Arsènal

by Alex Fynn

  With their unbeaten run ended, once inside the tunnel the Arsenal players let their opponents know how unfairly they felt they had been treated, resulting in an argument between the two managers. Ferguson, at the door of the visitors’ dressing room told Wenger to control his players, before some post-match refreshment was thrown at the United manager, although precisely what it was is dependent on which tabloid version of events that became known as ‘Soupgate’ and ‘Pizzagate’ is to be believed. What is in no doubt is that such was the extent of the melee, United’s security staff had to separate representatives of the two clubs. Wenger probably felt that he had been stitched up by his bête noire so there was never any likelihood of him admitting that maybe there should be some internal self-questioning and recrimination. Unfortunately, this holier-than-thou position ceded the moral argument to Ferguson, who was able to claim with some justification, his own reputation as a bad loser notwithstanding, “To not apologise for the behaviour of [his] players is unthinkable. It’s a disgrace. But I don’t expect him ever to apologise.” The hubbub aside, most critically, Arsenal failed to just accept that they had been the victims of poor refereeing and downright unlucky, and move on. Rather, a team that (as two years before) was lauded as one of the best ever club sides the world had ever seen, allowed the incident to undermine them and a more resilient Chelsea to take the initiative and establish a convincing lead in the title contest.

  The players take their cue from the manager. Arsène Wenger is a modest, self-effacing philosopher who finds it easy enough to move on from triumph, never resting on his laurels or enjoying his success. “With your club it is a love story that you expect will last forever and also accept that you could leave tomorrow,” he reflects. Which is perhaps why he agonises over defeats, running over in his mind the factors that produced the unexpected. But he doesn’t roll with the punches. Recovery takes too long, and his team seems to follow his lead. Although aware of the dangers – “the face of the manager,” he admits, “is a mirror to the health of his team” – too much time and energy are expended on self-pity. Even the Invincibles’ season was nearly halted in its tracks after elimination from the FA Cup and the Champions League in the space of four days. In their subsequent league fixture at home to Liverpool, they found themselves 2–1 down at the interval. It took what was arguably Thierry Henry’s finest performance in an Arsenal shirt to turn the game around and get the quest for the Premiership back on track with a 4–2 victory.

  The defence that season was improved by two changes, addressing the salient weaknesses that allowed the 2002/03 title to slip away. German international Jens Lehmann replaced the fading Seaman, whilst Kolo Toure, previously a utility player who had featured at both full-back positions as well as in midfield, was moved to partner Sol Campbell in the centre of the defence. His versatility endeared him to the manager – “I think about him as a centre back or right back, but sometimes I think this guy could make a centre forward. When he plays closer to the goal – in midfield or up front – he always creates chances and it’s too tempting when I think about it.” Given the importance to Wenger of keeping possession and ability on the ball – not least in defence – it is no coincidence that both Lauren and Ashley Cole played the earlier part of their careers further forward before being converted to full backs. Compared with Lee Dixon and Nigel Winterburn, the pair gave the team a great deal more threat going forward, even if defensively, they were not as tenacious as their predecessors, although Cole did improve to such an extent that he was eventually touted as one of the outstanding left backs in world football. Tony Banfield reveals “Technique and body shape are critical in all positions for Arsène. He wants full backs who can defend and when they go forward cross the ball like a winger. He doesn’t just put people in boxes.” It is Wenger’s way to envisage how changing positions can lead to optimum performance. Other examples are Thierry Henry, a winger converted to a centre forward, Emmanuel Petit, a centre back moved to midfield and Freddie Ljungberg switched from a striker to wide midfield. The only downside is that the prioritisation of possession, with seemingly suicidal passes made within the team’s own penalty area, can see some moments that frighten the living daylights out of fans who would sometimes prefer to see the ball hoofed to safety à la George Graham’s men of old. Fortunately the current crop are adept enough not to get caught out too often.

  Perhaps then, Wenger’s Arsenal should have performed better than they have in their ten consecutive Champions League campaigns. The first two (1998/99 and 1999/2000) were effectively sacrificed by the decision to play their home matches at Wembley. The sell-out crowds confirmed Arsenal had outgrown their Highbury home, but the neutral venue didn’t faze, and in some cases may even have inspired, oppon ents and they did not survive the group stage (although at least on the second occasion, their third place led to UEFA Cup involvement and the opportunity for Highbury to host European nights once again as the team progressed to the final and defeat on penalties to Galatasaray).

  The unfamiliarity of the larger stadium and its bigger pitch dimensions counted against the ‘home’ side. Wembley undoubtedly held back the team’s progress on the European platform, not least in upsetting the manager’s well-honed pre-match routine, developed to maximise the players’ focus on the job in hand and minimise extraneous distractions. Attention to detail went as far as ensuring adult movies were out of bounds (the night before a game, home or away, Premiership or Champions League, is spent at a hotel). “Films can be distracting,” Wenger believes. “I feel that once you are together you want your players to focus on the game, not on anything else.” Of the porn ban, he recalls, “I said we don’t do that and that was it, nobody said a word. I could control that, but now, if players come with a computer and want to take a porn film you cannot control it any more. Things change. Before they only had the television in the hotel.”

