by T E Crowdy
There was desperate fighting at Monte Croce. As the Austrian troops were halfway up the steep slopes, they came under heavy fire from Massena’s troops. The French even rolled boulders down the mountain slopes to break up the Austrian columns. The first attack failed; then a second. The third attempt was led by Lattermann’s grenadier brigade and the Transylvanians of IR 51 Splényi. This regiment was one of the fiercest Melas possessed, and was apparently known as the Legion Infernale by the French. While a brigade was directed to attack the rear of Massena’s position, the grenadiers and IR 51 Splényi formed an assault column and made a frontal attack. This time the boulders and musketry failed to prevent Melas’ soldiers gaining the heights, and Massena withdrew. The following day, Massena found himself pursued by land and fired on by sea. As his starving soldiers began to break up, the Austrians sent hussars in pursuit. Massena was forced to surround himself with a bodyguard of mounted officers, to draw swords and fight his way out.
The ensuing battles are a tapestry of desperate encounters, where Massena, Soult and Suchet each attempted to unite. The French were able to offer resistance for twelve days, and Soult and Massena were able to link up, but Suchet was driven off towards the Var. On 21 April, Massena toured the forts and walls surrounding Genoa and resigned himself to coming under siege. The French commander instructed the local authorities he was taking command of the city and forming a special commission which would deliberate on rations and public order. Later that day, the imperial army closed in. However, the defences of Genoa were such that an assault on the city from the landward side was all but impossible. The heights around the city were protected by fortresses, and the city had massive walls. The best chance for the Austrians was to starve the city into surrender or provoke its population into insurrection. There were four more weeks before the Army of the Reserve was expected from Switzerland. Would Massena be starved into submission before then?
While the operations on the Riviera continued, a close watch was maintained on the Alpine passes for the ‘Dijon’ Reserve Army. The hub for processing intelligence from the mountains was FML Vukassovich’s headquarters at Arona, on Lake Maggiore. On 8 May, Major Franz Mumb of the general-quartermaster-staff provided a detailed summary of the intelligence thus far available. It left no doubt that the French were preparing to advance through Switzerland:
‘Our best spy [Kundschafter] has now provided the news 3,000 enemy troops have arrived in Martigny, which are said to be designated to advance over Mt Bernard. Another 3,000 are supposed to be marching up, which are designated for the upper Valais Canton and are supposed to be advancing over the Simplon.
‘Without doubt, on the basis of these movements the St Gotthard will also probably be attacked with the greatest force from Altdorf via the Urserental valley. Therefore the troops positioned here have been deployed in such a way that in the event of an attack everything can be available at the appropriate point with the greatest speed; at the same time, scouts have recently been sent out to obtain more accurate information …
‘I view this as the result of the enemy crossing the Rhine and as protection for the march of the enemy General Berthier, which judging from his actions should be hurrying to General Massena to relieve him.
‘If it were now merely this, then certainly their forces facing these positions would not be so worrying, and I therefore hope we are in a position to hinder an advance in this case. At the same time, I confidently hope His Excellency General Baron Kray will defeat the enemy who have advanced to Stockach, therefore if this attack turns out well, then the enemy will certainly be forced to fall back on other plans again.
‘Just as I take the view, that the operations in the Riviera at this moment are as important as they are difficult and very extensive, and that the army must keep its forces together, yet I cannot hide my concern that for the division here, a small reserve both of infantry and cavalry is almost indispensible in the event of an enemy attack. I am therefore most fully confident that the army command will give proper consideration to supporting this division all the more, since as a result of their advance, the enemy could immediately spread out in the plains of Lombardy and Piedmont.’7
Major Mumb’s analysis was sound. He saw how events in Germany were having an impact on Italy, and what might be the outcome of the French breaking through the Alps. As Mumb was writing this letter, Zach was already planning ahead and writing to FML Ott from army headquarters at San Stefano, opening with:
‘The definitive report, which I have received that General Berthier will advance into Piedmont, which is however to remain completely secret, makes it necessary for me to consider how I will be able to reinforce General Kaim.’
