That night, Culoz occupied the heights north of Cornuda with six companies, the uhlan troop, and the half rocket battery. The main body of his brigade, nine companies, one troop, and the six pounder battery, was billeted in Onigo. To secure the entrance to the valley, two companies were posted in Pederobba and two more in Quero. Culoz himself updated all the senior officers of Nugent’s Corps that night, in Feltre. Brigade Felix Schwarzenberg was ordered to Culoz’s support, and the other formations were to accelerate their pace.
May 9th
At 06:00, on May 9th, Durando received Ferrari’s message of the previous evening. He had, two hours earlier, written to Ferrari that he would himself be advancing to the latter’s support, and that the 1st Cacciatori Battalion, currently marching towards Montebelluna, would be diverted to him. Now replying to Ferrari’s own despatch, he stated that he was himself advancing in Ferrari’s support. More ominously, Durando added that the Foreign Battalion, to the north in Primolano, was threatened, clearly signalling his preoccupation with that area, and adding that the reinforcements en route could probably not reach Ferrari until that evening. Even so, an hour later, at 07:00, he set out from Bassano with 3,000 men to Ferrari’s assistance, intending to march via Crespano.19
Durando reached Crespano at lunchtime, and here received from Ferrari a second despatch, which confirmed that the fighting had erupted again that morning. At about 13:00, Durando sent a two word message to his subordinate – Vengo Correndo! – I come running!20
In the area of Cornuda that morning, Major-General Culoz had a total of 15 companies, a half squadron, a half battery, and a half rocket battery, perhaps 2,700 men in all. Of these, in the first line were four companies of 1/Banal Grenzer, 7 and 8/IR Archduke Carl, one troop, Archduke Carl Uhlans, and three rocket launchers. Firing broke out early on the 9th, somewhere around 05:00.21 Having received Durando’s first message (that written at 04:00) General Ferrari began his attack against the enemy held valley and the heights on either side at about 09:00. The action was extremely slow moving, with the Austrians having the benefit of the heights.
At around 11:00, Durando’s second despatch reached Ferrari (the one written at 07:00, in answer to Ferrari’s first message). The news that reinforcements were coming was rapidly disseminated through the ranks. About this time, too, the half squadron of Papal Dragoons in Cornuda was warned for action. The very weak ‘squadron’ of only two troops, was formed mainly by men who came from Latium, the Marches, and Emilia, and was commanded by Lieutenant Enric: the 1st Troop was composed of 21 men under Second-Lieutenant Ciferri, and the 2nd, of 19 men under Captain Barbieri. They were dismounted in the town square, between the bell tower and the church, having spent the morning watching troops marching through the town, and towards the firing line.
Cornuda and vicinity
Orders soon arrived for the men to mount, and move forward along the road north. Whatever the intended purpose of the advance, what followed was a wild charge from just west of Cornuda as far as Onigo, scattering unsuspecting Austrian troops along the road. It ended in the square of Onigo, where Trooper Nicoletti fell, badly wounded, almost at the feet of Major-General Culoz. Of the 40 men who started the charge, 15 were killed, and the remainder wounded, many fatally.22 Certainly, they had bought some time for their comrades. Ferrari was also slow to deploy his reserves.
At about 12:30, General Durando’s third note was handed to Ferrari (Vengo Correndo!). There was now no doubt in Ferrari’s mind that reinforcements were coming, and this new, unequivocal information was passed on to the tired troops. As the action continued, at about 15:00, units of Brigade Felix Schwarzenberg began to enter the fray, not the reinforcements Ferrari had expected. Some 6,000 Austrian troops were now present on the field, if not in action.
