by Scott McEwen
In sum, the events in Benghazi thus reflect this Administration’s lack of a comprehensive national security strategy or effective defense posture in the region. This singular event will be repeated unless the United States recognizes and responds to the threats faced around the world, and properly positions resources and security assets to reflect those threats. Until that time, the United States will remain in a reactionary mode and should expect many more situations like Benghazi, where those on the ground act bravely, but the United States simply fails to provide the resources for an adequate response. Ultimately, those opposed to U.S. interests will continue to take advantage of perceived U.S. weakness, the United States will continue to lose credibility with our allies, and we will face the worst of all possible outcomes in strategically important locations around the world.
Congress must maintain pressure on the Administration to ensure that the United States takes all necessary steps to find the Benghazi attackers. Congress will also articulate to the American people the true nature of the threats faced around the world, and advocate for a more robust and proper defense posture for the United States. The Committees expect the Administration to fully comply with all current and future document requests about the attacks, and the Committees will continue reviewing several outstanding questions detailed below.
In light of the facts and unanswered questions documented in this progress report, the House Armed Services Committee will continue to review:
• The U.S. government’s assumptions and risk analysis–as reflected in the U.S. military and State Department posture in Libya and the region–given the historic importance and activities of extremists and al-Qa’ida-associated groups in Libya;
• The precise nature of the intelligence, if any, that was lost by the failure of U.S. officials to gain quick access to the U.S. facilities in Benghazi after the attacks;
• U.S. policymakers’ assumptions about al-Qa’ida, the global jihad, and the use of applying U.S. military resources to weak states, ungoverned spaces, and insecure contexts;
• The 1) operational capability, 2) resourcing, 3) readiness, and 4) intelligence collection and analysis of our forces in light of the Benghazi attacks;
• The implications of the events in Benghazi for conventional forces’, the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Forces’ (FAST), and special operations forces’ training, readiness, resourcing, and posture;
• The U.S. Africa Command’s Commander in-Extremis Force (CIF) for fully operational capability and posture; and
• The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, capacity, and requirements analysis of our forces in light of the Benghazi attacks.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee will continue to review:
• The ARB process and the need to create a more independent review body with greater ability to make disciplinary recommendations;
• The responsibility of senior State Department officials for the failure to provide proper security prior to the Benghazi attacks;
• Needed improvements in embassy security; and
• The State Department’s alertness to the overall political climate and resultant terrorist threats in high-risk environments.
The House Judiciary Committee will continue to review:
• The Administration’s decision to respond to the attacks with an FBI investigation;
• The U.S. government’s access to specific detainees and potential suspects; and
• The status of the FBI investigation.
The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee will continue to review:
• Interagency coordination, information sharing, and decision making leading up to, during, and after the attacks in Benghazi, particularly with a view toward both preventing and improving the response to similar attacks in the future;
• The Administration’s lack of transparency and accountability, including providing misleading information to the public and Congress;
• The inadequacy of the Administration’s investigation of the attacks, including the decision to treat the attacks as a law enforcement matter and the shortcomings of the Accountability Review Board;
• The Administration’s treatment of personnel and whistleblowers following the attack on Benghazi; and
• Any new or outstanding issues raised by whistleblowers.
• The Committee will also amplify and support the efforts of other Committees, as requested.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence will continue to review:
• The IC’s success at identifying and tracking the attackers;
• The IC’s information sharing among agencies and the incorporation of on-the-ground information into formal intelligence channels to better allow analysts to review such information in a timely fashion; and
• The value of on-the-ground reporting versus other intelligence reporting in a crisis.
Appendix I: Oversight Activities by Committee
The Committees have thus far reviewed tens of thousands of documents, including agency and White House emails, intelligence reporting, summaries of FBI interviews, classified and unclassified cables, and the various versions of the talking points created for HPSCI and used by Ambassador Susan Rice. They have also spoken with dozens of government officials in both interviews and open testimony. As the Committees’ reviews are ongoing, they expect full cooperation and compliance by the Administration with all past and future document and interview requests.
House Armed Services Committee:
• Systematic monitoring of intelligence traffic and multiple secure calls with DoD.
• HASC staff briefings and discussions with outside experts.
• HASC Chairman formal letters of inquiry to:
President Barack Obama
General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Director of Operations, The Joint Staff
Lieutenant General Flynn, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Admiral William McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
• September 12, 2012: Staff classified briefing on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Libya.
• September 19, 2012: Full Committee hearing on the attack in Benghazi.
