Our Great Hearted Men

by Peter Brune

  CHAPTER 5

  . . . so I drove over them

  While Lieutenant-General John Monash’s preparation for his command of the Australian Corps had been impressive, by early 1918 the five AIF divisions under his command now constituted one of the BEF’s elite corps. Lieutenant-Colonel G H N Jackson had been Monash’s GSO 1, 3rd Division. As an Englishman, he had been transferred to the British 29th Division in January 1918 as part of the ‘Australianisation’ of the Australian Corps. In a letter to Monash on 23 June, Jackson noted the difference between the 29th Division and Monash’s former 3rd Division command:

  Coming here is like coming back many, many years. Reminds me of 1897 when I joined. The Rouse is sounded, one is saluted on all sides, men are regarded as machines or gun fodder . . . It is a good division, certainly a very good Division but I wish you were commanding it. The lack of attention to detail is very apparent, e.g. no fuel for the men, 4 blankets to 3 men instead of two each and a thousand and one little things that we think essential are omitted . . . They are not within months of our modern ideas . . . The British Army is second to none. Magnificent heroism. Magnificent discipline in these old regular battalions but the selfish inhuman cranks on the one hand and the poor doddering old men on the other who command it are calculated to bitch any show.1

  That is not to say that every, or even most, of the British divisions were poorly led, but the inconsistencies between a significant number of them were pronounced. Further, Eric Andrews stated that one ‘English colonel pointed out that his division was in five different corps and three different armies in one month’.2 Such a state of affairs therefore led to a lack of continuity in training and staff work, and a lack of morale. In contrast, gradual but radical change had occurred in the quality of command in this new Australian Corps. On 15 May 1918, Lieutenant Sydney Traill—a 23-year-old clerk from Burwood, New South Wales who as a member of the 1st Battalion had been wounded at Gallipoli, Pozières and Hazebrouck—made a telling observation:

  The number of gentlemen one meets as officers nowadays is very small, gauging gentlemen by pre-war standards, and yet all these men holding commissions are gentlemen by act of parliament. Their talk, speech and manners in many cases is quite appalling, and yet everyone has to accept them as brother-officers and treat them with the utmost courtesy. No one, not even the old-fashioned colonels and majors ever try to be ‘uppish’ or superior. The war has brought some great changes. Standards are judged from such very different standpoints, thats [sic] the reason. In the pre-war days a man was judged by who his father was, or his clothes or manners or education or wealth. Now he is judged by his behaviour in action.3

  Thus, by 1918 the First AIF, with very few exceptions, was led from divisional to platoon command by soldiers who had had to prove their worth over time in the crucible of battle. At battalion level, there was an unqualified expectation for junior officers to ‘dress like the men, to live among them in the trenches, to share their hardships and privations, and to be responsible for their welfare’.4 With the creation of the Australian Corps, the First AIF not only retained its fierce pride as a homogeneous, volunteer formation at the divisional level, but its already strong esprit de corps was now further enhanced.

  The ‘Australianisation’ of the Corps provided not only a further boost in morale. The high standard of staff work acquired from common procedures and the coordination of training resulted in greater efficiency. We have noted General White’s extremely competent staff work leading up to the formation of the Corps. His successor, Brigadier-General Thomas Blamey, upheld that high standard. Monash would later write of Blamey:

  He possessed a mind cultured far above the average, widely informed, alert and prehensile. He had an infinite capacity for taking pains. A Staff College graduate . . . he was thoroughly versed in the technique of staff work, and in the minutiae of all procedure . . . He worked late and early, and set a high standard for the remainder of the large Corps Staff of which he was the head.5

  ***

  During April–June 1918, against the background of the gradual recovery of the BEF after Operation Michael; after the French struggle against the German offensive on the Marne; and, critically, as the build-up of American troops began behind the front line, the Australians and New Zealanders had been involved in what became known as ‘Peaceful Penetration’. This quaint term described the constant harassment of the German front line and, at times, the acquisition of small tracts of the front by means of limited raids. To a number of other units in the BEF engaged in similar activities, ‘Peaceful Penetration’ was known as ‘nibbling’, and involved essentially the same limited objectives and localised raids. From an Australian Corps perspective, the fruits of such tactics were threefold. First, it aimed to gain limited ground deemed important—for straightening of the line, or perhaps a portion of tactically useful ground however modest in area; it also strived to secure the initiative by disrupting the German front and their patrolling; and the third element—which soon became most apparent through observation and the taking of prisoners—was gaining the knowledge that the German front along the Somme was neither well fortified nor manned by seasoned troops.

