Corps of Sappers
The Corps of Sappers was composed of six companies, and a garrison detachment. A company comprised one captain, one lieutenant-captain, one oberlieutenant, one second-lieutenant, three master-sappers, six sergeants, one junior quartermaster, two drummers, 10 senior sappers, 13 old sappers, 60 young sappers, and three officers’ servants. The garrison detachment, at the Engineer Academy, numbered 80.
Corps of Miners
The Corps of Miners had a staff of 16, and six companies. These each comprised one captain, one lieutenant-captain, one oberlieutenant, one second-lieutenant, two feldwebels, two master-miners, eight leading miners, one junior quartermaster, two drummers, 12 senior miners, 20 old miners, 20 young miners, six sergeants, one junior quartermaster, two drummers, 10 senior sappers, 13 old sappers, 60 young sappers, and three officers’ servants, for a total of 144 men
Corps of Pioneers
The Corps of Pioneers consisted of a staff and two active battalions, one with six companies, and the other with four. There was also a depot. The staff numbered 27, and a company one captain, one lieutenant-captain, one oberlieutenant, one second-lieutenant, two feldwebels, five cadets, 12 corporals, two drummers, one junior quartermaster, 20 carpenters, 50 senior pioneers, 150 junior pioneers, and two officers’ servants.
NAVY
Always during its short existence heavily Italian, the officer corps was also inclined to consider officers of other nationalities as interlopers. At the beginning of 1848, the navy had just under 200 deck and engineering officers, in addition to the following:
Naval Artillery Corps
The Corps of Naval Artillery, commanded by a major, was composed of a staff of 17, and three companies, two of which were artillery, and one labour. The establishment for the corps was:
Two captains, one lieutenant-captain, six oberlieutenants, six second-lieutenants, 18 feldwebels, 54 corporals, 110 senior gunners, 208 junior gunners, and 12 officer’s servants.
Seaman Corps
Comprising the ship’s crews, this corps numbered six senior boatswains, 12 junior boatswains, 162 other petty officers, 900 ratings, 132 boys, and six drummers.
Naval Infantry Battalion
The Naval Infantry Battalion, with six companies, had a staff of 13 officers and men. The companies theoretically totalled five captains, one lieutenant-captain, six oberlieutenants, six second-lieutenants, 12 feldwebels, 12 corporals, six deputy quartermasters, 12 drummers, 96 Gefreiters, 1,003 men, and 12 officers’ servants.
Other
The Naval Construction Corps, Arsenal work force, medical service, administrative, and other branches of the service, both uniformed and otherwise numbered between 5 and 600.
Sailing vessels in commission numbered three frigates, six corvettes, seven brigs, five armed transport brigs, and three golettas. In addition to these were two steamers. Coastal craft comprised 38 pinnaces, and 21 gunboats. Also, there was special inshore squadron of some 70 small vessels in the Venetian Lagoon.
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1
Primarily Giustiniani, Statistique militaire; États Sardes.
2
Rüstow, p. 64.
3
Report of Major Offand, Relazioni e rapporti finali sulla campagna del 1848, Vol. II, pp. 329-331.
4
Not included in these figures are the two battalions of Veterans or the gendarmerie reale, or Royal Gendarmerie, 8,244 strong.
5
These were children of soldiers, who were kept on the payroll either because of good service by their father, or for charity. A similar system operated in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
6
Meyer-Ott, himself Swiss, comments acidly on the Papal infantry that, ‘… the 4,000 Swiss were probably worth all the rest put together.’, p.102. Certainly, they could be completely relied upon.
7
Sardagna, Filiberto, Notize storiche sull’esercito Granducale della Toscana dal 1848 al 1849, p. 5.
8
Primarily from Meynert, Geschichte der k .k. österreichischen Armee, ihre heranbildung und organisation etc., and Müller, Franz, Die kaiserl königl österreichischen Armee, etc., Rudtorffer, Militär-Geographie von Europa.
9
Mollinary, p. 118.
10
These variable number are as quoted in the regulations, Anon, Exercir-Reglement für die k.k. Linien-Infanterie, 1844, pp. 1-2. Most sources simply give the number of men as 180. Four officer’s servants are not included in this total.
