A part of the main army passed Peschiera on April 1st, withdrawing towards Verona. Radetzky and his staff spent some 15 minutes conferring with Rath, before moving on. The garrison was allocated one hundred head of oxen, two hundred sacks of rice, and 1,600 sacks of meal. On the 4th, the remainder of the main force passed by, also moving in the direction of Verona.
The next day, the rest of Rath’s allotted garrison marched in, the other four companies of I/Ottocaner Grenz Regiment, under the command of Major Ettinghausen, along with a troop of the Radetzky Hussars, and three officers and 88 men of the field artillery. Rath now had eight companies of infantry, the Ottochaner battalion, and two companies of the Szluiner. Other troops, apart from the garrison artillery, were withdrawn. The garrison now numbered around 1,700.1 There was, once again, nothing for him to do but wait.
Siege of Peschiera, May 1848
Carlo Alberto had decided, on April 4th, that operations against the fortress should commence as soon as practicable. It transpired that one of the few joint efforts between the Volunteer and Regular forces was to be made in that area. Overnight on the April 9th, General Bes received orders from the Army Chief of Staff.2 Count Salasco required that he, “…close up on the fortress, and to make a number of demonstrations against it.” The same day, a large force of volunteers, under the orders of General Allemandi, was to land at Bardolino and Lazise in order to conduct a raid on the eastern shores of Lake Garda, and the River Mincio.3
On the morning of the 10th, as the volunteers and Piedmontese moved to take up their positions around the fortress, at about 07:00, a Piedmontese officer, Lieutenant Govone, appeared at the fortresses Brescia Gate, with a summons to surrender, in order to prevent useless bloodshed. Govone pointed out that the Piedmontese held both banks of the river. FML Rath politely sent him on his way.
The Fortress of Peschiera (contemporary lithograph)
During the early afternoon, the encircling forces made their appearance on either side of the Mincio, halting approximately one kilometre from the defences. A heavy fire was opened against them, although the range was too great to have any effect. On the east bank of the river, though, one of the volunteer units, the Vicari-Simonetta Column, composed of a captain, a lieutenant, three NCOs, and about 50 men, eagerly moved forward, and engaged Fort Salvi with small-arms fire for a time. Fortunately, they incurred no loss.
The Austrian fire was gradually ceased, but not before, at around 18:00, Bes formed his infantry up, presented arms to the defenders, and shouted for cheers for Carlo Alberto and Italy. This ended the day’s proceedings, with the later comment by the Colonel of the 14th Infantry Regiment that it was a ‘…ridiculous demonstration…’
First Bombardment
Subsequently, work began on emplacing guns, with which to bombard the fortress. At this stage, only field guns were available, and the hoped for effect must have been for more moral than physical damage.
The batteries were positioned on the west bank of the Mincio, from north to south as follows (see map):
Zanetta – Four howitzers, of the 2nd Battery, Lieutenant Della Valle
Serraglio – Four howitzers of the 5th Battery, Lieutenant Velasco
Baduara – Two guns 1st Position Battery, Lieutenant Ugo
Montesini – Four guns 1st Position Battery, Lieutenant, cavaliere Avogadro
The guns of the Montesini Battery were provided with 80 rounds of ammunition each, and those of the other three batteries with 40 rounds apiece. The bombardment was set for April 13th.
That morning, both the King and the Duke of Savoy were present to observe, in the somewhat fairytale hope that the coming attack would cause the surrender of the place. Under the direction of Major Alfonso La Marmora, the bombardment began at 11:00, lasting for 5 hours, and was only halted when the batteries began to run low on ammunition. A total of 360 round shot and 240 shells were fired. The defending batteries initially answered the shelling vigorously, but had been silenced by about 16:00. In Fort Salvi, two pieces had been dismounted, and one man wounded. Piedmontese casualties numbered three wounded. Bes subsequently sent General Staff Major La Flêche to summon the fort’s surrender, but Rath refused for the second time.4 It was clear that a much more formal operation involving heavy guns would be required.
