Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

Allemandi’s report, p. 414, Relazioni e Rapporti, Vol. II. Corselli, p. 74, is scathing in his criticism of Allemandi, though recognising that both Carlo Alberto and the Provisional Government in Milan completely failed to support him.

  13

  Baroni, p. 67.

  14

  Baroni, p. 67.

  15

  Cattaneo, p. 195.

  16

  Dandolo, pp. 80-83, Baroni, pp. 70-71, Stoppani, pp. 19-21, Grüll, pp. 148-149, and Kriegsbegebenheiten 1848, Part 1, pp 109-111.

  17

  La Farina, p. 443.

  18

  Baroni, p. 94.

  19

  Report on the Operations of 28th April 1848, in Welden, pp. 204-205.

  20

  Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, Vol III, 1865, p. 197, Grüll, pp. 254-5, Fabris, Vol II, p. 405.

  21

  Anfossi, Memorie sulla campagna di Lombardia, p. 102.

  22

  Baroni, p. 96-98.

  23

  Ibid., Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, Vol III, 1865, pp 197-198, Grüll, pp. 257-260, Brunswick von Korompa, pp. 232-233.

  6

  Across the Mincio

  (See map on page 66)

  In consideration of the intricate political/military situation, a Council of War was summoned by Carlo Alberto to be held at his Headquarters in Cremona, at 10:00 on April 4th. The conference was presented with two very different positions. It was obvious to all present that Radetzky occupied a strong position, and had two lines of communication currently available to him. His major supply line was to the east, through Venetia, via Vicenza. The second, a more difficult and slow route, was north, through the mountains of the Tirol, and then eastwards. These being his most vulnerable points, what was to be done?

  The two corps commanders offered diametrically opposed advice. Sixty-one year old General De Sonnaz offered a radical plan. His proposal was for the army to march around the southern flank of the enemy, and use the port of Venice as its operational base. In this way, Radetzky’s main supply line would be cut, and the King’s army supplied by sea, of which the Sardinian and Neapolitan navies could, in the current circumstances, only be in control. De Sonnaz wished to strike while he perceived the enemy to be demoralised. He did not consider that Radetzky would leave the Quadrilateral to move against Lombardy and/or Piedmont. Furthermore, he believed that should they do so, they could be defeated in the field.1

  Fifty-seven year old Baron Bava, however, was of the opinion that the fortress of Mantua, which, it was postulated, would rise in revolt at the approach of the Piedmontese army, should be the first target. In addition, the River Mincio should be crossed, and the army should then manoeuvre between the Mincio and Adige, that is, within the Quadrilateral itself, against the enemy lines of communication. He believed in facing the main enemy force head on. If one of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral could be taken, the possibility existed for one or more of the rest. Also, the main enemy army would be held in check.

  The decision was made to cross the Mincio, move towards Mantua, and to begin operations against Peschiera. Moves against Radetzky’s supply line through the Tirol were also considered, and indeed, were shortly to be undertaken by the volunteer forces of the Provisional Government of Milan, ostensibly with the support of the Royal Army.

  For any criticism of Bava and the King on this subject, the state of the army’s supply trains is crucial. The idea of being supplied via the Adriatic could only apply once the army had made the march to Venice. Up to that point, the commissariat, a notably inefficient branch, would have to be able to provision about 45,000 men on the move, with a strong possibility of fighting occurring along the way. The possibility of a collapse in the supply system was very high, and, indeed, happened in the summer, while the army was more or less static. As Fabris stated, “In the end, more prudent advice prevailed …”.2

  The Rivoli Plateau 1848

  The following day, the King moved his Headquarters forward to Bozzolo, just over 17 kilometres west of Mantua. From here, the plans were made to cross the River Mincio, to begin on the 8th.3 The river was to be forced north of Mantua, at the villages, from south to north, of Goito, Monzambano, and Borghetto. The first named was to be the initial and major effort, and was to be made by I Corps. The latter two supporting operations were the responsibility of II Corps. Orders went out on April 6th, with the ancillary moves to commence on the 9th.

