Certainly, many of these troops were not permanently lost to the army, but at this time, it was, to say the least, less than clear. In a letter to his favourite daughter Friederike, with whom he always kept up a furious correspondence, dated April 27th, Radetzky gave his estimate of losses. He wrote: “I have lost 10,600 men by desertion from the army, and 13,000 by being cut off, in addition to which I have 306 dead and 700 wounded, six dead and 18 wounded officers, 360 officers separated, and two certain officer deserters.“9
These figures were gloomy indeed. There was no prospect, at this stage, of reinforcements, and the supply situation remained uncertain. The revolution in Venetia had cut the lines of communication to the east, potentially leaving only that through the Tirol, a difficult and slow route. The situation in the rest of the Empire was also unknown, but at the very least, must be considered chaotic.
Taking Stock – The Italian Situation
Carlo Alberto, at the head of the Sardinian main force, crossed the Ticino River at Pavia, with much fanfare, on March 29th. After Radetzky’s withdrawal into the Quadrilateral, Lombardy was virtually clear of the enemy. This had been accomplished largely by the Urban and Middle Class Lombards themselves, with the peasantry remaining a largely unknown quantity. The Austrian retreat, however, was compelled by the advance of the King’s Army, and the presence of that army ensured that there was no immediate prospect of a return by the Habsburg forces. Indeed, the situation appeared to offer the prospect of more long term institutional change in the status of Lombardy as a whole.
In Venetia, the situation was now more fluid. To be sure, Imperial authority outside the Quadrilateral had largely ceased to exist, and in Venice, a working Republic was already in existence, and was quickly recognised as such by the United States and the Swiss Confederation. The Austrian Army, in its fortresses, however, was entirely in the Veneto, and needless squabbles soon broke out between Venice and the mainland cities, which were always wary of her influence over them. These factors mitigated against unity of either purpose or action. Carlo Alberto was quick to send a military advisor to the Venetian Government, but would have been well advised to follow this gesture up with some troops. With the exception of one company of Fortress Artillery sent to the fortress of Palmanova on April 13th, not until much later did he do this. Even so, at this point, there was much potential for cooperation by the various parties, and in both Lombardy and Venetia, the recruitment of volunteers was forging ahead. In addition, there were forces at work in the other Italian states, which could add yet more volunteers to those mentioned, and perhaps regular troops, as well.
King Carlo Alberto with the Piedmontese Army, distributing the tricolour near Pavia, March 29th 1848 (Grimaldi)
FOREIGN REACTIONS
Much of Europe was in a chaotic state, but affairs in Italy stil ranked high in the estimation of many, and reactions to the revolutions varied widely. Inevitably, these perceptions were coloured by the accuracy or otherwise of the information received, and, above all of course, by self interest and possible gain.
France
French perception of the events in Upper Italy was a matter of both danger and opportunity. The country was beginning to settle after the February overthrow of King Louis Philippe, but was still volatile. As news arrived of the Italian revolutions, a mob of radical republicans crossed the frontier, intent upon incorporating the French speaking areas of Carlo Alberto’s realm into France. Fortunately, this development quickly descended into farce, and no significant military action was needed to quell the disturbances. The Provisional Government in Paris, for all practical purposes, run by the Foreign Minister, Alphonse Lamartine, took rapid steps to form an army of observation, ostensibly to protect the frontier. On March 30th, the First Division of the Army of the Alps was designated, to be formed under the command of General of Division Charles Maucourt de Bourjolly. It was to be composed of the following troops:
First Brigade
4th Chasseur Battalion
13th Light Infantry Regiment
22nd Light Infantry Regiment
Second Brigade
13th Line Infantry Regiment
66th Line Infantry Regiment
68th Line Infantry Regiment
7th Hussar Regiment
Two artillery batteries
One company of engineers
This force would eventually grow to over 60,000, and some of it would indeed be used in Italy, though no-one could have forseen how.
