Our Great Hearted Men

by Peter Brune

  On the 1st Division’s right flank, after the 3rd Brigade’s 11th and 12th Battalions had occupied the Green Line, the 9th and 10th Battalions moved through them to resume the advance to the Red Line. As with the 1st Brigade, the 3rd Brigade’s 9th and 10th Battalions were faced with a far shorter distance to the exploitation Blue Line. Although the 9th Battalion’s advance on the left flank ran into concentrated machine gun fire from the village of Villeret, its accompanying tank was able to offer strong support in the elimination of those enemy posts. After having cleared the village and a number of sunken roads, the Battalion occupied its portion of the Red Line by around 9.30 am. Given the relatively short distance from its Red Line positions to the Blue, the Battalion pushed out patrols from its leading company straight after the barrage lifted from in front of the Red Line.

  While the 9th Battalion had been thus employed, the 10th Battalion on its right found its main opposition in a trench line between the Green and Red Lines and an equally strong system just prior to reaching the Blue Line. The former trench system was captured by the Battalion’s C Company. It yielded 100 prisoners, twelve machine guns and a 77-mm gun.32 The 3rd Brigade Report on Operations would later record that: ‘The final stage was accomplished by a spirited charge, the enemy machine gunners only retiring after severe fighting. Posts were established in the proximity of the Blue Line.’33

  It will be remembered that on the 1st Division’s right or southern flank, the 4th Division’s 4th Brigade had deployed its 13th and 15th Battalions to outflank the village of Le Verguier, and that its 16th Battalion had been tasked with the capture and mopping up of that location. After its occupation of the Green Line, the 13th and 15th Battalions moved under their barrage to attack and occupy the Red Line. ‘Little opposition was met with and the Red Line was reported captured at 9.35 am.’34 The 4th Brigade plan now envisaged a consolidation of the Red Line by the 13th and 15th Battalions, and a movement by the 14th Battalion through them to advance towards the exploitation Blue Line. The 16th Battalion was to move forward and occupy the Green Line.

  At around 9.40 am the barrage ceased and the 14th Battalion moved towards the Blue Line. With most of the field artillery on the move, the Australian Field Artillery’s 41st Battery moved in support and ‘was able to engage many targets over open sights, and did much good work’. Upon reaching the enemy trench system, the 14th Battalion’s fight became one of ‘individual enterprises and “nibbles” here and there’, as a part of that feature was gained and the rest of the front was covered from the sunken road.35 As a result of similar difficulties on the 12th Brigade’s right flank, it was decided that the 4th Division would stay in the sunken road until after dark and that batteries of the field artillery would move forward to ‘previously selected positions’. The attack by the 4th Brigade’s 14th Battalion on the left and the 12th Brigade’s 46th Battalion on the right was timed for 11.00 pm. The 4th Division Report on Operations best sums up the superb teamwork between the artillery and the infantry:

  Considerable opposition was met with. Great difficulty was experienced in penetrating the thick masses of wire that protected the enemy works, and it was only due to the accuracy of the Artillery Barrage and splendid individual efforts of Officers and N.C.O’s that this obstacle was quickly overcome. Rain had commenced to fall before 11 p.m. and the night was very ‘dirty’. A hot meal had been served to the men whilst in the Sunken Road and all were in excellent spirits . . . At 1 a.m. the whole of the Blue Line was in our possession . . . Over 300 prisoners were captured together with a considerable number of machine guns and minenwerfers [mortars].36

  The 4th Brigade Report on Operations would later recall the intensity of the fighting that night: ‘Owing to the darkness of the night very few prisoners were taken but many dead Boche were found next morning in the numerous saps and dugouts.’37

  Daylight on 19 September 1918 saw the Australian Corps in occupation of nearly all of its exploitation Blue Line. Ahead of the 1st Division lay a tantalising spectacle: a significant portion of the Hindenburg Main Line, with its canal, tunnel and entrance, and the rolling ground stretching for miles around that feature, were clearly visible. It had been a stunning achievement.

