Manara’s command, at this point, having been reduced, and also having suffered some losses over the past 10 days, was composed of 38 officers and approximately 600 men. Some 250 of these were under the command of the dubious Bois-Guilbert. Of the remainder, 150 were volunteers from Milan, along with with 200 Piedmontese and Genoese. Arcioni commanded about 800 men. The rest were divided between Thannberg, a Belgian adventurer, and Vittorio Longhena, who had played a prime role in the revolution in Brescia.
The most important decision taken at the meeting was that of invading the Tirol, a project conceived by Allemandi. A widespread opinion held among the commanders was that the volunteers would do better in hilly and mountainous terrain than on the plains, and with the (unquestioned) support of local people, would be able to confuse, disorient, and defeat the enemy.2 This was particularly true of Carlo Cattaneo. The project was to be implemented forthwith.
Initial Operations around Lake Garda
General Allemandi’s orders specified that, by the morning of April 8th, the columns of Manara and Arcioni, assembled in Desenzano, on the south-west shore of Lake Garda, would embark in boats, and sail up the western shore of the lake, to Salò, some 14 kilometres to the north. After disembarkation, the troops were to march north-east to the town of Vestone, and the north-east as far as Tione, 30 kilometres inside the Tirol. Here, they would join Longhena’s column. Major-General Bes’s Piedmont Brigade was to have cooperated in this movement, a project with its roots in the first meeting of Bes and Manara, on March 27th. The entire scheme, however, was delayed by Bes’s own operations around Peschiera, ordered to be initiated after the King’s decision to do so on April 4th. For the moment, some volunteers would operate around Bardolino, on the eastern shore of the lake, a little over 10 kilometres north of Peschiera, where they would create a diversion. Allemandi’s grand scheme would have to wait.
To this end, on the morning of April 10th, as the Piedmontese prepared their first moves against Peschiera, Major Agostino Noaro and 450 volunteers were ferried across Lake Garda, from Desenzano to Cisano, a little south of Bardolino3. They then moved south, and at about 16:00, reached the village of Pacengo, about three kilometres from Peschiera. Concerned that he had had no sign of the enemy, Noaro, as darkness approached, resolved to seize the gunpowder mill near Castelnuovo, six kilometres east of the fortress, something which Baron Rath, the commander at Peschiera, had, some two weeks before, foreseen might happen.
About 200 men, led by Captains Rossi and Ranieri, surrounded the magazine, while Noaro attacked the guard post there with the rest of the force. A corporal and 13 men of I/Ottochaner Grenz IR were taken prisoner, and the magazine occupied. Some 500 barrels of powder were then loaded onto any vehicles which could be found, and taken to Salò, for transportation across the lake, a very long process, which continued into the following day.
Manara, now on the scene, concluded that the work would be better protected by an occupation of the town of Castelnuovo, which was on a height dominating the main road from Verona to Peschiera. He therefore sent Noaro, with 200 men, into the town and took up positions there. Approximately 100 men of IR Erzherzog Albrecht, a largely Italian regiment, were foraging in the village and were taken prisoner. Of these, 56 were induced to defect.
Although Noaro now wanted to fall back from Castelnuovo, a message arrived from Manara advising him to hold on there, as reinforcements would soon arrive with him. Allemandi had now given orders to Manara to move to Bardolino, land there, and hold it in case of Noaro’s retreat. This move was executed on the evening of the 10th. Manara spent the night in Bardolino, and was planning to leave when he received a further order from Allemandi to stay there, following which Noaro remained at Castelnuovo
In Verona, upon receiving word that a force of irregulars had occupied Castelnuovo, Radetzky immediately ordered II Corps to despatch a strong combined arms force to dislodge them, thus protecting I Corps’ flank as it withdrew towards Verona, as well as maintaining contact with Peschiera. Before daybreak on April 11th, Major-General Prince Wilhelm Thurn & Taxis was on the march towards the town with I/IR Piret, II/ IR Haugwitz, two squadrons of Windischgrätz Chevauxlegers, and the 4th Foot Artillery Battery.
At about 14:00, the two guns of the Austrian Advance Guard began to shell the town. This was followed by an attack by the Haugwitz Battalion. 3/IR Piret, Captain Menapace, followed by 2nd Company, also swept around the right flank, and stormed the north of the place, while 4/IR Piret, Captain Streicher, attacked from the south4. The entrances and streets were heavily barricaded, and the close-quarter fighting, grim.
