While the assault on the right had so far gone favourably, to the south of the road, Colonel Benedek himself, attacking with two Szluiner companies, and II/Archduke Sigismund was twice thrown back, on the second occasion, with the help of a flank attack by the Lucca and Neapolitan Civic Guards, personally ordered there by General De Laugier. The University Battalion had been sent to reinforce Colonel Campia, but this now left only the two grenadier companies to support the entire line.
Gunner Gasperi at Curtatone, reputed to have had his clothes burned off (Cenni)
While IR Paumgarten continued to push forward on the right, taking the Lakeside House, Benedek made a third assault on the lower entrenchments, supported by elements of Major-General Wohlgemuth’s brigade. This time it was successful, and the line carried. The commander of the University Battalion, Professor Montanelli, defending the Curtatone Mill, was wounded and captured. Colonel Campia was killed. As resistance waned here, at around 15:30, the fifth despatch from General Bava reached De Laugier, directing him to withdraw towards Goito, where Bava was collecting troops together. When the general gave the order to withdraw, it precipitated a general flight from Curtatone. From here, Colonel Benedek, with four Szluiner companies, and his two battalions of IR Gyulai, moved south towards Montanara, where a quite separate engagement was taking place.
Montanara
Lieutenant-Colonel Giovanetti, commanding at Montanara, had about 2,700 men there, and was lucky enough to have 1,400 regulars among them. Like his compatriot at Curtatone, he was also very weak in artillery, having only three six pounder guns, and a howitzer. Captain Ferdinando Agostini di Della Setta commanded the Tuscan artillery battery at Montanara. He described the position in a letter to his brother two days after the battle:16
At quarter past eleven, the Modenese, Araldi arrived in Montanara from Goito, bringing a Tuscan howitzer. The orders had put Araldi in charge of the Montanara position, myself of Curtatone, Mosel of the Grazie, and Niccolini of the positions between Curtatone and Goito. But, as soon as Araldi arrived, the alarm sounded, and I didn’t leave Montanara, keeping the command of the artillery. My detachment was formed with: 57 artillerymen, 14 artillerymen of the Reserve, 33 horses, 17 men of the train, three 6lbs guns, a howitzer, and four caissons. I deployed in front of the enemy’s battery, which was on the road to Mantua; Araldi and Mosel were with me. At first, I had deployed the howitzer along the Mantua Road, but I then replaced it with a gun, because the enemy had 12lbs ball, while we had only 6lbs. The guns along the road were covered by two embrasure-shaped earthworks; on both flanks, left and right, and there were earthworks covering two battalions. Four further battalions were deployed along the S. Silvestro Road, and in the fields. 17
In the town, the houses provided good defensive positions. These were rapidly loopholed, and protected by barricades. On the Tuscan right, a large square opened on to fields. Here stood a large house, Casa degli Spagnoli, and, just south of the town, the cemetery.
