Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  Because of the delays to the main column, Lieutenant Prola’s Bersaglieri company, accompanied by the 45 Parmesan volunteers pulled ahead of their supports, and were the first to engage, near the hamlet of Osteria Nuova. Facing Prola was an intimidating sight. On his left, was M. Bionde (181 metres high), ahead, the road to Pastrengo, and to his right, a large hill, M. San Martino, itself dominated by two high points upon it (Cima della Croce, 256 m., and del telegrafo, 262 m). Immediately engaged by the forward posts of IV/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Count Castiglione, which occupied M. San Martino, Prola was halted, and, heavily outnumbered, forced to pull back.

  In the meanwhile, Colonel Boyl had been fully occupied in unravelling his columns, and moving them forward. Three companies of I/1st Infantry Regiment, Major De Saxel arrived, and deployed in support of the Bersaglieri and Parmesans, renewing the action. Other companies went forward as they came up. Artillery was another matter, and not until around 13:00 would any guns appear.

  In the centre, the Duke of Savoy’s troops headed straight for the heights of M. Brocchi amd M. Bionde, with the Duke himself at their head. The muddy banks of the River Tione caused problems with the deployment of the leading regiment, the 7th Infantry, Colonel Callagiana, and the sharpshooters of the Gradiscaner Grenzer on the heights were able to add to the disorder.

  On the left, preceded by 3/Bersaglieri, Captain Cassinis, and 400 men drawn from Colonel Caselli’s 4th Infantry Regiment, the Cuneo and Piedmont Brigades advanced, in their turn. General Bes, a great believer in strong skirmish lines, reinforced Cassinis with these extra men, just as he had two days earlier. Bes had wished to extend his Piedmont Brigade’s flank further to the left, but General Federici considered this would in fact overextend the brigade, and at this stage, would not allow it.

  The Attack

  The situation at approximately 13:30, as the attack gained momentum, was as follows:

  On the Piedmontese right, Colonel Boyl’s 1st Infantry Regiment was forming for an attack on M. San Martino, being joined by 6/1st Guard Grenadiers, Captain Piossasco, 7/1st Guard Grenadiers, Captain San Vitale, and several sections of 1/1st, who appear to have simply followed along. The rest of the regiment was later sucked into the fighting, although supposed to remain near Bussolengo. Colonel Mollard’s 2nd Infantry Regiment, and Colonel Dapassano’s 2nd Guard Regiment were preparing to support these moves.

  In the centre, the Cuneo Brigade, accompanied by a section of 7th Field Artillery Battery, had crossed the Tione, and was climbing the heights of M. Le Brocche, in order to attack M. Bionde, and then Pastrengo. Behind them, two sections of the 2nd Position Battery, instructed by Major Alfonso La Marmora, gave fire support. The Composite Brigade maintained contact between the Cuneo Brigade and the Piedmont Brigade on the left.

  Carlo Alberto and his Staff at Pastrengo, April 30th 1848 (contemporary lithograph)

  On the left, the Piedmont Brigade had deployed on hills west of Piovezzano, from where Captain Lurago’s 1st Field Artillery Battery had begun fire on enemy positions. In reserve, the Regina Brigade was near Sandrà, with three squadrons of the Royal Piedmont Cavalry nearby. The remaining cavalry and the horse battery were between S. Giustina and Colombara. As the columns moved forward, fire became more general.

  Carlo Alberto and his retinue, including members of the Provisional Government of Milan, escorted by three Carabinieri squadrons, were much in evidence, and usually near the front line. At one point, a celebrated incident occurred, as the Royal Party moved up a slope, the preceding Carabinieri outriders were fired upon by a group of Austrian skirmishers. Major Sanfront, perceiving danger to the King, ordered a charge by the escort, and the skirmish was joined by a Cacciatori platoon of the 8th Infantry Regiment, and Carlo Alberto himself. In later years, the incident grew in stature to become a great charge.21

  The main worry for FML Wocher was his vulnerable right flank, also his only possible escape route. As the engagement became joined all along the line, a courier, Oberlieutenant Tallián of the Radetzky Hussars, reported to him that the division’s right flank was being turned. He feared that Federici’s force was actually heading for the bridge at Sega, although he could not know that, at this point, Federici had forbidden General Bes permission to extend to the left. Nevertheless, he was still in danger of being crushed by a much larger force. Three companies of the reserve, IR Piret, were advanced to the hamlet of Corsale, on the heights immediately north of Barracucca, to beef up the right wing. A withdrawal across the Adige was ordered.

