Our Great Hearted Men

by Peter Brune

  In what must have been a Brigade decision at the conference at Martin’s HQ at 10.00 pm on the 30th, it was resolved that ‘whenever opposition was met with in the dark the company concerned should simply rush the position making as much noise as possible’.40 Therefore, the 5th Brigade’s tactics were to embody firepower, aggression and bluff, in the hope of creating enemy confusion.

  ***

  As darkness gradually turned to light at 5.00 am on 31 August 1918, the 5th Brigade’s 17th Battalion moved to its start line. Few casualties were sustained on that approach, but as the Battalion moved forward, heavy machine gun fire was encountered from Park Wood, which caused the right company to engage that strong point in order to facilitate a general advance. The artillery concentration enabled the Battalion to move rapidly forward until an hour later, at 6.00 am, two companies gained the village of Mont St Quentin with a third able to form a defensive flank. While the 17th encountered no Germans in the village, large numbers of them were seen withdrawing.

  Before the 17th Battalion could make contact with the left-flank 20th Battalion, the Germans put in a counter-attack, which was supported by a battery of 77-mm guns firing over open sights, trench mortars and machine guns. With contact not made with the 20th Battalion on the left flank, the 17th Battalion was attacked from three sides, the gap on the left flank being the most serious threat. Heavy casualties resulted, with one company losing all of its officers. The 17th Battalion would later report that:

  The senior Company Commander on the spot decided to withdraw to the trench system, which was 80x [yards] from the Mont St Quentin–Peronne Road, leaving the left flank at the trench junction . . . which he defended in that area with two Vickers Guns and eight Lewis Guns. Five attempts by the enemy to bomb down our position from this flank were beaten off.41

  To the left of the 17th Battalion, the 20th Battalion had had an 800-yard stretch of ground between its start line and the artillery barrage line. The dash and aggression of the rush across that ground saw the Germans ‘surrender themselves readily in order to avoid coming to close quarters’.42 Having gained the trench system, the Battalion was able to follow up the barrage and capture its objective of Feuillaucourt. But at 5.30 pm, with its left flank and its right with the 17th Battalion both open, the 20th Battalion was attacked and a fierce fight eventuated. When the Battalion was enfiladed from the north by 77-mm fire and machine gun fire it was ordered to make a withdrawal. The potency of a requested concentration on the line to assist that withdrawal was prejudiced by the fact that the artillery was itself on the move. By that night, the 20th Battalion, having been forced to abandon Feuillaucourt, had dug in and secured its ground on Oder Trench, about 500 yards west of the Péronne–Bouchavesnes Road. Its casualties were one officer killed, four wounded, 21 other ranks killed, and 106 wounded. However, the telling statistic from the day’s fighting was the fact that the Battalion strength (exclusive of HQ) now stood at a paltry six officers and 125 other ranks.43 Private William McLennan’s 2nd Machine Gun Company had been in support of the 20th Battalion that day. His diary, 31 August 1918:

  Heard that our side outflanked Mont St Quentin this morning & cleaned up a wood beyond but had to fall back again as the 3rd Div had not got up on the left. We now hold a line of trench right in front of the village. The Hun has a commanding position there & you have to keep your head well down as MG bullets are flying around pretty thick at times . . . 1 pm. Hear that 6th Bde are coming in. 2 pm. 17th Btn comes into our trench . . . 6 pm. Mr Turnbull comes along to take charge . . . Our side are going over again in the morning. Hun starts shelling our trench with 5.9s. makes things very warm. They are landing all round our dugout. The concussing puts out the candle 30 ft below the surface several times. One gets the paradox between gun position & dugout . . . 2 get the trench 50 yds below us, kills 5 of 24th Btn & wounds several others. Shelling continuous pretty solid till 9.30 pm. On guard from 10.30 to 11.30 pm. Things fairly quiet. Hun is in a copse & ruins in valley as I see a couple of his flares going up from there. Mr Turnbull comes along a[nd] tells us that on the gun next to ours . . . Mick O’Loughlin has been killed, Bert Styles wounded & a couple of the others shell-shocked.44