  The trip-wire defence of the river line at this stage was in the hands of two Austrian brigades, those of Major-Generals Wohlgemuth, and Count Strassoldo. Wohlgemuth was responsible for the area from Mantua north to Pozzolo, supported by elements of Brigade Rath, of the same division. Strassoldo covered the area from there to Lake Garda. On April 8th, these brigades were disposed thus:

  Brigade Wohlgemuth (approximately 3,000 men):

  Goito

  West bank of the river

  22/Kaiser Jäger

  East bank

  IV/Kaiser Jäger (five companies)

  One company, Oguliner Grenz IR

  Two troops, Radetzky Hussars

  Four cannon, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 4

  Marengo

  Three and a half companies, Oguliner Grenz IR

  Two cannon, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 4

  Pozzolo

  I/Gradiscaner Grenz IR

  Foroni

  Two troops, Radetzky Hussars, as a link with Brigade Strassoldo to the north.

  Brigade Strassoldo:

  Monzambano and Borghetto, as outposts

  Two companies, 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion

  Salionze

  Four companies, 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion

  Two squadrons, Radetzky Hussars

  Three cannon, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 3

  Valeggio

  III/ IR Archduke Sigismund

  Three cannon, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 3

  Strassoldo’s two remaining battalions, I and II/IR Hohenlohe, transferred to him on April 3rd from Archduke Sigismund’s brigade, as part of the army reorganisation, were in Verona.

  The Bridge at Goito

  That blustery wet evening, Bava had his troops bivouacked in a semicircle around Goito, without any rations.4 Bes, with some 4,000 men was about 11 kilometres to the northwest, 2nd Division, 8,500 men, six and a half kilometres to the west, and 1st Division, some 9,000 men, almost 10 kilometres to the south west.

  At 07:00, next morning, 1st Division began the march towards Goito. In place there, Wohlgemuth’s two battalions and two troops of hussars, totalled perhaps 1,200 men, with four guns. That morning, preparations were being made to blow up the bridge. West of the river, in the village itself, was 22/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Knezich, who was also the interim battalion commander, covering this work.

  The Regina Brigade, along with divisional troops were in the van of the column. In support, Bava had a further 5,000 men, the Aosta Brigade and the Genoa and Nizza Cavalry Regiments.

  The weather began to clear, and around 08:00 the Piedmontese columns approached the rim of the heights above the town. The Advance Guard, 1/Bersaglieri (149), Captain Muscas, the weak Naval Infantry Battalion (301), Major Maccarani, the Mantua Volunteers, Captain Griffini (180), a troop of 25 Aosta Cavalry, Lieutenant Franchelli, and a company of engineers (138), Captain Ferrero, immediately moved to the attack, and skirmishing with Knezich’s outposts began. The Royal Army was in action for the first time in 33 years.

  The jäger sentinels were rapidly swept from the heights overlooking Goito, and pushed back into the village. As the Piedmontese infantry columns came along the road, the Austrian artillery on the east bank of the river opened fire upon them, causing Bava to deploy two battalions of the 9th Infantry in line on either side of the road, keeping the other four battalions of the Regina Brigade in column in the second echelon. The Naval Infantry Battalion was pushed forward in column, along the road, screened by Captain Muscas’ Bersaglieri, the latter’s founder, Colonel Alessandro La Marmora advan
cing with the company.

  The attackers broke through the locked and barricaded village gate, and moved on. As the Bersaglieri pushed into the village, Colonel La Marmora fell with a serious bullet wound, which smashed his jaw, the round exiting behind his ear – he would be out of action until late July. A section of the 6th Field Artillery Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Colli was placed to enfilade the Austrian guns across the river. Another section, of the 8th Battery, Second-Lieutenant Ricca, proceeded to batter the buildings occupied by enemy troops. At the same time, attempts by the Piedmontese to approach the bridge were prevented by heavy fire.

  About 09:00, Wohlgemuth was made aware, by Captain Baron Pirquet, of the growing danger that all of the troops still west of the river could be cut off and captured, and he received permission to cross the bridge, and withdraw as many men as possible, before the bridge was blown up. This, Pirquet gallantly did, and as soon as the men had crossed, the bridge charges were blown. However, some of the powder had been wet, and the bridge, though damaged, was not destroyed.

  The defenders made attempts to do further damage to the structure, but were fired upon by the Griffini Volunteer Company, as well as 2nd Grenadier Company/5th Infantry Regiment, Captain Paul, who had also worked their way forward. These, in addition to the artillery fire from the Piedmontese batteries (a total of 14 guns engaged) effectively stopped any further demolition of the bridge.

