First day of the Somme

by Andrew Macdonald

  That the Fourth Army attack was effectively over by this time had a lot to do with senior German commanders expecting the Allied offensive to fall between Gommecourt and Estrées. General-der-Infanterie Fritz von Below, commanding Second Army, and Generalleutnant Hermann von Stein, commanding XIV Reserve Corps, had forecast that the focal point of the coalition offensive would be on the British front rather than the French, and more specifically directed at the high ground either side of the River Ancre valley, broadly between Serre and Ovillers. This was their vital ground; a British success here was seen as likely undermining XIV Reserve Corps’ tenure on the Somme, with necessary implications for all of Second Army.

  Stein, Below and Generalleutnant Franz Freiherr von Soden, 26th Reserve Division’s dynamic commander, had started converting this terrain into a virtually impregnable stronghold of tiered machine guns, artillery, earthworks, barbed wire and fortified villages from at least early 1915. The neighbouring 2nd Guards Reserve, 52nd Infantry and 28th Reserve Divisions had similarly developed their flanking positions between Gommecourt and Serre, and also from Ovillers to Fricourt. But Below and Stein always attached less value to 12th Infantry Division’s patch between Mametz and Curlu; it was too far forward of the main ridge, which made it difficult for an attacker to assemble resources, and thus the area went under-developed. If Below and Stein drove the creation of a formidable defensive network north of Fricourt, they were equally responsible for its weakness further south.

  German statistics reveal much about the effectiveness of the British preparatory bombardment. Stein’s corps suffered 2500–3000 casualties during the seven days of shellfire, or 2.6–3.2% of its total 95,000 men. That meant 96.8–97.4% of its infantry, machine-gunners and artillerymen were alive in their deep dugouts and ready to deploy when battle began. Even though numerous telephone lines had been severed, the infantry and artillery were trained to operate independently and in isolation of one another. An estimated 120 (21.1%) of the roughly 570 artillery barrels supporting Stein’s line had been destroyed, which meant about 450 (78.9%) of XIV Reserve Corps’ guns remained nominally active, but among these were many ‘useless’ weapons that were ‘unable to provide sufficient support.’20 Most of Stein’s gun losses occurred between Mametz and Curlu, where the local divisional artillery had shown insufficient fire restraint, was consistently located and, also because of its underdeveloped positions, frequently destroyed. Artillery batteries north from Fricourt to Gommecourt, where greater fire discipline was practised, went comparatively undetected and survived in their better-constructed pits. Wire-cutting followed a similar pattern: about two-thirds of entanglements were reported either intact or partially intact between Serre and La Boisselle, and either absent or patchy in other places. Come 1 July the key elements of XIV Reserve Corps’ defensive scheme north of Fricourt were almost wholly intact, but further south they were damaged and vulnerable to attack.

  There were many reasons why the 24–30 June bombardment was mostly ineffective. Haig had 1769 artillery guns and howitzers to shatter the German defences and support his infantry. These were spread roughly evenly across battle fronts of his six attacking corps at a ratio of one field barrel for every 21 yards and one heavy barrel for every 57 yards. This gunstock was skewed to lighter-calibre field artillery, as was its supply of ammunition. Guns frequently failed due to overuse and poor manufacture, while many shell fuses were of dodgy quality. All of this was exacerbated by often inexperienced gunners who laboured against poor weather and visibility with nascent counter-battery techniques, inconsistent use of range charts and often questionable ground–air co-operation. Ground and air observers were impressed by the sights and sounds of the shellfire, and their reports were biased towards measuring cosmetic damage over assessing the effective breakdown of the German positions. Infantry patrol reports suggesting all was not well were marginalised, as was other naysayer commentary. Haig was seduced by upbeat observer reports summarising surface damage and did not realise his artillery lacked the firepower in terms of concentration, ammunition type and calibre to destroy or subdue the German defensive scheme.