  In their incisive study of General Rawlinson, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have left us with a telling summary of the Fourth Army’s attack on the Hindenburg Outpost Line on 18 September 1918:

  . . . if any of the factors which led to success on the Australian front were absent, the Germans were still capable of very stiff opposition . . . Clearly, in situations which gave the German defenders some hope of success, they were still prepared to fight it out. That is, in the absence of the full range of expertise which the British Army was now in a position to employ in delivering attacks, no operation was assured of success.38

  The Australian Corps’s resounding victory on 18 September did indeed come down to the application of ‘the full range of expertise’ that was then available to the BEF. A number of examples should be noted.

  A significant aspect of this expertise was the intensity and accuracy of the artillery and machine gun barrage, which caused many of the German machine gunners to be in their dugouts rather than manning their guns. In its Report on Operations, 10–20 September, the 4th Division reported that ‘many platoons crossed the hostile wire under cover of the barrage, and were into the hostile trenches almost immediately after the barrage lifted’.39 Further, the same report noted that a captured German officer, in describing the machine gun barrage, stated that ‘it was impossible for anyone to put their heads above the parapet without being shot’.40

  Another element was the refined and practised infantry drill of outflanking troublesome posts, which caused understandable distress among defenders whose morale was already shaken. Indeed, if the Germans were not eliminated from the flank or rear, they were all too often rushed by the closely following ‘mopping up’ second wave of attackers. In all this, it was often the proficient drill of the platoon or section, whose individuals drew on their experience, initiative and esprit de corps—and their concentrated use of trench mortars, Lewis Guns and rifle grenades.

  Next was the ability of both the field and heavy artillery to accurately engage their German counterparts. While Australian casualties from German guns were incurred, the reports on operations from the 1st and 4th Divisions and their Brigades mostly record light casualties on the start line and upon subsequent objectives.

  It would seem likely that the element of surprise, the gathering of accurate intelligence and the ability to bring down accurate infantry support and counter-battery fire were major factors in both the German casualties and the high surrender count. Obviously, the above-mentioned ingredients for success were vital, but ‘the extreme importance of complete and thorough preparation of administrative details was again emphasised’.41 In short, the role of sound staff work was of paramount importance in the Corps’s ability to apply this ‘full range of expertise’. Such was the attention to detail that the 4th Division report noted ‘a considerable factor in the success of their attack’ on the Blue Line at 11.00 pm on the 18th came down to ‘a hot meal prior to their final assault . . .’42

  In contrast, events on both the British left III Corps front and on the right IX Corps flank demonstrate both a lack of a number of the above-mentioned attributes and poor coordination. In the case of the III Corps we have noted the command issues concerning General Butler. In short, it is enough to say that Butler was no Monash. Two points are illuminating. First, in his book, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the hundred Days, Major-General Montgomery made the extraordinary admission that ‘owing to an error in the synchronisation of watches, some machine-guns opened fire too soon’. He then went on to say that despite this fundamental flaw the awaiting infantry were able to interpret the din of that barrage to ‘realise fully the intensity of the covering fire they were receiving from the machine-guns’.43 Montgomery might have added that the critical aim of surprise had bee
n lost. Further, he acknowledged that on some parts of the III Corps front, the ‘barrage gradually outstripped the infantry, and any attempt to advance had, therefore, to be made without its assistance’.44 Prior and Wilson have indicated that this failure to keep up with the barrage was caused by ‘over-complicated operation orders requiring the barrage (and as a consequence the troops) to make several changes in direction’.45 Thus the key elements of surprise—coordinated creeping artillery and machine gun barrages closely followed by disciplined, well-drilled infantry, so prevalent on the Australian Corps front—were lacking on this III Corps sector, which prejudiced the advance and caused higher casualties.

  By the end of 18 September, not only had III Corps failed to occupy any part of its Blue Line objective, but its front (already some 600 yards back from the Australian Corps left flank) now looped back further still as it travelled northwards.