  At the time of the decision to use Wembley, Wenger had been in the job less than two years and did not wield the power he has since appropriated. For some time now he has done it his way. Particular care is taken with the peculiar circumstances of European competition. Home or away, the routine is the same. The players train at London Colney the day before a match and spend that night in a hotel before making their way to the stadium after their pre-match meal – consumed precisely three hours before kick-off – by coach. Even for away trips, the only variation is the length of the flight involved (travelling is a necessary evil and even domestic journeys of any distance involve flying to minimise journey time). For Champions League away fixtures the party fly from Luton in the afternoon after training in the morning, relax in the evening and return as soon as possible after the following day’s match. The opportunity for a training session at the actual venue is not taken up, a rare Wenger procedure that has not been copied. Whether or not there is an advantage to be gained from becoming accustomed to the stadium and the pitch is debatable, but for the manager, it is a variation, a distraction he doesn’t need. The hours before a game – be it an afternoon or evening kick-off – involve nothing more strenuous than a stroll or a jog.

  So, with such a precise programme is there any flexibility to accommodate any idiosyncrasies? Dennis Bergkamp, so integral to the team, was not going anywhere by plane, and although television’s The A-Team got around the phobia of BA Barracus with the aid of sedatives, fact was not about to imitate fiction. Initially, Bergkamp made the trip to the more accessible grounds by car, boat and train, sometimes using all three modes of transport on one journey. The furthest he travelled in Arsenal’s cause was probably when he played against Fiorentina in Florence in 1999. On that occasion, his contribution did not appear affected by the journey in a game Arsenal should have won but for a missed spot-kick. However, the time taken and the physical condition of the player on arrival soon had Wenger reluctantly deciding he was better off without him. The consequence was the equivalent of losing probably his key man to suspension or injury every other European match, with the adver
se affect on selection and tactics. For so many seasons Bergkamp’s link-up play was a prerequisite and the team often struggled when he was not on the pitch. He contributed so much towards the domestic trophies that one wonders whether Arsène Wenger would have signed him if he had known he would be handicapped in this way in European competition. Of course, in 1995 when Bergkamp arrived in London to play for Bruce Rioch’s Arsenal, the Champions League format was still in its infancy and had yet to evolve into the prestigious money-making phenomenon it is today. Very few clubs, if any, with serious European aspirations would sign a non-flyer now.

  Perhaps this might explain why there was no great clamour for the player’s services as he grew older and accepted the unsentimental year-at-a-time renewals that became Wenger’s policy for over-30s. In effect, such contracts were the manager’s way of saying “You might be useful to me for another season, but if necessary I can survive without you and I won’t stand in your way if you want to leave.” Most players take the option of free agency, a move and a good salary to see out their days elsewhere, with the added bonus of a better chance of a first-team starting place. But Bergkamp was happy at Arsenal, his family were settled in Hadley Wood in Hertfordshire, and he was wealthy enough not to concern himself with diminished earning power. Besides, unlike many in his trade he wasn’t materialistic. As he said when he arrived at Highbury, “I never believed in star status,” and so easily adapted to the cameo role of the bit-part player. Ironically, Arsenal came closest to winning the Champions League in his final year at the club, by which time he had been phased out of the starting line-up, with compatriot Robin van Persie, José Antonio Reyes and Emmanuel Adebayor all ahead of him in the queue for the strikers’ positions.

  In Europe that season of 2005/06, Wenger often fielded a 4–5–1, leaving Thierry Henry to forage alone in attack whilst withdrawing his second striker into the midfield. It was a relatively new approach on the manager’s part and the team was visibly more compact in the centre when not in possession. The notion of the second striker playing off the front man in the way Bergkamp sometimes did was dispensed with; this was no 4–4–1–1. It had been employed in the previous season’s FA Cup Final (with Bergkamp as the lone front man) in desperation due to Wenger’s con viction that his team was ‘physically gone’ and in his view there was no alternative. On that occasion, Lady Luck was probably Arsenal’s outstanding contributor in a victory over Manchester United, secured via a penalty shoot-out after 120 tortuous minutes that was ill-deserved. So although Wenger will never go so far as to prepare a plan to deny his rivals, dire circumstances and the Champions League can force a more cautious approach, a rare concession of sorts. Of course the choice over when and where to involve Bergkamp was in the past now he was playing out his final year in a supporting capacity, which may have influenced the decision to deploy a line of five across the centre. The battle for midfield control often determines the outcome of European encounters. In past seasons, Arsenal were too dependent on Patrick Vieira and it was asking too much of one man to win the midfield battle almost single-handedly. Despite Vieira’s heroics, there simply weren’t enough tackles being made. Similarly, in defence, there was not enough quality support and cover to aid Sol Campbell. So when Henry and Pires flourished, they did so as a result of their own gifts and in spite of the system which was often fire-fighting rather than providing them with a solid platform on which they could freely express themselves.

