The Assassins: A Redical Sect in Islam

by Bernard Lewis

  Both statements may be true for different dates. Though Saladin’s account of the degree of collaboration among his opponents is probably exaggerated in order to discredit the Zangids, it was natural enough that his various enemies should at first concentrate their attacks on him rather than on one another. The curious story told by William of Tyre of an Assassin proposal to embrace Christianity may even reflect a genuine rapprochement between Sinan and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

  The first Assassin attempt on Saladin’s life occurred in December 1174 or January 1175, while he was besieging Aleppo. According to the biographers of Saladin, Giimiishtigin, who governed the city on behalf of the Zangid child who was its nominal ruler, sent messengers to Sinan, offering him lands and money in return for the assassination of Saladin. The appointed emissaries penetrated the camp on a cold winter day, but were recognized by the emir of Abu Qubais, a neighbour of theirs. He questioned them, and was at once killed. In the ensuing fracas many people were killed, but Saladin himself was unscathed. In the following year Sinan decided to make another attempt, and on 22 May 1176, Assassins, disguised as soldiers in his army, attacked him with knives while he was besieging Azaz. Thanks to his armour Saladin received only superficial wounds, and the assailants were dealt with by his emirs, several of whom perished in the struggle. Some sources attribute this second attempt also to the instigation of Gumushtigin. After these events Saladin adopted elaborate precautions, sleeping in a specially constructed wooden tower and allowing no one whom he did not know personally to approach him.

  While it is by no means impossible that, in organizing these two attempts on Saladin’s life, Sinan was acting in concert with Gumiishtigin, it is unlikely that Gumiishtigin’s inducements were his primary motive. What is far more probable is that Sinan, acting for reasons of his own, accepted the help of Gumiishtigin, thus gaining both material and tactical advantages. Similar considerations apply to the statement contained in a letter sent by Saladin to the caliph from Cairo in 1174, that the leaders of the abortive pro-Fatimid conspiracy in Egypt in that year had written to Sinan, stressing their common faith and urging him to take action against Saladin. The Nizari Ismailis of Syria and Persia owed no allegiance to the last Fatimids in Cairo, whom they regarded as usurpers. That Fatimid elements sought the aid of the Syrian Assassins is likely enough – some half-century previously the Fatimid caliph al-Amir had attempted to persuade them to accept his leadership. But the Nizaris had refused, and al-Amir himself had fallen to their daggers. It is not impossible that Sinan, again for tactical reasons, may have been willing to collaborate with the Egyptian conspirators, though it is unlikely that he would have continued to act in their interests after the definitive crushing of the plot in Egypt. A more likely immediate cause for Sinan’s action against Saladin may be found in a story told by a later chronicler, though not by the extant contemporary authors. In 1174-5, according to this account, ten thousand horsemen of the Nubuwiyya, an anti-Shi‘ite religious order in Iraq, raided the Ismaili centres in al-Bab and Buza’a, where they slaughtered 13,000 Ismailis and carried off much booty and many captives. Profiting from the confusion of the Ismailis, Saladin sent his army against them, raiding Sarmin, Ma’arrat Masrin, and Jabal al-Summaq, and killing most of the inhabitants. The chronicler unfortunately does not say in what month these events took place, but if, as seems likely, Saladin’s raid was carried out while his army was on its way northward to Aleppo, it may serve to explain the hostility of the Assassins towards him. Even without this explanation, however, it is clear that the emergence of Saladin as the major power in Muslim Syria, with a policy of Muslim unification, would mark him down as a dangerous adversary.

  In August 1176 Saladin advanced on the Assassin territories, in search of vengeance, and laid siege to Masyaf. There are different versions of the circumstances of his withdrawal. Saladin’s secretary and historian Imad al-Din, followed by most of the other Arabic sources, attributes it to the mediation of Saladin’s uncle, the prince of Hama, to whom his Assassin neighbours appealed for intercession. Another biographer adds a more convincing reason – the Frankish attack on the Biqa’ valley, and the resulting urgent need for Saladin’s presence there. In Kamal al-Din’s history of Aleppo it is Saladin who invokes the mediation of the prince of Hama, and asks for peace, apparently as a result of the terror inspired by Assassin tactics. In the Ismaili version, Saladin is terrified by Sinan’s supernatural powers; the prince of Hama intercedes on his behalf, and begs Sinan to allow him to depart in safety. Saladin agrees to withdraw, Sinan gives him a safe-conduct, and the two become the best of friends. The Ismaili account is obviously heavily overlaid with legend, but seems to contain this element of truth, that some sort of agreement was reached. Certainly we hear of no overt acts by the Assassins against Saladin after the withdrawal from Masyaf and there are even some hints of collusion.