Count Nugent himself had also just reached the field with Schwarzenberg. There was a lull in operations, while Schwarzenberg moved to Culoz’s left via Levada, threatening Ferrari’s right flank, while Culoz now proceeded to advance towards Cornuda. In addition, Major-General Schulzig, on the east bank of the Piave, about 15:30, also started a bombardment along the river, threatening a possible crossing behind his forces at Cornuda. General Guidotti, commanding here, rapidly pulled his troops back. From this time, with enemy forces increasing, and no sign of the promised reinforcements, the volunteers began to lose heart. Adjutant Major Pompeo Danzetta, of the 2nd Legion, was mortally wounded while encouraging his men. Danzetta died grasping the hand of Volunteer Mangani.23
Durando, in the meanwhile, had sent scouts forward to Cornuda. These reported back to the main column, at the hamlet of Rovero, some eight kilometres from Onigo, that the enemy force was some 2,000 men, ‘fire had ceased by 4 PM’, that the volunteers were withdrawing, and that they had themselves been fired upon by ‘Tirolese’. Just at this time, the last of three couriers from Colonel Casanova, in Primolano, reached the General. This officer reiterated Casanova’s insistence that he was threatened by a much larger force, and required immediate support. As D’Azeglio wrote,
General Durando had the alternative, either to succour a division, which, collectively, amounted to 11,500 men, and had in front of it only 2,000, and was said to have maintained its position; or a battalion of his own, left isolated at the distance of about twenty-three miles, and threatened by a force quadruple to its own strength.24
Durando turned his force about, and marched in the direction of Primolano. Ironically, returning to Bassano, Durando encountered Colonel Casanova himself, who had ridden to report that the enemy column threatening him had withdrawn. Pulled in two directions throughout the day, Durando had intervened on neither flank.
At 17:15, bowing to events, with men long since drifting away from the line, Ferrari ordered a retreat. The withdrawal of 2nd Roman Legion rapidly turned into a rout, soon extending to other units. Matters were made worse by recriminations and bitterness. The frequently promised reinforcements had not arrived. Perhaps worse, men of the 2nd Roman Legion had, during the fighting, been issued with some of the old Roman Militia ammunition mistakenly brought with the supply trains. This did not, of course, fit their modern weapons. Anger rapidly became talk of treachery, and as such, spread like wildfire. The intended withdrawal and concentration in Montebelluna became a general flight towards Treviso. Colonel Marescotti, commanding the Papal Grenadier Regiment, described that night and the next morning:
What a night, the one between May 9th and 10th! Everywhere, legions of straggling and exhausted soldiers, while our defeat had been slight; 200 dead and prisoners in all! And, how much terror there was amongst the peasants during the following morning. I was a witness to all of this, coming from Narvesa to Treviso; men and women were all along the way, asking news of each other. Someone was swearing about the Papal troops’ cowardice, others were accusing the commanders of stupidity; some cried that the Piave was the main fortress of the Veneto, and that Treviso would been a grave. Others were so stunned that they couldn’t speak, and were just looking around, as though they were already seeing the Croats entering their home. 25
Ferrari’s loss on the 9th was probably some 30 killed and 150 wounded, with perhaps 2,000 missing, the majority of whom deserted. By contrast, Austrian casualties were seven dead, including Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Karg, of IR Kinsky, and 25 wounded.26 The brigades of Culoz and Schwarzenberg bivouacked between Nogare and Cornuda. Across the Piave, after Guidotti’s retreat from the west bank, Austrian engineers, with the assembled materiel, began the construction of a bridge 800 paces above the ruins of the Priula Bridge, while more wood was gathered. Under the direction of Captain Maidich of the Pioneer Corps, after 15 hours of work, a 160 pace structure crossing two arms of the river was completed. The division of FML Schaaffgotsche immediately began to cross, and moved to Visnadello.
In Treviso, General Ferrari spent May 10th reorganising the mass of troops in the city, some 11,000 men.27 Proposals were put forward for a reoccupation of Montebelluna and for a reoccupation of the west bank of t
he Piave. Neither of these, in the circumstances, was even slightly realistic, although it could not have been foreseen that the Austrian engineers would have bridged the river so rapidly. Equally, the troops themselves were far from ready to undertake any serious operation. That same day, Durando, who had planned to advance on Montebelluna, finding the Austrians in possession of the town, marched on to Castelfranco.
Action of Castrette, May 11th (see map in colour section)
The next morning, however, both for morale reasons and to attempt to disrupt the linking up of Nugent and Schaaffgotsche, Ferrari decided to make a reconnaissance in force against the latter. Having received permission from General Durando’s Headquarters in Castelfranco, at about 13:00, Ferrari moved out of the city with the Grenadier and Cacciatori regiments, a squadron of Mounted Cacciatori, several volunteer units, and three guns. The general headed towards enemy positions around the village of Castrette (or Ca Strette), with the four battalions of the Indigenous Brigade, and the half battery, dropping supporting units of both Mounted and Foot Carabinieri at Carita. To his left, towards the village of Postioma, he detached Colonel Zambeccari’s Alto Reno Battalion, and the Mounted Cacciatori. In reserve, strong detachments from the three Volunteer Regiments were posted between Carita and Madonna del Rovero.
