by T E Crowdy
‘General Zach’s spy [Kundschafter] had secured free access to Massena[’s] headquarters. Provided with letters and tokens from this general, he could also go up to the region from Dijon from where he always brought the most certain messages about the strength and movements of the Reserve Army assembling there. Through him we knew that this was unable to undertake a serious operation before the end of April.’4
It is debatable if Gioelli dared show his face in Liguria after the Cuneo episode, but Austrian spies were certainly at work. It is more likely that Gioelli was able to operate in Switzerland, and perhaps as far as Dijon. In any case, the weight of evidence suggested something was going to come from Switzerland by one or more routes. According to Radetzky, when this intelligence was reported to the Hofkriegsrat it was largely discounted. Vienna reassured the army it should not be deceived by false news. The Ligurian Riviera was still thought the most likely route for a French invasion. This was the route Bonaparte had taken in 1796. He had magazines at Genoa and Savona, and the southern slopes of the Apennines were warmer for operations than the snow-bound Alps.
Whatever the French intentions, the Austrians fully intended to build on the success of the previous year. There were several options available: for example, they could invade France through the Mont Cenis Pass and advance on the Rhone Valley. Such a move would no doubt cause great consternation in France, but the outcome of it would be questionable. The Austrians would have to leave considerable covering forces around Turin and Alessandria to prevent Massena launching operations from Liguria in the south, and if Bonaparte’s new army did debouch from Switzerland, the Austrians’ lines of communication would be cut. Zach’s preference was to concentrate on the Riviera, on pushing the French westwards, back behind Nice and the River Var. This would give the Austrians a shorter defensive line to prevent incursions into Italy. Knowing there was still a window between operations commencing on the Apennines and those on the Alps, covering forces could be left to watch the Alpine passes, and a strategic reserve maintained in Piedmont to react once the true direction of the French advance was known. By this time Genoa should have fallen, and the Riviera swept clear. Leaving a covering force on the Var, the Austrians would then be able to concentrate their forces in Piedmont and meet the arrival of the French from Switzerland. From an operational point of view too, it was far easier to mount operations over the Apennines than the Alps. Stutterheim indicates there was also political pressure from the British to capture Genoa for the mutual benefit of the coalition partners.
Over the course of March, Zach was left to develop the details of this plan. It was very much a replica of the earlier Savona operation, but without the same level of intrigue and complexity. The imperial army would manoeuvre as if they intended to make Genoa their main target; but they would actually attack at Savona, splitting Massena’s line of communication with France. They would then advance westwards along the Riviera, pushing the French back beyond the Var, while a covering force blockaded Genoa. An active correspondence had been maintained with the Genoese General Assereto, and he promised to provoke a peasant uprising to assist with the operation. Assereto also proved an excellent source of intelligence on French movements in Liguria, sending reports to FML Hohenzollern about the poverty of supplies and poor morale among the French.
According to Stutterheim, by the end of March the imperial army in Italy consisted of 86,938 infantry and 14,541 cavalry – a total of 101,479 men. When the various garrisons were detached, around 80,000 men were available for field service. Of these, Zach allocated 30,000 (including most of the cavalry) to stay in Piedmont and remain in observation of the St Gotthard, Simplon, Great St Bernard and Mont Cenis passes. This left 50,000 men for operations against Genoa and the Riviera. The Order of Battle of the Austrian Army on 2 April 1800 shows the principal column commanders and their assembly points:5
Operational army on the Riviera
- Ott, with the brigades Eder, Stojanich, Gottesheim and Fenzel, nineteen battalions together, sixteen jäger companies and four squadrons of hussars; assembly point: on the Sturla;
- Hohenzollern, with the brigades of Rousseau and Döller, twelve battalions together, eight companies of jäger and four squadrons of hussars; assembly point: Novi;
- Palffy, with the brigades of Lattermann, Bussy, Sticker and St Julien, thirty-two battalions and four squadrons of hussars together; assembly point: Acqui;
- Elsnitz-Morzin, with the brigades Weidenfeld, Auersperg, Bellegarde, Ulm and Brentano, twenty-eight battalions and four squadrons together; assembly point: Ceva;
- Hadik, with the brigades of Pilatti and Festenberg, thirty squadrons together; assembly point: Acqui.