  When in possession with 4–5–1, there was no lack of flair, but the extra body in midfield aided the backline, and Arsenal were able to compile a Champions League record for not conceding a goal that spanned 12 fixtures. It was as if the manager, having reached a semi-final with Monaco in 1994, had finally remembered how to tackle the particular exigencies of the competition. Arsenal had tried and failed so many times to make the last four that he could not be credited with a tactical masterstroke after all this time, but rather, just trying something less adventurous that Henry, although not liking the role, could see the sense of: “[In the Champions League] we always played against teams who wanted to play positively apart from Juventus. We persevered with 4–5–1 and it worked well.”

  By not needing to alter the team between home and away legs, Arsenal developed a greater harmony and advanced to the final, taking the notable scalps of Real Madrid and Juventus en route. Bergkamp’s last competitive duty for the club was for the final against Barcelona in Paris. With plenty of time to recover from the short trip by Eurostar, he was available for selection. However, it was no surprise that he only made the bench, and with stamina a priority due to the reduction to ten men after only 18 minutes with Jens Lehmann’s dismissal (in tandem with the sacrifice of Robert Pires to make way for Manuel Almunia to keep goal) there was no chance of him making a valedictory appearance. Arsenal lost the final 2–1, Bergkamp a mere spectator. It was sad that he should be joined by Pires to watch the concluding 72 minutes, who it later transpired had also made his last bow in an Arsenal shirt.

  The match turned out to be a watershed. Not only would the team never again grace their historic Highbury home, but three more of those who appeared would be joining Pires in bidding farewell. Sol Campbell, Ashley Cole and José Antonio Reyes never played for the club again. Following the loss of Patrick Vieira and before him Ray Parlour, could the dressing room now come to terms with the absence of so many key men? Could Arsène Wenger rebuild once again? And would he have to do it without his captain and star player?

  CHAPTER SIX

  TURNING OVER

  May 17th 2006. In the changing room of the vanquished Champions League finalists, Thierry Henry walked over to Arsène Wenger. “I looked him straight in the eye and I simply said, ‘I am staying,’” Henry reported. Arsène Wenger shook his hand and replied, “I knew it. I was certain.” And yet, Henry had made up his mind only moments before. (The first that his wife, Clare, or his friend, David Dein, knew of the decision was on the plane returning to England.)

  If the preceding 90 minutes of action had unfolded in a different manner, he might have made his own final appearance in an Arsenal shirt. Having resolved his quandary, it was easy to deny that possibility. “It was a decision made from the heart,” he said later, “and if on losing I decided to stay, how much stronger would the feeling have been if we had won?” He went on to explain: “Despite everything wonderful that I envisaged [at Barcelona] it was not as strong as the relationship with my club. I wanted to be seen like a [Paolo] Maldini. When someone spoke about Arsenal, they spoke about me and when they spoke about me, they were speaking about Arsenal.” The decision to stay may have been influenced by a very generous loyalty bonus paid upfront that became apparent when the club’s accounts for the period were published.

  The final had not been played in a good spirit. Henry, in particular, had been singled out for gratuitous attention from opponents who most observers believed would soon be his teammates. He was surprised and disillusioned at their behaviour. Equally disillusioned was Robert Pires. From his perspective, his sacrificial substitution that allowed Manuel Almunia to fill in for the dismissed goalkeeper Jens Lehmann made his mind up about leaving for La Liga’s Villarreal. “I try not to live with regrets,” he reflected later. “I had to make a choice and, at that moment, it was painful to do it but I felt that regarding what happened during the final, I lost Arsène Wenger’s confidence. I wasn’t thinking about it before but, for me, it has been the trigger. It was the Champions League final in France, in front of all the family, all the French. So, for me, it has been the signal. He [Wenger] had plenty of options. I don’t know who I would have substituted but, for me, it was the fatal blow.”

  If Arsenal had a full complement on the pitch, they would certainly have been able to push Barcelona much harder and might even have emerged victorious. Their confident start showed they were not in awe of their opponents and with two attacking formations the outcome could have remained in doubt until the very end. If Henry had lifted the trophy, he
would have been able to depart reassured that he had given his side as much as he could, and that he was not leaving them in the lurch at a critical time of change. And Pires might have been content to accept the kind of arrangement Dennis Bergkamp had in his latter years. He wanted to feel appreciated, even if he felt he wasn’t going to start every game as a matter of course (a situation already occurring due to the competition for places and his own advancing years).

  Losing Pires was a blow, but Henry’s decision to stay was crucial. Scheduled to move to their new home in the summer of 2006, Arsenal needed to provide value for money to a much larger audience of 60,000, of whom 9,000 would be asked to pay – on a fortnightly basis – the kind of sums that buy the best seats at a World Cup Final. In short, top of the bill stars who would both entertain and ensure the club contests the big prizes were essential, especially as they were not going to open the new ground as European champions.

  Two days after the defeat in Paris, a press conference was called at which Thierry Henry, Arsène Wenger and David Dein all looked very pleased with themselves as it was announced that the number 14 shirt would continue to be worn by its present occupant. With a year remaining on his existing deal, Arsenal were in no position to let him see it out and leave for nothing in 2007. So it had came down to a choice of Henry either signing a new contract or moving on so that the club could receive substantial recompense on their investment.