  The historians tell several stories, the purpose of which is to explain – perhaps to justify – Saladin’s tolerance of the Assassins. On one occasion, it is said, the Sultan sent a threatening letter to the Assassin chief. His reply was as follows: ‘We have read the gist and details of your letter, and taken note of its threats against us with words and deeds, and by God it is astonishing to find a a fly buzzing in an elephant’s ear and a gnat biting statues. Others before you have said these things and we destroyed them and none could help them. Will you then annul the truth and give aid to the false? “Those who have done wrong will know to what end they will revert.” [Qur’an, xxvi, 228]. If indeed your orders have gone forth to cut off my head and tear my castles from the solid mountains, these are false hopes and vain fantasies, for essentials are not destroyed by accidentals, as souls are not dissolved by diseases. But if we return to the exoteric, perceived by the senses, and leave aside the esoteric, perceived by the mind, we have a good example in the Prophet of God, who said: “No prophet suffered what I suffered.” You know what happened to his line and family and party. But the situation has not changed and the cause has not failed and praise to God in the first and last. We are oppressed and not oppressors, deprived and not deprivers. When “the truth comes the false vanishes; verily the false is apt to vanish.” [Qur’an, xvii, 23]. You know the outward aspect of our affairs and the quality of our men, what they can accomplish in an instant and how they seek the intimacy of death. “Say: – Wish then for death if you speak truth.” [Qur’an, ii, 88]. The common proverb says: “Do you threaten a duck with the river?” Prepare means for disaster and don a garment against catastrophe; for I will defeat you from within your own ranks and take vengeance against you at your own place, and you will be as one who encompasses his own destruction, and “for God that is not of much account.” [cf. Qur’an, xiv, 23]. When you read this letter of ours, be on the look out for us and be moderate of your state, and read the first of “the Bee” and the last of “Sad”.’12

  Even more startling is a story told by Kamal al-Din on the authority of his brother: ‘My brother (God have mercy on him) told me that Sinan sent a messenger to Saladin (God have mercy on him) and ordered him to deliver his message only in private. Saladin had him searched, and when they found nothing dangerous on him he dismissed the assembly for him, leaving only a few people, and asked him to deliver his message. But he said: “My master ordered me not to deliver the message [unless in private].” Saladin then emptied the assembly of all save two Mamluks, and then said: “Give your message.” He replied: “I have been ordered only to deliver it in private.” Saladin said: “These two do not leave me. If you wish, deliver your message, and if not, return.” He said: “Why do you not send away these two as you sent away the others?” Saladin replied: “I regard these as my own sons, and they and I are as one.” Then the messenger turned to the two Mamluks and said: “If I ordered you in the name of my master to kill this Sultan, would you do so?” They answered yes, and drew their swords, saying: “Command us as you wish.” Sultan Saladin (God have mercy on him) was astounded, and the messenger left, taking th
em with him. And thereupon Saladin (God have mercy on him) inclined to make peace with him and enter into friendly relations with him. And God knows best.’13

  The next murder, on 31 August 1177, was of Shihab al-Din ibn al-Ajami, the vizier of the Zangid al-Malik al-Salih in Aleppo, and former vizier of Nur al-Din ibn Zangi. This assassination, which was accompanied by unsuccessful attempts on two of the vizier’s henchmen, is attributed by the Syrian historians to the machinations of Gumüshtigin, who had forged the signature of al-Malik al-Salih on a letter to Sinan asking him to send murderers. The authority for this story is the confession of the Assassins, who claimed, when questioned, that they were only carrying out the orders of al-Malik al-Salih himself. The trick was allegedly discovered in the course of subsequent correspondence between al-Malik al-Salih and Sinan, and Gumüshtigin’s enemies seized the opportunity to bring about his downfall. Whatever the truth of this story, the death of the vizier and the ensuing discord and mistrust cannot have been unwelcome to Saladin.