Zach went on to instruct Ott that reinforcements due to strengthen him must instead be sent elsewhere. That same day, 8 May, Melas wrote to Lord Keith, asking for the British to transport IR43 Thurn from Livorno to Ventimiglia as quickly as possible. The message is interesting because it shows army command then thought the Mont Cenis pass was the most probable route of attack by the French:
‘I have very certain notions that General Berthier proposes to debouch into Piedmont by Mont Cenis, with a part of the army which you know, Mylord, they collected at Dijon.’
According to Stutterheim, Melas received on 18 May the first positive report that the ‘Dijon’ Reserve Army had appeared in the Alpine passes. This report came from the outpost commander, Captain Zivnik, and was dated Aosta, 15 May 1800. It read:
‘Zivnik announces the enemy is ready to descend in two columns from the Great St Bernard, and at least 6,000 men from the Little St Bernard. A trusted peasant who reports the latter reports at the same time the enemy has requisitioned 600 mules.’8
At this moment, Melas’ headquarters were at Nice, approximately 350km from Aosta. On receiving the news, a letter was sent by Melas to the Hofkriegsrat detailing the army’s response:
‘As it is now confirmed both by reliable spy [Kundschafter] reports as well as by enemy movements, that the enemy general Berthier is advancing in the Valais Canton to enter Piedmont and towards Aosta, and has also pushed back our outposts positioned on the Great St Bernard, so I have ordered FML Baron Kaim to concentrate his troops with the proper caution towards that point, where the enemy’s main force is believed to be breaking through, not to allow himself to get involved in any real clashes in the mountain gullies, but to prepare all the more for the main action in the plain.’
Melas would move his headquarters from Nice to Turin to coordinate this, and march troops up from the Var, via Cuneo. In the meantime, FML Elsnitz was instructed to remain around the Var watching Suchet, but was instructed not to get in engaged in any major battles. However, he was to mislead the French into thinking an advance across the Var was being planned. According to Stutterheim, if Elsnitz was seriously attacked, he was instructed to slowly fall back onto the line of the Apennines and entrench himself in the mountains.
On 19 May, Melas sent a second letter to the Hofkriegsrat which clarified his thinking:
‘In the last reports made to the Hofkriegsrat, I have not been able to deny myself the request not to be uneasy about the account of an advance by the enemy General Berthier towards Piedmont, as I have already taken serious measures against this operation, about which not the slightest doubt remains in my mind, and also I do not intend to reduce my forces by isolated outpost actions, but to attack the enemy with a concentrated force. In fact with this intention, I have left Nice today and will arrive in Turin in a few days, in order to give the appropriate direction to forces commanded by the two FMLs Kaim and Vukassovich and my already concentrated cavalry … My main intention is at this time wholly directed, for a start, only to gaining time against Berthier, because each day gained is a perceptible loss to Massena and I hope to be able to give Your Excellency good news about Genoa even earlier than I see myself able to make a decisive move against Berthier.’
From reading this letter, it is clear that the Austrians had a coherent strat
egy. The arrival of Berthier was a cause of unease, but was not a surprise. Whatever Vienna had thought about the ‘Dijon’ Reserve Army, Melas’ command had been under no illusions about the threat from it for months. They had thought about their response in detail. The Austrian reluctance to fight in the mountains might be queried with hindsight. If they had raced reinforcements towards Aosta, they may have bottled the French army in very difficult position. However, there was logic to this decision. Firstly, the Austrians could not be truly sure where the main blow would fall. It appeared to be the Great St Bernard, but the Mont Cenis Pass and the other major Alpine passes had all given indications the French might attack. Perhaps more importantly, the covering forces under Kaim and Vukassovich were strong in cavalry, and so the Austrians supposed they would be at an advantage if they fought the French in the plains of northern Italy, rather than in the mountains, where infantry would have the advantage. The Austrians therefore wanted to deliver the main blow in the plain, with the maximum forces possible. According to the Piedmontese officer, Count Cavour, there was something of a mantra among the Austrians: ‘Let them come onto the plain, we shall beat them.’ Apparently, Zach was extremely pleased with the direction of the French advance, and foresaw being able to assemble the army in time to offer battle outside Turin on the left bank of the Po in the area of Volpiano. Zach was so confident of what was about to unfold that he loudly declared: ‘I have got them in a bag.’9
Melas does not appear to have entirely shared Zach’s enthusiasm. The old general had really felt the strain of seven weeks campaigning in the mountains. He had flashes of his younger self, but age and illness increasingly got the better of him. On 22 May, he wrote a letter to Tige, president of the Hofkriegsrat. It was almost pleading in tone. His body was wracked with pain, and although the improving weather was helping him cope, having been so long away from the Teplitz baths in Bohemia, he felt himself succumbing to weakness. If circumstances prevented Melas from using the spa at Acqui, this weakness might gain the upper hand, he cautioned. Although he did not explicitly ask to be relieved, Melas’ letter could have left Tige in no doubt that the commander of the army in Italy was struggling to cope with the demands of the campaign.
