Our Great Hearted Men

by Peter Brune

  For the Australian Corps’s attack on 9 August, fourteen Mark V Tanks (2nd Tank Battalion) were allotted to the soon-to-arrive 1st Division; seven were assigned to the 5th Division (8th Tank Battalion); and thirteen were given to the 2nd Division.14 The country over which this Australian advance was to be carried out consisted of around 4000 yards of level plain, after which it gradually rose to the ridge on which Lihons lay. ‘This high ground dominated the whole country’ over which the Australians were to attack, and gave enemy ‘observation over the area well in rear of Harbonnaires [sic]’.15 Clearly, any thrust by Monash must await contact from Currie as to the timing of his Canadian advance.

  Monash had first warned his divisional commanders at noon on 8 August that the operation would proceed, and further sent them his basic plan for it later that night. It was to be a three-phase attack. The first phase (the Green Line) sought to gain a mile and a half at its deepest southern point past Vauvillers extending to the railway; the second phase (the Red Line) anticipated gaining a line from the Old Roman Road to Framerville to a point on the railway midway between Rosières and Lihons; and the final phase (the Blue Line) aimed to capture the ground from the railway midway between Chaulnes, past Lihons and back to Framerville. In all, therefore, so as to maintain contact and ground with the Canadians, the operation sought to advance the Australian front some three miles along the railway, then extend northwards in a diminishing loop back to Framerville.

  The events that unfolded on 9 August clearly portray the difficulties already described in terms of communications and coordination, and the consequences of rushed planning.

  Major-General Glasgow’s 1st Division’s HQ arrived at Villers-Bretonneux on the afternoon of 8 August, while his 2nd Brigade reached Aubigny at around dusk and the 3rd Brigade arrived at Hamel near midnight. When the 1st Division received its orders to move forward, it therefore faced a march of about ten or eleven miles to reach the 5th Division’s 15th Brigade front line before going into battle. Further to this challenge in distance and timing, the 1st Division Unit Diary recorded that: ‘Communications which are maintained by D.R. [despatch rider] were becoming increasingly difficult and often caused delays in movements.’16 By 8.00 am the battalions of the 2nd Brigade were under way and an hour later the 3rd Brigade followed. The 1st Division’s brigade commanders received further orders at 1st Division HQ at 3.00 am. They were told that zero hour was to be 10.00 am and that their artillery support was to be the 1st Division Artillery and two brigades of the Royal Field Artillery.

  But a series of events on the Canadian front now changed the timings and circumstances of the attack. At around 1.00 am on the 9th, General Currie had first timed his advance for 10.00 am. At 7.30 am the 2nd Canadian Division’s 6th Brigade, which was to attack next to the Australians, had arrived at the front line after dark to discover that it faced a formidable German strength across its whole front. In order to bolster its assault, the 2nd Canadian Division therefore ordered its reserve 5th Brigade to move forward and attack on its right flank. Then, just after 8.00 am, the 1st Canadian Division informed the 2nd Division that it could not be ready to attack until 11.00 am. Major-General Glasgow was duly informed of this delay. When the 6th Canadian Brigade discovered that the Australian 1st Division had not yet arrived, and fearing that their left flank might thus be exposed by that Division’s absence or late arrival, its Brigade Major visited the adjacent 5th Australian Division’s 15th Brigade HQ at around 9.30 am, and asked Brigadier-General ‘Pompey’ Elliott whether his Brigade could attack in 1st Division’s place pending its arrival. After having received permission from his divisional commander (Major-General Hobbs), Elliott pledged his support. The Canadian Brigade Major had, however, given Elliott the original start time of 10.00 am.17

  Brigadier-General Elliott and his 15th Brigade moved with remarkable speed and efficiency. Elliott’s order to attack at 10.00 am reached his 60th Battalion at 9.14 am and his 58th Battalion at 9.55 am.18 Those two battalions were ordered to ‘leapfrog’ the two forward 15th Brigade battalions. In the end, the changed timing for the assault to 11.00 am saw the Australians arrive just as the Canadians advanced.