11
Ibid, but the number of servants here is three.
4
Radetzky Consolidates
AS THE WAR SPREADS
The Sack of Melegnano
As the Advance Guard neared Melegnano, 19 kilometres southeast of Milan Castle, at around 11:00 on the 23rd, a halt was ordered. The bridge across the River Lambro there had been damaged and barricaded, as was the town beyond the stream, and also some earthworks thrown up. The Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Wratislaw, along with Captain Count Castiglione and Kaiserjäger Staff Trumpeter Ciavotti, entered the town to arrange the requisition of supplies. The three men were seized by local citizens, some of whom threatened them with death. Subsequently, however, the men were released by unknown townspeople. This, unfortunately, occurred too late to save the place from attack.
Radetzky had personally ordered a bombardment of Melegnano, by both cannon and rockets. An assault was then made by a division of IV/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Zigau, with two platoons of his 20th Company to the right, and the other two platoons, as well as 19th Company, Oberlieutenant Chmielnicki, against the centre, supported by the other companies of the battalion. A division of IR Prohaska was directed against the south of the town, and the 6th division to the north. The latter was unable to cross a deep ditch, however, and consequently, a division of Ottochaner from Brigade Gyulai were ordered to the left flank. Resistance was brief, and the place taken and sacked. The three missing men were found, and returned to duties. 12 men in the town had been killed, and some 90 wounded in the attack. Two Austrians were killed, and one wounded, all from the Kaiser Jäger.
The bridge across the Lambro required some two hours of repair work before it was fully usable. Subsequently, Gyulai’s Advance Guard brigade moved on from the town, to Tavazzano, about half way to Lodi, while the main body of the Corps, and the trains, camped at Melegnano. Brigade Wohlgemuth, the rearguard, halted at San Giuliano. The retreat continued next day to Lodi, some 16 kilometres away. Once across the River Adda here, the Army halted for two nights, and was joined by various detachments and garrisons. Whilst here, on the 25 th, the Marshal first learned of the fall of Venice to the revolutionaries. With this, and Carlo Alberto’s declaration of war, it was now clear that the army must be pulled together into the Quadrilateral
Piedmont Declares War
As related, the revolutionaries in Milan had despatched an emissary, Count Arese, to Turin on the day the rebellion broke out. Arese met Carlo Alberto the following day, along with two other Lombard nobles, Counts d’Adda and Martini. The situation for the King was by no means easy, since he had no way of knowing how serious or widespread the insurrection was. Nevertheless, he undertook to support the Lombards, if they required his assistance. Count Martini was despatched to Milan with this offer. After a gruelling time getting into the city, Martini was finally able was to present it to the new Provisional Government on March 21st, and despite opposition from some of the Republicans, it was accepted.
King Carlo Alberto of Piedmont (Vernet)
Pressure in Turin was rapidly growing in favour of war. On the 23rd, from the pages of the newspaper Il Risorgimento, Count Camillo Cavour, not normally given to emotion, thundered, “The Dynasty‘s finest hour has arrived. There are circumstances when it is audacious to be prudent, and when it is wiser to be bold than calculating.”1 Carlo Alberto addressed his Cabinet two days later, informing them of his decision. Several ministers voiced concern at
the haste of this move, and at the lack of allies. The King, taking full responsibility for the decision, was able to overcome their opposition. War was declared the same day. Martini, upon his return to Turin with the acceptance of the King’s offer of assistance by the Milanese, found that the die had already been cast. The Kingdom would go to war with the Austrian Empire.
The public mood in Turin was blindly optimistic. “What care we for allies? Italy will act by herself!”(L’Italia farà da se!), was the cry.”2 Cheering crowds appeared before the Royal Palace, to see Carlo Alberto waving a tricolour flag. Within a short time, the army’s flags were changed to the Tricolour, with the Cross of Savoy superimposed on it. War was officially declared on the 24th, and the first Piedmontese troops crossed the border, the River Ticino, en route to Milan the next day.
