by Scott McEwen
Monday, June 11, 2012
Britain’s ambassador to Libya was in a convoy of cars attacked in the eastern city of Benghazi. The convoy was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). Two protection officers were injured.
Monday, August 27, 2012
U.S. officials were aware that Libya remained volatile. They were particularly concerned with the numerous armed militias that operated freely throughout the country. In August 2011, the State Department warned U.S. citizens against traveling to Libya, explaining that “inter-militia conflict can erupt at any time or any place.”
• The security environment in Benghazi was similarly deteriorating throughout 2012. From June 2011 to July 2012, then-Regional Security Officer (RSO) for Libya Eric Nordstrom, the principal security adviser to the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, compiled a list of over 200 security incidents in Libya, 50 of which took place in Benghazi. These included violent acts directed against diplomats and diplomatic facilities, international organizations, and third-country nationals, as well as large-scale militia clashes.
• In spite of these mounting security concerns, for most of 2012 the Benghazi Mission was forced to rely on fewer than the approved number of DS agents. Specifically, while the State Department memorandum signed by Under Secretary Kennedy claimed that five agents would be provided, this was only the case for 23 days in 2012. Reports indicate the Benghazi Mission was typically staffed with only three agents, and sometimes as few as one or two.
Monday, September 10, 2012
Ambassador Stevens travelled to Benghazi on September 10, 2012, both to fill staffing gaps between principal officers in Benghazi, and to allow the Ambassador to reconnect with local contacts. There were also plans for him to attend the establishment of a new American Corner at a local Benghazi school.
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACK TIMELINE
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
All times are Eastern European Time (EET, Benghazi)
~9:42 p.m. The attack begins at the TMF in Benghazi. Dozens of lightly armed men approached the TMF, quickly and deliberately breached the front gate, and set fire to the guard house and main diplomatic building. The attackers included members of Libya-based Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) and al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), among other groups. A State Department officer in the TMF’s Tactical Operations Center immediately put out calls for help to the TMF Annex—another facility for U.S. officials—the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, and State Department Headquarters in Washington, DC. At the time of the attack, Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, the information management officer, and one of the five Diplomatic Security (DS) officers were located in Villa C, the main building of the TMF. (DoD timeline/pg. 11)
9:59 p.m. An unarmed, unmanned, surveillance aircraft is directed to reposition overhead the Benghazi facility. (DoD timeline)
~10:02 p.m. Within 20 minutes of the attack, Stevens, Smith, and the DS officer suffered effects from smoke inhalation inside the main diplomatic building and tried to escape by crawling along the floor towards a window. The DS officer unknowingly lost touch with Ambassador Stevens and Mr. Smith somewhere along the smoke-filled escape route. After crawling out of a window and realizing that Ambassador Stevens and Mr. Smith were not with him, the DS officer, under gunfire, repeatedly re-entered the burning building to search for them. The DS officer used his radio to call for help. Security officers from other parts of the TMF complex responded and supported the DS officer’s search for the missing individuals. (pg. 11)
10:05 p.m. In an “Ops Alert” issued shortly after the attack began, the State Department Operations Center notified senior Department Officials, the White House Situation Room, and others, that the Benghazi compound was under attack and that “approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions have been heard as well.”
~10:07 p.m. A U.S. security team departed the Annex for the TMF. The security team tried to secure heavy weapons from militia members encountered along the route, and faced some resistance in getting to the TMF. Even in the face of those obstacles, the Annex security team arrived, under enemy fire, within 25 minutes of the beginning of the initial assault. Over the course of the following hour, the Annex security team joined the TMF security officers in searching for Ambassador Stevens and Mr. Smith. Together, they repelled sporadic gunfire and RPG fire and assembled all other U.S. personnel at the facility. Officers retrieved the body of Mr. Smith, but did not find Ambassador Stevens.
10:32 p.m. The National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, after receiving initial reports of the incident from the State Department, notifies the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The information is quickly passed to Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. (DoD timeline)
11:00 p.m. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey attend a previously scheduled meeting with the President at the White House. The leaders discuss potential responses to the emerging situation. (DoD timeline)
11:10 p.m. The diverted surveillance aircraft arrives on station over the Benghazi facility. (DoD timeline)
~11:15 p.m. After about 90 minutes of repeated attempts to go into the burning building to search for the Ambassador, the Annex security team assessed that the security situation was deteriorating and they could not continue their search. The Annex security team loaded all U.S. personnel into two vehicles and departed the TMF for the Annex. The exiting vehicles left under heavy gunfire and faced at least one roadblock in their route to the Annex. The first vehicle left around 11:15 p.m. and the second vehicle departed at about 11:30 p.m. All surviving American personnel departed the facility by 11:30 p.m.
