Black Friday

by S. Hussain Zaidi

  The media too found renewed interest in the blasts case. All newspapers reported the CBI version, but many carried Yaqub’s denial as well. There was also much investigation and speculation about Yaqub’s real role.

  Two countries reacted immediately to the media reports. The G.P. Koirala government in Nepal, facing general elections and wary of charges of yielding to pressure from India, quickly issued a denial. On 5 August, a spokesman of the Nepali home ministry stated that no one called Yaqub Memon had been taken into custody by the officials at the airport on 24 July. The wording of the denial was ambiguous as Yaqub had been travelling under the name of Yusuf Ahmed.

  The second, and sharper, denial came from Pakistan. The Pakistani high commissioner to India stated in a press release on 7 August that the arrest of the Indian citizen Yaqub Memon did not surprise Pakistan as it had always maintained that the Memon family was not in Pakistan. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto described Chavan’s statements as ‘a pack of lies’. She added that India was wrongly implicating Pakistan to divert attention from its own problems, especially the human rights abuse in Kashmir. Relations between the two countries were already tense as at the end of July Pakistan had virtually given notice at a UN press conference that they planned to raise the Kashmir issue before the General Assembly the following month.

  Soon after the blasts, Pakistan had said that it was willing to help to bring to book the people behind the blasts. Officially there was a task force set up for this purpose, though subsequently there was no report of its activities. When Indian intelligence sources said that the Memons were in Karachi, Pakistan had denied this.

  With the fresh evidence unearthed with Yaqub Memon’s arrest it was widely felt that Delhi would make renewed attempts to have Pakistan declared a terrorist state. For months Pakistan had been on the US watch list of countries likely to be declared terrorist states. Memon’s arrest could prove to be a major blow to Pakistan’s international image.

  There was considerable public and media speculation about how Yaqub, despite being under constant ISI surveillance, could fly out of Karachi, carrying incriminating documents. According to one theory, RAW agents had wooed him away; according to another, Benazir Bhutto was behind it as she was seeking to expose the security establishment which was loyal to her arch rival, the previous prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

  A third theory was that Dawood Ibrahim had persuaded Yaqub to return to India to delink his name from the conspiracy. The CBI had announced a Rs 15 lakh reward for information about him. In an interview to India Today (31 July 1994) Dawood had said: ‘I am in a desperate situation. The Indian government has reduced me to a mouse, one who is trapped and cannot move around freely.’

  Dawood’s link with the blasts, so far mentioned only in Dawood Phanse’s confession, had been reinforced when one of his close aides Usman Gani Mohammed Memon, a hawala operator, had been arrested on 20 July by the anti-terrorist squad of Gujarat police. During interrogation, Usman stated that Dawood had wanted to avenge the killings of innocent Muslims and so acquired and arranged for the shipment of RDX, arms and other explosives from Pakistan to India. The three hundred pages of Usman’s diary contained the names of top businessmen and builders who sought Dawood’s help to launder money. This arrest considerably bolstered the CBI’s theory that Dawood Ibrahim had masterminded the blasts.

  During interrogation, Yaqub Memon stubbornly maintained that he had never met Dawood, and named Tiger Memon and Taufiq Jaliawala as the prime movers of the conspiracy.

  The fourth theory about the arrest was that Yaqub had actually been on a business trip to Kathmandu and was apprehended while returning to Karachi. Off the record, CBI officials accepted this version. It was also speculated that the CBI had struck a deal with him, which all officials unanimously denied.

  Yaqub sat in the darkened room and gazed at the ceiling. There was hardly any sound around him, and he felt cut off from the world. He thought about how his life had changed, of Raheen, who was due to have their first child in the first week of August. It was now 9 August, and he did not know if he was a father yet. He wished passionately that he had not left Bombay on 9 March. They would have undoubtedly faced a lot of trouble, but they would not have been branded traitors.

  He had now spent twelve days with CBI officers, patiently answering their questions for hours every day. He had celebrated a mournful thirty-second birthday on 30 July.

  A CBI officer came to him and told him that he was to give an interview on television.

  Yaqub looked at him blankly. ‘What interview?’