  If the III Corps had experienced great difficulties on its left Fourth Army front, then the performance of the newly constituted IX Corps on the right or southern flank was also marred by a series of poor command decisions that severely inhibited its chances of success. For the purposes of this work, the main emphasis is placed upon the IX Corps’s 1st Division, which was deployed on the AIF 12th Brigade’s right flank.

  It will be recalled that a most effective machine gun barrage had been employed on the Australian Corps front, and to a lesser degree on the III Corps front, as a means of compensating for the paucity of tank support. In an error of judgement, General Braithwaite declined to employ that machine gun barrage on his IX Corps front. When his 1st and 6th Divisions attempted to gain ground on three key objectives during the period 18–19 September, they failed to do so. It was not until 20 September that Braithwaite finally employed a machine gun barrage. To compound this lack of firepower, the 5th Tank Brigade would later report that its tanks were ‘unsupported by their infantry who were unable to advance in face of the terrific machine gun fire’.46 Clearly, the tactics of infantry–tank assaults upon German machine gun nests, so prevalent on the 1st AIF Division front, were lacking.

  It has been demonstrated that across the Australian Corps front on 18 September, a ‘leapfrogging’ on a one, two or three battalion basis had been instigated to preserve the energy of the infantry and thus the momentum of the attack. On the Australian Corps right flank (Brigadier-General Leane’s 12th Brigade), the 2nd British Brigade deployed but one battalion, the 2nd Royal Sussex, to advance through the first two objectives and also seize the exploitation Blue Line. In an understatement, Charles Bean recorded that: ‘The strain on the troops was thus very great.’47 While it is conceded that its commander was ordered to carry out the exploitation ‘unless he thinks his troops have done all they can manage’, the lack of a clearly defined ‘leapfrogging’ point told heavily on the British 1st Division’s progress.

  Charles Bean would later record that the night of 18 September brought further concern for the British IX Corps southern front and particularly to Brigadier-General Leane’s AIF 12th Brigade’s right flank:

  . . . the left company of the 2nd Royal Sussex was exhausted and seemed to have lost heart after its captain’s death; it advanced but did not hold on. Farther south the 6th Division had not captured its first objective . . . Leane accordingly ordered two companies of the 48th to attack at the same time as the 46th and seize a position above St. Hélène, guarding his flank. The commander of the 1st British Division, however, protested that this lay on his front and ordered his own troops to attack it. Leane had to cancel his order but directed the two companies to advance and guard the flank inside his boundary instead.48

  The British 1st Division attack at midnight failed. Further, Bean recorded that after the successful 11.00 pm attack on 18 September when the 4th Division’s 4th and 12th AIF Brigades had captured their Blue Line objective, the British Commander of the 1st Division was giving inaccurate information as to the location of his Division. It was, in fact, a full half a mile back near its second Red Line objective.

  Bean might have gone further. Brigadier-General Leane’s 12th Brigade Report on Operations, 10–20 September 1918, is a damning document. Parts of his report stated that:

  With the exception of a small liaison party of English numbering about 10 who advanced with us touch could not be gained with the English for a considerable time. Although the Brigade detailed a Liaison Officer to the 2nd [British] Brigade not much assistance was given to this Brigade on account of the fact that the 2nd Brigade Headquarters seemed to be absolutely in the dark regarding the position of their troops. We endeavoured to get the 2nd Brigade to lay a line to 12th Brigade Headquarters, and although instructions were issued that responsibility for communication was Right to Left, the 2nd Brigade refused to lay the line . . . The English gave this Brigade no assistance whatever during the advance to the Blue Line and the information as to the position of their troops was absolutely inaccurate and misleading. This was proved by patrols repeatedly.49

  In concluding his report, Leane therefore stressed the necessity for inter-brigade communications; for being able to cross onto another brigade’s front if the capture of a given locality was to the benefit of all; and that every effort should be made to give accurate dispositions.50