The carnage continued for two hours, the village in flames, with men, women, and children perishing along with those fighting. Noaro’s men were driven out, and retreated to join Manara’s column in Lazise, which they then fortified, and spent an uneasy night, awaiting the return of the steamers from across the lake, which appeared the next day, and transported them to Saló
Castelnuovo itself was a burnt out shell. Of 175 houses, only 32 remained intact. 113 old men, women, and children died, either in the flames, or killed by the troops. Approximately 100-150 volunteers were killed, and two wounded, with 46 taken prisoner, one of them a Priest bearing arms. It was noted that the most enraged troops in the street-fighting were those of IR Haugwitz, Italian soldiers. Austrian losses were
IR Haugwitz
four dead, seven wounded, and one missing
IR Piret
three lightly wounded
4th Foot Artillery Battery
one wounded
Prince Taxis himself received a severe contusion from a spent musket ball.
A terrible and salutary lesson had been taught. After breakfast the next morning, the Austrian column left the smoking ruins, and marched back towards Verona, reaching the fortress at 22:00. Three days later, the Piedmontese Army began operations against the fortress of Peschiera. By then, however, the mainly Lombard volunteer units had already begun their own campaign.
INVASION OF THE TIROL
During March, there had been disturbances in the southern Tirol, which had a mixed German and Italian speaking population, unlike the north, where German almost completely dominated, and the Kaiser was universally revered. On March 19th, crowds gathered in the main southern town, Trento, and the town gates, and Customs House were destroyed. The garrison of three companies of 3rd Feld-Jäger Battalion, and one squadron of Liechtenstein Chevauxlegers battled the mobs, and after the deaths of two people, and some others wounded, the trouble died down. A Civic Guard had been formed, and the municipal authorities announced their sympathy with the Lombard rebellions. Fortunately for the Austrians, nothing further occurred, as the majority of the Trentini awaited events.
The Imperial forces in the Tirol, commanded by FML Ludwig, Baron Welden, were at this time composed of the following:
I/Kaiser Jäger
3rd Feld-Jäger Battalion
I & II/IR Baden
I & II/IR Schwarzenberg
I & II/IR Archduke Ferdinand D’Este
Southwest Tirol 1848
Four squadrons, Liechtenstein Chevauxlegers
Five guns
The force totalled 5,584 men, 497 horses, and five guns.5
Welden, at the first hint of trouble, despatched Colonel Baron Zobel to Trento, to take command of troops in the South Tirol, also sending the 1st division of the Kaiser Jäger to Trento Castle, where they arrived on March 30th. The whole infantry force in the south consisted of only 18 companies, these being two companies of I/Kaiser Jäger, III Kaiser Jäger, 3rd Feld-Jäger Battalion, and four companies of IR Schwarzenberg. In addition were two squadrons of the chevauxlegers, and two howitzers.
In Innsbruck, the two battalions of IR Ferdinand D’Este, Italian units with many dubious elements in the ranks, could not be relied upon, and were not employed in the theatre. Some of the men deserted, with their arms, and clashed with loyal troops sent to find them. The 3rd Battalion had, as described earlier, disinteg
rated. Conversely, on March 27th, an appeal by the Imperial authorities for volunteers was rapidly answered, and local companies were rapidly established throughout the Province.
On April 8th, realising the imminence of an attack, Zobel suppressed the Civic Guard and declared a State of Siege in Trento. He had earlier received, as a reinforcement from Marshal Radetzky in Verona, III/Kaiser Jäger. On this date, his troops were deployed thus:
III/Kaiser Jäger: four companies in Trento, one company in Ponton and Volargne, and one company in Peri, and Ala.
I/Kaiser Jäger: two companies in Stenico.
3rd Feld-Jäger Battalion: four companies in Trento, and two in Riva.