  ‘Peaceful Penetration’ began in the period 4–9 May in the triangular-shaped area between the Somme and Ancre Rivers and Morlancourt. The 3rd Division was able to capture a portion of the German front line and some 170 prisoners at a cost of 260 casualties, while on 19 May a 2nd Division attack secured the village of Ville-sur-Ancre. And on 10 June 1918, the 7th Brigade captured a part of the German front at Morlancourt, which yielded 325 prisoners at a cost of some 400 casualties.

  The scope for a significant but limited set-piece ‘bite and hold’ operation on the Australian Corps front had existed for some time on the so-called ‘Hamel Spur’. It ran from the main Villers-Bretonneux Plateau north-eastwards to a point on the River Somme opposite the village of Sailly-Laurette. The main tactical objectives in the area were the village of Hamel, Pear Trench (sometimes referred to as ‘Pear-shaped trench’), Hamel Wood and Vaire Wood. This area constituted a ‘bulge’ into the Australian perimeter that gave its German occupants two advantages. The first was that by mid-June Major-General Rosenthal’s 2nd Division line north of the Somme had progressed a considerable distance ahead of Major-General Sinclair-Maclagan’s 4th Division line on the other side of that river, with the result that German artillery near Accroche Wood was enfilading the latter’s right flank. The second was that the German occupation of the Hamel Spur limited the defence of the Villers-Bretonneux Plateau, and that feature overlooked the vital logistical centre of Amiens. While Monash was keen to address this ‘bulge’ on his front, the problem of manpower—and the possible losses that might be inflicted on his already below-strength corps—remained a limiting factor. For the time being, he had decided not to act.

  ***

  By January 1918 a number of changes had occurred within the Tank Corps. Its commander, Brigadier-General Elles, had realised that as the German tanks were inferior to his in quality and quantity, the second half of 1918 thus presented an opportunity to strike with an arm of warfare ‘which at present the enemy is not fully prepared to counter . . . We have an opportunity. Once tank meets tank the opportunity will vanish.’6 Elles strengthened his argument by stating that the BEF now possessed the new Mark V Tank, whose capabilities far outshone the Mark IV and that here was a chance to build upon the recent tank success at Cambrai.

  As stated in Chapter 2 of this work, the 5th Tank Brigade—consisting of the 2nd, 8th and 13th Tank Battalions—came into existence in March 1918 under the command of Brigadier-General Courage. It was allotted to the BEF’s Fourth Army under the command of General Rawlinson. Upon its arrival in France it lost no time in creating a brigade school at Vaux. Here, during the period May–June 1918, a system of training, ‘first of drivers combined with gunnery at targets, and later of trained tank crews combined with infantry was instituted and constantly improved’.7

  The tra
ining ground at Vaux consisted of a grassy slope that was screened at its rear by dense woods. This slope provided:

  . . . a natural grand stand for thousands of spectator troops; parallel with this ran the practice ground equipped with a double trench system complete with communication trenches, strong points, and redoubts, the surface riddled with shell-holes which called for some skill and continual alertness from Tank drivers. The length of the run from the first line to the final objective was about 900 yards.8

  It was to this training venue that Elles invited key Fourth Army officers in a determined effort to ‘sell’ the capabilities and potential of his new Mark V Tank. Monash and Blamey were among them. Great minds think alike. It will always be a matter of conjecture who first thought of an infantry-saving tank operation to eliminate the ‘bulge’ at Hamel. In the end it matters little. On 18 June 1918, when Rawlinson, Montgomery (Rawlinson’s Chief of Staff), Monash and Blamey discussed the operation, Monash stated that he would require ‘the assistance of Tanks, a small increase of my Artillery and an addition to my air resources’.9 Rawlinson then asked him for a preliminary plan.