  It is painfully obvious with hindsight that Haig directed the main part of his assault at the strongest sections of Second Army’s positions, which had emerged from the bombardment battered but very much functional. So it was, barring a few against-the-grain infantry epics, that VII, VIII, X and III Corps failed to make any lasting material gains between Gommecourt and La Boisselle. Thereafter, applying the same retrospective knowledge, it is scarcely surprising to find XV and XIII Corps, which also benefitted from a French artillery contribution, making successively better progress as the strength and defensive capabilities of German positions tapered off in their areas. The British corps-level outcomes of battle were defined not just by the ineffectiveness of Haig’s bombardment, but very much also by the level of military value that German commanders attached to the ground, and its resultant development throughout 1915 and early 1916.

  British corps commanders turned in polarised performances. Seventh Corps’ Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas D’Oyly Snow at Gommecourt did not understand the difference between a diversion and a feint, sought to draw enemy shell- and machine-gun fire onto his men and was still unable to snatch German gunners’ attention away from Serre. Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston gave prior notice that VIII Corps was attacking between Serre and Beaumont Hamel thanks to the bungled timing of the Hawthorn Ridge mine explosion and supporting barrage. Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Morland thought in straight lines at Thiepval, repeatedly trying to restart X Corps’ dead attacks while ignoring promising gains at Schwaben Redoubt. Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney’s III Corps paid severely before Ovillers and La Boisselle for his mask of competence and lack of imagination. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Horne was typically opportunistic when he bloodily failed to force the early capture of Fricourt after XV Corps’ initial gains on the back of a generally effective bombardment. Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Congreve, VC, was methodical and cautious as XIII Corps produced impressive gains against under-developed and shellfire-neutralised German positions around Montauban. These commanders’ after-battle pep talks reflected this: Snow, Hunter-Weston, Morland and Pulteney spoke bunkum and lies to dress up military failure as something else, Horne was slippery in explaining partial success and Congreve was sincere after his victory.

  A total of 175 battalions from Third and Fourth Armies, totalling about 133,175 officers and men, were involved in the 1 July fighting, whether they went over the top, remained in the British trenches or played a supporting role. A sample of 29 battalions whose bayonet strength on 1 July is accurately known reveals an average into-battle total of 761 officers and men for each, the range being 567–928.21 (Bayonet strength is the number of officers and men who actually went into battle and is lower than nominal strength, which includes a portion of men left out of battle and other soldiers detailed to the transport work, cooking duties and other ancillary tasks.) The initial attack wave at 7.30 a.m. comprised 59 whole bayonet-strength battalions and totalled roughly 44,899 soldiers of all ranks who went over the top.22 Of the remaining 116 battalions, about 75, comprising 57,075 soldiers, either followed immediately behind the first wave in direct support, or were involved in subsequent attacks throughout the course of the day. The remaining 31,201 men, across 41 battalions, were interleaved into the main attack waves, went forward piecemeal as carrying and consolidation parties or reinforcements, or remained in British lines, all too frequently under heavy German artillery and machine-gun fire.

  Tactical formations used by attacking battalions varied. Of the 134 battalions that formally attacked, 108 (80.6%) did so using closeorder tactics. Of these, 68 (50.7%) advanced in linear waves; 18 (13.4%) in linear waves followed by columns of platoons, sections or half platoons; 18 (13.4%) in columns of platoons or sections; and 4 (3%) in section columns. A further 9 (6.7%) adopted open-order artillery formation, with 14 (10.5%) a blend of linear wave, col
umns of platoon and sections, followed by some elements in artillery formation. The formation of advance used by 3 (2.3%) battalions is unknown. These figures do not include battalions committed piecemeal, whether providing reinforcements, or acting as carrying, consolidation or mopping-up parties. Nevertheless, the conventional imagery of unwavering lines of British infantry advancing into a tornado of German artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire23 is more than 80% correct.

  Of the 59 battalion units leading the attack, excluding minor elements of 7th Buffs, 51 (86.4%) did so in close-order formation. Of these, 38 (64.4%) advanced in linear-wave formations, with 9 (15.3%) progressing in linear waves followed by columns of platoons, sections or half platoons. Four (6.7%) moved forward in columns of sections. Eight (13.6%) of the 59 battalions led with linear-wave, or columns of platoons, or sections formations, followed by elements in artillery formation. Of the 59, 36 (61.8%) are known to have deployed in no-man’s-land before 7.30 a.m. — 26 of them between 7.23 a.m. and 7.29 a.m., but on 10 occasions between 7.10 and 7.20 a.m. — with a view to getting closer to the German front line before the barrage lifted. Another 75 battalions went forward to the attack immediately behind the leading wave, or some hours later. Of these, 57 (76%) did so in close order, whether in linear waves, columns of platoons and sections or section columns. Nine (12%) advanced in artillery formation, while six (8%) used some form of closeorder structure followed by at least some elements in artillery formation. A further 43 battalions were either partially interleaved into those attacking, worked on communication trenches, carried ammunition and supplies, consolidated captured ground, deployed piecemeal as reinforcements, or remained in British lines.