Moving towards Visnadello almost 10 kilometres to the north, Ferrari’s column encountered Austrian outposts at the village of Castrette, only four kilometres from Treviso. These were two companies of Illyrian Banat Grenzer, who were forced back from the village, withdrawing on the main force. Major-General Schulzig came forward in support, with 11 companies of IR Kinsky, three guns of 1st Foot Artillery Battery, and half of Rocket Battery Nr. 3. The Second division of the regiment was pushed directly along the road to Castrette, the Third division to the left flank, and the Fourth division to the right. The other five companies were held in reserve.28 Captain Ravioli describes the situation:
They were in the above-mentioned positions when General Ferrari, being certain of the enemy presence, ordered a piece of artillery to fire. Meanwhile, the infantry had taken their rifles and, in platoon columns, occupied the entire crossroads. The enemy answered our initial fire with a brisk fire of his own: indeed, the Austrians had managed to unlimber three guns at the intersection of the Postioma and Main Roads. Everyone knows that, in the Veneto, only the roads can help the deployment of guns, because the country is full of ditches and trees. The enemy rounds, skimming over the bayonets of the first ranks, fell into the second; many captains, lieutenants, and privates were killed or wounded.
The artillery officer, noting that his piece was manoeuvring less than 500 metres from the enemy battery, limbered up; the confusion was now great amongst the infantry, and the commanders could not stop it; the horses were mixed up with the troops, the confusion increased and, eventually, they were forced to abandon the gun.29
The confusion in the ranks of the Papal infantry worsened when rockets began to fall amongst them, and General Schulzig ordered the five IR Kinsky companies in reserve to attack along the main road. The whole of the four regular battalions broke and ran in complete panic, fleeing towards Treviso. Three gallant grenadier officers attempted to form what they termed an ‘Honour Battalion’ to stand, but they were swept away. The Papal cavalry now gallantly attempted to cover the disorderly rout, but many of them were captured when they were trapped in a ravine. The last stages of the ‘withdrawal’ were covered by Colonel Zambeccari’s Alto Reno Battalion. Fortunately, there was no pursuit, and Zambeccari’s unit suffered only one casualty, Lieutenant Pigozzi wounded. The Trevisians were appalled at the sight of the defeated force which entered the city. Montecchi wrote, “Such a hurried flight brought the morale of the troops in Treviso into the depths of despair, and one witnessed the outrage that this was not so much promoted by the simple soldiers of the Line, but by officers, who shouted in the streets of betrayal and dissolution.”30
Papal killed and wounded numbered over 300, with numerous others captured or missing.31 Apart from the cannon, two caissons, a Papal Grenadier flag, and numerous small arms were taken. Austrian losses are stated by Hilleprandt to be, ‘…at most 40 to 50 dead and wounded’, and as IR Kinsky had only two wounded, this appears accurate. Two prisoners were reported as taken by the Treviso National Guard.32
After the day’s shambles, with chaos reigning in Treviso, Ferrari appointed General Guidotti as commander of the city, assigning him a garrison composed of the Grenadier Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Volunteer Regiments, D’Amigo’s Venetian Battalion, 25 cavalry, and seven field guns, some 3,500 men in all, not counting the National Guard. Ferrari then marched, with all of the other units, to Mestre, just under 20 kilometres away, arriving the next morning. Even amid the chaos, however, a summons by Count Nugent to surrender was rejected.
The following day, President Manin sent this helpful despatch to Ferrari:
To His Excellency
General,
If not from your own letters, from other sources, we are aware of the unfortunate results of your rare courage, that to which all can testify. Please, withstand in Treviso now that the inhabitants are willing to do so; prevent the timorous disturbers who are inspiring dissension and dejection amongst the militia. One can hope that General Durando will somehow contribute to the defence of these provinces.