  While the 17th and 20th Battalions had been thus engaged, the 5th Brigade’s 19th Battalion had been ordered to cross the Somme and advance on the right flank. Some idea of the degree of difficulty, even for seasoned troops, of crossing the Somme and moving forward across challenging ground to a start line can be appreciated by the 19th Battalion Unit Diary:

  This was done under very adverse conditions owing to confused character of the ground ie., railway embankment along the river, quarries and steep hill facings. During the assembly the enemy severely shelled Ommiecourt–Les-Clery [sic] and neighbourhood of the bridge with heavy calibres and stragglers who became detached taking refuge from shell fire had to be directed to the objective. Exact location of enemy posts in neighbourhood was not known and the success of the operation depended mainly on boldness and trust.45

  When the 19th Battalion left its start line at 5.00 am it encountered only slight initial opposition due to the artillery shelling of all of the known enemy positions on its front. However, on reaching the trench system on the south-western slope of Mont St Quentin, it came under heavy machine gun fire from the village and 77-mm point-blank fire from Anvil Wood. At around 7.30 am, when the Germans were observed concentrating in the direction of Feuillaucourt, the Battalion was able to break up that enemy assembly with a combination of Stokes Mortar, Lewis Gun and rifle fire. The 19th Battalion identified the position as ‘precarious’ as it had no supporting troops on its right flank, and the 20th had yet to establish contact with the 3rd Division.

  Throughout the afternoon, any movement by the 19th Battalion soldiers manning their captured shallow trenches drew concentrated and frequent machine gun fire from the village. In addition, the long, broken brick wall on the Mont running parallel with the road was occupied by machine gun nests expertly deployed in breaches of that feature, and supported by further emplacements in the village ruins.

  At around 9.00 am, with the situation between Mont St Quentin Village and Feuillaucourt unclear, and the 5th Brigade’s Battalions experiencing difficulty in maintaining contact with each other, General Rosenthal committed his reserve 18th Battalion to the fight, with the intention of occupying the gap between the 17th and 20th Battalions, and reinforcing the right flank of the 17th Battalion.

  To maintain the momentum of the advance, the 2nd Division’s 6th Brigade was ordered forward at 11.30 am with its 23rd Battalion in the van, followed by the 24th, 21st and 22nd Battalions. Its orders were to clear the troublesome Anvil Wood and its surrounding ground. After having crossed the canal at Boscourt, the Brigade came under heavy machine gun fire near Halle and Park Wood. Despite this fire, Florina Trench was cleared and the Brigade now deployed ready to continue the advance. At around 2.30 pm, the 2nd Division’s last Brigade—the 7th—was also ordered forward via the bridges at Feuillères and Omiécourt.

  It is worth noting at this juncture the discipline in planning and execution of Monash’s original orders concerning division movements during this battle. As a result of the 5th Division’s failure to find a crossing point south of Péronne, its 14th Brigade was now ordered to follow the 6th Brigade across the Somme.

  Obeying Monash’s order that ‘right-of-way’ must be given to any new formation needing to cross the Somme through another’s crossing, the 2nd Division’s 7th Brigade now allowed the 5th Division’s 14th Brigade to pass through it. This was no mean feat. The 14th Brigade (already severely fatigued) was forced to undertake a seven-mile march, cross the Somme and ready itself for an attack the next day. As a consequence, the 7th Brigade was ordered to stand fast where it was to avoid undue congestion and slow movement.

  We last left Major-General Gellibrand’s 3rd Division late on 30 August on their northern Somme front, which extended from around 1100 yards west of Quarry Farm, bending southwards past
Road Wood and thence just west of Cléry Copse to the Somme. The 9th Brigade were on the left or northern flank and the 10th Brigade south of it.

  In unison with the 2nd Division operation just described, Gellibrand’s orders for 31st August were to advance at 5.42 am along the high ground west of the Mont St Quentin–Bouchavesnes Road. At the same time, the British 58th Division was to begin its assault—at 6.12 am—upon the high ground in the vicinity of Bouchavesnes.