  The quarrel between Aleppo and Sinan continued. In 1179-80 al-Malik al-Salih seized al-Hajira from the Assassins. Sinan’s protests producing no result, he sent agents to Aleppo who set fire to the market places and wrought great damage. Not one of the incendiaries was apprehended – a fact which suggests that that they could still command local support in the city.

  On 28 April 1192 they brought off their greatest coup – the murder of the Marquis Conrad of Montferrat, the King of Jerusalem, in Tyre. Most sources agree that the murderers disguised themselves as Christian monks and wormed their way into the confidence of the bishop and the marquis. Then, when an opportunity arose, they stabbed him to death. Saladin’s envoy in Tyre reported that when the two Assassins were put to the question they confessed that the king of England had instigated the murder. In view of the testimony of most of the oriental and some of the occidental sources, there seems little doubt that some such confession was indeed made. Richard’s obvious interest in the disappearance of the marquis, and the suspicious speed with which his protege Count Henry of Champagne married the widow and succeeded to the throne of the Latin kingdom, lent some colour to the story – and one can readily understand that it found widespread credence at the time. But whether or not the Assassins were telling the truth when they confessed is another question. The Zangid historian Ibn al-Athir, for whose dislike of Saladin due allowance must be made, mentions the attribution to Richard simply as a belief current among the Franks. He himself names Saladin as the instigator, and even knows the sum of money paid to Sinanfor the work. The plan was to kill both Richard himself and Conrad, but the murder of Richard proved impossible. The Ismaili biography attributes the initiative to Sinan, with the prior approval and co-operation of Saladin; but here too allowance must be made for the author’s obvious desire to present his hero as a loyal collaborator of Saladin in the holy war. He adds the unlikely information that, in reward for this deed, Saladin granted the Assassins many privileges, including the right to set up houses of propaganda in Cairo, Damascus, Horns, Hama, Aleppo, and other cities. In this story we may perhaps discern an exaggerated recollection of some definite recognition accorded to the Assassins by Saladin in the period after the agreement at Masyaf. Imad al-Din, on the other hand, tells us that the murder was not opportune for Saladin, since Conrad, though himself one of the leaders of the Crusaders, was an enemy of the more redoubtable Richard, and was in communication with Saladin at the time of his death. Conrad’s death freed Richard from anxiety and encouraged him to resume hostilities. Four months later he signed a truce with Saladin in which, at Saladin’s request, the Assassin territories were included. The murder of Conrad was Sinan’s last achievement. In 1192-3 or 1193-4 the redoubtable Old Man of the Mountain himself died, and was succeeded by a Persian called Nasr. With the new chief the authority of Alamut seems to have been restored, and remained unshaken until after the Mongol conquest. The names of several of the chief da‘is at different dates are known to us from literary sources and from inscriptions in the Ismaili centres in Syria; most of them are specifically referred to as delegates of Alamut.

  As subjects of Alamut, the Syrian Assassins were also affected by the new policies of Jalal al-Din Hasan III – the restoration of the law, and the alliance with the caliph in Baghdad. In 1211 the lord of Alamut sent messages to Syria, ordering his Syrian followers to build mosques and perform the ritual prayers, to avoid drink and drugs and other forbidden things, to observe the fast and all the prescriptions of the holy law.

  Little is known of how the ‘reform’ influenced the religious beliefs and practices of the Assassins; the alliance with the Caliph does however seem to have affected their activities. It is striking that in Syria, in the presence of the enemies of Islam, no further assassinations of Muslims are recorded, though several Christians were still to fall. The first of these was Raymond, son of Bohemond iv of Antioch, who was killed in the church in Tortosa in 1213. His father, thirsting for vengeance, laid siege to the fortress of Khawabi. The Assassins, by now clearly on good terms with the successors of Saladin, appealed for help to the ruler of Aleppo, who sent an expedition to relieve them. His troops suffered a set-back at the hands of the Franks, but an appeal to his colleague in Damascus brought an army which compelled the enemy to raise the siege and withdraw.