I/IR Schwarzenberg: two companies in Riva, two companies in Roveredo, and two in Bolzano
Instructions from Verona made it clear that, for the time being, there could be no more reinforcements from the main army. 6
The fortress of Rocca D’Anfo, near the frontier, was occupied on April 6th, by a company of Bergamo volunteers, commanded by Captain Scotti, and subsequently chosen by Allemandi as his Headquarters. The General had the columns of Arcioni and Longhena begin their advance into the Tirol, on the evening of the 10th, just before the disaster at Castelnuovo.7 The frontier was actually crossed on the following day. On the morning of the 11th, Arcioni’s force of about 1,200 arrived in Tione. Longhena reached Condino on the 9th, with 400 men, and joined Arcioni on the 12th, whereupon a Provisional Government was, somewhat optimistically, declared. Manara, in accordance with Allemandi’s orders, followed on with a pared-down force of 150 picked men, arriving in Tione on the 15th, missing the initial actions. In addition were the columns of Sedaboni, with 500 men, Malossi’s Brescians, 350, and 150 Trentini volunteers, with other assorted groups, a total of probably some 3,000 men at this juncture, exclusive of any independent bands.
This immediate border area between Lombardy and the Tirol is well described by a volunteer who served there later in the campaign, the-then 17 year old Giovanni Cadolini. Monte Suello is some four kilometres north of Rocca d’Anfo.
Monte Suello is a high hill dominating the Caffaro Torrent. That hill is a part of the range surrounding the Sabbia and Trompia valleys. Monte Suello is in a very important position, since it defends the Brescian territory, and forms an advanced defence of the Rocca d’Anfo. The latter is a fort which rises vertically along the range, and is therefore almost impregnable, but it could have been easily surrounded, if it had not been protected by the Monte Suello.
Monte Suello dominates the beautiful Chiese valley. The Caffaro flows impetuously below, forming the border with Province of Trento, then reaching Lake Idro, and becoming a tributary of the Chiese River. The bridge which previously crossed it had been completely destroyed, and only a little wooden bridge now allowed the crossing of the river.
At the bottom of the valley, beyond the border, there were Caffaro and Lodrone, two hamlets which were left almost deserted and destroyed by many fires after the fighting and raids that had occurred in the area. Further beyond the torrent, there were the Tyrolean villages of Darzo, Condino and Storo (which we occupied later in 1866) and the long valley which leads to Tione, crossed by the road which twists through the woods.8
Allemandi Advances on Trento
The two columns of Arcioni and Longhena, reinforced that morning by 80 Swiss volunteers armed with carbines9, advanced on Stenico on the morning of April 13th. In that village, Captain Batz, commanding the 1st division of I/Kaiser Jäger, and seven chevauxlegers, realising himself to be heavily outnumbered, withdrew an hour before their arrival, moving further north, and deployed at the bridge across the River Sarca at Sarche, some 20 kilometres west of Trento. Batz also moved 5/IR Schwarzenberg, Oberlieutenant Mravinchich, presently at Sarche, back towards the castle of Toblino, two kilometres to the north.
To dislodge Batz, on the 14th, Arcioni was to move from hilltop town of Stenico through the Sarca Valley, which it dominated, to Seleno, while Longhena’s task was advance further north, thus cutting off the enemy line of retreat to Toblino. The plan misfired, however, when Batz, informed of the enemy movements, made a rapid withdrawal to the Castle of Toblino, aided to an extent by the slow advance of Longhena, who failed to cut him off. While these events took place, 15/ Kaiser Jäger, Captain Zedaboni, moved forward to reinforce Batz, whose force now numbered about 450 men10.
Action of Toblino, April 14/15th
The defenders narrowly won the race, and the castle, on a small peninsula on the lake of the same name, was immediately attacked by the volunteers. Initially, a group led by Captain Madaschi attempted to batter in the gate, and when this failed, to set fire to it. This also failed; Madaschi was killed, and the attackers driven away. The Swiss carbineers, from behind a low wall and some trees and shrubbery, targeted the barricaded castle windows and loopholes. Firing continued on both sides until around 23:00, when the volunteers withdrew to various bivouacs for the night, exhausted, and foraging for food.
While this fighting continued, Longhena’s Advance Guard, the 1st Bergamo Company was sent on to secure the bridge between Toblino and Vezzano, on the Trento Road, as well as the settlement of Vezzano itself, only 13 kilometres from Trento. An advance picket, under Lieutenant Gasparini was posted in the latter. It was the closest they would get.
Upon receiving news of this offensive on the evening of the 14th, Colonel Zobel ordered Major Burlo, with a force of four companies and one three pounder cannon, to Captain Batz’ assistance.11 This force moved off, and reached Vezzano at 03:00 next morning, where is surprised and scattered Lieutenant Gasparini’s detachment. Moving on to the bridge, Burlo exchanged fire with the main body of the 1st Bergamo Company, which then withdrew. The bridge having been largely destroyed, considerable work was required to make it usable. Not until 11:30, was the advance able to continue. Burlo then sent a force west through the Ranzo Valley, to flank the enemy left, whilst he moved directly on Toblino.
