By around 19:00, darkness was falling, and firing dying down. By chance, as the enemy withdrawal was taking place, the messenger from Peschiera, Captain Franzini, rode up to Carlo Alberto, saluted, and handed him the despatch from the Duke of Genoa. As the King opened it, an Austrian projectile landed a very short in front of his horse, causing the animal to rear up. He slowly, and very deliberately, walked the spooked horse to a position directly over the unexploded shell, calmly read the despatch, and then said to the officers present, “Gentlemen; Peschiera is ours.”26 The news rapidly spread through the army, and widespread cheering broke out. It was to prove the King’s supreme moment of the campaign.
As these tidings spread, the weather took a turn for the worse, bringing rain which would last for several days. Carlo Alberto and General Bava could not be sure of their opponent’s intentions, but could now at least concentrate reasonably quickly, knowing that their troops were in high spirits. Two much needed victories had been won. At Goito, the artillery had been particularly effective.
The actions around Goito on the 30th show uncertainty on all sides. After the Marshal’s swift and deadly strike against the Tuscans, the operations on the 30th indicate that no major action was expected. That he intended to manoeuvre the Piedmontese away from Peschiera by II Corps is most likely, and D’Aspre himself certainly considered that the main enemy force was at Volta, and remained unconcerned by the cannon fire from Goito.27 The hot-headed Count Pimodan considered at the time that he should have been:
When the first Piedmontese line had given way under the Colonel Benedek’s impetuous attack, the Marshal, fearing to expose this brigade to useless losses, gave the order to cease the action, although he did not wish to do so, and General Wohlgemuth had knocked over the enemy battalions, and the victory so strongly favoured our side, that the Marshal decided to sustain the attack. It was on my way to Caignole and Ceresara that I found they had given the order to advance the Second Corps and Reserves. I took off with all speed on my horse, passing before the reserve companies of the Strassoldo Brigade, waving my white hanky lest they should fire at me, and took the road to Ceresara! It was late, just after half past five. The II Corps could not be far off. My heart was filled with joy. I was going to lead fifteen thousand men to the field of battle. Victory would be ours. I saw the Piedmontese crushed by our artillery; I heard the cheers of our cavalry as they broke their battalions. I looked around me, eagerly, hoping to see already General Aspre’s columns. My horse flew like the wind. Then, at last, I spied the first houses of Ceresara. But there, the troops, which had not long arrived, were resting in the fields, their muskets stacked. Everything was calm and peaceful. Still fired with the ardour of battle and the speed of my gallop, I saw our hopes of victory shattered. Faced with such indifference and inactivity, I could have wept with rage and frustration. I did not know that General D’Aspre’s corps had only just come up, and that he had received orders not to quit Ceresara. The Marshal hoped that, with their right flank turned, the Piedmontese would retire without a struggle. If they did not, he had ordered an attack the following morning, since the lateness of the hour prevented any modification to this battle plan.
During the action, General D’Aspre, who was aware that there was to be no attack until the morrow, was surprised to hear a fierce cannonade, and sent an officer to the Marshal for new orders. I came across this officer who, escorted by a cavalry piquet, was calmly riding, map in hand, rather than galloping toward the sound of the guns, even through the enemy’s skirmish line, just as Lieutenant Essbeck had done at Santa Lucia.28
The army’s movements themselves were sluggish and uncertain that day. Colonel Benedek showed little aggression or initiative on the 30th, unlike the previous day, and his brigade thus contributed little. Major-General Wohlgemuth and his troops did well, but with little support on the right, and the delay to that from the left, could not be expected to remain in position alone.
Losses on May 30th for the Piedmontese were 46 killed, 260 wounded, and 55 missing. The Austrian loss was two officers and 65 men killed, one general (Price Felix Schwarzenberg), 18 officers, and 311 men wounded, two officers captured, and one officer and 185 men missing.29
From the following day, the rain was constant. Nevertheless, the Marshal considered plans for a new offensive. On the morning of June 2nd, however, news was received that Peschiera had fallen. Rath’s report of this to Radetzky was passed through the lines by a Piedmontese emissary.