  We now come to a most peculiar decision made on 9 August. On that critically important Australian Corps right flank, Elliott’s 15th Brigade went into battle with three significant handicaps. The first was the fact that it was to advance with no real objective. That is, it was ordered to advance until the 1st Division arrived. The second was that it had no tank support but merely the pledge that the Canadians would ‘lend’ it one tank. The third was the extraordinary prior decision by the 1st Division to advance without artillery support. Charles Bean wrote that ‘[the 1st Division] . . . had dispensed with an artillery barrage presumably because the situation ahead and the rate of the Canadian advance were uncertain, and its own artillery might not be in position’.19

  This was a foolhardy decision. While the 5th Division’s 8th Brigade attack on Elliott’s left flank, and the Canadian 6th Brigade’s attack on his right, were to have both artillery and tank support, Elliott’s 15th Brigade was to have neither. Further, when the 1st Division was to finally move through Elliott’s Brigade, it still chose to have no initial artillery support. The 1st Division Unit Diary provides us with some interesting points.

  Artillery was to be in position by 10 a.m. For the capture of the BLUE Line, should two Inf. Bdes be employed, it was arranged for the C.R.A. [Commander Royal Artillery] to allot 2 F.A. Bdes to each of the General Officers commanding 2nd and 3rd Aust. Inf. Bdes. There was to be no Artillery Barrage [author’s italics].

  TANKS.

  14 Tanks of the 2nd Tank. Bn. were available for the capture of the GREEN and RED Line and were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde [1st Division]. In the event of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde. being needed for the capture of the BLUE Line, the tanks were to be distributed between the 2nd and 3rd Aust. Inf. Bdes by direct arrangements with the Tank. Bn. Commander. The G.O.C. 5th Tank Bde agreed to the absence of Artillery Barrage [author’s italics].20

  It is of interest to note that the 1st Division ‘had dispensed with an artillery barrage’ when its flanking brigades had not. The 1st Division’s Artillery Diary records that the Australian Corps HQ had ordered its artillery to be in position by 10.00 am.21 Clearly, Corps HQ expected it to support the infantry. Further, with regard to the tanks, two issues are apparent. The first is the order that any distribution of tanks between the 2nd and 3rd Brigades was to be made by ‘direct arrangements with the Tank. Bn. Commander’, a directive that would require a speedy liaison and precise timing. It would be, as events were to prove, most difficult. The second point is less clear but of crucial significance: ‘The G.O.C. 5th Tank Bde agreed to the absence of Artillery Barrage.’ This strange acquiescence on Brigadier-General Courage’s part might be explained by the fact that the Tank Corps doctrine was still, at this time, evolving. We have noted that at Hamel the Tank Corps had shown disappointment in being restricted to an advance with the infantry and under an artillery creeping barrage. After the war, and with the benefit of hindsight, Brevet-Colonel Fuller would emphasise two critical tank lessons: ‘the staying power of an attack lies in the general reserve. In this attack the tank general reserve was very weak, consequently after August 8 attacks began to “peter out” . . . once open warfare is entered on infantry must protect tanks from artillery fire.’22

  On 9 August 1918, when it was hoped that the Australians would break out into open warfare, this 5th Tank Brigade general reserve was indeed ‘very weak’, and most certainly destined to ‘peter out’. The chief reason for this was not the infantry’s inability to protect the tanks, but the absence of their prime protective weapon: the artillery. This could provide widespread smoke cover, creeping barrages and, more importantly, accurate counter-battery fire.

  ***

  In response to Brigadier-General Elliott’s orders to advance and take up the initial stage of the 1st Division’s attack on either s
ide of Harbonnières, the 15th Brigade’s 60th Battalion crossed its start line at 11.10 am and the 58th Battalion not long after. Although both battalions were met by shell fire on their approach, that fire, chiefly to their front and rear, caused few casualties. But when those units crossed their start lines, heavy machine gun fire slowed their advance and substantial casualties were taken. South of Harbonnières, the 60th Battalion was forced to ground and could then only advance about 100 yards at a time by section rushes before being forced to halt. The 58th Battalion, east of Harbonnières, met the same fate.

