Eyes on Target: Inside Stories From the Brotherhood of the U.S. Navy SEALs

by Scott McEwen

  The gear on display looked like an arms deal gone bad on the streets of Mogadishu. M-4s were the common gun of choice, outfitted with multiple thirty-round magazines and ten-inch close-quarter combat barrels. All guns had some form of laser sighting. The next most popular weapon was the venerable AK-47 in various configurations. While cheap in this part of the world, it was still the most common assault weapon for very good reason. It was reliable, and very easy to get ammo for virtually anywhere in the world, even from the bodies of slain enemies. They also had an assortment of semiautomatic pistols (generally .45 caliber), and 40 mm (mic-mic) grenade launchers. Ammunition and other weapons were shared among the group, not so much because anyone was in need but more to assure them that they were in this to the last round that anyone was still able to fire.

  The officer in command was on loan to the CIA from a special operations unit working elsewhere in the sands of North Africa. The distance between Benghazi and Tripoli is 406 miles. The cruising speed of a US C-130 is approximately 345 miles per hour. Therefore, the flight time between Tripoli and Benghazi was no greater than one hour fifteen minutes.

  A C-130 airplane had been regularly scheduled for the Tripoli-to-Benghazi run, though usually it moved packets of interoffice memos and cases of bottled water. Even though it had been repurposed, there was no need to even log a new flight plan.11 A total of two fire teams of eight men each were formed by the officer in charge. Each had a SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon) gunner, a radioman, and several others armed with various rifles and grenade launchers.

  They had a clear set of objectives. First, get from the airport to the CIA station as soon as possible. Second, either engage those attacking the station from the perimeter and therefore flank the enemy, or clear a path to the station and assist those already in the battle.

  They were the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), the posse riding in to the rescue. This was not the reason they were hired, but it became their mission when Americans were in jeopardy in a lonely and dangerous part of the world.

  * * *

  Reaching their objective would require that the group obtain vehicles for transport from the airport to the CIA station, which is approximately ten minutes away. The available intelligence, from radio traffic with the people at the CIA station, indicated that they were receiving some incoming sniper fire, and that the attacking force assembling at the CIA station seemed to be growing.

  Upon arrival, the QRF was initially stopped at the airport. However, after making it clear that they were not going to take no for an answer, they quickly obtained six civilian vehicles—taxicabs that cost $500 a month to rent. A ten-minute ride, even into a shooting zone, for $500 was considered fair trade. If the taxi driver survived (and likely he would), he would make two months of wages in a few minutes.

  The CIA kept reservoirs of cash for these kinds of contingencies. The men opened ziplock bags and fanned out the cash. As soon as the taxi drivers saw it, they reached for the money. “Not until we get there,” a CIA man said.

  They motioned to the old Mercedes taxis. Their attitude: Let’s get this done.

  A quick route was mapped out, and the two fire teams elected to break into two separate “trains” going into the compound area. This would allow each of them to act as backup in case the other was attacked along the way.

  After confirming the precise location of the attackers from a review of overhead drone data, each fire team mapped a path on their handheld GPS units. The first unit left for the CIA compound. Given their rides in civilian vehicles, their infiltration into the CIA station went off without a shot.

  The same was true when the second train of vehicles arrived at the location approximately ten minutes later, using a different route. The drivers took their cash and roared away in a cloud of diesel fumes.

  After a few quick moments of updating with the GRS agents at the compound, the arriving GRS agents set up an immediate perimeter defense with sniper and machine-gun kill zones completely surrounding the area around the CIA compound. The overlapping machine gun kill zones would also allow the GRS agents to effectively repel the ability of the attackers trying to bracket the CIA compound with mortar fire.

  By 4:30 a.m., the compound again began receiving probing fire from attackers; they were testing to see how close they were able to get to the perimeter. However, given the numbers and skill of the shooters on the roof of the CIA compound, the snipers were able to keep the attackers a few hundred yards away from the facility.

  At approximately 5:00 a.m., the attacking groups had built up enough courage to attempt a frontal assault on the compound. The mob was met with a fusillade of fire from sixteen battle-hardened GRS agents. Within minutes, many of the attackers lay dead or dying in the streets surrounding the compound. Their banzai charge had failed. It did, however, produce martyrs. The losses were simply too great for them to sustain the attack.

  The rising sun would make them even easier targets. Their will to fight was breaking down as they slunk away into the shrinking shadows. They were gone before the sun raised its disk over the eastern mountains.

  The American diplomats looked at each other with relief and a certain measure of disbelief. As one made coffee for the group, another said what everyone was thinking: “You know, it could have been much worse—Ty Woods and Glen Doherty could have died defending us.”

  Rescue Scenario Five

  Cruise Missile Launch

  10:00 P.M.

  Several of the ships stationed at the Gaeta naval base were equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles mounted with conventional warheads. With a flight speed of just over five hundred miles per hour, the missiles could easily make it to Benghazi within 1.5 hours. Given the location of the attackers in one central area outside the CIA station, it was determined that the best missile to launch was that containing the softball-sized cluster bomblet warhead. The exact GPS coordinates of the attacking mob were provided to the missile’s guidance control from the drone circling overhead.