Those of your own men you find irremediably disheartened you will disarm, and release away, but if in the event it seems they regain their own courage, you will make use of them. You do not need advice (from us). Let us have news from you every day, printed or written. Safety, Brotherhood, and Reliance.
The President – Manin
Signed – Tommaseo
Secretary and Clerk – Zennari33
On the 12th, Nugent initiated a containment of the city, causing some skirmishing. General Guidotti, during a sortie, took a rifle, and walked to the point where the firing was heaviest. Soon after, he was killed by a bullet in the chest. The defenders had some 50 killed and wounded, and the Imperial forces probably similar, IR Kinsky losing four killed, and one officer and 27 men wounded. The Austrians that night encamped some 500 metres from the walls. Command of the garrison now fell to Colonel Lante di Montefeltro, of the 1st Volunteer Regiment. A capable officer, he rapidly improved the morale and bearing of the troops. In an odd quirk of bureaucracy, on the 15th of May, he was appointed by the Venetian Government, as Commanding General, although not in their service. In the meanwhile, Nugent had summoned the city to surrender once again, but this was also refused. As he possessed only field guns, there was little more that could now be done.
While the Austrian Corps was occupied with Treviso, General Durando had moved to a position west of the River Brenta, ready to contest any move by Nugent towards Verona. The Venetian authorities, though, were greatly concerned that Durando and Ferrari had abandoned the city to its fate. Consequently, President Manin required them both to move to its aid. With little choice, in the light of the recent disasters, Durando re-crossed the Brenta on May 14th, and by a flank march to the south, and then east, approached Mestre from the west, entering the town at around 11:00, on May 16th, joining Ferrari’s division there. After reorganising the two forces, during which a number of formations, including the 2nd Roman Legion, were disbanded, Durando moved from Mestre towards Treviso on the 18th. By then, however, the situation had changed.
Thurn Replaces Nugent
For Count Nugent, he had crossed the Piave, and defeated the forces opposing him. The whole of the Friuli had been cleared of the enemy, who was now shut up in Venice, Treviso, Osoppo, Palmanova, and the remote Cadore, or had been pushed further west. However, his own health had paid a price, with the recurring pain of an old head-injury. Additionally, he was now at odds with his senior commanders as to how to proceed.
Nugent recognised, by May 15th, that it wasn’t possible to take Treviso quickly with the available troops and weapons. That same day, FML Freiherr von Stürmer announced his belief that the ent
ire force should move to Verona as soon as possible, and that the newly formed II Reseve Corps could be left to protect the already conquered country between the Isonzo and the Piave. Radetzky most certainly wished to quicken Nugent’s march to Verona, but Nugent held a Council of War on May 16th in Visnadello, to discuss three possible courses of action;
Should the whole Corps meet the main army at the Adige River, and forego all possibilities for a retreat, and should they destroy the bridge over the Piave? or…
Should they leave a part of the Corps in place, and the rest should march to join the main army as soon as possible? or…
Should the whole Corps start, but first await the arrival of the Brigade of Colonel Susan (two Battalions, Haynau Infantry, I/Deutsch-Banater, and I/Wallachian Banater), which was expected at Conegliano on May 18th, to secure the line of the Piave?
FML’s Thurn, the Prince of Württemberg, and Schaaffgotsche, supported by the brigade commanders, insisted that the course of action should be to march immediately upon Verona, to reinforce the main army. The unwell Nugent disagreed. Nevertheless, the third proposal was adopted.
The next day, a further conference took place, which Nugent was too ill to attend. The decision to march on Verona was effectively taken, and Nugent agreed that he should give up his command, and report sick. He left for Gorizia on the 18th. FML Thurn, as senior officer, took command of the Reserve Corps, now designated III Corps, and gave orders that the march to Verona would begin on the evening of the same day, having received, during the night, a second letter from Radetzky, in which the Marshal insisted that the corps march directly on the city. A further change of command entailed Major-General Edmund Schwarzenberg replacing the Prince of Württemberg, who was injured as a result of a fall from his horse. The Prince was also sent to Gorizia.34 III Corps broke camp, and began its march at 20:00, on May 18th, amidst a storm with heavy rain. The next day, it crossed the Brenta.
Radetzky's Marches Page 24