  21/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Baron Pirquet, was designated the rearguard south of Pastrengo. He immediately placed his company in Osteria Nuova. Pirquet proved more than a nuisance, and drew the attention of much of the Piedmontese right wing. Subsequently, largely surrounded, he was summoned to surrender in several languages. Declining this, he somehow broke out of the encirclement, and was able to escape through the rough terrain with most of his command. This stand undoubtedly allowed other units to withdraw safely. Constant small firefights took place between rear and advance guards as they did so.

  As the Cuneo Brigade ascended the steep Monte Bionde, the Gradiscaners fell back before them, as did the Oguliners nearest the Adige, pulling back through Pastrengo. The latter battalion, during its withdrawal from the town, was fired upon by two sections of the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, brought forward by Lieutenant Bottacco, and attacked by the battery’s escort, 3/ Royal Piedmont Cavalry, Captain di Sigala, pressing the withdrawal over the rough terrain. Several intrepid troopers attempted to take the battalion’s standard, but were unable to do so. During this encounter, Second-Lieutenant Bevilacqua, who had joined the squadron three hours earlier, was killed.

  With the Austrians in full retreat, the action became a question of reaching the bridge at Sega. All of the major Imperial units were able to do this, with one exception. The three companies of IR Piret which had been moved forward to strengthen the right wing never received any orders to withdraw. Attacked by large numbers, and with all escape routes blocked, they were forced to surrender

  Colonel Count Zobel, who had marched from Rivoli with six companies to support Wocher, was just lucky enough to reach the west bank with his main force before the bridge was dismantled by Captain Grünbühl’s engineers, at around 17:30. His remaining company, arriving late, was brought across by boat, on Grünbühl’s authority, as subsequently were five hussars who appeared on the river bank. Wocher’s division had been given a rough time, but it had survived. He posted his troops along the east bank to observe enemy movements. The losses in this day’s fighting were as follows:

  Austrian:

  The Austrian loss for the three days of Pastrengo was considerably higher than that of their opponents. Hilleprandt gives the totals as one officer and 24 men killed, two officers and 145 men wounded, with five officers and 378 men taken prisoner. This does not include the losses specified above, on the 29th. The reason for this appears to be that Hilleprandt’s figures only represent the loss within Wocher’s division, and therefore, the additional numbers must be added in. The total number of casualties, including the other minor associated skirmishes, is probably somewhere between 620-650. 22

  Piedmontese:

  Piedmontese casualties for the three days operations are given by Fabris as 15 killed and 90 wounded. Of these, he puts nine killed and 50 wounded as the loss for the third day. Since General Bes gives the loss on the 28th to be three or four dead, and 27 wounded (Colonel Wehrlin states that his regiment lost more than this, three killed and 38 wounded), and III/1st Regiment had three killed and 21 wounded on the 29th, that total is already exceeded. For the three days, once again including the related skirmishes, the loss is likely to be around 150 men.

  The operations of the previous three days had concluded the operations necessary for the Investment of Peschiera to follow. The next major move was already on Carlo Alberto’s mind, and would follow very quickly.

  Minor Operations around Mantua – Early to Mid-May


  (see map on page 142)

  The Tuscan Division joins the Piedmontese Army

  As related, the Tuscan Division had formed in early April, and its services offered to Carlo Alberto. The King having decided to employ the Tuscans in the area west of Mantua, on the west bank of the Mincio. The division arrived in the designated area on April 24th, and immediately began its deployment, with roughly equal contingents at Curtatone, on the south shore of Lake Superiore, and at Montanara, to the south. The remainder of the units were placed further to the west, with Headquarters at the monastery of Le Grazie (see map). In the event of a serious attack from Mantua, these positions were vulnerable, as General Bava informed the Chief of Staff on April 29th.