Halted by both the bad weather and Bava’s swift reaction, the Field Marshal made an equally swift change of plan. Unable, for the moment, to defeat the main Piedmontese force, he would focus on clearing his own lines of communication via Vicenza. The strategic moment had come.
_______________________
1
See Appendix XIV. Baron von Lütgendorf, p. 5, gives a total of 48,000, but this includes Zobel’s brigade of 2,300 on the Rivoli Plateau.
2
These moves from Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part II, pp. 8-10.
3
Ibid, p. 9, and Troubetzkoi, p. 72. If the re-provisioning of Peschiera, in these circumstances, was a serious objective, it appears unrealistic.
4
Fabris, Vol. III, p. 43.
5
Strack, p. 135. Galotti, Relazione e Rapporti, Vol. II, p. 434, states three wounded, and one prisoner.
6
Fabris, Vol. III, pp.43-47, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol. II, pp. 143-146, 375, 437-438, Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part II, pp. 18-20 and Grüll, pp. 230-232. Pinelli, p. 419 gives the Piedmontese loss as two killed and fourteen wounded.
7
Bruna, p. 70.
8
Bava, Der Kampf Italiens, p. 21. Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 17-19, and Rüstow, p. 204, who mistakenly attributes the report to a General ‘Bevilacqua’.
9
Fabris, Vol. III, p. 19.
10
Bava, Relazione storica, Document 5, of Supporting Documents. This dispatch was delivered to General De Laugier at about 03:00 on the 29th.
11
For a succinct chronology of these various messages, see Cippola and Tarozzi, Tanto Infausta, sì…, pp. 38-39.
12
These figures are from Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, Vol. IV 1866, pp. 29-31.
13
Report of Colonel Benedek, 29th May, KA, AFA, May 1848, Document 231a.
14
Bruna, p. 72.
15
Ibid, pp. 72-74.
16
Della Seta, Ferdinando Agostini di, Le Milizie Toscana alla Guerra del Quarantotto. Lettere di Ferdinando Agostini di Della Seta, Capitano d’artiglieria al Conte Andrea suo fratello, pp. 54-55.
17
Della Seta, p. 58.
18
Corselli, p. 102. Marchetti, p. 170, says five companies.
19
Della Seta, pp. 59-60.
20
Pimodan, pp. 91-92.
21
Cipolla and Tarozzi give an exhaustive analysis of the Italian losses, pp. 58-66.
22
Fabris, Vol III, p. 55.
23
Report of Colonel Benedek, 30th May, KA, AFA, May 1848, Document 351, and quoted in Kriegsbegebenheiten.
24
Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 95-96.
25
Ibid, p.97.
26
Della Rocca, p. 74. Talleyrand-Périgord was also an eyewitness, and does not mention the unexploded shell. He relates the King’s words as, “Gentlemen, the Duke of Genoa announces the surrender of Peschiera.”, p. 98.
27
Lütgendorf, p. 30.
28
Pimodan, pp. 98-99.
29
Grüll, pp. 237-238, and Bortolotti, p. 185.
11
Operations in Venetia, April–May 1848
Action of Montebello
The need for organisation and discipline amongst the various groups of volunteers was graphi
cally demonstrated in early April, in an action in Venetia. Rumours had spread that some thousands of volunteers, with artillery, had assembled at Montebello, a town approximately half-way between Verona and Vicenza. Such an increased threat to his army’s communications, Marshal Radetzky could not allow. Accordingly, Brigade Friedrich Liechtenstein was despatched to deal with it.