Earlier, Giovanetti had directed Major Beraudi, with two companies of Neapolitan and one of Florentine Civic Guards, to occupy positions around one and a half kilometres in front of the main line. He was instructed to delay the enemy advance as long as possible. Beraudi proved very successful, once the Austrian advance was sighted, at about 09:30. After a time, however, the major fell, mortally wounded, and the Austrian advance began to develop against the Tuscan right, around the cemetery and Casa degli Spagnoli.18
Captain Della Seta described the action with pardonable excess:
The trenches were immensely useful during the struggle: had they not been there, we would have suffered a hundred dead, or more, amongst them, all of us artillerymen. My brave gunners showed lion’s courage during the action; our fire was really brilliant. The troops behind the breastwork often applauded our shots; I often aimed the rounds, and they applauded me as well. We destroyed the enemy guns. The Pisa Bersaglieri worked wonders during the fighting: four Hungarian assaults were repulsed by them, and they then came out of their trenches and pursued the enemy as far as their own batteries. Their commander, Major Beraudi, wished to disable some of the enemy’s guns, but he was, unfortunately, wounded twice, in the stomach and the head, and died. I twice fired grapeshot at the Hungarians, who were a few paces from our trenches, and repulsed them
The Hungarians Della Seta described were, in fact, troops of I/Gradiscaner Grenzer, from Count Clam’s Brigade. This battalion, shaken by the repulse, were pulled back, and re-assembled. The two battalions of IR Prohaska, however, moved to the attack. I/IR Prohaska, Major Hartenberg, moved into the village, while the regiment’s commander, Colonel Reischach, led from the front. The cemetery and Casa degli Spagnoli were both taken, and held. To make matters worse, Prince Liechtenstein’s brigade was now appearing on and behind Lieutenant-Colonel Giovanetti’s right flank. With any defence now impossible, the various remaining units of his force attempted to make their way out of the envelopment. Many were captured. Della Seta, by a supreme effort, had managed to limber his howitzer to two horses, and withdraw from Montanara. He did not get far:
I took it through the enemy’s fire, crossing two ditches, but while we were crossing the third, the two horses lost their strength. At the same time, the enemy redoubled his fire against us: I tried to once again cross the ditch, but fell into it. Some Civici who had helped me were wounded. Four were killed. I came back, cut the traces of the horses, and cried,’Save himself, who can!’ I would never have said it, but the situation was terrible: of my detachment, I have today only three men of the train, three horses, and eight gunners.19
Losses in this very unequal, but nevertheless prolonged struggle, were also unequal. Austrian casualties totalled 790. Of these, eight officers and 87 men were killed, 29 officers and 488 men wounded, and 179 men missing. Of the missing, 118 were from IR Prohaska, a Carinthian regiment, and it is unlikely that many of these remained so for long.
Young Count Pimodan was in no doubt that the cost of victory had been high. He wrote,
We bought that victory no less dearly. We had to march on unsheltered ground against a scattered enemy, taking by assault every house, which had been turned into a fortress. The officers exposed themselves everywhere. The following calculation is a clear proof of this: the companies were composed of 120 men, with four officers each. The proportion between the number of soldiers wounded and killed and that of the officers should have been of one to 30. But in the Paumgarten Regiment, it was of one to nine, and, in the Prohaska Regiment of one to eight, and in the other regiments of one to 10. At the head of the above-mentioned regiments, Colonels Reisach and Benedek conquered the Montanara and Curtatone redoubts, and broke the enemy line. In the evening, I went to the hospital: it was filled with our wounded. Nine officers of a Paumgarten battalion had been collected in a room. One of them had a knee broken by a grenade, and begged to have his leg amputated; there was also Captain Count Thurn, calm and quiet, giving his last farewell to some officers near him. A bullet had pierced his stomach, while he was assaulting the Montanara redoubt; these were his last few hours. I also found there one of my new comrades, poor Shultz, who had left his family, and began his service just a few days before the battle. I approached his bed, trying to encourage him, but he didn’t need my consolation: he was laughing about his misfortune, and joking about his wound. But, three days later he was dead. As soon as I returned, I was ordered to deliver, to Generals Wratislaw and Wocher, the orders for the beginning of the march on the next day. I took a coach, but the corpses scattered along the Grazie road terrified the horses, which refused to go on. I was forced to go on foot.20
For the defeated, De Laugier’s formation was badly hurt. Of the less than 5,500 men engaged, almost 2,000 were lost, half of them captured in the debacle at Montanara. Losses were:
Curtatone – 89 killed, 249 wounded, and 99 prisoners or missing.
Montanara – 87 killed, 269 wounded, and 1,087 prisoners or missing.21
During the evening and n
ight, some 2,000 Tuscan and other troops, mostly in small groups, made their way towards Goito. They were directed to the Somenzari Palace, in the town, for the night. General De Laugier, in great pain from several broken ribs from his fall, nevertheless ensured that his men received a meal.
This terrible blow effectively obliterated the Tuscan Division. There would remain a Tuscan presence in the field, but much reduced. Many of the volunteers, disillusioned and feeling themselves sacrificed for Royal ambitions, simply went home, very bitter. Their stand had, in fact, had bought precious time for General Bava, but this was of little or no comfort to them.