  On 20 June Courage submitted a tank plan to Monash for the operation. In essence it embodied the developing tank doctrine, which drew heavily upon the recent Cambrai success. Courage proposed three echelons or waves of tanks. The Advanced Section would comprise some five sections of three tanks each; those fifteen tanks were to ‘protect the advance of the tanks following in the rear and the infantry attached . . .’10 But the Advanced Section’s main role was to move to the rear of the main tactical points (Vaire and Hamel Woods, Pear Trench and Hamel Village) as quickly as possible and ‘cut off the retreat of the garrison, and . . . prevent the enemy reinforcing these points’. Courage believed that ‘this manoeuvre will tend to demoralize the enemy’.11 The second wave of seven sections of three tanks each—the Main Body Sections—were to accompany the infantry to its objectives and provide ‘immediate protection by fire’.12 The third or last wave of tanks—the Mopping-up Sections—were tasked with the replacement of any Main Body Section tanks that were put out of action, and the elimination of surviving German machine gun posts.

  Courage’s plan also envisaged the firing of smoke barrages to frustrate the enemy’s ability to range on his tanks during both the advance and the withdrawal. For air assistance, it advocated ‘a few planes with a noisy type of engine’13 be flown over the German lines to mask the tanks’ approach and, during the advance, low-flying planes to engage German dispositions and to look for and engage anti-tank guns. Finally, after consolidation of the objectives, the three tank echelons were to occupy a number of the woods to ‘do as much damage as possible’ and then after half an hour withdraw and ‘return to their assembly positions where they will refill and refit as quickly as possible’.14

  On 21 June 1918, just a day after Monash had received Courage’s outline for the Hamel attack, he submitted his preliminary plan to Rawlinson. In essence Monash adopted Courage’s plan. In doing so, he saw his task as the coordination of this tank plan with the other arms at his disposal. He proposed to assist the planes’ efforts to drown the noise of the tanks’ approach by adding an artillery barrage during the last 1000 yards of their approach. To acclimatise the Germans to this artillery bombardment, he ordered that it be composed of smoke and gas and that it should be a daily occurrence—starting as soon as possible—until the day of the attack. On that final day Monash ordered that the gas should not be a part of the barrage, and it was therefore hoped that the Germans would be caught wearing their gas masks, which would inhibit their detection of the tank approach, and also impair their ability to fight.

  In allotting his initial manpower resources for the Hamel operation, Monash planned that there would be three waves of infantry. The first was to assault and then remain at the critical points of Hamel Village and Vaire Wood; the second wave, accompanied by the main body of tanks, was to be twice the size of the first, and was tasked with pushing through to the final objectives; and the third wave was to act as the reserve, as carriers and, if need be, to eliminate any few remaining German posts.

  In the centre, the 4th Division’s 4th Brigade was to assault Pear Trench and Vaire–Hamel Wood with one battalion (with the main body of tanks) on a front of a mile and a half; then two battalions were to pass through it and, with the tanks, occupy the final objectives; and the fourth was to act as carriers. On the northern sector, Monash deployed the 3rd Division’s 11th Brigade, employing the same one battalion followed by two with a fourth as carriers, across a front of a mile and a quarter. Its first objective was Hamel Village. On the southern one-mile-long front, two battalions of the 2nd Division were to provide flank protection and gain some limited ground. The total frontage to be attacked was ‘approximately 6,000 yards, increasing to 7,500 on the farthest objective, and the greatest depth 2,500 yards’.15

  The decision to use three infantry brigades from three different divisions for Hamel was an astute one, because it took into account the relative fitness for battle of those brigades, and precluded the chance of any one division suffering heavy casualties.

  Monash’s desire for extra artillery was met by the allocation of an additional five brigades of field and two brigades of heavy artillery. His field artillery (guns and howitzers) would now number 326, while his heavy artillery count rose to 302 guns.16 The main volume of heavy artillery fire was to be directed against the German artillery in the Lamotte–Cerisy Valley, while the long-range guns were to concentrate on the enemy’s rear communications.