The remaining troops in Italy were comprised of:
- Vukassovich and Kaim, with the brigades of Nimptsch, Gorup, Knesevich, La Marseille, de Briey, Loudon and Dedovich, thirty-five battalions, twelve jäger companies and thirty-two squadrons together; formed in Piedmont;
- Fröhlich, with the brigades of Riera, Knesevich and Sommariva, eight battalions, two companies and ten squadrons, assembled around Rome and Florence;
- Standing garrisons: two battalions in Istria; two battalions in Terra Firma (i.e. the mainland Veneto region); three battalions in Venice; four battalions in Mantua and Verona; five battalions in Milan, Alessandria and Tortona.
At the outset of the campaign, we should take a moment to reflect on the composition of the Austrian army in Italy. Drawn from every quarter of the Habsburg Empire, it was multi-national, multi-lingual, a mix of Catholic and Orthodox religions and drawn from everywhere from the Low Countries to the Ottoman frontiers. With such a diverse pool of recruits, the imperial army perhaps lacked the same nationalist fervour of the French, but it instead relied on creating a strong regimental esprit de corps.
The flower of the imperial army was its cavalry contingent, although it did not include any heavy cavalry regiments. Instead, the cavalry contingent was composed of light dragoons and hussars. Given the campaign was to be largely fought in the mountainous Apennines, cavalry was of limited use beyond scouting and reconnaissance, so Melas had the bulk of his cavalry acting as a mobile reserve, half watching the Alps and half stationed at Acqui. Although Melas was a cavalry general by designation, the real expert in handling cavalry was FML Karl Hadik. Another gifted cavalry officer, one who would make his name in the forthcoming campaign, was the French-born Colonel Johann Maria Frimont, commander of the Jäger-Regiment zu Pferde, or Bussy Light Horse - a regiment partly populated by French émigrés. The imperial army was also strong in artillery, and had well-trained gunners. In addition to the reserve batteries (each of six field guns and two howitzers) and cavalry batteries (four 6-pdrs and two howitzers), each infantry regiment was allocated a pair of 3-pdr guns, which could either be used in the line for local fire support or massed into larger batteries. The imperial army was also strong in technical troops, with specialist pioneer battalions equipped with lightweight, portable bridges called Laufbrücken.
The most numerous component of Melas’ army was the infantry. The infantry regiments comprised two field battalions each (a Lieb, or life, battalion, and an Oberst, or colonel, battalion), each formed of six companies of soldiers, with a nominal strength of 200 men per company; although, like their French counterparts, these strengths were rarely maintained in the field. Regiments had a smaller third battalion, normally formed of four companies, which usually acted as a depot. The infantry wore a compact, short-tailed white coat, which proved more economic and practical than long-tailed coats of the eighteenth century. The regiments from Western Europe and Poland were classed as ‘German’. These wore white breeches. Troops from Hungary, Croatia and the military borders were designed as ‘Hungarian’ and wore light blue trousers. At this period, the majority of infantrymen wore a crested leather helmet with a brass plaque. The best soldiers from each infantry regiment were the grenadiers. Each regiment provided two companies of grenadiers, selected from their best, strongest and mos
t physically imposing troops. When the army was assembled, the grenadier companies were amalgamated and formed into battalions, six companies strong. These battalions were in turn brigaded. In Melas’ army, there were two such brigades of grenadiers, under the command of GM Christoph von Lattermann and GM Karl Philippi von Weidenfeld. These troops were to prove themselves as formidable opponents.
