Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  Zobel could make no headway, and became increasingly concerned for his right flank, which a company under Captain De Rolland, was edging around. Captain Steiber, gallantly leading part of his company, was killed, causing his troops to waver, and fall back. Zobel called off the action, and withdrew to Pian di Cenere, where his force encamped for the night. The next morning, he withdrew to Avio and Brentonico, leaving a picket of one officer and 40 men near Monte della Neve, to observe enemy movements. The lack of water precluded the presence of a larger force.

  Count San Vitale, heavily outnumbered, although in a very strong position, had outfought Zobel. He had kept his troops in hand, and they had behaved extremely well. Captain Cassinis’ Student Bersaglieri had now, perhaps, earned that illustrious name. Austrian casualties totalled one officer and 11 men dead, one officer and 38 men wounded, with one man missing. Piedmontese losses were three killed, and about 15 wounded.7 The Piedmontese, impressed by Captain Steiber’s courage, buried him with full honours, and a gravestone.8

  The retention of these strong positions was very advantageous for the Royal Army, as they were readily defensible with relatively small numbers. The Imperial forces must have rued that they originally abandoned them without a fight.

  Minor operations around Verona

  Reconnaissance of June 14th at San Giustina, Sona, and Sommacampagna

  Once firmly re-established in Verona, but unsure of enemy intentions in the light of their occupation of the Rivoli Plateau, the Marshal had decided upon a reconnaissance in force to establish the strength of the hostile forces on the heights of San Giustina, Sona, and Sommacampagna, to the west of the city. To this end, on the 14th, at 03:00, three columns were despatched against these points from the cavalry brigade of Archduke Ernst.

  To the north, against San Giustina moved the column of Major Faber, two squadrons of Liechtenstein Chevauxlegers; in the centre, towards Sona, went two more, accompanied by the Archduke himself, and two squadrons of the Archduke Carl Uhlans, under their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Batky, advanced on the left, towards Sommacampagna. The movement was supported by the 5th division of IR Archduke Carl, Captain Pleugmakers.

  Batky’s column surprised a Piedmontese foraging party of the Novara Cavalry Regiment, capturing 19 men, with three wagons, both men and vehicles being taken to Verona. Shortly afterwards, however, it was engaged by two squadrons of the same regiment, led by their commanding officer, Colonel Maffei, and driven back with a loss of one officer and five men wounded, and five men taken prisoner, and fell back on their supporting infantry. Colonel Maffei himself was also wounded, as were two of his men, and one other was killed.

  This reconnaissance had clearly shown that large numbers of Piedmontese troops were in the area immediately west of the city. For Radetzky, the swift return of the army from Vicenza had, indeed, been perfectly – and very fortunately – timed. Carlo Alberto already knew the question he had to ask himself. Simply – What now? In the meanwhile, the constant patrolling continued.

  Bussolengo, 21st June

  After a tip-off by a local man that enemy troops were in a farmhouse near Bussolengo, a detachment of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, led by Captain Ottonelli, surprised and captured a picket of 11 men of the Deutsch-Banat Grenz Regiment. This was the first time that this regiment had been encountered in this vicinity.

  Lugangnago, 27th June

  At 23:45, on the 27th, Lieutenant Gény with a Cacciatori patrol was sent out to search farms and buildings in the area towards Sona and Sommacampagna. At around 03:30, in Lugangnago, the detachment surprised and captured an Austrian corporal and eight men.

  Rivalta and Belluna, 1st July

  In response to orders from General De Sonnaz to reconnoitre enemy positions in front of Rivoli and Corona, on July 1st, commanded by the Duke of Savoy, a Piedmontese force descended from the heights of Rivoli and Spiazzi against Preabocco and Brentino, both Austrian occupied. This led to a scrappy exchange of musketry and artillery fire, which lasted three hours, ending with the Duke pulling his troops back to their original locations. Austrian losses were one man killed and seven wounded. Piedmontese casualties were one artilleryman killed, and 10 men of the 14th Infantry Regiment wounded. One gun was dismounted on either side.9 A further skirmish took place on July 8th.

