Sortie from Fort Pietole, July 15th
As the siege works continued, a sortie from the fortress was ordered against the hamlet of Pietole, which comprised about thirty dwellings. Both to clear the field of fire, and to prevent enemy use of the place, the settlement was to be demolished. Engineer Second-Lieutenant Schauer, with 20 miners, moved off on the 15th, to accomplish this.
The detachment prepared the settlement for demolition, but before the destruction was complete, the Piedmontese renewed their attack on the fort. The detachment, other than Schauer and Leading-Miner Weber, pulled back under the protection of the friendly skirmish line. Schauer and Weber remained behind to explode a charge to complete the work, from a house with a good line of sight. However, they soon discovered that one of the other men had the firing mechanism necessary to do so. Schauer instead used the still burning embers from a burning building to set off the charge of nine zentrums of powder by hand, after which the men made their escape.
Reconnaissance towards Mantua, July 19/20th
Learning of Major Rukavina’s defeat at Governolo, Prince Liechtenstein’s brigade, which had been marching towards that place to link up with him, withdrew to the area between Noara and Ostiglia, where, on the 19th, a skirmish across the River Po took place between them and about 150 men, commanded by Captain Castelli, along with some local National Guards. Two Austrians were wounded. The following day, the brigade attempted to move towards Mantua, but near the small village of Castellaro, east of the city, found its way blocked by elements of the Aosta Brigade. After some ineffective rifle fire from both sides, it withdrew to Sanguinetto on the 22nd. Radetzky, in the meanwhile, had sent Major-General Baron Simbschen to take temporary command. Simbschen, as ordered, subsequently moved his new command towards Sommacampagna, in preparation for the impending offensive in that area.
After the departure of the main force to support General De Sonnaz’ command, the 2nd and Lombard Divisions remained deployed around Mantua for several days. On the 26th, General Ferrere received news that there had been great battle at Custoza, and was given orders that he should march that night to join the main army. General Perrone’s Lombards were to take position on the River Oglio. The short lived ‘Siege of Mantua’ was over.
Tosa Gate, Milan, March 1848 (Canella)
Two Austrian Infantrymen, Italy 1848 (von Ottenfeld)
Austrian Grenzer at Pastrengo, April 29th 1848 (von Myrbach)
The Piedmontese Guard Grenadiers at Goito, May 30th 1848 (lithograph by Pianca)
Austrian Wagon Train soldiers Erhard Moosbacher and Thomas Nekowetz rescuing a gun despite the loss of the gun team at Goito, May 30th 1848 (unknown artist)
The Piedmont Brigade at Staffalo during the series of actions around Custoza, July 24th 1848 (Ghisi)
Lieutenant-Colonel Sunstenau with Austrian IR 54, Sommacompagna, July 24th 1848 (unknown artist)
Austrian IR 56 at Monte Godio, Custoza, July 1848 (Puchinger)
Radetzky and his Staff at Novara, March 23rd 1849 (Neumann)
Archduke Albrecht at Novara, March 23rd 1849 (von Myrbach)
The Storming of Bicocca during the Battle of Novara, March 23rd 1849 (von Myrbach)
Night Bombardment of the Viaduct and Venice, 1849 (contemporary lithograph)
Austrian Battery Nr. 26, facing Venice (Gerasch)
Austrian sortie against the Viaduct, Venice, overnight July 6th 1849 (Gerasch)
Castrette, situation May 11th
Battle of Custoza July 23rd 1848. Morning attacks and subsequent moves
Battle of Custoza July 24th 1848
Battle of Custoza July 25th 1848. Situation about 1700 and subsequent Piedmontese retreat
Battle of Volta. Situation about 1800, July 26th 1848
Battle of Volta. Morning attacks, July 27th 1848
Battle of Mortara 1630, March 21st 1849
Battle of Novara 1100, March 23rd 1849
Battle of Novara 1430, March 23 1849
Battle of Novara 1715, March 23 1849
_______________________
1
Fabris noted that, due to the Napoleonic connection, the Rivoli Plateau, “…still exercised a strong attraction on the senior Piedmontese officers.” Vol. III, p. 120.
2
The Duke replaced General Federici on June 3rd, when the latter was named Governor of the Fortress of Verona.
3
Memorie Inedite, p. 255.
4
Talleyrand-Périgord, p. 144. In his diary, Lieutenant Ferrero identifies this messenger as Doctor Canella, and that he specified that the city could hold out for six or eight days, p. 75. Canella held the rank of captain. Bortolotti, p. 214, quoting Canella’s memoirs, also says four or five days.
5
Bava, Relazione storica, pp. 40-42, and Relazioni e Rapporti 1848, Vol. I, p. 64. It should be noted the defences of the Rideau had been further strengthened after Santa Lucia – Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part II, pp. 2-3.