The decision to take matters further was made on April 24th. At yet another Council of War, the issue of resources as relevant to priorities was again discussed. In regard to Peschiera, the King decided that a siege would be undertaken.5
Sortie of April 30th
On the 30th, hearing the sound of artillery fire from the east, from what was the action at Pastrengo, Rath ordered a sortie in support. Around noon, the fortress opened a heavy fire, to cover the movement of two companies of Ottochaner under Captain Wimmer against the battery at Casa Ricchione. Covering Wimmer’s left was a platoon of Szluiner, commanded by Lieutenant Seravicsa, and his right by Oberlieutenant Saladin with some hussars.
Unfortunately for Wimmer, Saladin’s men were seen by Piedmontese vedettes, Wimmer rapidly became engaged with 2/Cacciatori, 14th Infantry Regiment, Captain Cerale. Cerale was soon joined by a platoon of 1/Cacciatori, and another of 2/Grenadier, as well as a squadron of Piedmont Royal Cavalry. After a 45 minute engagement, Wimmer was unceremoniously pushed back into the fortress. He had lost nine men left on the field, and 22 wounded, of whom an extraordinary 14 later died. The Piedmontese took five prisoners. Cerale lost one man killed, with another eight wounded. The other units had five more wounded amongst them. 6
The Siege of Peschiera
At the beginning of May, the Duke of Genoa was appointed to command the formal siege operations. General Rossi commanded the artillery, and 39 year old Major Giovanni Cavalli, the engineer operations. The Artillery Park was efficiently managed by Colonel Actis, and Captain Ricaldone was in charge of the transportation of all materials, a truly thankless task.
Whilst awaiting the arrival of the heavy artillery, Prince Ferdinando conducted two reconnaissances of the fortress, together with Generals Rossi and Chioda, and Major La Marmora. The first took place on April 27th, from the heights on the west bank of the river, and the second, on May 4th, from the area of Cavalcaselle on the east bank. These raised doubts in their minds as to the wisdom of laying siege to the fortress, rather than simply masking it. That decision, however, had already been made.
Prince Ferdinando of Savoy, Duke of Genoa (contemporary lithograph)
This being the case, it was agreed that the major effort would be made from the north-east, opening a breach near the Verona Gate. The main advantage of this approach was that it meant operating directly against the main fortress, without first reducing the outworks. While these could not, of course, be ignored, such an operation would require only one breach, and one assault. In the circumstances, it was the most sensible option.
For a trench to be opened, the guns in the Mandella had first to be silenced. Equally, however, it was important that the Austrians not be made aware of the area where the main effort was to be undertaken. Therefore, the emplaced field artillery batteries would be used on the west bank, to bombard Fort Salvi. Ammunition for the heavy guns was in short supply, and so it was crucial that these be used for the main effort on the east bank.
Assembly and Movement of the Siege Train
Originally, the Piedmontese siege train was to have consisted of 25 pieces of ordnance. However, orders were given to increase this to 45 pieces. It was to be divided into two columns, which would move separately, with an eight day interval between them
Major Cavalli compiled the list of the 45 guns which were required to leave the fortress of Alessandria, with their ammunition, and be assembled in Cremona, having passed the River Po. Major Seyssel, in Cremona with the vehicles he had assembled, would then have them moved to the Mincio. The two columns thus formed were composed of the following ordnance and munitions:7
1st Column
2nd Column
Totals
Ord
nance
32 pounder metal cannon
9
1
10
32 pounder bronze cannon
3
3
6
24 pounder metal cannon
-
12
12
22 pound metal howitzers
4
4
8
27 pound bronze mortars
4
2
6
22 pound bronze mortars
-
3
3
Ammunition
32 pound shot (12 kg.)
3,600
1,200
4,800
24 pound shot (9 kg.)
3,600
3,600
22 pound grenades (24 kg.)
1,200
1,200
2,400
27 pound bombs (52 kg.)