  Dossobono, 4th July

  On July 4th, 5/7th Infantry Regiment Captain Aghemo (120 men), accompanied by 11 men of the Aosta Cavalry, made a reconnaissance from Villafranca in the direction of Dossobono. This detachment clashed with Austrian cavalry near the village, without any significant result.10

  Lugangnago, 14th July

  The commander of the 3rd Division, General Broglia, ordered a further probe towards the village of Lugagnano. The detachment sent exchanged fire with Austrian pickets, finding the place occupied. It was discovered that the Austrians were clearing buildings along their outpost lines, and that local wells were being drained, or filled in.

  After the abortive ‘March on Verona’, the Royal Army had returned to the hills west of the city, and remained there for more than a month, with only episodes such as those described above taking place. The Rivoli Plateau had been taken and held. After the disaster of Vicenza, though, devoid of any strategic imperative, the King hoped for the enemy to attack. When this did not occur, he once again requested Baron Bava to prepare a plan of campaign. The latter, on the 21st of June, proposed the close investment of Mantua. To this, the King readily agreed. The task was assigned to I Corps, the Reserve Division, and the Lombard Division, the arrival of the latter being eagerly awaited by Carlo Alberto.

  Force dispositions during the Siege of Mantua, mid-July 1848

  I Corps, the Piedmont Brigade, and the Lombards were to be deployed astride the Mincio, between Goito and Mozzecane. II Corps, further north, was divided, with most of 3rd Division posted between Sona and Santa Giustina, on either side of the Peschiera-Verona Road, and farthest north, half of 4th Division, placed between Pastrengo and Rivoli, occupying the Rivoli Plateau. This latter move, which would have been extremely important in April, in support of the volunteers, was now of no importance. With the Duke of Savoy’s Reserve Division stationed north of Mantua, the army was effectively split into three components. On these dispositions, Colonel Fabris comments:

  Of this force, a larger grouping was around Goito; and two smaller groups, one guarding the heights between Verona and Peschiera, the other by the entrance to Rivoli. Between them was a gap worth a good day’s march, hardly covered by a reserve division. This spreading out was the result of a series of criteria, which, from the beginning of the campaign, had pushed the operation in various directions, to which no sense of ultimate purpose was given, nor a firm and unique will to take care of its execution.11

  The ‘Siege of Mantua’

  Initial Moves

  With the arrival of Major-General Perrone’s Lombard Division, the blockade of Mantua finally commenced on July 13th, many of the troops bivouacking in most unhealthy marshy terrain around the city.12 A bridge was constructed across the Mincio at Sacca, to link the forces on either bank. From this point some form of skirmish occurred almost daily, somewhere around the fortress.

  That same day, the Second Division moved into positions to the south and west of Mantua, on the west bank of the Mincio. General Perrone’s Lombards, newly arrived, poorly uniformed, and with little training, were to move to Ferrere’s right, east of the Mantua-Borgoforte Road, but the execution was very slow. At about 17:00, the King himself, returning to his headquarters, encountered the first units of the division moving up. The poor progress had been due to a delay in feeding the troops, which had caused a minor mutiny. Now that most of the units detailed for the operations were available, work could begin. Whereas as in May, the defences had only to be masked on the west bank of the Adige, now, a full envelopment was needed. The defences of Mantua at this time, which heavily depended upon water, were described by Lieutenant Ferrero, in his diary on July 16th:

  Mantua
was blockaded on the right bank of the Mincio by the Second Division, made up from the Casal and Acqui Brigades, together with the First Lombard Division, under the command of General Perrone. The blockade extended from the banks of the Upper Lake as far as the Lower Lake, in other words, in a great arc from the Sanctuary of the Graces to the fortifications of Pietole. The engineers established redoubts alongside the main roads, to defend against surprise attacks by the enemy and to protect the most exposed areas from artillery fire.

  Until 1708, Mantua was the capital of the Duchy of Gonzagne. It lies on the right bank of the Mincio. Here, the river is dyked to form a great lake divided into three parts: the Upper Lake, the Middle Lake and the Lower Lake. The first lake stretches four Italian miles to the west, and is contained by what is known as the Mill Dyke, which also serves as a bridge between the town and the citadel. From this lake, a canal runs through Mantua as far as the port of Catena. The Middle Lake is about two miles long. It is crossed by St George’s Bridge, which links Mantua with the fort of the same name. The Lower Lake narrows gradually until it reaches the village of Pietole, at which point the Mincio flows normally again. Mantua’s fortifications consist of a curtain wall, the citadel, the works around the Pradella Gate, the Te, and Migliaretto redoubts, and the forts of St. George and Pietole.