Great Britain
British interests were first and foremost commercial. Instability was bad for trade, and this was the cornerstone of British policy. This said, Britain’s attitude towards the upheavals in the Italian peninsula was one of ambivalence. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, whilst encouraging reform, was no supporter of revolution. He, through his Minister in Turin, Ralph Abercrombie, strongly advised Carlo Alberto against war. When war came, he was to do his level best to put an end to it. The British public, on the other hand, was largely sympathetic to the perceived aspirations of the Independence movement. Britain was also suspicious of France’s ambitions.
Russia
Tsar Nicholas, the only major ruler whose lands went almost completely unaffected by the revolutions of 1848, was understandably appalled by their outbreak. He was equally horrified that, in these circumstances, a fellow monarch would attack another ruler who was beset by such a rebellion. The Sardinian Ambassador to St. Petersburg was immediately handed his passports, and expelled from the country, and the Tsar’s minister in Turin withdrawn.
THE WAR SPREADS
With the spread of insurrection across northern Italy, in the view of many emulating the previous outbreaks in the south, pressure grew on all rulers in the Italian peninsula to offer support and assistance to the movement, nebulous though it was. It was not, in this extremely volatile atmosphere, to prove possible for anyone to stand aside. Each sovereign entity was faced with an immediate decision. The results in every one, though seemingly similar, spoke with a number of voices.
Formation of a Papal Expeditionary Force
From the moment that the revolution began in Milan, it was obvious to all that the Papacy must adopt a position. The first news of the events in Vienna, doubtless much embellished, arrived in Rome on March 21st. As mentioned, Pius IX’s own policies had raised levels of expectation very high in many quarters. Indeed, his attempt at forming some sort of league of Italian states had been making progress. Crowds in the streets demanded action to help the rebellion, and attacked the Austrian Legation. Against his better judgement, the Pope chose to join what appeared to be the common cause.
A Corps of Operations was ordered to be formed, and command of it was given, on the 23rd, to a Piedmontese officer, Lieutenant-General Giovanni Durando, a 44 year old former Guards officer, who had seen service in the Carlist Wars. Durando was already on secondment in a post of training and reorganisation of the Papal Army. His force was to consist of two divisions, one of Papal regular troops, directly commanded by himself, and the other, of Civic Guard and volunteers. The latter would be command by a Neapolitan, 78 year old Colonel Andrea Ferrari, another Napoleonic veteran. It would not prove to be an easy relationship.
The first units to move were elements of the regular forces. On the 24th, the two battalions of the Grenadier Regiment, Colonel Marescotti, and the two battalions of the Cacciatori Regiment, Colonel Bini, marched north from Rome towards Bologna, 580 kilometres away. With them went three and a half squadrons of Dragoons, Colonel Lanci, two squadrons of Mounted Cacciatori, Major Savini, and a squadron of Mounted Carabinieri. The rest of the division would follow on as soon as possible. The Civic and Volunteer units, many of which were still in the process of formation, would follow on subsequently.
The same day, General Durando and members of his staff also left Rome for Bologna, stipulating that all of the units of both divisions should be assembled in the latter city by the 20th of April, less than a month away. It was, to say the
very least, an extremely tall order.10
Papal Volunteers leaving Rome (Illustrated London News)
Creation of a Neapolitan Expeditionary Force
The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had been in a state of chaos since King Ferdinando II’s acceptance, in January 1848, of a constitution, the adoption of which he swore to on February 10th. Even so, now, many of the political elements which had demanded a constitution now proceeded to utterly ignore its existence, insisting upon entirely new proposals. The revolution in Sicily continued largely unabated, and then came the news of the Lombard and Venetian Revolutions. Demands now came from many sides that Naples join the Crusade against Austria. Indeed, groups and individual volunteers were already making their way to the seat of war. Ferdinando’s range of possible options was shrinking rapidly.
Under severe pressure from all sides, the King allowed the creation of an expeditionary force to be assembled and moved north. Command was given to General Guglielmo Pepe, a former Napoleonic veteran and revolutionary, who had himself most recently been part of the movement demanding a new constitution from Ferdinando. The King had no serious intention of allowing the force to actively enter the war, though Pepe did not really recognise this. Ferdinando did, however, consider that despatching troops to the north might gain him support from the other Italian States against the Sicilian rebellion.