  In the meantime the Assassin chiefs had found a way of turning their reputation to good account. Under threat of assassination, they exacted payments from both Muslim and Christian rulers, even, it would seem, from temporary visitors to the Levant. In the year 1227, according to an Arabic source, the chief da‘i Majd al-Din received envoys from the Emperor Frederick II, who had come to Palestine on a Crusade; they brought gifts worth almost 80,000 dinars. On the pretext that the road to Alamut was too dangerous because of the ravages of the Khorazmians, Majd al-Din kept the gifts in Syria and himself gave the Emperor the safe-conduct he required. At the same time, he took the precaution of sending an envoy to the ruler of Aleppo, to inform him of the Emperor’s embassy and to ensure concerted action.

  The Khorazmian danger may also explain another incident, said to have occurred earlier in the same year. According to this story, Majd al-Din sent an envoy to the Seljuq Sultan of Rum, in Konya, to demand that the regular annual tribute of 2,000 dinars, which the Sultan had previously sent to Alamut, should now be sent to him. The Sultan, in some uncertainty, sent a messenger to Alamut to consult Jalal al-Din; the lord of Alamut confirmed that he had assigned this money to Syria, and instructed the Sultan to pay it. He paid.

  At about this time the Assassins themselves became tributary to the Knights Hospitallers. After the Emperor’s mission, says the Arabic chronicler, the Hospitallers demanded tribute from the Assassins, who refused, saying: ‘Your king the Emperor gives to us; will you then take from us?’ The Hospitallers then attacked them and carried off much booty. The text does not make it clear whether the tribute to the Hospitallers dates from this event or was already in existence.14

  An interesting indication of how far the Assassins had become a recognized and even an accepted part of the Syrian political scene is given by Ibn Wasil, himself a native of central Syria. In the year 1240 the qadi of Sinjar, Badr al-Din, incurred the wrath of the new Sultan. Fleeing through Syria, he sought and received asylum from the Assassins. Their chief at that time was a Persian called Taj al-Din, who had come from Alamut. Ibn Wasil does not hesitate to add that he knew him personally and was on terms of friendship with him. The same Taj al-Din is named in a Masyaf inscription dated Dhu’l Qa‘da 646 (February or March 1249).

  Only one group of events remains to be recorded before the political extinction of the Assassins in Syria – their dealings with St Louis. The story of an Assassin plot against St Louis while he was still a youth in France can, like all the other stories of Assassin activities in Europe, be dismissed as without foundation. But the account by Joinville, the biographer of St Louis, of the king’s dealings with the Assassins after his arrival in Palestine is of
a different order, and bears every mark of authenticity. Emissaries of the Assassins came to the king in Acre, and asked him to pay tribute to their chief, ‘as the Emperor of Germany, the King of Hungary, the Sultan of Babylon [Egypt], and the others do every year, because they know well they can only live as long as it may please him.’15 Alternatively, if the King did not wish to pay tribute, they would be satisfied with the remission of the tribute which they themselves paid to the Hospitallers and the Templars. This tribute was paid, explains Joinville, because these two orders feared nothing from the Assassins, since, if one master was killed, he would at once be replaced by another as good and the Assassin chief did not wish to waste his men where nothing could be gained. In the event, the tribute to the orders continued, and the King and the chief da‘i exchanged gifts. It was on this occasion that the Arabic-speaking friar Yves the Breton met and talked with the Assassin chief.

  The end of the power of the Assassins came under the double assault of the Mongols and of the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, Baybars. In Syria, as one would expect, the Assassins joined with the other Muslims in repelling the Mongol threat, and sought to win the good graces of Baybars by sending him embassies and gifts, Baybars at first showed no open hostility to them, and, in granting a truce to the Hospitallers in 1266, stipulated that they renounce the tribute they were receiving from various Muslim cities and districts, including the Assassin castles, whose tribute is given by an Egyptian source as 1,200 dinars and a hundred mudd of wheat and barley. The Assassins prudently sent emissaries to Baybars offering him the tribute which they had formerly paid to the Franks, to be used in the holy war.