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
12:06 p.m. In a second “Ops Alert” the State Department Operations Center reported that al-Qaeda linked Ansar al-Sharia claimed responsibility for the attack and had called for an attack on Embassy Tripoli
12:00-2:00 a.m. Secretary Panetta convenes a series of meetings in the Pentagon with senior officials including General Dempsey and General Ham. They discuss additional response options for Benghazi and for the potential outbreak of further violence throughout the region, particularly in Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, and Sana’a. During these meetings, Secretary Panetta authorizes:
• A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon, stationed in Rota, Spain, to prepare to deploy to Benghazi, and a second FAST platoon, also stationed in Rota, Spain, to prepare to deploy to the Embassy in Tripoli.
• A EUCOM special operations force, which is training in Central Europe, to prepare to deploy to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
• A special operations force based in the United States to prepare to deploy to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
During this period, actions are verbally conveyed from the Pentagon to the affected Combatant Commands in order to expedite movement of forces upon receipt of formal authorization.
12:30 a.m. A seven-man security team from U.S. Embassy Tripoli, including two DoD personnel, departs for Benghazi.
~1:15 a.m. The American security team from Tripoli lands in Benghazi. (DoD timeline)
2:30 a.m. The National Military Command Center conducts a Benghazi Conference Call with representatives from AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, SOCOM, and the four services.
2:39 a.m. As ordered by Secretary Panetta, the National Military Command Center transmits formal authorization for the two FAST platoons, and associated equipment, to prepare to deploy and for the EUCOM special operations force, and associated equipment, to move to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
2:53 a.m. As ordered by Secretary Panetta, the National Military Command Center transmits formal authorization to deploy a special operations force, and associated equipment, from the United States to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
5:00 a.m. A second, unmanned, unarmed surveillance aircraft is directed to relieve the initial asset still over Benghazi.
5:15 a.m. At around 5:15 a.m., within 15 minutes of the Tripoli team’s
arrival at the Annex from the airport, a short but deadly coordinated terrorist attack began at the Annex. The attack, which included small arms, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), and well-aimed mortar fire, killed two American security officers, and severely wounded two others.
6:05 a.m. AFRICOM orders a C-17 aircraft in Germany to prepare to deploy to Libya to evacuate Americans.
7:40 a.m. The first wave of American personnel depart Benghazi for Tripoli via airplane. (DoD timeline)
10:00 a.m. The second wave of Americans, including the fallen, depart Benghazi for Tripoli via airplane.
2:15 p.m. The C-17 departs Germany en route to Tripoli to evacuate Americans.
7:17 p.m. The C-17 departs Tripoli en route Ramstein, Germany, with the American personnel and the remains of Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, and Mr. Glen Doherty.
7:57 p.m. The EUCOM special operations force, and associated equipment, arrives at an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
8:56 p.m. The FAST platoon, and associated equipment, arrives in Tripoli.
9:28 p.m. The special operations force deployed from the United States, and associated equipment, arrives at an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
10:19 p.m. The C-17 arrives in Ramstein, Germany.
END OF SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACK TIMELINE
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
• FBI formally opens an investigation into the deaths of Ambassador Sevens and the three other Americans killed in the attack.
• Relying on analytical intuition with limited reporting on September 12, 2012, IC analysts correctly evaluated soon after the attacks that the event was a terrorist attack against a U.S. facility, likely conducted by Islamic extremists.
Thursday, September 13, 2012
Beginning on September 13, 2012, analysts began receiving and relying on a larger volume of diverse intelligence reporting that referenced protests and demonstrations in Benghazi. Analysts revised their assessments again to determine finally that the attack was deliberate and that a protest was not occurring at the time of the attack. The IC’s modification of its assessments reflects the reasonable evolution of tactical intelligence analysis.
Saturday, September 15, 2012
HPSCI staff received the IC talking points on the Benghazi attack.
Sunday, September 16, 2012
On Sunday, September 16, 2012, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice appeared on five morning talk shows to discuss the Administration’s account of the attack. In nearly identical statements, she stated that the attack was a spontaneous protest in response to a “hateful video.”
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
The National Counterterrorism Center Director testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee that our diplomats died “in the course of a terrorist attack on our embassy.” This testimony marked a significant shift in the Administration’s rhetoric.
Thursday, September 20, 2012
After Director of NCTC’s testimony, Administration officials began referring to the event as a terrorist attack. On September 20, 2012, Jay Carney stated that, “it is, I think, self-evident that what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack.”
Friday, September 21, 2012
Secretary Clinton stated that, “What happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack, and we will not rest until we have tracked down and brought to justice the terrorists who murdered four Americans.”
Thursday, October 4, 2012
• Due to security concerns and bureaucratic entanglements among the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense, the FBI team investigating the terrorist attack did not access the crime scene until more than three weeks later, on October 4, 2012. The FBI spent less than one day collecting evidence at the TMF. FBI officials indicated that the security situation delayed and undermined a more thorough investigation of the site.
• Secretary Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB), headed by Thomas Pickering, a retired U.S. ambassador, to examine the facts and circumstances of the attacks and to report findings and recommendations.