The first military unit to leave for the front was the 10th Line Infantry Regiment, Colonel Rodriguez. I/10th was sent by sea to join the Tuscan forces, and disembarked in Leghorn on April 6th, to be followed by II/10th, nine days later.
Pepe’s main force, after much prevarication and a multitude of changes, was to consist of two divisions, the First, commanded by Lieutenant-General Giovanni Statella, also his second in command, and the Second, under Brigadier-General Klein, plus a cavalry brigade. Statella’s division was composed of seven battalions, one artillery battery, one company of engineers, and an ambulance. That of Klein comprised eight battalions, one artillery battery, and an engineer company. The Cavalry Brigade, commanded by Colonel Carlo LaHalle, was composed of 12 squadrons and one artillery battery. Carefully omitted from Pepe’s corps were any Guards or Swiss units, King Ferdinando’s most reliable troops, who might well be needed at home. The entire expeditionary force numbered approximately 14,000 men.11
Pepe and his staff, with Klein’s division, were transported to the Papal port of Ancona in naval vessels, and disembarked there on May 7th. From here, the troops were to march towards Bologna, where Pepe made his headquarters. The First Division, marching north through the Pontiff’s Secular Realm, also moved towards that city. Upon arrival there, this division was directed to Ferrara. With the completion of these moves, the Expeditionary Force was ready to cross the river Po, and enter the conflict.
Tuscany (pop. 1,500,000)
On March 19th, the tidings of the Viennese revolution reached Florence. By the 21st, popular feeling had mushroomed into support for the national cause. The Chief Minister, Baron Ricasoli, advised the Grand Duke of the tumult, and the latter ordered that the Tuscan Army would march forthwith against the common enemy, and that volunteers would also be mustered. This was, in theory, to protect the Duchy’s borders, although all were aware that this was window dressing. Indeed, the first act taken by the Tuscan army was to occupy some disputed territory of the neighbouring Duchy of Modena!12
Fired by the idea of a Holy cause, the Grand Duke, on March 29th, ordered the formation of a combined Regular and Volunteer force, to be placed at the orders of the Sardinian King. Preparations were rapid, and less than a month later, a division of some 5,000 men crossed the River Po and joined Carlo Alberto’s forces. Interestingly, although great enthusiasm for the cause was in evidence in the streets, the number of volunteers was small, only some 3,000.13 The Tuscan column was assigned to positions west of Mantua. Attached to them were the two battalions of the Neapolitan 10th Line Infantry Regiment, and additional volunteer recruits.
Parma (pop. 493,000)
As related above, the Duchy had thrown its lot in with the revolution almost immediately, and the Duke had placed his realm under the protection of Carlo Alberto as a step towards unification. The small Austrian-trained army was only able to offer a force of two small battalions, together 1,026 men (of whom 200 were National Guardsmen, and 180 unarmed), an artillery section of two guns, and a handful of cavalry, all under the command of Colonel Eugenio Leonardi, a less than impressive force, although the troops themselves were of high quality. These troops were placed in the Composite Brigade of Piedmontese II Corps.
Modena (pop. 575,000)
As with Parma, although with less enthusiasm, the Duchy of Modena had also thrown its hat in the ring with Carlo Alberto. The very small military force of Duke Francesco IV consisted of one battalion of line infantry, composed of two companies of grenadiers, and six of fusiliers, with a small staff, a corps of dragoons, with one mounted and two dismounted companies, two artillery companies, and two engineer companies, some 2,400 men in all. There was also a Gendarmerie. For service with the Piedmontese, the Duchy sent a volunteer battalion of 800 men, two infantry companies totalling 225 men, 35 mounted dragoons, and thirty gunners, with three cannon and a howitzer: in all 1,090 men, under the command of an excellent officer, Major Fontana.