  The 60th Battalion Unit Diary:

  12.45 pm. The Battalion had only managed to advance between 500 and 600 yards. At this time a message was sent back to the artillery who were now in position asking for immediate assistance . . . to barrage this line for 5 minutes then slowly creep up for 1000 yards . . . the message met with a ready response and some very accurate fire shooting was witnessed. Its effect on the enemy was immediate and they commenced to run first to the LEFT then back to the RIGHT along the RAILWAY Line.23

  As the 58th Battalion was seen to be in line on the left of the 60th, a message was sent to the 58th informing it of the requested artillery barrage, and at 1.05 pm a second message was sent to the artillery requesting them to sweep three degrees right and three degrees left.24 This second barrage caused the Germans to rapidly retreat, with around 100 being taken prisoner.

  While the 15th Brigade was thus occupied, the Australian Corps’s left-flank attack was initially undertaken by the 5th Division’s 8th Brigade. Its 29th Battalion was to attack alongside the 15th Brigade’s 58th Battalion. Here, despite efforts at the brigade and battalion levels to fulfil orders, poor communications and consequent rushed planning inhibited a coordinated assault. The 29th Battalion Unit Diary recorded that the CO had received his verbal instructions at Brigade HQ for the advance of around 800 yards to the Green Line at 8.00 am; that at 9.50 am the Battalion received orders to be ready to move at 10.00 am in fighting order; and that the CO’s Operation Order, which had been despatched by a mounted DR at Brigade HQ, did not reach the Battalion until 11.45 am.25 After having returned to Battalion HQ at 10.10 am the CO gave verbal instructions to his company commanders and at 10.42 am the Battalion moved forward to attack through the left edge of Harbonnières.26 To add to this regrettable state of affairs, the ‘protective’ barrage came down at 11.00 am while the 29th—which given the circumstances had reacted with commendable urgency—did not commence the attack until 11.40 am.

  The 8th Tank Battalion provided six Mark V Tanks with one in reserve for this 8th Brigade assault. Having advanced five minutes before the arrival of the 29th Battalion, and totally without artillery smoke-shell and supporting counter-battery fire, four of their number were put out of action by a single German anti-tank gun sited in a shed on the north-western edge of Vauvillers. After a fifth tank ditched, the remaining tank left the scene to return for duty later.

  By 12.20 pm the 29th Battalion, positioned midway between their start line and their Vauvillers objective, had sustained heavy casualties from machine gun fire sited in and around Vauvillers. They were ordered to stay in their positions until progress could be made without incurring further heavy casualties. Their Unit Diary provides a gripping account of both the Battalion’s subsequent military skill and its élan:

  12.30 pm. The C.O. (Lieut. Col. J. McArthur) was wounded by a M.G. bullet in the neck . . .

  1 pm. Coys moved by short rushes towards objective and engaged enemy M.G.’s with Lewis Gun and Rifle Fire.

  2.15 pm. After a series of short rushes and by means of crawling, all three Coys were on the objective.27

  By 2.30 pm the 29th Battalion’s A Company had advanced through and beyond Vauvillers and had succeeded in establishing Lewis Gun posts to cover that location. By 3.00 pm their new line ran north-east and east of the village. But in so doing, the Battalion sustained three officers and fourteen other ranks killed and nine officers and 69 other ranks wounded, giving it a total casualty count of twelve and 83.28

  While the described events were in train on the Australian Corps’s 8th and 15th Brigade fronts, the Canadians on the right Fourth Army front had gained impressive initial ground. By around 1.00 pm, assisted by four tanks, they managed to advance some two miles to the village of Rosières and thereby roll back the Fourth Army’s right flank. By the afternoon of 9 August 1918, the Australian Corps 1st Division’s first objective had been all but taken by the magnificent efforts of the 15th Brigade and its supporting 8th Brigade on its left.

  Major-General Glasgow had decided to commit two of his 2nd Brigade Battalions (the 7th and 8th) to his initial 1st Division attack, and if his first objective—the ground leading up to the edge of the Lihons high ground—was taken, he would then commit that Brigade to the final objective of Lihons village. Should that last objective not be taken, he then planned to commit his 3rd Brigade to his left flank on 10 August. At the start line, the 7th Battalion was to advance on the left and the 8th Battalion on the right. During their advance the two battalions were to each have seven tanks in support.