  For the next three hours, artillery and small arms fire was exchanged across the river, one gun on each side being dismounted. During the duel, Captain Knezich, firing from the balcony of an Inn named The Giraffe, was mortally wounded by a bersagliere5. Finally, Wohlgemuth withdrew, initially to Marengo, and finally to Mozzecane for the night. By the evening, the Piedmontese had repaired the bridge, and were moving across it.

  Losses were as follows:

  Austrian

  Kaiser Jäger – Two officers and 17 men killed, two officers and 13 men wounded, and 68 men taken prisoner

  Artillery – One officer and ten men wounded

  Oguliner Grenz IR – 11 men wounded

  Radetzky Hussars – 1 man wounded

  Total: 125, plus 20 horses killed

  Piedmontese

  5th Infantry Regiment – Two men wounded

  9th Infantry Regiment – Nine men wounded

  The Bridge at Goito (unknown artist)

  10th Infantry Regiment – Two men killed, one officer and seven men wounded

  Naval Infantry Battalion – One officer and one man killed, two officers and ten men wounded

  1st Besaglieri Company, One officer and one man killed, two officers and six men wounded

  Total: 48

  It had been a spirited action, and a tonic for the Royal Army in general. I Corps had made its mark. The following morning, II Corps, in its turn, prepared to force the river further north.

  Monzambano

  The town of Monzambano stands on the west bank of the Mincio, about five and a half kilometres below Peschiera. On April 9th, the 2nd Infantry Regiment, II and III/16th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Position Battery, and the Novara Cavalry Regiment moved against the bridge and town around 17:00. The Austrian rearguard, after an exchange of fire between their two 6 pounders and the eight Piedmontese 16 pounder cannon directed by Major Filippa, withdrew to the heights to the east, and then retreated. The Piedmontese lost one man killed, and one officer and two men wounded.

  Valeggio

  Valeggio stands on the east bank of the river, opposite the village of Borghetto. Around 14:00, on the 10th, I and II/2nd Infantry Regiment, led by the regimental commander, Colonel Mollard, and supported by four guns of the 1st Position Battery, Captain Avogadro, advanced from Borghetto against the village. The bridge there, which had been broken by the Austrian rearguard, was hastily patched up with some planks.

  The Austrian troops, four companies of III/IR Sigismund, and two guns, had withdrawn to the heights east of the village, near the ruined Valeggio Castle. Observing the enemy work on the bridge, Oberfeuerwerker Schramm, commanding the two guns now there, engaged both the enemy artillery and fired upon the bridge. A hit was scored on the bridge as the first Piedmontese infantry were crossing, breaking it once again, and trapping three men on the wrong side. Schramm’s continued efforts caused Colonel Mollard to pull his troops back behind Borghetto for the night, enabling the Austrians to retire.

  The three men stranded on the east bank, Lieutenant Pelissier, Sergeant Blanc, and Grenadier Gerdil, hid in a house in the village until nightfall, when they acquired a boat, and were able to cross back over the river and rejoin their unit. The following morning, the bridge was repaired, and Valeggio occupied. Further south, at Pozzolo, north of Marengo, a few shots were exchanged as some Austrian vedettes withdrew.

  Radetzky’s concentration completed

  On the night of the 10th, in accordance with previously issued instructions, the two brigades of Strassoldo and Wohlgemuth withdrew unmolested to Verona, through Sommacampagna, while the rest of I Corps did so via Villafranca. By daybreak on the 11th, the entire Corps was within the Rideau, a total of some 32,000 men now being there. For the Marshal, his nagging concern as to the situation in Mantua was greatly relieved by a message sent that night by Count Gorczkowski, reporting on the Conference of his senior officers which he had called, finding the state of the defences now adequate, and including the following personal message:

  Because I consider the fate of the Fortress of Mantua and my military honour as inseparably interwoven, I must declare to Your Excellency with the frankness of a soldier, and of a man who considers duty and honour as paramount up to the very end of his career, that the moment I will have to abandon Mantua, will be the moment at which I would have to ask His Majesty to be relieved of my position.6

  The Marshal now knew that, at least for the immediate future, Mantua was safe. It was time for him to look to the defences of Verona, and to await news from the east. The Piedmontese, however, unaware of Gorczkowski’s confidence, still had their eyes on both cities. General Bava’s plans had been fulfilled. The army had crossed the Mincio with trifling loss, and was free to operate within the Quadrilateral. Ironically, the bulk of it would remain there for three months.