Tuesday, October, 9, 2012
The State Department held a conference call briefing for reporters in which the Department publicly acknowledged that there had been no protest outside the Benghazi diplomatic facility prior to the assault. State Department officials would testify before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee the next day.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Administration officials have blamed their initial statements on “evolving” intelligence reports. To that end, Ambassador Rice stated on November 27, 2012, that Acting CIA Director Michael Morell “explained that the talking points provided by the intelligence community, and the initial assessment upon which they were based, were incorrect in a key respect: there was no protest or demonstration in Benghazi.”
Also by Scott McEwen
American Sniper (with Chris Kyle)
Sniper Elite
Target America
Also by Rich Miniter
Leading from behind
Mastermind
Disinformation
Shadow War
Losing bin Laden
The Myth of Market Share
Glossary
AFRICOM: United States Africa Command
BALACLAVA: a knitted hood commonly used by counterterrorism operators to conceal facial features
BDU: Battle Dress Uniform
BEARCAT: radio-frequency scanner
BLACK: synonym for any covert or clandestine activity
BLACK HAWK: H-60 Army chopper (troop transport)
BLOWOUT KIT: medical pouch
BOOT (BOOTLEGGER) TURN: a 180-degree turn done in a vehicle while it is moving forward. The parking or emergency brake is used in conjunction with the wheel to execute the turn. Called a bootleg because of its earliest uses by moonshiners and bootleg liquor runners.
BTR-60PB: Soviet eight-wheeled (8×8) armored personnel carrier armed with 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine gun (500 rounds), and PKT coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun (3,000 rounds). It was replaced by the BTR-70.
C-3: a yellowish, solid plastic explosive of pre–Vietnam War vintage, used in Mk-135 satchel charges
C-4: a white plastic explosive
C-5A: the U.S. Air Force’s largest transport plane
C-130: Hercules turboprop transport aircraft, originally made by Lockheed in 1951 and still flying all over the world
C-141: a jet transport with a range of up to five thousand miles
CCT: Combat Control Team—a team of Air Force personnel organized, trained, and equipped to locate, identify, and mark drop/landing zones; provide limited weather observations; install and operate navigational aids and air traffic control communications necessary to guide aircraft to drop/landing zones; and control air traffic at these zones
CINC: Commander IN Chief. The commander in chief of a Navy unit, or the president of the United States. A Navy CINC is usually of flag rank (admiral) and is in charge of a large area, command, or fleet.
CINCLANT: Commander IN Chief, AtLANTic
CINCLANTFLT: Commander IN Chief, AtLANTic FLeeT
CINCPAC: Commander IN Chief, PACific
CINCPACFLT: Commander IN Chief, PACfic FLeeT
CNO: Chief of Naval Operations
CQC: close quarters combat
CUTVEE: a cut-down Humvee without a top, doors, or windows; also known as M-988 cargo/troop carrier
CVIC: Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center
DSS: Diplomatic Security Service. As federal agents, all DSS special agents have the power to arrest, carry firearms, and serve arrest warrants.
EC-130: a C-130 configured by the Navy (or Air Force) as a command/control/communications (C3) aircraft
EOD: Explosives Ordinance Disposal
ESCAPE AND EVASION (E & E): the procedures and operations which downed pilots and SEAL snipers use to avoid hostile forces and return to base
FOB: forward ope
rating base
FOUR-STRIPER: U.S. Navy captain (equal in rank to a colonel)
GRS: Global Response Staff (CIA)
HAHO: High Altitude, High Opening. Refers to parachute jumping.
HALO: High Altitude, Low Opening. Refers to parachute jumping.
HK: Heckler and Koch, make of firearm commonly used by Special Operations forces in various makes, including 9 mm submachine gun
HRT: Hostage Rescue Team
HUMINT: HUMan INTelligence, information gathered on a subject by people on the ground, either trained intelligence specialists or locals
IBL: Inflatable Boat, Large
IBS: Inflatable Boat, Small
IED: Improvised Explosive Devices
JSOC: Joint Special Operations Command; it commands Special Mission Units that include SEAL Team Six, Delta Force, and the air force’s Twenty-Fourth Special Tactics Squadron.
JTF: Joint Task Force
KIA: Killed In Action
KNOT: one knot equals roughly 1.15 miles per hour
LAW: Light Antitank Weapon that fires one 66 mm unguided rocket. Replaced by the AT-4.
LITTLE BIRD: special operations light helicopters. Armament includes guns, rockets, and missiles.
LOADOUT: the equipment, munitions, and materials for an operation or exercise. A loadout can include all the weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by a single man or by an entire unit.
LST: Lightweight Satellite Terminal; an encrypted radio that can send burst packets to a satellite for fast relay
LZ: Landing Zone
M60: a machine gun that fires 7.62 mm ammunition
MI6: a basic .223-caliber weapon, used in Vietnam
MC-130: USAF special operations aircraft