Arsènal
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Wenger though had different priorities. He had to ensure that if, financially, things did not work out, he had a young group who would grow older together and that, in the worst case scenario, would have some sell-on value. “My priority will always be to keep the players I already have,” he says, “because above all I believe in the virtues of teamwork. And one can only maintain and develop the players by communicating a culture, a culture which passes from generation to generation.” In the short term, trophies would actually be a bonus. It was a delicate balancing act, operating with a miniscule budget compared to his rivals whilst keeping his team competitive enough to ensure Champions League football, with its attendant (and essential) income.
The corollary at the start of the 2006/07 season was a largely inexperienced squad. The opening skirmishes at the Emirates saw Henry and Ljungberg start, although their injury woes soon gave the fans a glimpse of the future. Aside from Gilberto and William Gallas, the oldest outfield squad members were 25-year-olds Tomas Rosicky and Kolo Toure. So much for Wenger’s optimum ages. By his own criteria, only William Gallas was playing at the peak of his powers. His qualifying assessment, “because they have exceptional talent they play already”, was still to be proved.
Compared to the past there were a high number of home draws in the first half of the Premiership campaign – five in the first nine fixtures. A pattern emerged as a result of unworldliness on the one hand and exceptional stamina and fitness on the other. Either Arsenal scored first, and went on to a comfortable victory, or conceded the lead and then salvaged a draw, often equalising right at the death as the visitors visibly wilted under the pressure. But it was often naivety – specifically a lack of concentration – that sometimes handicapped them when they fell behind. Still, the omens were good. As the team gradually became accustomed to their new surroundings, results improved. The concluding ten league matches saw only five points dropped, compared with twice as many from the first nine. They even came from behind to beat eventual champions Manchester United, and taken in conjunction with a victory at Old Trafford, the conviction grew that, with greater consistency, this young side could challenge their free-spending rivals.
Wenger believes that “the elevation of the general physical level has made the game faster and therefore you need a minimum high standard of physical ability to survive, even if you have experience and talent. So, instead of driving at 100 miles an hour football is now 150 miles an hour. So at 150 mph you can use your experience, but you must be [physically] capable of driving at 150 mph. The physical level of any team in the Premier League compared to ten years ago is higher. Because every new generation is better prepared. And the measurement of the physical performances of the players has kicked out some players who were not at the level.”
Certainly the Arsenal squad for the first seasons at the Emirates, with at least two players for every position, was numerically as strong as any other. However, due to the lack of experience, there was less quality in depth. So, needing to overturn a 1–0 deficit against PSV in the home leg of the Champions League game, Wenger fielded Gilberto at centre back whilst the raw Johan Djourou remained on the bench. In central midfield there were two teenagers. No one questioned the selection of the precocious Fabregas, but was Denilson the right partner? Up front Emmanuel Adebayor, yet to notch his first Champions League goal, was partnered by Julio Bapista who, outside of the Carling Cup, had scored a total of two goals since his arrival on loan from Real Madrid. Arsenal’s scorer on the night? A PSV player putting through his own net. It was not enough. In desperation, Wenger was forced to send on an unfit Thierry Henry for his final appearance in a futile attempt to score a second goal. PSV qualified thanks to a late equaliser.
With every passing transfer window since Wenger splashed out on Theo Walcott, Adebayor and Abou Diaby in January 2006, Arsenal’s supporters became increasingly frustrated at the small amount of chequebook activity, not least because with the club at last on more solid financial ground and the board’s pronouncements of available fund ing, the only restraint on the manager is his own parsimony. Many fans believe the squad is simply not strong enough, doubting Wenger’s faith in the younger players, or indeed that certain of the older ones that he has signed (such as Pascal Cygan) were ever good enough in the first place. What is revealing about the youthful inflow is that, in spite of not paying huge sums to get them, Arsenal’s 2006/07 wage bill (£89.7 million) was similar in size to that of Manchester United, though at just over 50% of turnover is way below the Premiership average (Chelsea write their own rules with staff costs of over £100 million). The message seems to be that even if Arsène Wenger now chooses not to shop at Harrods, once he has bought what he wants, he is determined to hang onto it if he can (without undermining the club’s wage structure).
With a combined budget for transfer activity and player wages, the Arsenal manager knows his limits, though they have been considerably extended as a result of the high rise in income: the Emirates effect. If former managing director Keith Edelman is taken at his word (“Arsène has got sufficient funds for any signing he wishes to make”) Wenger chooses not to spend everything he has available to him. Towards the end of the 2006/07 season, Peter Hill-Wood, Danny Fiszman and Arsène Wenger met up for dinner at Wiltons, a renowned West End restaurant. Hill-Wood recalls, “At the end of the dinner, we were talking about a new contract for him. And Danny said, ‘Arsène, if we gave you £100 million to spend, what would you do?’ And this was exactly his remark. ‘I’d give it back.’ Good, nice to hear it.”