800
800
1,600
22 pound bombs ( – )
-
900
900
32 pound canister (16 kg.)
120
40
160
24 pound canister ( – )
-
144
144
Powder
Kilos
27,000
27,000
54,000
The siege train only reached Cavalcaselle on May 13th. Work on the emplacements had recently begun. On the east bank of the Mincio, four batteries were to be constructed, and armed with siege guns. These were:
Preliminary work began on the first four batteries – those on the east bank – overnight on the 11th/12th, under the direction of Major Cavalli. Engineers opened the access to the positions, masked the more exposed areas, and prepared them to resist sorties. Work continued during the next few days. Although fire from the fortress against the works took place on the afternoon of the 13th, the morning of the 14th, and the whole of the following night, it had very little effect on its progress.
The weather, on the other hand, was a completely different matter. It rained for the whole of both the 16th and 17th, making it impossible to arm the batteries. Troops from both the Cuneo and Pinerolo Brigades were used, together with the engineers and pontoniers, to help move materials, vehicles, and munitions through the mud. The artillery park was placed at Pozzolengo, and a munitions depot set up in a church there, much to the annoyance of the local priest. Lieutenant Ferrero visited the siege works on the 17th, later writing, “Despite the rain of the last few days, the siege batteries are in place; tomorrow they will open fire.”8 Finally, by the morning of the 18th, the batteries were armed and provisioned, though it was very muddy, and visibility poor.
The Bombardment
At 14:00, under the gaze of the King and his staff, on a signal given by the Duke of Genoa, the first shot was fired from Battery Nr. 3. Serving the guns was difficult in the mud, and visibility remained poor. Indeed, it was worsened by the cannon smoke which would not dissipate. Conditions were such that the shelling ceased after only three hours. The Montesini Battery had two men killed, along with one infantryman of 14th Regiment.
It took until 07:00 on the 21st, before conditions improved, and allowed the resumption of the bombardment. The silencing of the Mandella remained the first priority. On the 22nd, a great explosion shook the work, the besiegers gleefully choosing to believe that a powder magazine had been hit. In fact, it was a small pile of shells, but even so, three artillerymen, and nine Ottochaner were burned in the explosion. Nevertheless, return fire from the work grew weaker, and eventually ceased, as it was abandoned by the defenders.
In a daring move on the night of the 24th, Lieutenant Bessone actually entered Fort Salvi with his platoon. They then moved as far the fortresses Brescia Gate. Upon his return, Bressone was able to report that Salvi, too, was abandoned. Furthermore, reports from deserters confirmed that the garrison was chronically short of food. In fact, the supply of meat ran out that same day.
The bombardment continued for the next two days. With the Mandella abandoned, it was now possible to move the batteries themselves forward in the area between Bastion Nr. 1 and the Verona Gate. There was now some urgency at Piedmontese Headquarters, since Count Thurn’s force from Venetia was now known to have reached Verona, reinforcing Radetzky with another corps. At 14:00, on May 26th, Carlo Alberto ordered the batteries to cease fire. He then sent an emissary, Major La Marmora, to Baron Rath. La Marmora was empowered to offer Rath, in exchange for the surrender of the fortress, free passage to their own lines, on condition that the garrison not serve in Italy for a period of one year. He also informed the fortress commander of all recent (bad) news. Rath’s request to send an officer to Verona, to verify this information was, of course, refused. La Marmora did, however, accept a 24 hour cease fire.
Austrian troops leaving Peschiera (Illustrated London News)
Whilst these discussions took place, two more batteries were completed, Numbers 8 and 9.
Nr. 8
Bastion Nr. 2 four 32 pounder cannon, Lieutenant Pallavicini
Nr. 9
Bastion Nr. 2 six 32 pounder cannon,
Verona Gate Lieutenant Quaglia
When the cease fire expired, Rath sent Major Ettinghausen, with a request for a further five day truce. Should no relief force appear by the end of this, Rath would accept the Honours of War. Ettinghausen was received by the Duke of Genoa, Generals Chiodo, Rossi, and Manno, and Major La Marmora. After discussion, Ettinghausen was offered a four day extension, on condition that he remain as a hostage. This, the Major refused.