  In all this, two points deserve mention. The first is that General Braithwaite had been in command of IX Corps for a mere fifteen days, and his Corps had been established only a short while. To therefore expect the same level of staff work and cooperation between the various elements of his corps as existed in the Australian Corps was an unrealistic aspiration. Second, although Prior and Wilson have succinctly pointed out the level of expertise and weaponry then available to the BEF, success in battle comes down to the formulation and execution of a practised doctrine. The acquisition of that doctrine depends on four basic ingredients: ability, experience, cooperation and the resulting esprit de corps. And that process takes time. Perhaps this phenomenon is best summed up by one of Brigadier-General Leane’s final points contained in his report:

  Close liaison and conferences of all concerned in the attack again proved of the utmost value. They are worth tons of paper. By this means you find out what is in the mind of the others engaged in the operation. Everyone engaged is quite clear as to what you intend to do and arranges accordingly. Write your operation order then! It saves lots of amendments later on.51

  It is worth remembering that such Australian Corps conferences were not confined to corps, division or brigade level, but permeated right through the chain of command.

  ***

  In his assessment of Monash’s command both leading up to and during the Australian Corps attack upon the Hindenburg Line, Charles Bean would later write:

  In this decisive fighting, for such it was, he was right to work his troops to the extreme limit of their endurance, which normally is beyond the limit to which men themselves think they can endure. At such times victory often goes to the troops that hold out the longest, withstanding the strain, toil or exhaustion in perhaps unbelievable degree and for an unbelievable time; and the value of different armies depends largely upon how far they are ready to do this.52

  CHAPTER 11

  . . . some damn good men amongst them

  Hamel, Amiens, Mont St Quentin, Péronne and now the Hindenburg Outpost Line—all stunning victories achieved by a commander who had rightly pushed his highly trained troops to the very limit of their endurance. But for a significant number of the AIF’s soldiers that limit was reached in September 1918.

  The first problem that confronted the AIF was the rapidly diminishing strength of its infantry battalions as they approached the Hindenburg Line. As an earlier response to his lack of reinforcements, Field Marshal Haig, against his wishes, had been forced to restructure the British Army to three battalions per brigade instead of four. Bean has recorded that ‘a similar measure had long before been adopted by the French and Germans, and this policy had already been approved for the AIF in February . . .’1 But
the Australian Government was loath to implement such a policy until it became absolutely essential. That necessity came as a result of Ludendorff’s Operation Michael in March 1918. Consequently, the 3rd Division 9th Brigade’s 36th Battalion was disbanded on 30 April 1918; the 4th Division 13th Brigade’s 52nd Battalion on 16 May; and that Division’s 12th Brigade’s 47th Battalion on 31 May.

  By early September 1918 the situation had become critical. The British Army Council now drew attention to the fact that while the 57 remaining battalions in the Australian Corps were collectively some 8500 soldiers below full strength, the projected reinforcements over the next four months would only amount to some 3000 per month. Therefore over that time, taking into account casualties and illness, the AIF had little chance of preserving even its existing poor strength.

  It is interesting to note the reactions of Generals Birdwood and Monash when the Army Council sent Haig a further letter on 29 August, suggesting that the change from four to three battalions per brigade should be instituted as soon as possible. When Haig asked them for a response, both were measured and, in a number of ways, sought to delay the inevitable. Birdwood had previously advocated an individual assessment of battalions, in that they should only be disbanded when they could no longer function at a required strength. Monash, who pointed out that the present strength of the AIF had been sufficient to gain it startling successes, argued that no change should be undertaken before the new year. Convinced that the approaching winter would force a slowing in the momentum of the Fourth Army’s advance, and that by mid-October the Corps would be rested, he was hopeful that in the new year the AIF might attain a battalion strength of some 750. To further avoid the disbandments, Monash also urged two additional initiatives: that each battalion might now function with three rather than four companies, and that the desired reductions might be achieved by allowing him and his generals the prerogative of disbanding individual battalions if and when they found it beneficial. The first option was redundant in the sense that many of the AIF battalions had already reduced their establishment from four to three companies, while the second was in line with Birdwood’s suggestion that such disbandments should best be undertaken by the AIF itself, rather than by employing a rigid policy across the Corps.