It is apparent that the manager places more importance on keeping happy those he has taken time and energy to find and develop than he does taking a chance on expensive new additions. “I will always stick to the same policy,” Wenger explains, “but if there is a guy who could one day reach out to another level and will cost a fortune, we could nevertheless buy him.” It would be inaccurate to claim that Wenger used to sign current stars, as really only Marc Overmars, Davor Suker, Sol Campbell and William Gallas ever arrived with well-established reputations that the manager was never going to markedly enhance. But it could certainly be argued that Arsenal had more success when there was stiffer competition for places, with experienced campaigners often unable to get a start. At no point in their careers at the club could the likes of Kanu, Sylvain Wiltord, Edu, Gilles Grimandi and Oleg Luzhny claim that they had a first-team place nailed down. That resource disappeared with the stadium move and cries for its return have seemingly fallen on deaf ears.
Is it possible that, in reaction to what Wenger has referred to as “financial doping” (a veiled attack on certain clubs’ extravagant spending) he has decided to build a team in a completely different way, declining to engage in any auction? Could he be reluctant to spend his budget by way of proving a point? Namely, anyone can buy success, but there is another way: constructing a side stuffed full with players produced by his own coaching methods. “You may forget that one of the joys of team sports is the development of a group who have been together for some time,” reflects Wenger. “Take the example of this young Arsenal team [2007/08]. They have grown up together which means they have also suffered together and shared the pain. When you think about the disappointments of last season, I feel in spite of everything it was a turning point. We held on. We never gave up and we always fought. I said to myself, ‘There is something special there, a mental strength that will surprise people when it goes well.’”
Granted, the approach is almost certainly a result of (financial) necessity being the mother of (youthful) invention, but how many other managers could have produced a team on such meagre resources that sells out a 60,000 stadium on a habitual basis? And not only that, but wherever in the world they play, Arsenal attract crowds as glamour opposition, a consequence of the regular broadcasting of their Premiership adventures and the sheer entertainment value they provide. So now Milan or Real Madrid versus Arsenal is an 80,000-plus sell-out as a live event with millions more around the w
orld watching the television spectacular. Indeed, the Arsenal versus Milan Champions League first leg in February 2008 had more commentary teams covering the game in the flesh than any previous match in the competition’s history outside the final. Wenger’s young team are top of the bill, as he concurs: “I think we are more respected in Europe because of eight or nine consecutive seasons in the Champions League. Everywhere we go it looks like it is a big, big game. We had to gain respect and we are [now] looked upon as a big scalp.” (Gooners still chuckle at Zinedine Zidane’s response when a journalist asked him if he almost joined Tottenham earlier in his career. The answer – “Who?” – would never have been given about Arsenal.)
The significance of Europe is uppermost in Wenger’s mind. Firstly, continued participation goes a long way towards underpinning his budget. Secondly, in his own mind, the absence of the Champions League trophy is a gaping hole in his CV that he is determined to fill in before his work at Arsenal is complete. “I want to win the Champions League but it’s step by step,” he says. “And to win not once but two or three times, to go into the history of European football.” And if he can do it with his ‘third’ Arsenal side, it will be the supreme achievement, against all the odds.
CHAPTER SEVEN
MOVE ALONG NOW
In the summer of 1998 Arsenal announced that their upcoming Champions League matches would not be staged at their own home. As newly crowned Premiership champions the club, for the first time since 1991, had qualified for the rebranded European Cup. In the intervening seven years the competition had undergone a dramatic makeover. So much so that Arsenal were apparently unwilling to meet the stipulated commercial criteria demanded by UEFA. The broadcasters and sponsors who underwrote the competition and provided the huge financial rewards required literally hundreds of tickets, hospitality and parking spaces. Highbury might not have been ideal, but with a little effort and imagination the obligations could have been fulfilled. Somehow, the venue that could not cope in 1998 and 1999 was subsequently able to host six campaigns when the club’s original choice of Wembley Stadium began the process of reconstruction. The club bit the bullet and moved a couple of hundred Highbury season-ticket holders from their prime West Stand seats. They also had to leave the first four pitchside rows empty, presumably irritating more fans, so that the perimeter advertising boards of the Champions League sponsors could have the necessary impact. As a result, capacity was reduced to 35,500.
But the main reason behind the decision to sacrifice a large measure of home advantage and play at Wembley in 1998 was that the directors knew only too well that more and more potential revenue was being lost with every successive home fixture. Moving the Champions League matches to a venue that could accommodate over 70,000 would give them a firm idea of how many people might be prepared to pay to watch the team if more tickets were available. And of course they could make more money if their hunch proved correct.