  The officer grinned broadly. ‘You’re about to become a celebrity. It will be on the national TV—Doordarshan—and the whole of India is going to watch you.’

  Yaqub was in half a mind to refuse, when it struck him that he could use this opportunity to let ninety crore of his countrymen know that apart from Tiger Memon, the other Memons were decent, law-abiding citizens. He asked the officer, ‘When am I supposed to be on television?’

  ‘We have to go in for a recording now, it will be aired later tonight.’

  He was escorted to the Doordarshan studio. The programme on which he was being interviewed was Newstrack, a half-hour news analysis show. In response to the questions, he narrated the tale of his journey to Kathmandu, his interception at the airport, and his handing over to the CBI. He stated that it was Tiger Memon and Taufiq Jaliawala who had been the kingpins, and explained how Tiger had been used by the ISI in the plot.

  Yaqub spoke at length about the role played by Taufiq Jaliawala. It was Jaliawala who had coordinated with Dubai and Bombay on behalf of the Pakistani authorities, and played a major role in selecting the blast sites. Jaliawala’s construction business, automobile shop and sari emporium in Karachi were merely fronts for his more lucrative illegal businesses. He was a close associate of Dawood Ibrahim, and of Tiger Memon. When the Memons moved to Karachi, Jaliawala had initially given them shelter in his own bungalow, and aided them in securing new identity cards and passports. He had also given shelter to about ten of the men directly involved in the blasts—including Javed Chikna and Anwar Theba, Tiger’s two most senior aides— when they had arrived in Karachi. Yaqub also described the wedding of Jaliawala’s daughter Rabia to Farooq, son of Feroze Dadi of Crawford Market, Bombay, on 30 April 1994. Many prominent citizens of Bombay, and underworld leaders from Bombay and Dubai had been invited and Jaliawala had indicated that he would rather the Memons did not attend as it would cause embarrassment if anyone from Bombay recognized them.

  Apart from Jaliawala, there was another smuggler, Sayed Arif, also working from Dubai, who had aided Tiger Memon. With the money lent by Jaliawala and Arif, the Memon family had built a lavish bungalow called Ahmed House, which had cost Pakistani Rs 1.16 crore, in the Karachi Development Scheme area. However, despite material comforts, the Memon family was not happy exiled from their native land. From Yaqub’s account, the family came across as good Indians, only circumstantially connected to the blasts and now in danger.

  During June and July 1994, copies of the chargesheet in the blasts case had reached Karachi. Yaqub had talked to lawyers who studied it and said that based on the evidence detailed, only Tiger could be convicted. The other members of the family would, at worse, receive light sentences. It was this assurance which had prompted Yaqub’s return. He had prepared for the homecoming carefully. He had driven around Karachi, photographing the homes of Jaliawala, Dawood and Tiger’s lieutenants who had executed the bomb blasts. He had recorded conversations between Jaliawala, Tiger and others on microcassettes, secured a video of Rabia’s wedding, and gathered documents which showed how the Memons had all been given new identities. His cousin Usman had been his confidant.

  Finally, Yaqub was asked whether he had met Dawood Ibrahim. He denied meeting him, but said that he knew his name.

  The interview was aired on Doordarshan at 9 p.m. It created a huge sensation, as such an interview was unprecedented in the annals of Indian television. Th
e government’s aim had been fulfilled: the world had heard how Pakistan had been involved in the blasts and even now was sheltering its perpetrators. Many viewers were impressed with Yaqub’s courage and intelligence, and intrigued by the discrepancies between the CBI account and Yaqub’s.

  There were eight armed commandos waiting at the arrivals terminal at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi. Several CBI officers also prowled around, keeping their eyes glued to the main arrival gate. It was 24 August 1994.

  Air-India flight 736 from Dubai had already arrived. Soon they saw a group of six adults whose faces looked familiar and who had an uncertain air about them. Suleiman Memon and Isa Memon supported sixty-six-year-old Abdul Razak and sixty-year-old Hanifa. Immediately behind them walked a youth in his twenties, whom they assumed to be Yusuf. Following him was Suleiman’s wife Rubina and their two children, seven-year-old Iliyas and five-year-old Aliyah. Each of the adult male Memons carried a price of Rs 1 lakh, and each of the adult women carried a price of Rs 25,000. Only five adult members of the family were still missing—Tiger and his wife Shabana, Ayub and his wife Reshma, and Yaqub’s wife Raheen who had recently delivered.