  The 3rd Division’s left-flank 9th Brigade managed to cross the Feuillaucourt–Rancourt Road and capture the Old Quarry and Quarry Farm. Late that day the Germans counter-attacked. Although Quarry Farm was lost, elements of the embattled 9th Brigade held the Old Quarry. The 3rd Division Report gives some idea of the intensity of that fight:

  The number of guns and machine guns captured made it evident that the enemy had intended to hold his ground as long as possible. The field guns were mostly distributed singly, and in many cases were fought to the last moment, and it was only by bayonetting the gunners that they could be put out of action.46

  On the right 3rd Division flank the 10th Brigade’s 40th Battalion was able to employ its Lewis Gunners and snipers to break up localised German efforts to concentrate for counter-attacks. Later German attempts during the day to form up for counter-attacks were also dispersed by speedy and accurate liaison between the Brigade and its artillery. By the afternoon of 31 August, the 9th and 10th Brigades were ‘utterly tired out as a result of previous weeks strenuous fighting’ but were greatly heartened by the news that their 11th Brigade was to relieve them that night.47

  By dusk on 31 August, further artillery support had crossed the Somme at Feuillères and had taken up positions in a valley east of Cléry. At 7.00 pm Brigadier-General Robertson received verbal orders that his 6th Brigade was to pass through the 5th Brigade, and early on 1 September establish a line running east of Feuillaucourt and Mont St Quentin. Further, the 14th Brigade (Brigadier-General Stewart) was to deploy on the 6th Brigade’s right flank and attack in a south-easterly direction towards Péronne and St Denis. At a conference held at Robertson’s HQ at 9.00 pm that night, Robertson and Stewart defined their boundaries and organised their artillery support. They were confronted with two challenges. The first was the fact that the exact positions of the 5th Brigade remained somewhat obscure, so they determined that the artillery start line would start just east of the St Denis–Mont St Quentin Road. They also decided that in order to allow the 14th Brigade adequate time in preparation, zero hour was to be at 6.00 am rather than 5.00 am.

  Some appreciation of the degree of difficulty associated with these urgent plans might be gained by Monash’s comment on them:

  It was a serious performance to demand, and it was fraught with many risks. There was no time to assemble responsible Commanders concerned, separated as they were by long distances over bad and congested roads. In the absence of properly co-ordinated action, there was every chance of confusion, and cross-purposes, and even collision of authority arising from the troops of one Division passing over ground under the tactical control of another Division. But the only alternative was to do nothing and attempt nothing. That would have been the worst of bad generalship, and it was an occasion when risks must be taken.48

  Pertinent points. However, the real and most damning ‘worst of bad generalship’ would have been to attempt such a challenging operation with anything other than extremely capable leadership and the very best, seasoned troops.

  ***

  The 2nd Division’s 5th Brigade had made stunning ground, but at great cost on 31 August. The 6th Brigade’s entry into the Battle of Mont St Quentin was also severely contested. Brigadier Robertson planned his attack on a two-battalion front: the 24th Battalion on the left, and his 23rd Battalion on the right. The strength of his 6th Brigade was (including each Battalion HQ) 75 officers and 1259 other ranks.

  While the left-flank 24th Battalion managed to reach its start line at the northern part of Gottlieb Trench at 6.00 am, as it moved forward it met a hail of machine gun fire. By the time it reached the bank of the road it was forced to stop behind that cover. Its northern company, meanwhile, skirted Feuillaucourt before also being held up by similar fire from Plevna Trench and the Canal du Nord.

  While the 24th Battalion had been subjected to severe machine gun fire and held up, its right-flank 23rd Battalion had endured an even tougher time. If Gottlieb Trench had been clear of Germans to the north, it sprang to life with concentrated machine gun fire when the 23rd moved there to its start line. That portion of the offending trench was only just cleared by the 6.00 am zero hour. Machine gun fire had made casualties of all officers in two of its companies, and all of the sergeants except one in another. Here once again, we note the professionalism and dash of experienced troops who know their drill, and can display initiative, assume command and maintain the momentum of an attack. Those soldiers were able to reach Elsa Trench, where they reinforced a lone detachment of the 5th Brigade that had gamely fought on.