  Where the preparatory shellfire had cut the German wire and substantially suppressed artillery–infantry resistance, these tactics produced results. This was the case for 7th, 21st, 18th (Eastern) and particularly 30th Divisions between Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban. Where German defensive obstacles remained there was no hope — as 29th and 31st Divisions’ respective debacles at today’s Newfoundland Memorial Park, near Beaumont Hamel, and Sheffield Memorial Park, near Serre, so painfully testified, along with the majority of 8th and 34th Divisions before Ovillers and La Boisselle, and most of 32nd Division at Thiepval. However, if the wire was either cut or patchy and the German infantry garrison and gunners further back were only briefly suppressed or slow in reacting, local break-ins were possible, at least until an organised enemy infantry–artillery fightback began. This was the lot of 46th (North Midland) and 56th Divisions at Gommecourt, 4th Division at Heidenkopf, 29th Division at Hawthorn Ridge, 36th (Ulster) Division at Schwaben Redoubt, and a portion of 8th Division at Nab Valley. The success or failure of British infantry tactics was not so much linked to the formation of advance alone, but rather to the level of the preparatory bombardment’s effectiveness.

  Barrages used to cover the infantry’s passage across no-man’s-land varied in effectiveness. Where the seven-day bombardment had left the wire cut or patchy, the infantry was often able to cross over and break into the German line, but only if the supporting barrage suppressed remaining enemy infantry, machine-gunners and artillerymen (including those further back and in neighbouring sectors) for long enough. This facilitated a handful of generally short-lived incursions by the northern III, VII, VIII and X Corps, and also the more substantial break-ins further south by XV and XIII Corps. Fifteenth Corps’ infantry benefitted from a creeping barrage that rolled forward in consistent intervals of time and distance. XIII Corps’ infantry was supported by a fire plan that involved a timed curtain of shellfire that stepped forward over the German positions, rather than creeping. In the case of XV and XIII Corps, the barrage mostly covered infantry until it reached the German parapet, but not always, as 7th, 18th (Eastern) and 21st Divisions discovered in places. In most cases the supporting barrage either lifted off the German front line too quickly, outpaced the infantry, or both.

  Thereafter the men’s fortunes were linked to how effective the prebattle bombardment had been in suppressing or destroying enemy resistance and sweeping away defensive obstacles. This explains the German infantry’s eradication of most of the initial gains by the four northern corps, and varying difficulties experienced by 7th, 18th and 21st Divisions, and to a much lesser extent 30th Division, in obtaining their objectives between Fricourt and Montauban. Providing artillery support for infantry as it moved forward was essential, but 1 July revealed that the success of that shellfire in breaking down obstacles and suppressing resistance was linked both to its own density and pace, and also very much to the preparatory bombardment’s performance beforehand.

  Nineteen mines of varying sizes were blown along Fourth Army’s front, and these produced generally disappointing results. Of the massive mines, Hawthorn Ridge (40,600 pounds) facilitated a minor gain by 29th Division near Beaumont Hamel. However, its 7.20 a.m. detonation gave defenders in that area and much further afield a 10-minute warning of Third and Fourth Armies’ attack. At La Boisselle, Y-Sap (40,600 pounds) had no discernible benefit for 34th Division, while the double-core Lochnagar blast (60,000 pounds) allowed a permanent footing against the overall grain of battle for that division just south of La Boisselle. Two 8000-pound mines designed to wreck German tunnels at the Glory Hole, just outside La Boisselle and not under direct attack, were of no benefit to the 34th. Several mines at The Tambour, east of Fricourt, probably helped 10th West Yorkshires’ initial waves, but only two of three (9000 pounds, 15,000 pounds and 25,000 pounds) blew — the largest of the three failed to detonate because its chamber had flooded prior to battle. In each of these cases German casualties were considerably fewer than expected, and the defenders quickly recovered. Around Mametz, the Bulgar Point mine (2000 pounds) before 7th Division and Casino Point mine (5000 pounds) in front of 18th (Eastern) Division also helped the infantry forward, but better preparatory and supporting artillery work in this area was also a material factor. This was also the case for seven 200–500-pound mines blown around Mametz for the 7th, three of which were on ground not under direct attack, plus two more 500-pound mines north of Carnoy in the 18th’s area. ‘Though many mines were fired,’ opined the official historian, ‘they were too much scattered up and down the front to produce a noticeable effect on the enemy.’24