  The Memons had travelled to Dubai, where they had contacted the Indian embassy, filed their affidavits and informed the embassy of their intention to return. The embassy had in turn informed the CBI, and escorted the group to the airport and on to the plane.

  As the group reached the CBI officers, one of them came forward, introduced himself and told them that they were under arrest. They were taken to a safe house in a central government police colony in south Delhi, guarded by eight ferocious-looking and fully armed commandos. Metropolitan magistrate V.K. Jain remanded them to CBI custody for fourteen days under TADA. The children were allowed to stay with the family. The media had no inkling about these arrests at that time.

  On 11 September the clan was joined by Raheen and her month-old baby. Raheen too arrived from Dubai, was arrested at the airport and remanded into custody.

  Many believed that this mass surrender by the Memon family meant that a deal had been struck. The Indian government and the CBI, embarrassed that none of the important people in the conspiracy had been captured, had probably offered the Memons lighter punishment or an acquittal if they returned to India. However, the CBI maintained that there was no deal and the Memons were not planning to turn approvers. Its director, K. Vijay Rama Rao, said that the Memons had surrendered because they had had no other option.

  ■

  The evidence provided by Yaqub and Usman proved useful in tracing the RDX back into Pakistan. They had also supplied information which indicated Dawood’s closeness to powerful people in Pakistan. Yaqub revealed that after the communal riots in Bombay, Raza Ashfaq Sarvar, then a minister in the Muslim League government of Punjab, Pakistan, frequently met Dawood in Dubai. He also stated that Dawood was close to several men in the Pakistani army, as well as to Taufiq Jaliawala, who Yaqub alleged had organized the RDX supply for the ISI. Usman furnished details of a meeting in Dawood’s Dubai house on 10 January, where the plan for the blasts was reportedly discussed.

  Earlier, there had been some other small pieces of evidence which showed Pakistani involvement. For example, Rakesh Maria’s team had seized twenty-seven cartons from the Memons’ garage and compound space in Al-Hussaini—twenty-five on 21 March 1993 and two on 24 March. The cartons were covered with black stains which made it difficult to read the labels. On a couple however the words ‘Packstile Packages Ltd., Lahore. Consignee: Wah Noble’ could be read. The police laboratory at Kalina declared after examining the boxes that they had been used to carry plastic explosives. Investigation revealed that Wah Noble was a private limited company whose official address was 12/92 GT Road, Wah, Pakistan. The company dealt with the manufacture of dynamite, emulsion and powdered high explosives like black powder and PETN, safely fuses, detonators and blasting equipment. Thus the explosives used seemed to have been manufactured and sent from Pakistan.

  The government of every country monitors the sale of explosives, especially their import and export. It could be inferred that the government of Pakistan or at least some central government agency there had given its tacit consent for the smuggling of these deadly explosives. They had also entered India illegally. When the CBI checked with the Indian Director General of Foreign Trade, it was discovered that five companies in India had a licence to import explosives. For each consignment, approval had to be obtained from the Controller of Explosives at Nagpur. These five companies were Hutti Gold Mines Company, Raichore; HLS Geeta Ltd., Jaisalmer; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Vishakapatnam; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Bombay; and HLS India Ltd., New Delhi. As none of these firms had imported the explosives, it was clear that they had been smuggled illegally to the country from Pakistan.

  The hand grenades used also seemed to be sourced from Pakistan. The markings on them read ‘Arges 69’, and weapons experts said this was an Austrian company. A sample was sent to the Federal Ministry for Interior in Austria for investigation. They sent a report to the Indian government dated 28 April 1993. It reported that the grenades were manufactured by two firms— Ulbrichts-Witwe and Arges-Armaturen in Schwanenstadt. The two firms were owned by the same person and were located about a hundred metres from each other. Ulbrichts processed metals and synthetics, while Arges manufactured hand grenades and helmets.