The war had indeed grown beyond the involvement of Lombardy and Venetia. While enthusiasm elsewhere, had continued to increase, however, fighting had also been taking place.
_______________________
1
Costa de Beauregard, p. 131.
2
Della Rocca, pp. 52-53.
3
Mariotti comments, unfairly, that the volunteers acted at this stage, “… with no clear purpose…” p. 147. In fact, it was too chaotic, as yet, to define one.
4
This is hardly an unknown factor. Marx and Engels both despised the peasantry.
5
Dandolo, I volontari ed i Bersaglieri Lombardi, p. 39, and quoted in Fabris, Vol.I, p. 260.
6
Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, pp. 159-160.
7
Pimodan, pp. 38-43.
8
Grüll, pp. 97-98.
9
Duhr, Bernhard (editor), Briefe des Feldmarschalls Radetzky an seine Tochter Friederike 1847-1857, p. 80. The two officer desertions would have been certain to have hurt Radetzky deeply.
10
D’Azeglio, p. 5. Ovidi, however, states that one battalion, and one squadron of each regiment left that day. It is worth noting that D’Azeglio, the Deputy Chief of Staff, was actually present.
11
Ulloa, Vol. II, p. 198, and the figure generally agreed upon. Oddly, Pepe himself states the number as 17,000, Vol. 1, p. 146. For order of battle, see Appendix V.
12
Four years earlier, Tuscany had been able to quietly absorb the small Duchy of Lucca.
13
See Appendix IV.
5
The Lombard Volunteers and the Invasion of the Tirol
A Structure for the Lombard Volunteers
In Milan and elsewhere throughout Lombardy, new groups of volunteers were being formed. Legions, Columns, and Battalions were appearing everywhere, the terminology being largely meaningless. Overwhelmed by all the tasks associated with administration, and with large numbers of volunteers appearing in Milan daily, the War Committee of the Provisional Government decided that a commander of all of these diverse groups must be appointed. The man chosen was Michele Napoleone Allemandi. The 41 year old, born in Piedmont, was a colonel in the Swiss Federal Army, having made a name for himself in the previous year’s brief civil war in that country. Allemandi was appointed by the Provisional Government as a Brigadier-General of the ‘Italian Army’ on April 1st, perhaps an appropriate day. His task was an unenviable one. At this stage, few, if any of his groups of men could be called formations, and some were out of control, although in many, there were some former soldiers. He had no
staff, few arms, little equipment, and no uniforms.
The next day, Allemandi moved on to Brescia, the same day that Radetzky entered Verona. On the 3rd, he held a conference with his commanders there. He listened to their reports, and was briefed on their, and enemy, positions. He gave orders to all present that he should be immediately informed of any developments, and subsequently considered all that he had been told, together with pondering the organisation of his forces. It cannot have been an easy reflection.
Nevertheless, even though not all of the men were ideal material, there were many of the willing and highly motivated available. A Pavian student recruit, Volunteer De Angelis, wrote to his father on May 4th, bubbling with enthusiasm:
Things in Milan seem to have taken a turn for the better. We are divided into two companies, and these companies were divided into two platoons each. I am in the Second Company, First Platoon, on the right. Today, I attended the medical examination; the doctor believed that I was seventeen. I told him that I was 20 years old, and he replied that I looked younger. He told me that I was fit for duty, and I did not even undress myself! Our morale is high.1
Whether General Allemandi or his troops were ready or not, the time for reflection was past. The senior commanders were summoned again to his headquarters, now in Monteciaro, on April 6th. At this conference, the general divided his immediately available men, only about 3,000, into four ‘Columns’, commanded by Luciano Manara, Antonio Arcioni, Vittorio Longhena, and Ernesto Thannberg respectively, with each column bearing the name of its commander, although they were also numbered. Every individual volunteer unit now had to decide which of the four it would join. The only exception to this rule was the small Vicari-Simonetta Column, armed with excellent Swiss carbines, which was to be assigned to the regular Piedmontese Army at Peschiera.
Radetzky's Marches Page 10