Was the King a cynical opportunist? In a sense, yes. It is often stated that the Piedmontese Army was organised and deployed against the threat from France, and that this demonstrates Carlo Alberto’s insincerity against the common enemy. Such theories ignore the simple fact that Austria harboured no territorial ambitions on the Sub-Alpine Kingdom, whereas France most certainly did. The King knew full well that the Empire was no threat to him, and that France potentially was. His desire to dominate Lombardy, however, was very strong. Only the opportunity that offered him a fleeting chance of glory in the spring of 1848 caused him to ignore a potential threat in favour of a potential gain. To this extent, he can be regarded as cynical. Even so, he was risking everything by this intervention, and was fully aware of this.
Radetzky Retreats to Verona – Preparations in Milan
On the 26th, Radetzky withdrew from Lodi to San Bernardino, with the main body I Corps, while Brigades Wohlgemuth and Zobel moved to Crema, and Brigade Clam to Soncino. The garrisons of Lodi and Crema were absorbed into these brigades. The columns of Colonel Benedek and Colonel Haen amalgamated at Pizzeghetoni.
The growing number of men in Milan was creating problems and the War Committee decided that they must be removed from the city. It was agreed that those who had already volunteered and any future volunteers should be concentrated in Treviglio. The 120 men of the existing Manara Legion, strengthened by an additional 100 volunteers, began to move there on the evening of the 24th. Manara was instructed “to strengthen the defences of all of the villages, exploit the waterways as a means of defence, and harass the retreating enemy”. Complying with his orders, Manara, followed in the wake of the retreating Austrians.3 However, with a wisdom beyond his 24 years, he quickly realised that that the enemy retreat was an orderly one, and that the local population were by no means all on the side of the revolution. The hostility towards the enemy was far from universal, although it probably did not appear so to the retreating Austrians. Manara recognised that it was essential that his men gain the confidence and support of the rural population.
The Provisional Government, believing that Radetzky’s army was defeated, had not considered what would happen next. This is, not perhaps, surprising. The intellectuals cared little for the peasants, and considered them of little consequence. Much of the rural population was unreceptive to revolution. Many of the men had served in the Imperial Army and most of them had only ever known Austrian rule so had little appetite for change.4
A force of 1,200 Swiss volunteers, under Antonio Arcioni, arrived in Treviglio on the 25th. That same day, a Piedmontese column under Major-General Bes crossed the frontier, reaching Milan the next day, and marching through the city to public acclaim. The able Bes, however, had more than theatrical plans. Pushing on with his Piedmont Brigade, he arrived in Treviglio on the evening of the 27th. He was anxious to meet the famed Manara, and it was agreed at their subsequent meeting to jointly co-ordinate and plan operations. It was agreed that, “…the volunteers would be supported by the regulars as if they were the vanguard of the main body of the army.”5 Sadly, little such cooperation would actually take place, as the King and most of his senior officers had little faith in the abilities or the motives of many of the volunteers, and, equally sadly, they were partially correct. Bes had offered more than he could deliver, though this was not, of course, then apparent. Equally, there were many in Milan who regarded the Piedmontese as unnecessary interlopers. In their view, the enemy had already been defeated.
That evening Arcioni and part of his command (about 800 men) moved to Antignate, beyond the Sorio, reaching the hamlet at 18:00. Manara had charged him with the task of disturbing the enemy‘s march on the left flank; he was also ordered also to occupy Crema, should the latter not be heavily occupied; conversely, should he be attacked by superior forces, he was authorised to retreat towards Treviglio. The remainder of the Arcioni Column, some 250 men, under the command of Vicari, remained in Caravaggio with the purpose of moving on Brescia the following day. Torres and his men were detached to Vailate. In the vicinity of Treviglio therefore, were some 6,500 men, eight guns, and 600 horses.
Radetzky withdrew from Crema on the morning of the 27th, and by that evening had reached Soncino. Rumours abounded that the Austrians had left the city, and Torres was given orders to verify these reports the next day, reinforced with some of Manara’s men. The last Austrian troops to leave Crema, the brigades of Zobel and Wohlgemuth, marched out of the city the following morning, the rearguard elements at around 08:00. Torre’s force entered it only about an hour later, to see that the red/white/green tricolour was already flying.