  The curtain walls are punctuated at intervals by meutrières and small bastions. The citadel, built on the left bank between the Upper and Middle Lakes, is pentagonal in shape. It has four bastions and three sides, turned towards Venice, faced with counter-scarps, and ditches filled with water. The sides facing Mantua is defended by a single wall, which meant that if the enemy forced the garrison back into the town, its only protection would be this weak rampart. The Te and Migliaretto redoubts are situated on the town side, looking over the Po. The Migliaretto redoubt, which covers the Te, is badly laid out, and could easily be reduced by artillery placed on the right bank of the Mincio; it is entered by the Ceresa dyke.

  The fort of St. George, on the left bank, is triangular, and must be considered as a bridgehead, preventing the approach of the enemy and facilitating sorties. Like the citadel, this fort is a weak spot in the city’s defences, should it be attacked from the south.

  Mantua’s main strength lies in the waters and marshes which surround it, forming an almost insurmountable obstacle. In the war of 1796, this city put up a spirited resistance to the French army commanded by Bonaparte. However, Mantua was far less well-protected then: the redoubts were not finished, four of the five dykes could offer no resistance; the Pradelle works were constructed at a later date by the French engineer Chasseloup; Fort Pietole had only just been completed by the Austrians; and the moats had not yet been filled.

  Diversion of Ferrara

  No sooner had this deployment been made, however, when word arrived at the King’s Headquarters in Roverbella, of an enemy move on Ferrara. This was potentially very explosive, in that Carlo Alberto had no desire to see Austrian troops operating south of the Po.

  The Imperial troops in the citadel of that city, I/Warasdiner St. George Grenz Regiment, were running short of supplies, and Radetzky had ordered that the garrison be revictualled.13 Consequently, on the night of June 12th, the reinforced brigade of Prince Franz Liechtenstein, about 5,000 men, left Legnago, was ferried across to the south bank of the River Po, and then moved towards Ferrara, appearing before the city at about mid day on the 14th. The Papal garrison, consisting of the 5th Indigenous Fusilier Battalion (449 men), and 650 men of the 1st and 2nd Foreign Regiments, quickly withdrew from the city.

  Prince Liechtenstein then came to an agreement with the city authorities to provide for the garrison in the Citadel. Having concluded this, the force re-crossed the Po the next day, with the intention of linking up with the Austrian force at Governolo, for a joint operation against the blockading forces. The situation there had, however, changed.

  Second Action of Governolo, July 18th

  The force which Prince Liechtenstein had been ordered to join consisted of three companies of II/Banal Grenz Regiment, and four guns of the 17th 6 Pounder Foot Artillery Battery. Commanded by Major Rukavina, of the Banal, the force was sent to Governolo on the 16th, to take the place of the single company sent there the previous day, and which then moved west to Formigosa, on the left bank of the Mincio, between Governolo and Mantua. That same day, Prince Liechtenstein was summoned to a conference in Mantua, where he would shortly find himself confined by the encroaching siege operations.

  Lieutenant-General Bava, who had received orders from the King to take a force to intercept Liechtenstein, led a force composed of the Regina Brigade, the 1/II Bersaglieri, the 6th Field and 2nd Horse Artillery Batteries, and the Genoa Cavalry Regiment, some 6,000 men, and 15 guns, to cross the Po at Bogoforte. Here, on the morning of the 17th, as he was starting to move across the river, he learned that Liechtenstein had already crossed to the north bank. Realising that the two Austrian forces intended to link up, Bava immediately marched on Governolo.

  General Trotti, with the 10th Infantry Regiment, three squadrons, and four guns of the 6th Battery formed the left hand column, and the 9th Infantry Regiment, with the remaining artillery and cavalry took the more southerly route nearer the Po.

  At about 11:00 on the 18th, the Piedmontese guns opened fire on Oberlieutenant Franz’s two 6 pounder guns, and two 7 pound howitzers across the river. The contest could not last long, and Franz was forced to pull back after two of his pieces were dismounted by the effective Piedmontese fire, with 20 men killed or wounded, along with 10 dead horses. Additionally, Captain Lion’s Bersaglieri appeared on the east side of the town, having drifted down the river on boats, and landed below it.