  MANTUA

  Following on from Carlo Alberto’s Council of War held on April 4th, in addition to operations further north, probes in the direction of Mantua were to be made. The first of these led to what were actually the first shots of the campaign being exchanged between the Imperial and Piedmontese armies. Of no importance other than for those present, it took place at the town of Marcaria, some 20 kilometres west of the city.

  Marcaria – First Shots of the Campaign

  As the Piedmontese approached Mantua, their Advance Guard, on the evening of April 5th, had reached Marcaria. Reports of their having crossed the River Oglio caused a reconnaissance to be made by the Austrians, under the command of Colonel Benedek.

  That evening, I/5th Infantry, 1/Bersaglieri, and Battery bivouacked at Marcaria, with outposts of one troop and a platoon of 3rd Squadron, Genoa Cavalry, 400 metres further along the Mantua Road, commanded by Lieutenant Cavaliere Morelli.

  At 20:30, Colonel Benedek led his force from Fort Belfiore towards Marcaria, some 20 kilometres to the west of Mantua. It comprised I/IR Gyulai, 11/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Streicher, one troop of the Kaiser Uhlans, and two guns. Leaving one company at Montanara to guard his left flank, he pushed on. To cover his withdrawal, Benedek also left a half-company at the bridge across the Orone at Castelluchio, and another at the Tartaro, near Marcaria.

  At 04:00 on the 6th, the advance developed Piedmontese pickets a little under a kilometre east of Marcaria. These were surprised, and in a short skirmish, 12 men of the Genoa Cavalry Regiment were captured by the uhlans, together with their horses. The Piedmontese had three other men killed, and one wounded. Austrian casualties totalled three; Oberlieutenant Regensburger, and two men of the Kaiser Jäger wounded. Benedek immediately began his withdraw
al. A follow up move, personally ordered by a furious General Bava, was unable to make contact with him, and his force returned to Mantua, with the prisoners, at 12:00. Lieutenant Morelli’s commanding officer later wrote that had the 12 lost men had their horses bridled, they, too, would have escaped.7

  Reconnaissance against Mantua of April 18th and 19th

  With his army safely across the Mincio, operations having begun against Peschiera, and Radetzky pulling back into Verona, Carlo Alberto decided upon a major reconnaissance against Mantua, always his favoured objective. Overnight on April 18th, a column commanded by Major-General Olivieri, comprising III/11th Infantry Regiment, the Nizza and Aosta Cavalry Regiments, and ½ of the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, moved towards Montanara and Curtatone to drive in the Austrian outposts in the area.

  The next morning, three infantry brigades, under the command of General Bava, moved towards the fortress of Mantua. Major-General Sommariva, with his Aosta Brigade, with ½ 6th Field Artillery Battery, 2/Bersaglieri, and the Genoa Volunteers advanced from Sacca in the direction of the Le Grazie Monastery (see Map 14, Curtatone-Montanara), and on Rivalta, north of that place, on the Goito Road, and then towards Curtatone and Mantua. General Ferrere, with the remaining five battalions of his Casale Brigade, the Griffini Volunteer Company, and the other four guns of 6th Field Artillery Battery, left Piuberga, occupied Ospedaletto, further west on the main road between Mantua and Cremona, joined by Olivieri, followed on. Finally, the Cuneo Brigade with 2nd Position Battery, remained in reserve at Castelluchio, west of the Monastery.

  As Sommariva’s column approached, they encountered no resistance until they approached the lunette known as Fort Pietole (as the Austrian pickets were withdrawn into the fort in the hours of daylight), and were met by canister fire. At the same time, two companies of IR Gyulai and three guns of Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 1, Oberlieutenant Sattler, moved forward to engage. A house in the hamlet of Gli Angeli was stormed by the Austrian infantry, and one Piedmontese piece dismounted by Sattler’s guns, before the skirmish spluttered out around 13:30. IR Gyulai had two men killed, and eight wounded. Sommariva had three bersaglieri and one man of the Aosta Brigade wounded.8