The ‘force’ in question was, in fact, mainly Paduan Crusaders, many of them students of Padua University, headed by Professor Gustavo Cucchia. On April 1st, they numbered about 1,700. Along with some 500 other volunteers, the whole was ‘commanded’ by a Napoleonic veteran, General Sanfermo. It was certainly not a military unit, with probably only about one-third of them armed with muskets.1 The first Austrian official bulletin of the campaign described the events of a week later:
During the 7th, Major-General Liechtenstein was ordered, with his Brigade, to San Bonifacio. He was given the task of making a reconnaissance towards Montebello, because it was rumoured that, in this place, there were thousands of rebels, with some artillery. The following day, we overcame the many difficulties of the ground which we had encountered along the way, and, shortly afterwards, our vanguard met the enemy at Sorio. The enemy, about 1,000 men strong, was indeed entrenched in that place, awaiting the assault in his strong position. Our troops, willing to overrun the rebels, gallantly assaulted the barricades, killing 50 of the enemy, and capturing 40, taking two guns, and a great number of Tricolour Flags.
The insurgents were routed, and fled towards the hills, trying to escape our pursuing troops. The column then advanced along the road, assaulted the Montebello Bridge, and captured two guns.
Eventually, we found Montebello entirely abandoned by the enemy. Our losses were two dead, and nine wounded.
Thus, the Brigade performed its task extremely well, and, eventually, began the march towards Verona, where it was expected by night.2
The engagement was swiftly finished, and as current circumstances did not allow for a large force to be detached for long, the brigade returned to Verona at about 17:00 on April 9th. Old General Sanfermo was swiftly (and unfairly) blamed for the disaster, and equally swiftly ejected from command. Elevated in his place was Professor Cucchia.
Though of little military significance, this action had a drastic effect on the morale of many of the volunteers in both Venetia and Lombardy, and, most importantly, to their families. Many in both categories had, like their compatriots in the Tirol, considered, if they had considered at all, that the campaign would be little more than a lengthy glorified victory parade. The effect of real fighting was bad enough, but total defeat was a severe shock to many.
On April 14th, Major-General Alberto La Marmora arrived in Venice, having been despatched by Carlo Alberto to assist and advise President Manin on military matters. The latter, completely out of his depth, lost no time in sending La Marmora to Vicenza to assess the situation. The latter did so immediately, reporting to the Republic’s cabinet two days later. He informed them that Venetian military forces were effectively nonexistent. The men were largely untrained, with poor uniforms and little equipment, and although many were highly motivated, many others were not. Some so-called units were in a constant state of flux (see Appendix VI). La Marmora had a formidable task with this alone. His situation was, however, about to made infinitely worse, from a completely unexpected direction – the east.
The Formation of an Austrian Reserve Corps
The planning for the formation of a Reserve Corps began immediately after the outbreak of the revolution in Vienna. 71 year old FZM Laval, Count Nugent von Westmeath, the Master of Ordnance, and commanding general in Inner Austria, showed amazing foresight and organisational skills in creating the nucleus of a corps-sized force in only three weeks, in spite of the chaotic state of administration at this point, and without knowing where or how it might prove to be needed. As well as complete, partial or depot units, he obtained individuals from any possible source; men returning from leave, in transit, or awaiting assignment. Nugent was also fortunate to be able to make use of the troops which had been transported from Venice to Trieste under the capitulation of March 22nd. By the middle of April, the Reserve Corps numbering some 14,500 men, stood under his command on the Lombard-Venetian frontier, where the threat to the Empire appeared most urgent. It was, to say the least, a startling achievement. The Corps was now given no mean objective; the rescue of Field Marshal Radetzky and his army. Operations began, at the town of Romans, just east of the Isonzo River, on the 17th of that month.3
The Papal Army crosses the River Po
The instructions issued by the Papal War Ministry authorised General Durando to cross the Po when he deemed fit, and they had followed this up with numerous requests that he do so. He was further prodded by pleas from the Venetian government. On March 28th, however, the Papal War Minister, Prince Aldobrandini, wrote informing the general that he was to place himself at the orders of Carlo Alberto. Upon receipt of this order, Durando sent his Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Taparelli, Marquis D’Azeglio, to the King’s Headquarters, then in Cremona. The colonel was to apprise His Majesty of the state of preparedness of the Papal forces, and to receive orders from him. Additionally, D’Azeglio was to advise Carlo Alberto of Durando’s own preferred option, which was immediately to march on Padua, and from there, either operate with the insurgent forces in eastern Venetia, or directly in concert with the Piedmontese Army. The King, as yet unsure of the general situation, informed D’Azeglio that Durando should initially concentrate his forces in the area of Ostiglia and Governolo, just north of the Po, and await developments.4
By April 17 th, the last elements of both Papal divisions had arrived in Ferrara, 40 kilometres north of Bologna, incredibly exceeding Durando’s deadline for the latter city by three days. However, almost all of the troops were woefully untrained for war. Even the Swiss regiments, accustomed to being posted as individual companies, or even smaller units, protecting consulates and the like, required a great deal of training to operate as battalions. Many units were, in addition, poorly commanded. Nevertheless, although time constraints were critical, an all too brief but arduous regime of training took place. The Dragoons, perhaps, could be considered something of an exception, since they were frequently involved in the almost constant low level conflict against groups of brigands in the Papal lands, experience which had given them some stamina and experience in the field.