  The Tomahawk missile is guided by a combination of a precision GPS, a special terrain way-point radar map, and two types of terminal guidance systems to place a warhead with literal pinpoint accuracy. The missile is designed to fly through a one-meter-square window on Earth at an exact predesignated time, and it has proven its ability to do so on thousands of occasions.12 The newest Tomahawks, called Block IVs or tactical Tomahawks, can be retargeted in flight.

  Given the possibility that the attackers might break off the attack and/or change locations prior to the missile’s arrival, it was determined that the BGM-109 Block IV would be used. Further, given the decisions to use the small bomblets, the amount of collateral damage to the surrounding structures and civilian populace would be minimized.

  The missile was launched from the destroyer at Gaeta at 3:00 a.m., after it was determined by the Pentagon that no other human and/or drone assets were capable of being used. During the hour-long flight to target, the location of the mob changed by approximately half a block to a small open area two blocks from the CIA house. The drone provided the exact location to within inches, and the targeting system on the cruise missile was reset.

  The missile hit the mob at 4:40 a.m., and essentially destroyed the entire area for an approximate 150-foot radius. All attackers within the radius were instantly killed.

  What was remaining of the attacking force staggered from the area after witnessing the complete devastation an unknown device had wrought upon them.

  * * *

  Based on a careful scrutiny of the available facts and timeline and interviews with fighter pilots, SEAL assault element leaders, and others, there were five plausible rescue options available to President Obama. Fighters could have been scrambled, armed drones dispatched, a commando Quick Reaction Force deployed, or cruise missiles launched. Instead, the president had dinner and failed to press his staff for action.

  As the experts that we interviewed made clear, none of these were exotic or Hollywood-only options. Each scenario wa
s based on the men and equipment in the theater of operations at the time, and none required those forces to do anything beyond what they had trained relentlessly to do. They are realistic alternatives.

  We may never know why the president didn’t act. Was he concerned about the political ramifications of ordering air strikes or teams into harm’s way some two months before a tough presidential election? Liberating Libya and killing bin Laden were the president’s prime foreign policy achievements. Having to fight al Qaeda (or its affiliates) to save Americans in Libya would call each of those accomplishments into question. And if the rescue mission had failed, it could have been another Desert One, the Carter-era Iranian hostage-rescue effort that killed eight men and never came close to saving a single trapped diplomat (as we described in chapter 2). Surely, these were concerns that weighed on the president’s mind.

  Still, two important points remain: the tragedy reveals the extraordinary prowess of only two U.S. Navy SEALs (Doherty and Woods) against some one hundred attackers. These two men helped save the lives of more than forty Americans against overwhelming odds, and that speaks volumes about the training and caliber of these men as individuals and as part of the SEAL teams.

  And the tragedy reveals why the SEALs are indispensible. If a team had been deployed in time, there is little doubt that Benghazi would be simply another story of these Navy commandos triumphing against seemingly impossible odds. If America is going to continue to hold the al Qaeda menace at bay, it will need men like Woods and Doherty; it will need the U.S. Navy SEALs.

  Where do these heroes come from? They are sought out and selected, they are prepared using the most demanding methods possible, and they are trained continuously to maintain their extraordinary abilities. Beyond the physical strength, mental toughness, and incredible skills, these heroes are made by a unique culture that shapes and sharpens them.

  Yet the subculture of the SEALs is dependent on a political class that understands their unique abilities and summons the courage to send them in. The SEALs cannot save anyone if the president does not send them in.

  CHAPTER 10

  Benghazi Timeline

  The narrative of the Benghazi attacks, as presented in the American media, has been scattered and episodic at best. As a result, the public failed to grasp the full meaning of the terror attacks on September 11, 2012, and the vital role that SEAL culture played in both giving lives and saving them.

  Drawing on official timelines released by the State Department, the Defense Department, and congressional reports, as well as major American news organizations and Arabic-language newspapers, we constructed what we believe is the most complete and authoritative timeline of the Benghazi tragedy.

  APRIL 5, 2011: Chris Stevens arrives in Benghazi on a Greek cargo ship. State Department spokesman Mark Toner says Stevens is “meeting with members of the Transitional National Council.”1 The Washington Post reports that Stevens is expected to stay in Libya “for several days.”2

  APRIL 7, 2011: Mark Toner says that Stevens is going to remain in Benghazi “for several more days, at least.”3 Stevens stays for months, setting up a temporary headquarters in the Tibesti Hotel.

  APRIL 26, 2011: State Department director of policy planning Jake Sullivan says that Stevens “is working on a daily basis to try to understand better who the opposition is, what they stand for, what their plans are, what their agenda is, and so forth.”4

  JUNE 1, 2011: A car bomb explodes outside the Tibesti Hotel.5 Stevens is unharmed.