Tactically, we know the Austrians put thought into the forthcoming campaign. On 1 April 1800, Zach issued a tactical instruction on mountain warfare.6 The key asset was speed. Regiments were instructed not to waste time with musketry. The most effective tactic was believed to be an attack with quick marching, closed-up formations, with military bands playing. Under no circumstances were the columns to disperse. Further, it was only thought necessary to throw a few skirmishers in front of these closed formations. Although the French skirmishers would be able to fire on the Austrian formations as they approached, the losses to skirmishers would be comparatively light if the attack was pushed home rapidly. If a protracted exchange with skirmishers took place, the fighting would likely be ‘long and murderous’ and, more crucially, would allow the enemy time to gather up his forces and respond to the attack.
It should be recognized that the Austrians did have light infantry specialists, which were necessary for a whole range of petit guerre operations, such as acting as an advanced guard, protecting camps and operating in difficult terrain. The army in Italy had numerous companies of jäger (huntsmen) and also several Grenzer (border guards) regiments. The former were drawn from the mountainous Tyrol region and were professional soldiers comprising hunters and backwoodsmen. They typically wore a neutral blue-grey uniform, which afforded a level of camouflage (a concept still fairly alien to European armies). The Grenzers, on the other hand, were men drawn from the military border with the Ottoman Empire, mostly of Croatian or Serbian stock. Although theoretically capable of fighting as line infantry, skirmishing was their preferred style of fighting. In French accounts, they were usually referred to as ‘Croats’ and had a fierce reputation.
Detailed instructions were issued to the various Austrian corps commanders on 30 March and everything was set. Melas would lead the main column assembled at Acqui. This column comprised the brigades of GMs Lattermann, Bussy, Sticker and St Julien (thirty-two battalions and four squadrons) and would head through Carcare and Altare over the Cadibona Pass for Savona. St Julien (twelve battalions and one squadron) would guard the left flank by marching through Mioglia to take Montenotte mountain. A second column assembled at Ceva under the command of FMLs Elsnitz and Morzin with the brigades of GMs Weidenfeld, Auersperg, Bellegarde, Ulm and Brentano (twenty-eight battalions and four squadrons). These would march through Carcare and turn south to Mallare, leaving GM Ulm around Millesimo to watch the upper Bormida valley and Mount Settepanni, protecting Elsnitz’s right flank. The troops earmarked for operations against Genoa were commanded by FMLs Ott and Hohenzollern. When the main column’s attack on Montenotte began on 7 April, Ott and Hohenzollern would also commence operations. Assembling in the Sturla valley, Ott’s force consisted of the brigades of GMs Eder, Stojanich, Gottesheim and Fenzel (nineteen battalions, sixteen jäger companies and four squadrons). Ott would attack the French position at Torriglia with his infantry and one hussar squadron and secure the Bobbio road. Meanwhile, the brigade of GM Gottesheim (four battalions, all the jägers and three squadrons) would attack Recco. A proclamation would be made on 5 April, calling on the Ligurian peasants to rise up against the French. These insurgents would come under the command of General Assereto. They would work with Hohenzollern in demonstrating against Voltaggio and the Bocchetta Pass on the direct route to Genoa.
MAP 2: Zach’s strategy – 30 March 1800
The army would probe Genoa through the Bochetta Pass (G), while launching the main attack at Savona via the Cadabona pass (F). The army would encircle Genoa and advance to Nice, clearing the French from the Rivera. Kaim would seize the Mont Cenis Pass (D), while Vukassovich monitored the Alpine passes of Gt St Bernard (C), Simplon (B) and St Gotthard (A). When Berthier’s ‘Dijon’ army advanced into Italy, Melas would take the army from the Rivera towards Turin via the Tenda Pass (E), leaving Elsnitz to defend Nice against Suchet.