  Now in place, the units settled into an intensive regime of training and drill. Of course, this applied more particularly to the Volunteer and Civic Guard units, and which many did not like. The Civic Guards, in particular, with a high percentage of men from the upper echelons of society, believed that things should be done by consensus, and both they and the volunteers strongly disliked the general. D’Arco Ferrari was replaced in command by General Cesare de Laugier

  Austrian Reconnaissances against Curtatone-Montanara of May 4th-10th

  During May 2nd and 3rd, a bickering fire took place between the outposts of both sides, west of Mantua.23 As a result, it was decided to mount a major reconnaissance from the fortress to probe the enemy forces. On the morning of May 4th, at approximately 10:00, three columns emerged from Mantua to examine the positions of this new enemy. The right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Count Kielmansegge, one company of Szluiner Grenzer, two companies of IR Gyulai, two troops of Baiern Dragoons, and three guns made for Curtatone, along the main road from Mantua. The centre, led by Colonel Count Salis, with one Szluiner company, four companies of IR Franz d’Este, one squadron, Baiern Dragoons, four rocket tubes, and two guns pushed towards Montanara. Finally, on the left, Lieutenant-Colonel Freysauff led four companies of his own IR Paumgarten and two guns towards San Silvestro, south of Montanara. In reserve, were two companies of IR Ferdinand D’Este, and a squadron of uhlans, held near Fort Belfiore. The advances were made concurrently.

  The right and middle columns moved forward to within artillery range of Curtatone and Montanara respectively, exchanging fire with the Tuscan/Neapolitan outposts, Salis’ troops taking a sergeant of the Leghorn Civic Guard prisoner. On the left, Freysauff reached San Silvestro, driving back a Neapolitan picket, capturing one man of the 10th Neapolitan Line Regiment. Having gleaned information as to the units present and the existence of enemy artillery, at about 14:00, the expedition withdrew to Mantua, having suffered five casualties, all wounded. The Italians had one officer and three men wounded, and the two men taken prisoner.

  On the night of May 8/9th, the entire Tuscan division was ordered to Le Grazie, to form a and march to Goito. The next day, however, these orders were countermanded by General Franzini, and the division returned, the last units leaving Goito at around 16:30 that day. In the meanwhile, early on the 10th, Austrian patrols from IR Gyulai had found the Tuscan camp to be abandoned. The Gyulai company, following up, encountered the first returning Italian column, the Fortini Civic Guard Battalion, and II/10th Neapolitan Infantry Regiment,20 mounted Cacciatori, and two guns. In the skirmish that followed, three Austrians were wounded. Italian losses were nine wounded, Major Ferdinando Landucci mortally. The division re-occupied its former positions.

  Reconnaissance against Curtatone-Montanara, May 13th

  Once again, on the 13th, Gorczkowski sent a reconnaissance in force, in three columns, against Curtatone, Montanara, and San Silvestro. The first, commanded by Colonel Benedek, consisted of Benedek’s own I/IR Gyulai, 4 and 7/Szluiner Grenzer, four guns of 1st Foot Artillery Battery, four rocket tubes, and a pioneer detachment of IR Franz d’Este, and was directed upon Curtatone. The middle column of Colonel Castellitz, advancing on Montanara, was composed of one battalion IR Franz d’Este, one Szluiner company, one troop, Baiern Dragoons, and two horse artillery guns. On the left flank, Colonel Döll, with one battalion IR Paumgarten and a troop of dragoons made for San Silvestro.

  Benedek advanced at about 13:30, the Szluiner rapidly pushing forward, the Tuscan pickets falling back before them, losing some prisoners, while Bendek formed I/IR Gyulai into an attack column immediately south of the main road. The two guns unlimbered on the road, 900 paces from the Tuscan fieldworks. The two cannon there, commanded by Lieutenant Mossell, put up a spirited fire, and after firing only 11 rounds, with the battery commander and an NCO wounded, the Austrian guns were forced to withdraw. The rockets also proved ineffective, and faced with small-arms and canister fire, Benedek pulled back.

  The other two columns also met considerable resistance, and although Colonel Döll, on the Austrian left, was able to make some progress, a countermove led personally by General de Laugier forced him back. As Hilleprandt states, Montanara was found to be strongly fortified, and heavily occupied. At approximately 18:00, Gorczkowski ordered a withdrawal to the fortress. This was unhindered by the defenders. Austrian losses were nine men killed, and two officers and 28 men wounded. De Laugier lost 35 wounded and 20 prisoners.