On the 29th, Brigade Strassoldo withdrew to Desenzano, Brigade Clam to Lonato, that of S. Gyulai to Castenedolo, Maurer to Isorella, and the Rear-Guard brigade (Zobel) to Manerbio. Radetzky, with the brigades of Rath and Archduke Sigismund, and the baggae train moved on to Montechiaro the same day. Here, on the 30th, he received the detailed news of the fall of Venice, and revolt throughout the Veneto.6
That same day, Count Pimodan, who, with a small escort, had carried despatches to the Fortress commander of Peschiera, captured a courier carrying a message relaying the defeat and withdrawal of Radetzky and the army from Milan. Having gleaned the close proximity of the retreating army from the prisoner, Pimodan, on his own initiative, galloped off in that direction, accompanied by one trooper. After a hard ride, they reached the advance guard of the main force, and found their way to Headquarters. Rapidly dismounting, Pimodan blurted out his message to the Field Marshal as he later related; “Excellency, I said, General D’Aspre is in Verona with 16,000 men. Mantua and Peschiera are also ours.” Tears of relief rolled down the old man’s face as he hugged the rash bringer of these tidings, which rapidly spread throughout the army. Pimodan himself was immediately sent back, via Peschiera where he again updated the fortress commander, Baron Rath, to Verona to report to D’Aspre the progress of the Army.7
Army Headquarters, with Brigade Schaaffgotsche, was in Densenzano on the 31st, moving to Castelnuovo on April 1st, and arriving in Verona on April 2nd, where Headquarters was now established. The following day, the Marshal issued an Army Order, addressed to his soldiers, which ended:
For reasons of higher strategy, I as a general have given way, not you! You are undefeated. You, yourselves know this; that at all points where you appeared, you were victorious. Soldiers! Trust in me as I trust in you! Soon, I will again lead you forward to take revenge for the betrayal and treachery which was committed against you.
There would be no more retreat. He was thus enabled to place his army in one of the best defensive positions in Europe, the Quadrilateral, flanked by the rivers Mincio and Adige, and protected by the fortresses of Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, and Legnago. One of the particular strengths of the position was that none of these were more than a day’s march from two of the others.
Taking Stock – The Austrian Situation
Though the main Austrian army was now out of immediate danger, the overall situation was neither clear nor predictable. One immediate task was to attempt to discover how much of the army was missing, and of those that were, how many would not return, at least in the short term. All
of this had to be done in the midst of the normal blizzard of paper which made up a mid-Nineteenth Century army’s work on campaign
The Quadrilateral
In a report from Verona to Count Fiquelmont, dated April 5th, Radetzky gave his loss as a total of 99 companies, 2 squadrons, and six cannon. This was approximately 17,000 men. These units were:8
I Corps
IR Geppert, Nr. 43 – five companies: Captured in their garrison
IR Archduke Albrecht, Nr. 44 – 12 companies: Lost in Cremona
IR Cecciopperi, Nr. 23 – six companies: Lost in Cremona
6th Foot Pounder Battery Nr. 7 – six guns : Captured in Como
IR Prohaska, Nr. 7 – two companies: Captured in Como
Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz IR, Nr. 5 – six companies: Captured in Como
II Corps
Warasdiner St. George Grenz IR, Nr. 6: Covered by the Capitulation of Venice
Peterwardeiner Grenz IR, Nr. 9 – six companies: As above
IR Wimpffen, Nr. 13 – six companies: As above
Angelmayer Grenadier Battalion – four companies: As above
5th Garrison Battalion – six companies: As above
8th Feld-Jäger Battalion – four companies: Lost at Rovigo
IR Archduke Ferdinand D’Este, Nr. 26 – six companies: Lost in Udine and Palmanova
IR Zanini, Nr. 16 – six companies: Lost in Treviso
1st Banal Grenz IR, Nr. 10 – six companies: In Belluno and Conegliano and cut off from the Army.
2nd Banal Grenz IR, Nr. 11 – two companies: In Ceneda and Serravalle, and cut off from the Army
IR Archduke Franz D’Este, Nr, 32 – four companies: In Parma, cut off from the Army.
Hussar Regiment Reuss, Nr. 7 – one squadron: As above
Windischgrätz Chevauxleger Regiment, Nr. 4 – one squadron: Capitulated, and sent to Trieste
Radetzky's Marches Page 9