Piedmontese Concentration at Goito
After a chaotic night, Bava rode into Goito at about noon on the 29th. The sound of cannon fire was audible from Curtatone, less than 15 kilometres away. Having surveyed the position, he moved on to Volta to gauge the progress of his concentration there, upon which everything now depended. At 15:00, he met Carlo Alberto who had just arrived, and they were both able to observe the satisfactory nature of the troops’ rapid approach. A courier from General De Laugier, with a request for urgent assistance found them here, but was sent back with the message to the general to pull back to Goito.
By that evening, Carlo Alberto had massed perhaps 20,000 men in the area between Valeggio, Volta and Goito. The next morning, the King rode straight to Goito, and troop columns, many of them very tired, were soon on the move to join him there.
Radetzky, having defeated the Tuscan force, now had to divine the intentions of the Piedmontese. For this, a major reconnaissance was ordered for the Cavalry Division. After consideration of the various possibilities the following orders were issued for May 30th. I and Reserve Corps were to advance directly on Goito. II Corps was to march on Ceresara, nine kilometres west of Goito, from where the cavalry would seek information on enemy whereabouts and movements.
Initially, I Corps was to concentrate at Rivalta, north of Le Grazie. Thereafter, Brigade Benedek was to begin the advance on Goito, along road via Sacca. Benedek was to be reinforced by four squadrons of hussars, and from the Corps Artillery Reserve, by 12 Pounder Battery Nr. 1, and half of Rocket Battery Nr. 1. II Corps was to assemble west of Curtatone, in Castelucchio, and march north-west towards Rodigo. The Reserve Corps, and Army Headquaters had to assemble in Rivalta.
The orders required strict cooperation in the movements of the various formations. The brigades all began moving from their bivouacks toward the assembly areas at about 08:00. In the event, many of the movements were carried out sluggishly, and Benedek did not get moving until around noon. Likewise, the Reserve Corps was not fully assembled until the afternoon.
As these ponderous Austrian concentrations gradually took shape, Bava’s own buildup gathered pace. By 14:00, he had over 20 battalions at Goito. At this point, the hussar vedettes of Benedek’s column exchanged shots with those of the Aosta Cavalry, just north of Sacca. About the same time, lookouts in the bell tower of Goito Church reported seeing enemy troops. Benedek deployed his brigade. On the right of the road, between it and the Mincio, he placed two companies of Szluiner, with two companies of IR Paumgarten behind them. To the left of the road, two more Szluiner companies were deployed in open order, and behind these, stood the other ten companies of IR Paumgarten, deployed in two parallel columns. One of his two squadrons formed the vedette line, and the other was close to the road, in the second line. The rest of I Corps was strung out along the road behind Benedek.
The Second Action of Goito
Immediately prior to the Austrian attack, deployed in three lines facing south, were the following:
In Goito
I/10th Neapolitan Infantry, and a small Tuscan detachment
Third Line
Left Wing
Genoa and Savoy Cavalry Regiments (12 squadrons), with three horse artillery batteries
Right Wing
Guards Brigade (six battalions), with one horse battery
Second Line
Left Wing
Nizza Cavalry Regiment, with one field battery
Right Wing
Brigade Aosta (six battalions), with one field battery
First Line
Left Wing
11th & 17th Infantry Regiments (five battalions),
Right Wing
Brigade Cuneo (four battalions), with one position and one horse battery
The outposts comprised 1/Bersaglieri, Captain Lions on the left, and 2/Bersaglieri/Captain De Biller, on the left.22
As Benedek continued forward, the Szluiners and the Bersaglieri came in to contact. At approximately 15:30, the Piedmontese artillery on the heights facing him opened fire. These were 3rd Position Battery, Captain Efisio, and 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, Captain di Priero, 16 guns. Quickly, the Austrian guns, six 12 pounders, six 6 pounders, and three rocket tubes, were brought forward to reply, at a distance of from 1,000 and 1,100 paces. However, the weight of the enemy fire came as a surprise. “Both the calibre and number of the enemy guns were, however, superior, and which therefore had a devastating effect on our troops, and also on the batteries.”23
New to the war that afternoon, was a newly appointed French officer of Carlo Alberto’s staff, Edmond Talleyrand-Périgord, the Duke de Dino. The Duke had managed to acquire a horse, and, in civilian clothes, wandered the area:
Mounted on my country nag, I roamed the battlefield. I arrived too late to appreciate the strategic deployment of the two armies, but tried at least to take in the battle as a whole as well as desiring to see the king, the princes, and the enemy.