  On 23 June 1918, General Rawlinson sent Monash’s plan to GHQ. It is of interest to note that while Haig endorsed the operation, he still clung to the antiquated notion that ‘a cavalry division should be held ready against the possibility of a panic flight by the surprised enemy’.17 Monash now set to work to provide a detailed plan for Hamel and gave himself around seven days before its launch.

  Courage’s plan may well have impressed Monash, Rawlinson and Haig, but it most certainly did not draw the same enthusiasm from Blamey and Brigadier-General Coxen, the Corps Artillery Commander. Their grievance concerned Courage’s desire for a first wave of tanks to move independently ahead of the infantry and the second wave of tanks to ‘cut off the retreat of the garrison, and . . . prevent the enemy reinforcing these points’. During a conference held at the 4th Division’s HQ on 25 June, Major-General Sinclair-Maclagan and the brigadiers chosen for the battle—with the Bullecourt fiasco fixed firmly in their minds—strongly sided with Blamey and Coxen. And they were right. Written early in 1919, the 5th Tank Brigade’s ‘War Experiences’ emphasised an important point:

  Tanks of the present (Mark V) type should not be asked to advance in front of infantry in daylight over open ground without some form of protection from hostile artillery fire . . . Close support and quick intervention by field artillery in this form of fighting are all-important. Without it an advance will probably be held up and heavy casualties caused to Tanks . . . The production of a type of Tank considerably faster than the Mark V, and equally handy, would overcome the difficulty now experienced in avoiding hostile gun fire.18

  In short, a blitzkrieg-style doctrine was still over twenty years away. Senior tank officers such as Elles, Courage and Fuller were confusing the potential of a future tank to move rapidly ahead of infantry and cut off an enemy retreat—and thereby achieve surprise and demoralisation—with the reality of the Mark V Tank’s present maximum speed of 4.6 mph (and average speed of 3 mph). Blamey and Coxen were simply advocating mutual support between the infantry and the tanks; and the coordination of machine gun barrages, air support and, most important of all, a creeping artillery barrage to accompany the infantry–tank advance. Moreover, they argued for predicted counter-battery fire upon the very German weapon that might inflict heavy tank casualties: their guns. And at the forefront of their thinking was the potential for a re-enactment of Bullecourt, and that priceless infantry might again be shredded by a lack of a
rtillery support.

  In the end, the emphatic and united protests of the Australian senior officers prevailed. The emphasis of the Hamel operation had now rightly shifted from that of a tank operation to one of a combined infantry–tank–artillery battle. To support the infantry and tank attack would be a creeping artillery barrage (with every tenth shell one of smoke) that would advance 200 yards for the first four minutes and thereafter 100 yards every three until at the halfway mark and after a ten-minute interval the barrage would cover 100 yards every four minutes until the final objectives were gained.

  As the initial plans for Hamel were thus under way, General Rawlinson, aware of the fact that the Australian Corps was under strength, suggested to Monash that a number of Americans who were training with the Australians to the rear might be used to bolster the Hamel brigades. On the proviso that the Americans were to be allotted to the Australians by platoon or company and under their own junior officers, this was agreed to. According to Charles Bean, this idea came to Rawlinson on either 22 or 23 June, and influenced him to fix the date of the operation to American Independence Day: 4 July 1918.19

  Monash’s first task was to facilitate the joint training of the 5th Tank Brigade with his infantry:

  The usual practice was to give a demonstration to two Infantry Battalions each morning and two each afternoon. The exercise to be shown was first explained in detail to the onlooking troops, and questions as to Tanks, their powers, equipment, and so forth answered . . . A running commentary of explanation and criticism was kept up during this display, and after it further questions were invited and discussed. Each visiting battalion then sent two companies to perform the exercise, and was in turn criticised and praised or admonished as their performance might demand. Three types of exercise were shown: an attack supported by an artillery barrage, indicated by flags; an attack without a barrage; and an open warfare rush by Tanks to mask and isolate a fortified farm. Smoke signals, flag signals, and aeroplane signals were all employed.20