At Toblino, the action had recommenced that morning, but, at around 08:00, seeing the approach of the flanking column, the volunteers began to fall back. Observing this, and the approach of reinforcements, Batz ordered a sortie by Captain Mavrinchich’s 5/ Schwarzenberg and a platoon of 15/ Kaiser Jäger, under Oberlieutenant Escher. The volunteers quickly withdrew towards Stenico. Burlo and Batz subsequently pulled back to Vezzano.
Losses in this scrappy fighting were extremely uneven. The Imperial losses totaled three dead – two Kaiser Jäger, and one man from 5/IR Schwarzenberg, and five wounded, the latter all Kaiser Jäger. Italian losses totaled 81 killed and wounded, with a further 21 taken prisoner. Of the latter, 17 were later shot in the moat in Trento, as deserters from the Imperial Army, taken under arms against it. The disparity can be partly explained by the rash attack on the castle, and the lack of training and decent weapons of the volunteers, as well as the high quality of the troops they faced. Longhena was blamed for failing to adhere strictly to Allemandi’s orders, and was recalled to Brescia, and his command taken over by Arcioni.
For Allemandi’s force, these actions came as a rude shock, and it was demoralising for many, who had expected the campaign to be more of a triumphal progress than a war. Poorly equipped, and mostly unhardened by training, they suffered badly in the cold and rain of an Alpine April. All ranks had too much to learn in a very short time.
In the meanwhile, Allemandi himself had reached Tione by the 13th April, gathering information for his projected attacks on Trento and Riva, which, as discussed, by this time already under way. Aware that his men would greatly benefit from a stiffening of regular troops, and above all needing artillery, he had decided to appeal directly to the King.
Allemandi went to the King’s Headquarters in Volta, with a request for two infantry battalions, and some cannon. He found, however, that His Majesty and his Staff were entirely preoccupied with the operations around Peschiera. The general was informed that no troops or artillery were available. This was not entirely true, but both the King and his gene
rals had an innate distrust of the volunteers, combined with a contemptuous view of their abilities.
Failure here led Allemandi to Milan, where the Provisional Government readily agreed to provide him with the six cannon which had been captured in Cremona some three weeks before. This was precisely what he needed, and he returned to his headquarters to await the guns.12 In fact, however, they were never despatched, and Allemandi’s next dealings with the Provisional Government would be decidedly less than cordial.
After the defeat at Toblino, the volunteer units assembled around Stenico. With the columns of Sedaboni, Tibaldi, and Scotti, there were once again nearly 3,000 men present. These were:
Bergamo Volunteers
450
Sedaboni Battalion
500
Arcioni Column
1,200
Malossi Brescians
350
Cremonese Volunteers
250
Tirolean Volunteers
15013
Indiscipline and insubordination, unfortunately, continued to be rife. Captain Scotti, for example, commanding the 3rd Bergamo Volunteer Company, chafed under the authority of Colonel Bonorandi to such an extent that the latter allowed him to withdraw from his authority.14 Scotti subsequently moved north, towards Malé and Cles. Another new column, under Francesco Anfossi, brother of Augusto, killed in the street-fighting in Milan, was despatched into the Val di Ledro, and another, under Captain Filippini, to the Pass of Ponale, some 2 kilometres south of Riva, on the west shore of Lake Garda.
Action of Varrone, April 18th
On April 16th, Colonel Sedaboni advanced to Ballino. Bonorandi following the next day, had orders for Sedaboni to occupy the villages of Tenno and Pranzo, just west of the former. Arriving in Ballino, Bonorandi found that Sedaboni had already moved forward without any orders. Sending out scouts, he was able to discover that Sedaboni had, on the 18th, advanced as far as Varrone, where he encountered 6/3rd Feld-Jäger Battalion, supported by 2/IR Schwarzenberg. A sharp action ensued, with the jäger holding the village, while the infantry flanked the volunteers. Sedaboni’s men broke, and fled to Arco, arriving there that evening, in complete disarray. The villagers there, feted the men, but they continued to retreat to Tenno, reaching there about midnight on the 18th. Here, the battalion completely disintegrated.
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