• October 18, 2012: Staff classified briefing on intelligence and operations related to the attack in Benghazi.
• October 29, 2012: Chairman letter to the President.
• November 20, 2012: Staff classified briefing on intelligence and operations related to the attack in Benghazi.
• November 16, 2012: Staff participated in DoD briefing to House Members.
• November 29, 2012: Full Committee, Members only, briefing on the attack in Benghazi.
• February 6, 2013: Full Committee briefing on intelligence and operations related to North and East Africa.
• March 15, 2013: Full Committee hearing on the posture of U.S. EUCOM and U.S. AFRICOM.
House Foreign Affairs Committee:
• HFAC sent six letters–individually and collaboratively with sister Committees–requesting documents and information from the State Department. Obtained a public commitment by Secretary Kerry to reassess the restricted manner by which documents have been provided to the Committee.
• Reviewed thousands of pages of documents and information produced by the State Department pursuant to this investigation. It has interviewed State Department and DoD personnel.
• Approached a DS agent who was on the scene in a not-yet-successful effort to obtain additional information. This individual wishes to remain anonymous.
• Building on its Benghazi investigation, the Committee is taking a broader look at embassy security to determine whether the State Department is adequately protecting its personnel at other diplomatic facilities. Improving embassy security is a Committee legislative priority. The Committee is p
articularly concerned about, and is currently investigating, the security situation at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan.
• November 14, 2012: Classified briefing for Committee Members and cleared staff.
• November 15, 2012: Full Committee hearing with private experts entitled, “Benghazi and Beyond: What Went Wrong on September 11, 2012, nd How to Prevent it from Happening at other Frontline Posts, Part I.”
• December 19, 2012: Classified briefing for Committee Members and cleared staff with Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen, Chair and Vice Chair of the Accountability Review Board.
• December 20, 2012: Full Committee hearing with State Department Deputy Secretaries Burns and Nides entitled, “Benghazi Attack, Part II: The Accountability Review Board Report.”
• January 23, 2013: Full Committee hearing with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled, “Terrorist Attack in Benghazi: The Secretary of State’s View.” (Committee Members submitted more than 100 Questions For the Record and have received responses to nearly all.)
House Judiciary Committee:
• Following the September 11, 2012, Benghazi, Libya, terrorist attack, House Judiciary Committee staff and members received classified briefings from IC components, including the FBI.
House Committee on Government and Oversight Reform
• September 20, 2012: Letter from National Security Subcommittee Chairman Jason Chaffetz to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton requesting documents and information related to the Benghazi attacks and Libya-related security decisions.
• September 27, 2012: Staff interview of Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wood, former commander of the Site Security Team at Embassy Tripoli.
• October 1, 2012: House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Darrell Issa and Chairman Chaffetz interview Eric Nordstrom, former Regional Security Officer at Embassy Tripoli.
• October 2, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Secretary Clinton requesting information about the State Department’s awareness of the deteriorating security environment in Libya.
• October 6, 2012: Chairman Chaffetz travels to Stuttgart, Germany, to meet with General Carter Ham, Commanding Officer, U.S. Africa Command.
• October 7, 2012: Chairman Chaffetz travels to Tripoli, Libya, to meet with Embassy leadership.
• October 9, 2012: Transcribed interview of David Oliveira, former Assistant Regional Security Officer at the Benghazi Special Mission Compound.
• October 9, 2012: Transcribed interview of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
• October 10, 2012: Full Committee hearing entitled “The Security Failures of Benghazi.”
• October 19, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to President Obama requesting information about White House involvement in Libya-related security decisions.
• October 25, 2012: Transcribed interview of Erfana Dar, former Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick Kennedy.
• October 29, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Secretary Clinton requesting information about any investigations conducted by the Department or the Government of Libya in response to the April 6, 2012, and June 6, 2012, bombings of the Benghazi Special Mission Compound.
• November 1, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Secretary Clinton requesting documents and information related to media reports about pre-attack surveillance of the Benghazi Special Mission Compound.
• November 16, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Secretary Clinton reiterating the Committee’s unfulfilled request for documents and information related to the Benghazi attacks.
• November 20, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Acting CIA Director Michael Morrell requesting an official, unclassified timeline of CIA actions in response to the Benghazi attacks.
• November 26, 2012: Letter from Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta requesting information about the U.S. military response to the Benghazi attacks.
• December 13, 2012: Classified briefing by the Defense Department on actions taken in response to the Benghazi attacks.