The trio of group-stage opponents – Dynamo Kiev, Panathinaikos and Lens – were hardly the stuff of legend to fire the imagination of the Gooner multitude, so as insurance against the potential embarrassment of banks of empty seating, prices were heavily discounted, with thousands available at £10. And it worked, as all three matches easily sold out. However, the downside of the exercise was that Arsenal went out, finishing third despite the questionable standard of the opposition, group winners Dynamo Kiev excepted. At least the following season, there was less disgrace in being eliminated by Barcelona and Fiorentina, although the exit was still a terrible letdown after creditable away draws against both clubs. Arsenal had not bargained for the opposition, without exception, raising their game, stimulated by the prospect of playing at one of the historic homes of football. Although these appear in the Arsenal record books as home fixtures, there was no question that effectively they took place at a neutral venue.
At least the third match of the group against unglamorous Swedish opponents provided the reassurance that Arsenal could fill the high capacity whoever they were playing. “What really opened my eyes,” Arsène Wenger later reflected “was that when we played against [AIK] Solna in the Champions League at Wembley we sold 74,000 seats and the opponent wasn’t anybody exceptional.” “Why?” asked David Dein rhetorically. “Because we had 20,000 seats at £10. We simply have to have a bigger stadium. We are at a dis advantage [at Highbury]. You go to Old Trafford and they’ve got over 60,000 of their own fans behind them. People want to see us. Now is the time to act.” Ultimately, from a market ing point of view at least it was an invaluable experiment, albeit at the cost of effectively delaying the team’s learning process on the continent by a couple of seasons.
To even begin to satisfy their potential customers, the board would have to look at leaving Highbury for good. The Wembley experience created an about turn in the directors’ plans. Chairman Peter Hill-Wood recalls, “We had a board meeting and decided to look at building a new stadium and we agreed unanimously we wouldn’t move, and then we changed our mind. I think you’ve always got to be prepared to do that.” To David Dein the marble halls were history. “We are treading water,” he said. “What we are doing now [by being at Highbury] is to keep putting prices up in order to try to meet overheads and you now have a different supporter profile. And that in my opinion is not right.”
Worried about the impending drain on resources that building a new stadium would entail and how it might affect the playing side, Dein continued to press for other options with Wembley at the top of his list of candidates. He wanted Arsenal to consider returning to Wembley with its re-opening scheduled for 2003. He felt that if Wembley became Arsenal’s permanent home it would in time become a stronghold, just as it had been for England for decades. Of course the stadium would be owned by the FA, still staging cup finals and England internationals, and Arsenal would be its partner by virtue of providing the bulk of its turnover. It was an unusual concept – with matchday and event income more than covering the fixed and variable costs of building and administration providing the unlikely scenario of relegation was avoided.
However, when it came for support for his Wembley plan Dein was soon in a minority of one. “I think that the rest of the board felt that [Dein’s] judgment was quite wrong,” said Peter Hill-Wood. “Whether he had a different agenda to the rest of us is a moot point. We were convinced that we had to have our own stadium. To be tenants of the FA at Wembley with an ever-increasing rental didn’t make any financial sense.” It would have been unheard of for a top-tier British club not to own their own home, although a common arrangement in Italy where a stadium is often owned by the local authority and sometimes hosts more than one team, such as Rome’s Stadio Olimpico (shared by Roma and Lazio) and the San Siro (home of AC Milan and Internazionale). The vice-chairman’s view was based on a belief that the immediate here and now was what counted and, if successful, the future would take care of itself.
His co-directors did consider buying Wembley outright. “We actually made a bid before the FA bought it [from Wembley plc],” confirms Hill-Wood. “It would not have been the right answer but we were serious about it.” This was a bizarre standpoint considering the club’s poor playing results at the national stadium. Arsenal were prepared to ignore the maxim that to have a successful business you first have to have a successful team. Apart from the attendances, Wembley had provided little evidence it could replace the stronghold that was Highbury. However, the argument was soon academic. The old venue hosted its final match in autumn 2000, with the FA aiming to replace the existing structure and re-open for business within three years. A seemingly never-ending succession of construction, financial and legal problems resulted in the new Wembley eventually staging its first match several months after the Emirates was up and running.
Another option for Arsenal was to locate near the M25 motorway in Hertfordshire, which would have allowed for easier access by car, and little in the way of ‘NIMBY’ objections or construction constraints. However, while parking problems woul
d have been mitigated, there would have been fewer links to public transport and due to its lack of proximity to the West End and the City, the corporate hospitality market, not least for midweek matches, would have been more difficult to attract.
The club were persuaded to change their focus away from greenfield sites by Antony Spencer, a partner of land agents Anthony Green and Spencer. Initially involved with the board as a conduit for the Eurostar development at Kings Cross – Eurostar wanted to incorporate Arsenal in their plans for a new station – Spencer quickly recognised that there were insoluble problems with that concept and switched his attention to coming up with an alternative even closer to home. Superimposing an exact to scale footprint of the Wembley Stadium site on the London N5 section of the A–Z, the possibility of Ashburton Grove leapt off the page at him. A triangle of land sandwiched between the London to Glasgow railway line, the Hornsey Road and Queensland Road, housing a council waste depot and several small businesses, the site was just about big enough for a stadium but obtaining planning permission would be problematic to say the very least.