  If the 1st Division’s decision not to employ an artillery barrage as it went into action on 9 August was rash, then the liaison between it and the 2nd Tank Battalion was no less poorly organised. In his report on the operation written on 10 August, the commander of the 2nd Tank Battalion, Major Laskey, pointed out that at 6.00 am on the 9th he received the 1st Division’s second Battle Instructions Order, which outlined the first objective only, and that he ‘had not received Battle Instructions No. 1, which were distributed to Divisions only’.29 Thus, Laskey had no knowledge of the three-phase objectives of the attack. Further, his only method of gaining that information came when the 8th Tank Battalion furnished him with their map of the objectives for their support of the 8th Brigade, which Laskey hurriedly copied.30 The tanks were now rushed forward as quickly as possible. These events are in marked contrast to the highly detailed infantry–artillery–tank plans for the previous day.

  After having marched for some five hours and covered ten to eleven miles ‘with only the usual 10 minutes halt in each hour and no spell for their mid-day meal’,31 the 2nd Brigade’s 7th and 8th Battalions passed through the 15th Brigade at around 1.40 pm.

  The 8th Battalion moved forward on the southern right flank and the 7th on its left. After passing through the 60th Battalion, the 8th Battalion’s right flank—adjoining the Canadians who were well ahead—made the quickest progress. As the Battalion approached the higher ground, the vulnerable tanks became targets for the German guns. Major Laskey would later write that:

  On approaching ROSIERES Station and the factory by it . . . resistance became stronger and shelling more intense. Three Tanks received direct hits there. At about this time a message dropped by an aeroplane reached me to the effect that ‘German reinforcements were arriving at LIHONS by the CHAULNES road, apparently infantry and field guns.’ I at once sent this back to the 2nd Brigade Report Centre . . . in order that these might be dealt with by our artillery. Before this was done a German Field battery came into action on the high ground . . . where they commanded the whole of the country to the west. These at once opened fire on the Tanks, knocking out about 5 . . . The Tanks were unable to advance in face of this fire, and the infantry were held up by it, and by heavy machine gun fire from the border of the woods west of LIHONS, for fully one and a half hours, and suffered severely. Two field guns that tried to come into action against this battery . . . were obliged to withdraw after firing only about two rounds each, as they came at once under heavy and accurate fire from the German guns.

  At about 5.30 p.m. the German battery was engaged by artillery fire and very soon withdrew, leaving one gun behind, presumably disabled and immovable.32

  After having destroyed the tanks, the German guns turned their attention to the infantry. In the face of this artillery and machine gun fire, the 8th Battalion continued its steady if slow advance at the cost of heavy casua
lties. At around 5.00 pm the Battalion had reached the trench system ‘occupied by the Allies prior to the German retirement in March 1917’.33 These trenches now provided some reasonable cover for the advance, which eventually saw three of four guns of a German battery put out of action. The only impediment to the 8th Battalion’s progress was a brief withdrawal to conform with a temporary hold-up on the Canadian front. During the fighting that day the 8th Battalion suffered heavy Lewis Gun losses. On 9 August the Battalion’s steadfast advance had begun with a strength of 26 officers and 680 other ranks. By the end of the day, it had suffered three officers and 27 other ranks killed and nine officers and 175 other ranks wounded for a total casualty count of 30 killed and 184 wounded.34

  Private Reg Johanesen was a labourer from Northcote, Melbourne. After having joined the AIF on 1 January 1915, he had arrived at Gallipoli on 26 June 1915 as a reinforcement to the 8th Battalion. By 9 August 1918, Johanesen had not only survived Gallipoli and the Western Front for some three years, but had been wounded twice: at Lagnicourt on 22 April 1917 (shrapnel in the face) and then, six months later, near Broodseinde on 4 October 1917 (broken ribs and shrapnel to the body). Johanesen was a Lewis Gunner: