by T E Crowdy
Having departed Paris on 6 May, Bonaparte had arrived at Geneva on 9 May, moving to Lausanne on 12 May. The First Consul conducted a series of reviews of the various divisions of the Army of the Reserve then quartered around the eastern side of Lake Geneva. On 13 May, he inspected the divisions of Chambarlac and Loison on the plain of Saint-Sulpice. He then travelled to Vevey to inspect Boudet’s infantry division. He was satisfied with the quality of the uniforms, but was extremely angry to find a great many conscripts had deserted the 30th Line, taking with them their packs and muskets. Instructions were sent to General Mortier in Paris to search for these miscreants. Bonaparte then ordered a live firing exercise to ensure all the men present had tasted gunpowder and felt the kick of a musket before climbing the Alps. He took the soldiers into his confidence, explaining why they were going to fight: ‘I offered peace to the Emperor; he did not wish it. We now have to take it by the throat.’5
On 14 May, the First Consul was joined by Minister of War Carnot, who had travelled directly to Lausanne from Moreau’s headquarters. Carnot had arrived at the Army of the Rhine on the morning of 10 May, the day after the Battle of Biberach, another victorious encounter over the army of Kray. When Carnot presented Moreau with instructions to detach 25,000 men to enter Italy by the St Gotthard, the latter complained he would have to curtail offensive operations and might not be able to hold such an advanced position if such a significant number of troops were taken away from him. When Carnot pressed Moreau on the urgency of following this instruction, Moreau went about selecting troops from all over his theatre of operations, many of which were a significant distance from Switzerland; some as far away as Mainz. He made an excuse for this, saying he did not want the Austrians to realize he was detaching a sizeable part of his force to Italy. These troops would be placed under the command of General Moncey, not Lecourbe as earlier planned. This placed the First Consul’s project in dire trouble. Bonaparte could only risk a march on Milan if the approaches to the St Gotthard were secured and he could rely on a strong reinforcement coming down from Germany. The First Consul was forced to write to Moreau on 14 May in strong terms, stressing Massena’s perilous situation and pointing out that the Army of the Reserve was also weak. If Moreau did not provide General Moncey with 18,000‑20,000 men and have them enter Italy in the last week of May, then Genoa might fall, with the loss of 14,000 soldiers. This eventuality would require Moreau to send a far larger force into Italy. Bonaparte urged him to execute this order promptly so that Genoa might be saved.6
At this very moment, Lannes was already on the mountain at Bourg-Saint-Pierre, preparing to lead the army’s advanced guard over the pass on the night of 15‑16 May. At the age of 31, Lannes was a perfect choice to lead this difficult venture. He was known as the ‘Roland of the army’, after the heroic paladin of Charlemagne immortalized in the epic poem Chanson de Roland, and was considered the bravest man in the army. He was calm under fire and possessed accurate judgement even in the direst emergency. He was of average height, slender and wore his hair in a powdered queue; but swore like a trooper in any company, with his vocabulary described as a ‘rolling artillery’. His advanced guard comprised General Mainoni’s ‘brigade’ (in fact just the 28th Line, the half-brigade which had been guarding the Alpine passes in this region over the past year) and Watrin’s division, composed of the 6th Light Infantry, 22nd and 40th Line. Brigadier General Rivaud would be attached to the advanced guard with the 12th Regiment of Hussars and the 21st Chasseurs. For artillery, Berthier had reckoned on Lannes having four 4-pdrs, two 8-pdrs, two howitzers, four Genevan 4-pdrs and six 2-pdrs which were already on the St Bernard. The guns at Bourg-Saint-Pierre would need to be dismantled, their carriages, wheels and limbers carried by men and mules, while the heavy barrels were mounted on sledges and dragged by ropes. Lannes complained that the process of preparing the artillery was much harder than expected and he did not have enough ropes. Lannes also issued his troops with strict instructions for the ascent. The path was so narrow that they would form in two ranks only. Mounted officers would have to go on foot, with their horses led. To avoid avalanches, they would make the climb at night, and fifty lanterns would be carried to illuminate the route. Everyone was to remain quiet for fear of avalanches, but at the steepest points, soldiers were authorized to lean on their muskets for support.
From Bourg-Saint-Pierre to the summit of the pass was a climb of 800 metres, over a distance of 13km. Initially it was difficult, but manageable. However, the last 4km were particularly steep, with a little path zigzagging its way up rocky outcrops to the top of the pass. At the summit was a hospice for travellers founded in the eleventh century by Saint Bernard of Menthon. This hospice was managed by a congregation of monks and their enormous dogs, which were famous for rescuing travellers caught in snowdrifts. With the order’s headquarters at the foot of the pass in Martigny, the First Consul arranged for all his soldiers to receive a piece of bread, a portion of gruyere cheese and a cup of wine on reaching the summit (the monastery’s archives show the first troops received two cups of wine). After such an exhausting climb, this refreshment would prove an invaluable boost to sustenance and morale. As Horse Grenadier Joseph Petit would say of the wine ration: ‘No one, not even the most avaricious among us, would have exchanged that single draught for all the gold in Mexico.’ Everything was therefore set for the campaign of the Army of the Reserve to commence.
On 15 May, Lannes began the advance to Aosta. The brigade of Malher (22nd and 40th Line) led the way, pausing briefly at the summit, where the monks had placed the food and wine on tables in front of the hospice. The march continued past a large frozen lake behind the summit until the first Austrian forward posts were encountered in front of Saint-Rhemy. These were driven back on Étroubles, where sixty Austrians had set up a post. Again, these were quickly brushed aside by Lannes’ troops. The following morning, Lannes reached Aosta at 11.00 am. Here the Austrians made more of a stand with 400 men, but Lannes sent a battalion of the 6th Light to turn their position. The Austrians fell back into the town and made something of a stand on the bridge there. Eager to keep up the momentum of his advance, Lannes ordered a bayonet charge, which quickly finished the matter. From the prisoners and captured post, Lannes was able to glean some intelligence. Nice had fallen to the Austrians, he reported to Berthier, and there were very few Austrian troops in the valley. The nearest large force of Austrians appeared to be six or seven regiments of cavalry at Turin, but almost the whole imperial army was reported to be around Genoa.
Behind Lannes’ division, Rivaud’s cavalry brigade was next to pass, setting out at two in the morning from St Pierre on 16 May. Two hours behind this brigade was Boudet’s infantry division. Berthier sent a progress report to Bonaparte, admitting the sledges constructed for the artillery were useless. The local peasants showed the French troops how to use the hollowed out trunks of pine trees to create a cradle for the heavy gun barrels. It then took sixty men to drag each gun barrel to the summit of the pass. He also asked for more mules to be sent to Saint-Rhemy because a backlog of artillery and stores was building up there for want of transport. The work was back-breaking. Within a few days, the commander of the artillery, General Marmont, wrote to the First Consul complaining the peasants had abandoned the project because the work was so hard. He had been forced to ‘lavish’ money on them to get them to start work again. Berthier estimated it was costing 500 francs in labour per gun; although he need not have worried too much about the cost - the peasants were never paid.7 The mules were proving difficult because they were fearful of treading on ice and kept dropping their loads. In any case, there was a shortage of mules, because those sent to the summit were not returned to Marmont, but were kept with the soldiers passing into Italy. The mule drivers were deserting by the dozen through a lack of shoes and coats, and the mules were dying of starvation because no one had thought to feed them. Marmont wrote how he commandeered a battalion of the 59th Line and a detachment of 600 men from Loison�
�s division to support the movement of the artillery, and he claimed it was only thanks to the blows of the officers that anything was achieved at all (corporal punishment had been banned after the revolution). These soldiers were now so ‘tired, harassed and discontented’ that it was impossible to use them again. Marmont recommended drastic action be taken. Behind Loison’s division were the infantry divisions of Chambarlhac and Monnier. In order to get the artillery across, Marmont recommended the whole division take part, with officers at the head of their men, carrying everything up to Saint-Rhemy.8
This course of action was adopted. Gunners were assigned to direct the operation, a task they took on with particular zeal. Witness the following episode reported by Grenadier Coignet of the 96th Line:
‘Nothing could be more difficult than our journey. Always climbing up horrible slopes and very narrow paths. The stones cut our shoes. From time to time we stopped, then walked again. No one spoke a word. When we reached the ice, it was still worse. Our gunner was no longer master of his piece. At every moment it slipped towards the ravines, and it was necessary to stop, to put it back on the right path. Without the example of our chief, we would have lost courage … We reached the permanent snows. There it went better; our cannon slid nicely. We were going faster. General Chambarlhac came by and wanted to increase the pace. He approached the gunner and assumed the master’s tone. He was badly received. “It is not you who commands here,” replied the gunner. “It is I who am responsible for the piece, and who alone directs it. Go on your way.” In spite of these words, the general advanced as if to seize the gunner. “General,” cried the latter. “If you do not withdraw, I will knock you out with this trail spike or throw you into the precipice!” Chambarlhac thought it prudent to move along.’
Meanwhile, Lannes had pushed on, fighting another action at Châtillon on 18 May. Again the Austrians blocked the road, and again an impatient Lannes drove them out of their position with a bayonet charge. The following day they reached Fort Bard, where the French really faced their first major problem of the campaign. The fortress blocked the passage out of the alpine valleys into the fertile plains of northern Italy. With supplies having to be carried all the way from Lausanne, it was essential the French broke out of the Aosta valley in order to find food, and also to coordinate with General Thurreau, who has been ordered to advance over the Mont Cenis Pass. At first glance there appeared to be little hope of this. The fortress contained two levels of gun batteries, which dominated the road below. This road was bordered by rocks on one side and by the Dora Baltea River on the other. The road itself was cut by three drawbridges, each of which needed to be secured in order to transport the artillery. Berthier rode forward to look at the position for himself, realizing they had underestimated the scale of the obstacle before them. He concluded that they should attempt an assault, but if this did not succeed, it would be necessary to find an alternative route past the fort in order to prevent the army from starving. A goat track had been discovered at Arnad which led over Mount Albard down to Donnas, but this was not practical for the artillery. Unless the fortress surrendered, Berthier would be entering Italy without any artillery.
While Lannes’ advanced guard and Boudet’s division were sent to Donnas, on the night of 21/22 May an attack was made on Bard. A small force of grenadiers from Loison’s division and some engineers climbed down the rocks, following a water pipe, and were able to get inside the village. There they lowered the drawbridges and forced the Austrians there to retreat into the safety of the fort. The guns inside the fortification opened fire, but the French were able to shelter inside the buildings. However, it was impossible to get the artillery past the rain of shells, canister and grenades thrown down by the defenders.
On 22 May, Lannes occupied Ivrea, where he captured several small calibre Austrian guns and their ammunition wagons. He issued strict instructions to his soldiers against pillaging. For two days, Lannes remained at this place supported by Boudet’s division waiting for his artillery to arrive from Bard. Berthier was desperate to get the guns through to the advanced guard. Initially they thought it might be possible to dismount the smaller 4-pdrs and carry these over Mount Albard. An artillery officer was instructed to do this, but he refused. The commander of the army’s artillery, General Marmont, feared the guns had already been badly treated being dragged over the St Bernard and did not want them broken up again.9 On 22 May, an attempt was made to pass a gun below the fort under the cover of darkness. It was dragged by men rather than horses because if someone was struck, they could roll away: injured horses had to be removed from their harnesses. The artillery chief of staff, Sénarmont, complained that all thirteen of the men who attempted to do this were wounded by a hail of musketry, grenades, fire pots, etc. On 23 May, Berthier agreed to an experiment using an Austrian 3-pdr gun. This would have its wheels covered in straw to muffle the noise of its passage. Unfortunately, the attempt was thwarted by heavy rain which caused the straw to fall away. A third attempt appears to have been successful, with Berthier writing to Lannes on 25 May confirming he had received two 4-pdrs and an ammunition caisson. This success would be repeated over the coming nights, allowing a trickle of light artillery into Italy. It was extremely hazardous work. On one occasion, an Austrian shell landed directly under an ammunition wagon being escorted through. Disaster was only averted by a soldier who managed to cut the fuse with his sabre and prevent the shell from exploding.10
On the morning of 26 May, Lannes instructed Watrin and Boudet to have their men under arms at daybreak. Lannes had been authorized to force a passage over the Chivasso River, convincing the Austrians this new army was destined for Turin, and from there the Ligurian Riviera. Watrin’s division led the attack, with Boudet’s troops drawn up 800 metres in reserve. The 6th Light Infantry led the attack, opening with a direct assault on the bridge. The Austrian artillery opened fire on the French column, which struggled to gain a foothold on the bridge. The Austrians launched a counter-attack and drove the Frenchmen away. Lannes was told of a nearby ford, and sent the 6th Light to the left of the bridge to find it. At the same time, he sent the 22nd and 40th Half-Brigades to the right of the road to create a diversion. The 28th Line were ordered forwards to threaten the bridge, should the Austrians weaken their centre. The Austrians began to retreat, covering their withdrawal by a cavalry screen. Boudet was called up and told to advance in the direction of Romano. As the French advanced, they were met by a huge force of Austrian cavalry, perhaps as many as 4,000 strong. This cavalry charged the French infantry, passing between the intervals in the French battalions, before peeling away and rejoining the retreating infantry. This was the first significant clash of the campaign, and somewhat ominously for the Austrians, their superiority in artillery and cavarly did nothing to blunt the French bayonets.
Having crossed the Alps and advanced from Ivrea in the direction of Turin, it would have been reasonable to suppose Bonaparte’s intention was to do battle with the Austrians and relieve Genoa. Thurreau’s attack on the Mont Cenis Pass on 22 May increased the focus on the Piedmontese capital. As we have seen, such a move would have been welcomed by the Austrians, whose strategy had been to avoid fighting in the mountains, instead luring the French out onto the plains in front of Turin. A battle on the plains was their desired intention, but Bonaparte had no intention of obliging them. Although he kept his options open, and did not discount marching on Genoa, the First Consul had always had his eye on Milan, the great capital of Lombardy. Its capture would be partly political – it would read well in the bulletins – and partly practical, as it would no doubt contain provisions for his army. The real prize, however, was strategic. By occupying Milan, Moncey could advance from Switzerland over the St Gotthard Pass, thus substantially reinforcing the Army of the Reserve and opening a new line of communication for it. From Milan, the road network extended out across Italy, affording numerous routes to advance. Most crucially, Bonaparte thought his capture of Milan would act as a lure, tempting th
e Austrians out of Liguria and the Apennines and onto ground of his choosing. He did not want to fight the Austrians on the plains, but around Stradella between the mountains and the Po. To believe that the First Consul had any intention of marching to Massena’s relief is to misinterpret the entire point of the campaign. A direct advance on Genoa would not accomplish any of Bonaparte’s high-level strategic aims.
General Lannes had led the advanced-guard over the St Bernard and down the Aosta Valley. His troops now became a covering force, making demonstrations around Chivasso in the direction of Turin, while Thurreau pressed along the Susa valley. At the same time, Murat was given command of a new advanced guard which would spearhead the march on Milan. Murat’s command consisted of Monnier’s infantry division and the cavalry brigades of Kellermann and Champeaux. They were supported by General Duhesme, in command of the infantry divisions of Loison and Boudet. Although the approach to Milan was only lightly defended by the Austrians, there were two major rivers to cross – the Sesia and Ticino. Both rivers flowed southward from the Alps to the Po, and both were swollen by icy meltwater coming down off the mountains. The Army of the Reserve had no bridging equipment available and few engineers, so the key to Murat’s success was a lightning advance, and to hopefully find the bridges over these rivers still intact. Alas, arriving at the Sesia opposite Vercelli, the French discovered the bridge had been burned and the Austrians were in observation on the opposite bank.
On the evening of 28 May, Duhesme reached Vercelli and made a reconnaissance of the river crossing. Duhesme placed two batteries of guns opposite the Austrian position and directed Boudet’s infantry to ford the treacherous river above and below these batteries. At 3.00 am on 29 May, the Austrians opened fire on the French works across the river. The French retaliated in kind. General Festenberg, commanding the Austrian forces, was convinced the French were going to force the crossing with boats, so ordered his infantry to fire blindly into the darkness. Meanwhile, Boudet’s infantry started to ford the river. The 9th Light Infantry went to the right with Murat. The current was very strong and the infantry was only able to cross after the cavalry formed a supporting chain across the river. Boudet’s second brigade, under Brigadier General Guénand, crossed the river on the left. Again the river current was very strong and several men were drowned. However, by seven in the morning, Boudet’s force was across the river and converging on Festenberg’s position. Faced with the prospect of encirclement, the Austrians withdrew in the direction of Novara, pursued by the 9th Light. With the river crossing secured, a ‘flying bridge’ was hastily assembled at Sesia in order to allow the bulk of Murat’s forces to cross. Not much more than a raft, the flying bridge was a large, flat floating platform, moored to either bank, which used the river current to propel the raft from one side to the other. At Novara, Duhesme requested engineers, pioneer troops, surgeons and basic medical supplies to be forwarded urgently to the advanced-guard. Having prioritized bringing artillery over the Alps, and with Fort Bard still blocking the route for vehicles, specialist equipment was in very short supply.