Chapter 6
Over the Alps
We have seen how Bonaparte developed his strategy for the coming campaign, skilfully positioning the Army of the Reserve so as to be poised to support Italy or Germany, using Switzerland as a great curtain behind which he could hide his manoeuvres. Although his preference was to attack Italy, no final decision had been made until news of Melas’ attack on the Riviera was confirmed. On 24 April, the First Consul wrote to his Minister of War, Lazare Carnot, setting out the strategic situation. If Massena was defeated and pushed back to the line of the Maritime Alps, it was critical the Army of the Reserve attacked Piedmont or the Milanese to divert Melas’ attention from Massena, and to cause him to return to the defence of Lombardy and his military stores. In equal measure, if Massena was able to defeat Melas, then the Austrian army would be fatally weakened and unable to resist the advance of the Reserve. The letter instructed Carnot to direct Berthier to move the Reserve to Geneva ‘with all diligence’, and to transport to Villeneuve all the munitions and wine then assembled at Geneva. Bonaparte instructed Berthier to cross the Alps via the Great St Bernard or Simplon passes and to enter Piedmont and Lombardy. At the same time, Bonaparte instructed Carnot to reiterate the order for Moreau to attack the Austrians in Germany. Bonaparte added: ‘Let him know his delay essentially compromises the safety of the Republic.’1
The First Consul also wrote directly to Berthier with some specific guidance on how to implement the order from Carnot. If he used the St Bernard, Berthier would find himself much nearer to Lake Geneva and would therefore enjoy better lines of supply; however, he asked Berthier to assure himself of the nature of the roads from Aosta to the River Po. Although Bonaparte promised to send more specific instructions once he had heard from Massena, he gave Berthier a very strong and encouraging directive:
‘Nothing in Italy will be able to resist the 40,000 men you have. Whether the Austrian army is victorious or defeated, it cannot, in any case, sustain the shock of a fresh army.’2
Berthier received Carnot’s order two days later, on 26 April. Before receiving these instructions, he was still uncertain about using the route over the Great St Bernard, and appears to have favoured taking the longer route via Lucerne, where he could join forces with General Lecourbe of the Army of the Rhine. Together they could fall on Italy via the St Gotthard Pass, while Watrin’s division crossed via the Great St Bernard to act as a link with Massena’s army. On receiving the order from Paris, Berthier realized the urgency of the situation and immediately issued instructions to the various corps around Dijon to march towards Lake Geneva. The following day, Berthier wrote to Bonaparte stating he would ‘sacrifice everything for Massena’. However, there came a note of caution: he had been expecting a delivery of five million cartridges and lead, but none had materialized. The only ammunition wagons he possessed were those which arrived with Chambarlhac, so even if the cartridges did turn up, he had no means of transporting them. He asked if Moreau’s ammunition wagons at Sampigny might be directed to Dijon and Auxonne instead? He concluded on a more upbeat note: ‘We will do the impossible.’3
As Berthier penned this letter, Bonaparte received a report from Oudinot, chief of staff to the Army of Italy, dated 17 April. It confirmed Melas had attacked Massena on all points, particularly at Savona and Genoa. Uncertain if Massena would be able to make contact with Paris, Oudinot felt obliged to write on his commander-in-chief ’s behalf. While he painted a picture of extraordinary heroism on the part of Massena and Soult, Oudinot’s letter left Bonaparte in no doubt of the army’s predicament. It spoke of Melas’ ‘astonishing superiority’ and of columns marching on Genoa, leaving no doubt the Austrians were planning to invest the place. The fort of Savona only had provisions for ten days, and the army was already suffering from hunger. Although Suchet was attempting to re-establish communications with Massena, the British navy prevented any help being sent by sea to Genoa directly. This letter must have reinforced Bonaparte’s determination to take rapid action.