  In view of the stiff German resistance to this 6th Brigade advance, a halt was called across its front, and additional artillery support was requested. In response ‘every gun and howitzer that could be brought to bear, including the heavies, bombarded Mont St Quentin’ for a half an hour.49 During that shelling, the 21st Battalion had pushed two companies forward to bolster the attack, and at 1.30 pm they rushed the northern half of the village while the 23rd Battalion stormed its southern half. In unison with those two thrusts, the 24th Battalion struck north of Mont St Quentin village and a further company of the 21st to its south. Mont St Quentin had fallen. The 2nd Division Report noted that:

  Intense fighting took place, the defenders were picked troops and fought to the death, few prisoners were taken and the enemy dead lay strewn over the whole area. The advance was continued to the Wood and a line established 600 yards east of the village. The 24th Bn. pushed down Plevna and Koverla Trenches and the Coy. of the 21st Bn. consolidated in Koros Alley.50

  A consolidation of the 6th Brigade line now ensued: Vickers machine guns were brought forward, the 22nd Battalion was brought up to thicken the front, and one of its companies pushed forward to occupy the right-flank Gott Mit Uns Trench. At around 3.00 pm on 1 September, General Rosenthal ordered that his remaining 2nd Division Brigade—the 7th—was to relieve the 5th during darkness that night, and the 6th Brigade was to attempt to advance until relieved by the 7th on 3 September.

  While the events just described had unfolded on the 2nd Division front, the 5th Division’s 14th Brigade, whose task was a south-easterly thrust towards Péronne and St Denis, had also been given a monumental task. After having marched some seven miles across covered and rough country, it was ordered to relieve the front-line troops occupying Florina Trench and use that feature as its start line. Employing the now standard two-battalion advance, its 53rd Battalion was to operate on the left or northern flank, its 54th Battalion was to move on the right, its 56th was to move in close support, and the 55th was to act as brigade reserve. The right-flank 54th Battalion’s ultimate objective was to fight its way into Péronne and then secure that town and its crossings; the left-flank 53rd Battalion was to seize the ground running from its boundary with the 6th Brigade and thence southwards to the Cologne River.

  The artillery support for the 14th Brigade would comprise a hurricane bombardment upon known and likely locations of artillery and machine gun fire. The 53rd and 54th Battalions were each to be further supported by a section of machine guns and a sub-section of Light Trench Mortars.

  It will be recalled that when the 6th Brigade’s right-flank 23rd Battalion had reached its Florina Trench start line, it had found that portion of the trench in enemy hands. When the 14th Brigade’s left-flank 53rd Battalion’s patrols reached its adjacent part of that trench, it too was occupied by the enemy. A bitter hand-to-hand fight resulted after movement through thick enemy wire, during which both battalions were delayed by 25 minutes in their assembly. The 14th B
rigade Report stated that ‘practically no prisoners were taken at this period owing to the violence of the fighting’.51

  By 6.45 am the right-flank 54th Battalion, despite having encountered heavy machine gun fire and an additional obstacle of belts of wire (and resulting heavy casualties), had gained the water surrounds of Péronne and had watched the Germans retreating into the town. To the north the 53rd Battalion (closely followed up by elements of the 55th and 56th) had advanced through a wood, and by 7.30 am their companies had linked up just east of the cemetery—about 650 yards north of Péronne. After one company of the 53rd had managed to advance beyond their flanks, it was wisely decided to stop the advance, consolidate by bringing forward troops from the rearward 55th Battalion, and also bolstering its left flank pending contact with the 6th Brigade. To the south, by 8.45 am the 54th Battalion had gained central Péronne and, finding that their southern flank was protected by swamps, proceeded to secure the town.

  HQ 14th Brigade issued orders for a halt at 8.30 pm on 1 September, with all small forward detachments withdrawn to conform to a line running from just south of Péronne, roughly through to the ground east of the cemetery, and thence to just west of the Sugar Factory. As the Germans were still able to offer concentrated fire from the north-eastern ramparts of Péronne and from St Denis Wood, darkness would enable further artillery support to be moved forward.