This was an ambitious plan and exploited Massena’s extended line along the length of Liguria. Not knowing where the Austrians would place their main attack, Massena had to string his forces out. He remained in Genoa, while at Cornigliano General Soult took command of the forces in western Liguria, The French order of battle of 5 April 1800 shows the locations of the French forces, and indicates how shockingly low in numbers many of the half-brigades were, with some barely amounting to half a battalion in strength:
Army of Italy, 5 April 1800
Commander-in-Chief: André Massena (Genoa)
Genoa Garrison
Commander: Adjudant-General Degiovanni
41st Line 350 men
55th Line 250
73rd Line 500
Reserve
92nd Line 500 at Sampierdarena
25th Light 1,700 at Vestri di Ponente and Cornigliano
Lieutenant-General Soult (Cornigliano)
Division Miollis: 4,200 Albaro
8th Light 600 San Alberto and Recco
24th Line 800 Tortiglia and Scofera
74th Line 1,100 Monte Cornua
106th Line 1,700 Albaro and Nervi
Division Gazan: 4,920 San Quirico
3rd Line 1,300 Cazella, Buzalla and Savignone
5th Light 500 Voltaggio and Carasso
2nd Line 1,600 Campo Marone, Rivarolo and Ronco
78th Line 1,300 Campo Freddo, Marcarolo and Masone
Piedmontese Grenadiers 90 Teggia
Artillery 40 Bocchetta Pass
Pioneers (three companies) 90 San Quirico
Division Marbot: 4,700 Savona
3rd Light 900 Stella and La Madonna
62th Line 1,500 La Vagnola and Monte-Notte
63th Line 500 St Bernardone and Madonna di Savona
93th Line 500 Savona
97th Line 1,300 Vado and Cadibona
Garrison of Gavi
45th Line 500
In addition to the above troops, the Army of Italy also comprised the division of Thurreau (6,400), based at Briançon and guarding the alpine passes as far as Switzerland, including the Mont Cenis Pass.
On 5 April, Melas moved his headquarters to Cairo Montenotte, just 16km from Savona as the crow flies. At dawn the following day, GM Palffy led the attack on the Cadibona Pass on the road to Savona. Zach’s detailed planning immediately paid off, as the French around Savona found Austrian columns coming at them from all sides. Given the Austrians’ determination to ignore the harrying fire of skirmishers, but to drive forward quickly, the outnumbered Frenchmen had little option but to fall back on Savona or else be cut off in the mountains and surrounded. As the sun set on the first day of the campaign, Melas’ troops were fighting on the outskirts of Savona. Realizing his situation was hopeless, General Marbot left a small garrison in the citadel of Savona, and then broke out eastwards through Albissola in the direction of Genoa.
Meanwhile, Massena was given troubles of his own on 6 April. At two in the afternoon, a British frigate began bombarding the port of Genoa. GM Gottesheim began his march through the mountains to get onto the eastern flank of Genoa and reached as far as Bisagno. At the same time, Ott and Hohenzollern probed into the Bochetta Pass. The information reaching Massena that evening could have left him in no doubt that the Austrians had commenced a major operation. His priority was to preserve Genoa, but at the same time he also needed to maintain his communications with the rest of his army. To buy time, Massena launched a fierce counter-attack against Gottesheim in the early hours of 7 April. There was bitter fighting around Monte Fasce in which Gottesheim was pushed back almost to his starting position with significant losses. This was only a minor setback for the Austrians, because they had succeeded in their first major goal – to sp
lit the French forces in two.
On 9 April, Melas went aboard the Royal Navy flagship HMS Audacious to meet with Lord Keith, the British commander of the Mediterranean Fleet. Melas was aware that Massena’s main strength was around Genoa, so he decided to turn the main column eastwards and advance along the coast towards the city, supported by the guns of the British warships. That same day, Hohenzollern began probing southwards towards Genoa. Massena therefore realized the full extent of his problems.
Again, Massena adopted an aggressive stance. On 10 April, he advanced westwards with two columns, attempting to regain contact with Suchet around Montenotte. Leaving 7,000 men to guard Genoa, Massena marched with Gardanne’s 4,500-strong division down the coast road, while Soult headed for Sasello with Gazan’s 5,000-man division. Suchet had also been ordered to attack from the west, the plan being for all three to unite at Montenotte.