  All of these factors, as well as a lack of surprise across the fronts of Third and Fourth Armies, profoundly affected the tactical outcome of the battle. German soldiers had observed the steady accumulation of men and materiel, which led to their commanders divining as early as February 1916 that a heavy British attack was being prepared. The beginning of the five- and then seven-day bombardment only flagged the attack’s imminent arrival. The cutting of gaps in the British wire for infantry to pass through, the laying of rickety wooden bridges for infantry to cross their own trenches and the obvious digging of jumping-off ditches in some areas of no-man’s-land further confirmed this. British soldiers taken captive in trench raids provided more details to their captors, and further information was intercepted by subterranean listening devices that tuned in to insecure and uncoded telephone communications. All of this meant German commanders very much expected Haig’s attack, while the blowing of the Hawthorn Ridge mine alerted German defenders between Gommecourt and at least Ovillers and La Boisselle that the moment had arrived. The vast majority of German infantrymen and machine-gunners had survived the preparatory bombardment and were for the most part ready and waiting to meet the British attack up to 10 minutes before it began.

  RAWLINSON AND HIS retinue began the day in an ‘observation fort’ known as the Grandstand on a hillock near Albert.25 From here he had a sweeping view over the hazy battlefield. Rawlinson had returned to his Querrieu headquarters by 9.20 a.m.26 Initial battle reports were already being telephoned in. From these calls a skeleton outline of progress was assembled.27 ‘The battle has begun well,’ Rawlinson noted.28 ‘Bombardment was good and stokes [sic] mortars seem to have been a success. The villages of Serre, B. Hammel [si
c] and Thiepvaal [sic] seem to be sticking us up but south the III, XV and XIII Corps seem to be getting on well. The French on our right are also going strong and have taken the Bois Favier [sic].’29 In sum, Rawlinson was well aware by 9.20 a.m., almost two hours after Zero, that all was not going quite to plan: attempts to form a defensive left flank on Serre Heights were proving troublesome and positive progress already seemed to be skewed to the southern half of the battlefield, which was correct around Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban for XV and XIII Corps but not so for III Corps on the killing grounds before La Boisselle and Ovillers.

  Shortly after noon Rawlinson had markedly tempered his initial assessment. He knew Montauban had fallen to XIII Corps, mistakenly believed Serre had been taken by VIII Corps and had been informed that Beaumont Hamel, Thiepval, Ovillers, Fricourt and Mametz were proving stubborn.30 Further bombardments were needed.31 ‘The 18, 30, 31 and 36 Divisions seem to have done the best so far.’32 These assessments are broadly confirmed by Fourth Army’s summary of operations.33 More specifically, 36th (Ulster) Division’s stellar break-in at Schwaben Redoubt was known of, while it was believed 31st Division had men digging in around Serre. Fourth Division was in Heidenkopf, and 32nd Division was thought to have elements in Thiepval and definitely held Leipzig Redoubt. Third Corps apparently had men ‘well over’ the German second line, some bound for Contalmaison, Peake and Bailiff Woods or ‘close in front of Pozières.’34 La Boisselle was free of enemy, but the situation in Ovillers was unclear. Further south, XV Corps had effectively flanked Fricourt and was in the process of taking Mametz. Thirteenth Corps’ 30th Division had seized Montauban. The neighbouring 18th (Eastern) Division was still some time away from pulling up alongside the 30th. From these reports Rawlinson noted at 12.15 p.m. that ‘progress in the centre [of Fourth Army’s battle front] is therefore slow whilst the flanks are secured.’35