At 22:00, on May 27th, hostilities were renewed. Next morning, the bombardment resumed, with infantrymen of the 14th Regiment assisting with the siege guns. In the circumstances, it was urgent for the besiegers to know the state of the Mandella, in the event of an attempted escalade. Engineer Corporal Manzini, in the pitch black, was able to calculate that any such attempt would require enough fascines for a wide hole, over three metres deep. During the following night, an attempted coup using boats failed.
In the fortress, the last food was eaten on the 29th. There was now no option other than to surrender. This news was communicated to the Duke of Savoy, who promptly went to see the King, in Valeggio. His father, however, was not there, but was fighting the advance guard of Radetzky’s army at Goito. Prince Ferdinando immediately grasped that in case of either King’s victory or defeat, he must have possession of Peschiera. Returning to his Headquarters in Cavalcaselle, he accepted, from Major Ettinghausen, Baron Rath’s surrender, on the terms earlier offered.
Newly completed Batteries Nrs. 10 and 11 had been ready to open fire on the evening of that same day. They had been armed as follows:
Nr. 10
Fort Salvi
Bastion Nr. 1 three 15 pound howitzers,
Lieutenant Ricaldone
Nr. 11
Left Lunette
Contarini Bastion
And cavalier two 16 pounder cannon, and
One 15 pound howitzer
Lieutenant Della Rovere
Austrian losses during the bombardment, exclusive of those related above, were two artillerymen, three Ottochaner, and six Szluiners killed, five artillerymen, 18 Ottochaner, and four Szluiners wounded. Eight guns had been dismounted9. The garrison evacuated the fortress the next day, June 1st, as stipulated. Formal possession was then taken by the Duke of Genoa, at the head of the 13th Infantry Regiment.
At the time of the Capitulation, the following 63 pieces of ordnance were emplaced in the fortress and its outworks10:
The fortress, never provisioned for hostilities, had withstood 34 days of blockade, and a 16 day siege. From the 18th to the 30th of May, the besieging batteries on the right had fired 2,278 rounds. The Montesini Battery discharged 335 shells and 171 mortar bombs, and the Olivi Battey, 697 rounds. The Zanetta Battery fired the remaining 1,055 projectiles. On the left 1
,200 ten inch shells, 1,200 eight inch grenades, and 600 32 pounder balls were fired at the fortress, making a grand total of 5,278 rounds. The Piedmontese siege engineers were of the opinion that the fortress could have resisted longer, but simple hunger was actually the deciding factor.11
_______________________
1
Czeike, p. 1514, gives a total of 1,663 in mid-April.
2
These orders came directly from the Chief of Staff, and were not copied to Bes’ divisional commander, Lieutenant-General Federici, as Bes was temporarily commanding a ‘Column’, composed of one of his own regiments, the 4th, of the 14th Regiment, and also the 1st Field Artillery Battery. Salasco felt that if sent through channels, they would be delivered too late. Such a comment from the Chief of Staff says a great deal about the army’s staff work.
3
Fabris, Vol. I, p. 337. Baroni, p. 44, considers that the Piedmontese involvement of the volunteers here was patronising.
4
The timings here are those given by the Piedmontese. Grüll states that the shelling lasted six hours, and that La Flêche appeared at the Brescia Gate at 17:30, p. 131.
5
Fabris, Vol. II, pp. 167-168.
6
Anon., Die Belagerung von Peschiera, p. 16, Relazioni e Rapporti, Vol II, pp. 246-247, Fantoni, La Brigata Pinerolo, pp. 10-11. The nine men ‘left on the field’ may include the prisoners.
7
These totals from Fabris, Vol. II, p, 351.
Radetzky's Marches Page 19