  It was clear to Gorczkowski that enemy forces were now well established west of Mantua, as they already were to the west of Verona. Which city Carlo Alberto would attack, however, was something which he and Radetzky could only guess at.

  _______________________

  1

  One is forced to wonder how, if the bulk of the army was no longer present.

  2

  For this conference, see Baldini, pp. 54-55, Fabris, P. 282-283, and Berkeley, Vol III, pp. 117-119.

  3

  While these continued, the first contact between the Austrian and Piedmontese armies occurred west of Mantua, on the 6th – see section on Mantua below.

  4

  Note the discussion above on the army’s commissariat.

  5

  Pinelli, p. 255, says that Knezich acted, ‘…more like a soldier than an officer…’. Two nephews of the Tirolean patriot Andreas Hofer were among the dead.

  6

  Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, pp. 240-244.

  7

  Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, pp. 78-80, Strack, pp. 74-75, Pinelli, p. 250, and Relazioni e Rapporti 1848, Vol. II, pp. 501-502. Presland places the contact one hour earlier, and states that one of Streicher’s jäger fired a shot too early, spoiling a complete surprise, Vae Victis, p. 72.

  8

  Fabris, Part II, pp. 161-165, Grüll, pp. 155-156, Staeger von Wadlburg, Ereignisse, pp. 33-35, and Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 1, pp. 117-118. The latter states that the Austrians loss totalled eight wounded.

  9

  Grüll, pp.132-134, Pinelli, pp. 301-302, and Bortolotti, pp. 78-79. The latter states that Zambeccari’s forced had been reinforced by 200 more volunteers.

  10

  See Appendix IV.

  11

  Fabris, Vol. II, pp. 279-282, Grüll, pp. 158-159, Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, Vol. II, 1865, pp. 252-253, Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 1, pp. 121-122, Pinelli, pp. 304-305, and Staeger von Waldburg, pp. 36-37. The composition and deployment of the K.K. force varies somewhat – that shown appears the most consistent. The loss on both sides, too, varies.

  12

  Hilleprandt ‘1848’, Vol. I 1865, p. 263, Relazioni e rapporti, Vol II, p. 63, and Pinelli, pp. 307-308.

  13

  Described by Schneidawind (and others) as, “Three hours beyond Verona…”, p. 275.

  14

  Relazioni e Rapporti, Vol II, pp. 111-112. Oddly, Fabris, Vol. II, p 178, reverses the regiments’ objectives. Though Bes clearly had private information, most senior Piedmontese commanders were surprised by the action that took place.

  15

  Ibid, and pp. 140-141, Fabris, Vol II., pp. 178-181, and Schneidawind, pp. 275-276.

  16

  According to Lieutenant Ferrero’s diary, Captain Nagel was killed by a cacciatore aft
er he had beaten a wounded man to death, and he himself saw Nagel’s body. Austrian accounts say that Nagel was seen to be hit by several rounds. See Ferrero, pp. 34-35, and Strack, p. 109.

  17

  27 of the missing from IR Haugwitz deserted. Pinelli, p. 105. Piedmontese loss from Fabris II, p. 185, and Austrian, Grüll, p. 167.

  18

  These figures are from Troubetzkoi, Plan III. He gives a low figure for the artillery which perhaps should be doubled. Hilleprandt gives a round total of 7,000. Deployment from 1848, Vol. I, 1865, pp. 267-268.

  19

  Piedmontese accounts agree on 11:00; both Hilleprandt, and Kriegsbegebenheiten, say 10:00, and Grüll, p. 169, states 09:00. Schneidawind, p. 278, is possibly correct in stating that firing began around 11:00.

  20

  Fabris, Vol II, pp. 186-187. Troubetzkoi states a total of 14,712, Plan III.

  21

  Fabris,Vol. II, p. 197. He concludes that this happened on M. Bionde.

  22

  Prybila, Infanterie-Regiments Leopold II, König der Belgier…, specifies the Wocher Division’s loss as 555 officers and men, p. 645.

  23

  De Laugier, Le milizie toscane, p. 8, states that the Austrians had one dead and two wounded, without loss to his troops.