Battle of Goito 1600, May 30 1848
With my horse shying at every explosion, I wondered what people would think of me, without a uniform, and constantly making a spectacle of myself thanks to my four-legged friend. I soon reassured myself, thinking that, at such a moment, everyone had far too much to do to pay any attention to an individual wandering around full of curiosity in the midst of a battle.
After spending a few moments contemplating the scene, I approached an artillery sergeant. I spoke to him in Italian and he replied in French. He was a Savoyard, and our common language created a bond of confidence between us. He readily answered my questions: that, after two hours, the army did not believe there would be a battle, that the king had gone back to Volta……..when, suddenly the Austrians appeared.
“Battle was joined straight away”, he said brightly. “And for men taken by surprise, we gave as good as we got.” “Indeed so, my friend”, I replied, “but can you tell me where the King is, at present?” “The King, sir? No difficulty there. See, look over there, on the right of the battery, the tall thin chap with the pale face, dressed like a general.” “The one on the black horse?” “Yes, that’s him. That’s our valiant Charles-Albert.”
The Aosta Brigade at Goito, May 30th 1848 (Grimaldi)
At that moment, a shell exploded at the feet of the king’s horse. I saw him expertly curb his mount, smile at his horrified staff, and raise his hand to his ear. He had been hit by a splinter, hardly a wound, merely a souvenir from Mars.24
With Benedek stalled, up came Brigade Wohlgemuth on his left, and still further to the left and some distance behind him, that of Strassoldo, slowly moving through the farms to their front under fire, the ground full of hedges, blackcurrant groves, trees, and ditches, which were occupied by I and II/7th Infantry Regiment. Leading Wohlgemuth’s advance were IV/Kaiser Jäger, on his right, and I/Oguliner Grenzer, to the left, pushing the Piedmontese skirmish line of III/8th Infantry Regiment before them. To counter this, Colonel Fenile, the regiment’s commander ordered 1/8th, currently facing south, to change front, facing east, to catch the Austrians in the flank. At just this moment, though, III/8th broke, along with Captain Lions’ Bersaglieri.
In the confusion, some Piedmontese troops fired upon one another, and elements of 8th Regiment fled to Cerlongo, over five kilometres away. Wohlgemuth now continued his advance against the steep heights. Benedek remained pinned, on his right. Seeing t
his, General Bava ordered that fresh troops be committed. Two brigades, the Guards on the right, and the Aosta Brigade, on the left, began to move forward a little before 17:00. At their head, rode the Duke of Savoy.
On the Piedmontese right, the Guards came into contact with Gyulai, now occupying the farms he had pushed to, and both the terrain as well as the Kaiser Jäger and Grenzer made their progress very slow and difficult. The attack was led by the Duke of Savoy, who called out to the Guards, “With me, the Guards, for the Honour of the House of Savoy!”25
During this action, he was hit in the thigh by a ricocheting musket ball, which caused a messy, rather than dangerous wound. Progress began to be made, when four guns of the 1st Horse Artillery Battery, Captain San Martino, and one section of the 8th Field Battery, under Captain Bocca, managed to unlimber on Wohlgemuth’s left flank, and open fire.
Wohlgemuth, already under under pressure from the Aosta Brigade on the right and the Guards on his left, was forced back. Benedek had already been compelled to withdraw form his advanced position by a fresh move by four battalions (Neapolitan, I & III/17th Regiment, and one of the 11th). Brigade Clam having now come up, this countermove was halted. The Austrian brigades pulled back.
Radetzky's Marches Page 21