  In 1968, both firms had received an enquiry from Akhtar and Hoffman from Islamabad, regarding the licensing of machinery for the production of hand grenades of model HG 69. A deal was struck, and from 1968 to 1971, the requisite machinery was licensed to them. After 1971, this was replaced by machinery for model HG 72.

  There were plans for setting up a company called Ulbrichts Pakistan in collaboration with Akhtar and Hoffman but there was a dispute regarding payment of licensing fees and no official agreement could be reached. However, during 1972–75, there was a firm called Ulbrichts Pakistan, which described itself as a joint-venture partner of Ulbrichts Austria and produced and sold HG 69 hand grenades in Pakistan. There were still three cases pending in the courts in Pakistan regarding this firm.

  The Austrian report stated that the samples sent indicated that the grenades had been made with the machines sold to Pakistan in 1968. The markings on the detonators of the grenades and the serial numbers showed they were manufactured by Ulbrichts Pakistan in 1983. HG 69 grenades had not been produced in Austria since 1971. The grenades sent for examination differed from those produced in Austria in two ways: the steel pellets in the casing were different, and the explosive substance used was not nitropenta which the Austrian company used.

  Besides the explosives and the grenades, the Star brand pistols which had been recovered were also of Pakistan manufacture. These were very popular with the Bombay underworld.

  But the most clinching evidence of Pakistani collusion was the fact that they had harboured the Memon family and given them false passports, even after they had denied that the Memons were in Pakistan when India had requested their deportation. The passports of the Memons which Yaqub had been carrying showed that all members of the family had been issued Thai visas from the embassy of Thailand in Islamabad on 15 April 1993, valid until 14 July 1993.

  All these details added up to significant confirmation of Pakistan’s involvement. Yaqub Memon’s return had paid rich dividends for the CBI.

  14

  The Helping Hand

  It was a typical neta reception room on the sixth floor of Mantralaya. On this day in December 1994, orderlies rushed in and out purposefully, and hangers-on milled around. Sharad Pawar was very busy in his office, so the crowd in the reception room grew.

  Among the people waiting was a sixty-year-old whose face was familiar to most of his countrymen, and many beyond its shores. Sunil Dutt had been waiting for over three hours. Dutt was used to waiting: he had spent many hours here or in the reception of Pawar’s bungalow Varsha since Sanjay had first been arrested in April.
The chief minister was very busy nowadays.

  Dutt and his wife had been close friends with Indira Gandhi and her family, and had received the friendliest of treatment from them. In Delhi, as an MP, he had access to people in power, though all Narasimha Rao would give were half promises. Bombay however, though his party was in power, was proving to be a different experience. Pawar, when he finally granted Dutt an audience, said that the matters were in the hands of the judiciary so he was helpless.

  Dutt had had a lifetime of coping with crises—the early death of his father, being a refugee from Pakistan, his early struggles as an actor, the commercial failure of his first directorial venture Yaadein, his wife’s long illness and death, and his son’s battles with drugs. He had taken over Nargis’s work as an activist after her death. He had marched for peace in ravaged Punjab in 1987, and for nuclear disarmament in Japan in 1984. He had worked with the riot-affected in Bhagalpur in 1984. He had dealt with all of these, and he resolved not to be defeated by the latest crisis.

  During the communal riots, Dutt had spoken out stridently about the Shiv Sena, and Thackeray too had criticized Dutt vehemently. In the constituency of northwest Bombay, Thackeray’s candidate Madhukar Sarpotdar had repeatedly lost to Dutt. But now Thackeray seemed to be the only man who could help him, and Dutt resolved to approach him.

  Thackeray’s bungalow Matoshree, Kala Nagar, was heavily guarded with policemen swarming all over the fortress-like building. The hall was crowded with shakha pramukhs, the chiefs of the area branches, and politicians from the villages of Maharashtra, Delhi and UP. Dutt was the only Congressman present, and a buzz went up when he was finally escorted in after going through several security checks.

  Thackeray was busy in a high-level meeting with Sena stalwarts, as the assembly elections were around the corner. But informed of Dutt’s arrival, he immediately adjourned the meeting, something leaders who had worked with him for decades had never seen him do. He asked that Dutt be escorted to a special visitor’s room.