth Fleet—tethered to the island to support ground forces. Ushijima’s strategy would combine passive ground defense with a violent air offensive. Suicidal kamikaze tactics were planned on an unprecedented scale.

  By spring of 1945, the Allies understood the enemy’s decision to sacrifice planes and pilots in reckless kamikaze attacks from their time in the Philippines. Individual suicide attacks by anti-shipping swimmers near Iwo Jima and the “human bullet” anti-tank demolitions on Peleliu were common. Japanese headquarters had escalated these tactics to an overwhelming level at Okinawa. They unleashed their newest weapon: Operation Kikusui (floating chrysanthemums) devastating mass suicide airstrikes against the fleet.

  While small groups of kamikazes struck the fleet nightly and achieved some damage, the worst destruction came from concentrated Kikusui raids. The Japanese launched ten separate Kikusui attacks during the battle on Okinawa—each with over 350 aircraft. Japanese headquarters coordinated these raids and other tactical surprises, like the sacrificial sortie of the Yamato and other formidable counter-attacks. These tactics resulted in a shocking loss of life on both sides.