While Bonaparte’s preference had always been to take Milan, Oudinot’s report gave him doubts. The First Consul wrote to Berthier telling him Milan might not be their destination after all, but instead they might have to march on Tortona to disengage Massena at Genoa. If defeated by Melas, Massena would have no choice but to shut himself up in Genoa, where he had an estimated thirty days of provisions. For this reason, Bonaparte instructed Berthier to use the St Bernard. From Aosta they could march on Genoa, or head to Lake Maggiore and Milan if necessary. Furthermore, from Lake Geneva to Aosta was only four days’ march, so he would be closest to his lines of supply. The First Consul committed the rest of this day to finding bullets moulds, lead and money for the army as it arrived in Switzerland.
As the army marched on Lake Geneva, an extraordinary effort was made to find the necessary supplies. At one point Berthier complained he was about to attack the Austrians without a single cannon. In the other letters he pleaded for the First Consul to quit Paris and join the army. Bonaparte remained in Paris, firing letters off demanding resources for Berthier. Throughout this period, he remained anxious for signs of movement from the German front. On 5 May, he at last received positive news. Moreau had defeated Kray at the Battle of Stockach on 3 May, and with the Austrians in retreat, the route to the St Gotthard would be clear for a second descent into Italy. This appears to have swung the First Consul’s strategy back in favour of an advance to Milan. It certainly gave him the option. Receiving the news by telegraph, Bonaparte congratulated Moreau and told him the Minister of War would soon be joining him. He told Moreau the position of the Army of Italy was critical, and Massena only had provisions to hold Genoa until 25 or 26 May. Bonaparte then sent word to Berthier that he was leaving Paris at midnight, and would stop onl
y a few hours in Dijon before travelling to Geneva to join the army. ‘Everything is going perfectly,’ he added.4
While the army raced towards the Alps, General Armand-Samuel Marescot had conducted a second detailed reconnaissance of the Great St Bernard Pass. He presented his report on 8 May. The road was practical for infantry, cavalry and wagons as far as Martigny, where the ascent began. From there until Bourg-Saint-Pierre, the road was practical for infantry, cavalry, light vehicles and light artillery. From Bourg-Saint-Pierre to the summit, the road was practical for foot soldiers, mules and cavalry, albeit with great difficulty. The only way the army could get its equipment and supplies beyond this point was by hiring peasants and mules. The artillery could be broken up and mounted on litters, and dragged across the pass. To prevent the men from falling sick from drinking melted snow, stores of vinegar and brandy would be necessary for purifying it. The main hazard was posed not by the enemy forces in the Aosta valley (their forward posts were 2km from the summit), but by avalanches, which were capable of engulfing several battalions at a time. The most favourable time for crossing would be at night, under moonlight, or in the morning before noon when the sun started to melt the ice. The peasants had assured Marescot that the slightest movement of men or animals, or even a voice, might be enough to trigger an avalanche. If so, it might prove necessary to fire artillery off in order to initiate the avalanches in advance. There was another hazard to the enterprise. On the Italian side of the mountains, on the main road from Aosta to Ivrea, was Fort Bard. This fortress could hold a garrison of 400 men and was mounted on a tall rock face, making it impossible to assault. The scale of this problem does not appear to have figured highly in the French plans. There was also a significant risk if Moreau did not support the enterprise by detaching sufficient troops through the St Gotthard.