• January 12, 2013: Chairman Issa travels to Rota, Spain, to meet with military personnel sent to reinforce security at Embassy Tripoli immediately following the attacks in Benghazi.
• January 28, 2013: Joint letter from House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce and Chairmen Issa and Chaffetz to Secretary Clinton requesting access to all documents reviewed by, and the names of all individuals interviewed by, the Accountability Review Board.
• March 15, 2013: Members of the Committee receive a classified briefing from General Ham.
• The Committee has reviewed over 25,000 pages of classified and unclassified documents made available by the State Department.
• The Committee has heard from, and continues to hear from, multiple individuals with direct and/or indirect information about events surrounding the attacks in Benghazi.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
• Requested, received, and reviewed thousands of pages of documents, including emails, cables, and classified intelligence assessments. These documents contain various drafts of the talking points created for HPSCI and used by Ambassador Rice, and emails from Administration officials, including those from White House officials, related to the creation of those talking points. The Committee continues to submit questions for the record and receive documents from the IC on an ongoing basis.
• September 13, 2012: Full Committee classified roundtable discussion with NCTC Director Olsen.
• September 14, 2012: Full Committee classified roundtable discussion with Director of CIA, David H. Petraeus.
• November 15, 2012: Full Committee classified hearing on Benghazi attacks with officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), CIA, NCTC, DoD, FBI, and State.
• November 16, 2012: Full Committee classified hearing on Benghazi Attacks with former Director of CIA Petraeus.
• December 13, 2012: Full Committee classified hearing on efforts to find the Benghazi terrorists.
• March 19, 2013: Full Committee classified briefing led by ODNI General Counsel Bob Litt to discuss Benghazi talking points.
• The Committee staff conducted numerous staff meetings and maintains a running list of questions for the record.
• HPSCI Chairman Rogers sent a letter to Acting CIA Director Morell raising his concerns about information sharing and analytic issues uncovered to date.
Appendix II: Consolidated Timeline of Events
March-October 2011
The Libyan revolution was supported by the United States most directly in the form of NATO air operations, which lasted from March through October of 2011.
Tuesday, December 27, 2011
A State Department memorandum circulated at the end of 2011 recommended that U.S. personnel remain in Benghazi. It explained that many Libyans were “strongly” in favor of a U.S. outpost in Benghazi, in part because they believed a U.S. presence in eastern Libya would ensure that the new Tripoli-based government fairly considered eastern interests.
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
Ambassador Cretz sent a cable to Secretary Clinton requesting additional security assets. Specifically, he asked for the continued deployment of both Mobile Security Detachment (MSD) teams, or at least additional DS agents to replace them, as well as the full five DS agents which the December 2011 memorandum claimed would be stationed in Benghazi.
Friday, April 6, 2012
The Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) in Benghazi came under attack when disgruntled Libyan contract guards allegedly threw a small improvised explosive device (IED) over the perimeter wall. No casualties were reported.
Thursday, April 19, 2012
State responded to Ambassador Cretz’s request for additional security assets. The cable response to Tripoli bears Secretary
Clinton’s signature, and specifically acknowledges Ambassador Cretz’s March 28 request for additional security. Despite the Ambassador’s March request, the April cable from Clinton stipulates that the plan to drawdown security assets will proceed as planned. The cable further recommends that State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the U.S Mission in Libya conduct a “joint re-assessment of the number of DS agents requested for Benghazi.”
Wednesday, June 6, 2012
The TMF was attacked again by unknown assailants who used an IED powerful enough to blow a hole in the perimeter wall. Again, no casualties were reported.
Thursday, June 7, 2012
Ambassador Stevens made a personal plea for an increase in security. In a June 2012 email, he told a Department official that with national elections in July and August, the Mission “would feel much safer if we could keep two MSD teams with us through this period [to support] our staff and [personal detail] for me and the [Deputy Chief of Mission] and any VIP visitors.” The Department official replied that due to other commitments and limited resources, “unfortunately, MSD cannot support the request.”
Monday, July 9, 2012
A July 2012 cable from Ambassador Stevens stressed that security conditions in Libya had not met the requisite benchmarks established by the Department and the U.S. Mission in Libya to initiate a security drawdown, and requested that security personnel, including the MSD teams, be permitted to stay. After being apprised of this pending request, Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb exclaimed: “NO I do not [I repeat] not want them to ask for the MSD team to stay!” The MSD team was withdrawn, though it is unclear whether the Department ever formally rejected the Ambassador’s July request.