  With the Piedmontese across the river, although an initial cavalry probe was repulsed, Rukavina had no answer to artillery. He was wounded, and the majority of his troops taken prisoner. It had been a quick and decisive action, with the Austrians suffering 60 killed and wounded, with Rukavina, eight other officers, and 346 others taken prisoner. The two dismounted cannon were taken, along with the battalion’s standard. Captain Lion’s company, and the 1st Cacciatori/9th Infantry Regiment, Captain Danesio, particularly distinguished themselves. Piedmontese losses were only 12 killed and 23 wounded.14 Bava’s decision to employ overwhelming force had been amply vindicated. Franz, with his two remaining guns, and the remnants of the infantry, linked up with the single company stationed in Formigosa, and retreated towards Mantua.

  In the meanwhile, the Fortress Commander in Mantua, General Gorczkowski, having heard of Bava’s move, had sent out a column of three battalions, three squadrons, and a battery towards Governolo, under the command of Colonel Drascovich. Drascovich encountered the survivors of Rukavina’s troops, and the two forces then withdrew to Mantua together.

  Major Rukavina and Lieutenant Franz had done their best with the small force at their disposal. Bava’s attack was both well planned and executed. Ever modest, he issued an Order of the Day, in which he elevated the action into a great battle.15

  Completion of the Investment of the City

  By July 18th, the siege-works on the right bank of the Mincio were completed, and it was time for those on the left bank to be undertaken. Carlo Alberto moved his Headquarters to Marmirolo, north of the city, on the Goito-Mantua Road. On the 20th, he rode along the right bank of the river, as far as Formigoso, to observe the progress, and also to personally encourage the troops in their work. The following day, orders were sent to the Fortress Commander of Peschiera, General Federici, to transfer 12 siege guns, and 200 artillerymen to join the besieging force.16

  Count Gorczkowski, on July 22nd, proposed a prisoner exchange of one of his officers for a Tuscan captain. The proposal was rejected by the King, for the simple reason that the Austrian officer, Lieutenant Baumgarten, had seen many of the Piedmontese siege-works, and conversed with their officers.

  In general, Carlo Alberto and Bava could be pleased with progress so far. The preparations for a full si
ege, whether really realistic or not, were well underway, and the Lombard troops were operational. In addition, the action at Governolo had acted as a tonic for the whole army. Affairs to the north, though, were to render all of these events completely irrelevant. On the 23rd, Carlo Alberto heard the news that General De Sonnaz had been attacked on the Rivoli Plateau on the previous day, and that he had fallen back to Peschiera. In addition, it was expected that an impending major attack would come that day in the area of Villafranca-Sommacampagna.

  This information proved to be correct. Immediate orders were given that four brigades, and the cavalry, should march via Mozzecane towards Villafranca. The King and his headquarters followed suit. Unfortunately, being a Sunday, the deeply religious Monarch held Mass first, this delaying the movement until 11:00. There was then another delay for Carlo Alberto, as Count Casati had arrived to discuss constitutional matters.17

  Minor Operations around Mantua, July

  Although there were various aspects of the siege, the focus of much of the Royal Army’s attention was Fort Pietole, the outwork west of the city, between the roads to Curtatone and Montanara. In this area, especially, artillery exchanges, and minor skirmishes took place daily, the following being of note.

  Reconnaissance against Fort Pietole, July 14th

  On the 14th, the Lombard Student Battalion mounted a raid on Fort Pietole. Volunteer De Angelis, in one of his frequent letters to his father, written the next day, explained how, after eating their rations, they, ‘…marched along the Mantua Road, towards Fort Pietole. Morale was high, and our father, Lieutenant-Colonel Pasotti was satisfied with his troops.’ However, the students were unable to attack the fort’s occupants, behind their defensive works. De Angelis wrote of a loss of one mortally, and six or seven other wounded. On the 16th, he gave further details of the losses. ‘Quartermaster-Sergeant Ponti (2nd Company), died blessing the cause. Amongst the dead, there were also a certain Azzali, father of a family, and a Buffoni. Fichi was wounded in the arm, Zefferino in a foot, and the Pavian, Mazuchelli, lost four fingers; another one lost a leg….many sick came back and everyone was dissatisfied at being uselessly exposed to the enemy’s guns.’ The unfortunate volunteers had received a rough handling in their first action.18