The overall situation was further compounded by the poor and deteriorating relations between Generals Durando and Ferrari. Most of the latter’s troops were badly clothed and equipped, as compared to the regular troops. To a degree, this was inevitable. Even so, Ferrari, on a number of occasions, had complained to his superior that his troops had insufficient clothing and boots, a point made graphically by his own men, from some of whom emanated loose talk of treachery and betrayal. He also asked for the inclusion of some of the regular units to stiffen his division, but Durando, probably genuinely, decided that he could not at present spare any. Yet another problem was small arms ammunition. Much of it was not of recent manufacture, and therefore lacked optimum performance. Far worse, however, was that, due to an administrative error, a quantity of ammunition for the old flintlock smoothbore British Brown Bess muskets used by Pontifical militia units not committed to the war, was mistakenly sent forward with the supply trains. This unknown time bomb would have severe repercussions.
On the 21st of April, having received orders from Carlo Alberto, the Papal forces began crossing the Po, and officially entered the war. Durando established his headquarters in Ostiglia, inside Lombardy, almost 70 kilometres north of Bologna. He would remain there for several days, waiting for any further instructions, and for his formations to complete their concentration. Once again, this latter point applied especially to the poorly trained, equipped, and clothed men of the Volunteer Division.5
Further instructions from Carlo Alberto arrived on the 25th. Durando was to move his forces as quickly as possible eas
t to the Friuli, to oppose the march of the Imperial Reserve Corps of FZM Nugent, which was already threatening eastern Venetia. He decided to move the following morning, making up the time by a forced march. The troops started on the 26th; the artillery and cavalry moved through Trecenta, Badia and Monselice, to Padua. The Foreign Brigade, with the Carabinieri and sappers, crossed the Po on the 27th, on boats pulled by a steam tugboat, landing at Polesella and then marching through Rovigo to Padua, where they arrived on the evening of the 28th. Here, they joined the Indigenous Brigade, which had already reached there that morning.6 Durando had not moved a moment too soon.
Nugent Pushes to the River Piave (see map on page 163)
Action of Visco
11 days earlier, at around 11:00 on April 17th, the Austrian Reserve Corps began its march west from the small town of Romans, on the River Isonzo. Count Nugent’s push to relieve the main army had begun. The Corps order of march was Brigade Schulzig, Brigade Felix Schwarzenberg, Brigade Culoz, and finally the Reserve, of three squadrons, one horse artillery battery, and three rocket batteries. Advancing over bridges erected by the engineers, the force moved west.
Since the 20th of March, three companies of IR Fürstenwärther had provided the most advanced Austrian outpost line west of the Isonzo. The farthest point was the village of Visco, three kilometres east of the fortress of Palmanova. In and around the village was 8/IR Fürstenwärther, Oberlieutenant Dobrowski, with 10th Company, Captain Grimm, on his right at S. Vito. At about 11:00, Visco was assailed by an ‘insurgent’ force thought to be 6-800 men, with Dobrowski swiftly pulling back.
Radetzky's Marches Page 22