  AUGUST 3, 2011: Stevens gives his only State Department press briefing. He states “there was a security vacuum when the regime fell, and they [the rebels) had to stand up very quickly to this organization called the TNC. The police, for the most part, just left their posts because they were afraid of popular reaction against them because they had committed abuses in the early days against the people. So there’s hardly any police around, and because of that vacuum, militias started to form and step in. And so looking after the security of Benghazi and eastern Libya, you’ve got a lot of militias and a few police. And this had led to some security challenges.”6

  AUGUST–DECEMBER 2011: In August 2011, American diplomats move into the compound (known as Villa C) where the September 11, 2012, attack would take place. A senior State Department official describes it in October 2011: “The compound is roughly three hundred yards long—that’s three football fields long—and a hundred yards wide. We need that much room to provide the best possible setback against car bombs. Over the next few months, physical security at the compound is strengthened. The outer wall is upgraded; its height is increased to nine feet. It is topped by three feet of barbed wire and concertina wire all around the huge property. External lighting is increased. Jersey barriers, which are big concrete blocks, are installed outside and inside the gate. Steel drop bars are added at the gates to control vehicle access and to provide some anti-ram protection. The buildings outside were strengthened.”7

  SEPTEMBER 27, 2011: Fifteen commanders of the Protective Security Brigade protest in front of Transitional National Council headquarters, saying they aren’t being provided enough equipment and the government is trying to dissolve their militia.8

  SEPTEMBER 27, 2011: In a separate protest, hundreds of people gathered in Benghazi to demand the removal of “climbers,” holdovers from the Gadhafi era who were still working for the state.9

  OCTOBER 2011: The State Department hires Blue Mountain Libya to be the primary security force protecting the American compound (Villa C) in Benghazi. The British company is little known at the time, but its $783,284 contract enables it to hire twenty Libyans to guard the compound. Eric Nordstrom, former regional security officer for the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, told congressional investigators: “It’s my understanding that there was a very high turnover with those people.” Some former Blue Mountain employees told Reuters they had “minimal training” and that they described “being hired by Blue Mountain after a casual recruiting and screening process.”10

  NOVEMBER 24–27, 2011: Students at the state-run Benghazi University hold three days of protests, claiming that they are being flunked and expelled from classes without due process.11 They portray the new transitional government as linked to the old regime in a seamless garment of corruption.

  DECEMBER 1–2, 2011: The “U.S. citizen chief of party of a U.S. based NGO” [nongovernmental organization] is held captive for thirty-six hours by the Zintan Martyrs Brigade, which raided a Libyan bachelor party attended by him to look for alcohol. The brigade detained everyone for thirty-six hours and transferred control of the men to the police, which let them go because of a lack of evidence.”12

  DECEMBER 12–13, 2011: Three thousand young people protest in Benghazi’s Shajarah Square against corruption and the allegedly large number of former Gadhafi-era figures still working for the government. Members of the Committee of Wise Men, a pro-TNC group, join a second demonstration on the second night.13

  DECEMBER 20, 2011: The Libyan government seizes 150 rocket launchers and makes scores of arrests as it claims pro-Gadhafi forces were planning to attack embassies and oil fields over Christmas and New Year’s. The operation, according to the government, was code-named Papa Noel.14

  JANUARY 2012: Salafists [Muslim radicals] destroy the Sufi cemetery of Sidi Ubaid in Benghazi and remove thirty-one corpses.15

  JANUARY 12, 2012: Azza Ali Orfi, a political activist, is beaten by two men after she left the Al-Fadhel Hotel in Benghazi.16 She is a pro-democracy, pro-American activist. Both the Libyan government and the State Department see the attack as a warning shot.

  JANUARY 19, 2012: Transitional National Council vice chairman Abdul-Hafiz Ghoga is assaulted by protesters after he attends a memorial service at Garyounis University for victims of the Libyan revolution. Ghoga subsequently resigns, saying he does not want to contribute to an “atmosphere of hatred” surrounding the government.17 His departure reveals that the new government cannot protect its senior officials.

/>   FEBRUARY 2012: Lt. Col. Andrew Wood arrives in Benghazi and notes the security situation is disintegrating. “Shooting instances occurred, [and] many instances involved the local security guard force that we were training,” he tells CBS News in October 2012. “Constantly, there were battles going on between militias, criminal activity, and that became [an] increasing danger as time went on as well.” Wood said that Ambassador Stevens “was constantly concerned about the threats to not just himself but the entire staff there.”18

  FEBRUARY 19, 2012: A militia detains U.S. Mission personnel in Benghazi after they drive through a previously unknown checkpoint. They were subsequently freed, but the diplomats report there are now twelve checkpoints between the airport and the embassy, with militia members aggressively trying to open doors and check contents of diplomatic vehicles.19

  MARCH–APRIL 2012: The number of American Diplomatic Security Service agents in Benghazi falls to one because of visa problems. (At the time of the attack on September 11, 2012 there are five—three at the consulate and two accompanying Ambassador Stevens.)20