6
Bortolotti, p. 234, gives the higher figure. The use of the term Bersaglieri was widespread at this time. It does not generally indicate any comparison with the elite Piedmontese units so designated. This said, Captain Cassinis’ plucky company may surely be allowed some resemblance.
7
Pinelli, Vol. III, pp. 490-491, Memorie Inedite, p. 262, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol. II, pp. 250-251, and 381-382, Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, pp. 6-7, and Grüll, pp. 300-303. Both sides exaggerate enemy loss. Hilleprandt, 1866, Vol I, p. 198, gives the Austrian wounded as one officer, and 46 men.
8
Here, on page 491, Pinelli mistakenly relates that Major Scharinger was buried along with Steiber. Sharinger would have doubtless been saddened by the news of his demise.
9
Fabris, Part 3, p.210, Grüll, pp. 305-307, Thurn. P. 35, and Memorie Inedite, pp. 263-264.
10
Pinelli, Vol III, p. 521, and Memorie Inedite, p. 264.
11
Fabris, Part III, pp. 142-143.
12
Della Rocca states that he objected to the operation primarily on the grounds of the danger of disease amongst the troops, p.78.
13
It will be recalled that these troops had been blockaded there since March.
14
Pinelli, p. 546.
15
Troubetzkoi, p. 113, describes the order as “pompous”. Bava himself modestly described the action as, “… one of the most brilliant in military history …”, Bava, p.43.
16
Ferrero, Notes, p. 153. In the event, this transfer did not take place.
17
Memorie Inedite, pp. 273-275.
18
Soriga, Renato, „Il corpo degli studenti pavesi nella campagna del 1848”, Bollettino della Società pavese di storia patria, Pavia 1912, pp. 238-239.
14
The Battle of Custoza
Since his return to Verona from Vicenza, Marshal Radetzky had been awaiting further reinforcements, to enable him to launch an all out attack on Carlo Alberto. By mid July, he had four Army Corps in the immediate area of Verona, available for mobile operations, over 47,000 men. Another Corps was forming in Legnago (See Appendix XVI). Furthermore, Carlo Alberto, as discussed, had divided his own forces into two groups, the larger of the two beginning to undertake siege operations around Mantua. He, too, had received reinforcements, in the form of two new divisions. The 2nd Reserve Division, of Lieutenant-General Visconti, was composed of men from the classes of 1817-19, called up into the new ‘Fourth Battalions’ of infantry regiments, starting in April. Recruited mainly in Lombardy, the 12 battalions of the division, divided into four Provisional Regiments, were deployed on the west bank of the River Mincio by the end of June, after a limited amount of training. The so-called Lombard Division, commanded by General Ettore Perrone, though, was even less fortunate.
Newly recruited, with hardly any training, and also badly clothed and equipped, they w
ere not fit for anything other than static operations, and, as noted, had been employed as such south of Mantua. Major Francesco Lorenzini, a Lombard officer, lamented the clothing and equipment of these troops as they marched in:
What was the state of this blessed river [sic], you can’t believe it. When I think about it, still it seems that I’m dreaming. The officers had little of what they needed, and this for many good reasons that it’s better not to tell. The soldiers lacked the most needed items. Whole battalions wore the cloth uniform; others had the canvas jacket. A battalion which had the tunic of cloth, didn’t have the greatcoat. Whole companies didn’t have cartridge boxes, and carried the ammunition in the pockets of their trousers. Only a few, other than those which they already wore, had a second pair of shoes. Not everybody had a change of underwear. Almost nobody had the scabbard for the bayonet (not too bad), and the most essential objects for the cleaning of their person, and of clothes and weapons.1
Radetzky Plans his Offensive
Radetzky now formulated his detailed plans to overwhelm the Piedmontese. The prelude to the main attack was to be, as several times before, a move on the Rivoli Plateau. The primary purpose of this was to contain General De Sonnaz’ troops on that wing, and thus prevent him from reinforcing his troops on the right, opposite Verona. The second phase, on the following morning, would be a massive attack involving eight brigades, the whole of I and II Corps, straight at the strongest point of the Piedmontese line. Once this was broken, the King’s forces would be split in two, and could be rolled up either in the north or south.
On the 21st, from the still incomplete IV Corps, the Marshal combined the brigades of Prince Franz Liechtenstein and Major-General Degenfeld, and placed Major-General Ferdinand Simbschen in command. One battalion, two squadrons, and five guns were removed, leaving Simbschen with some 6,000 men. This very large brigade was then ordered forward.2 All of these evolutions and plans led to a series of complicated, confused, and confusing actions, fought over difficult terrain and in blistering heat, during the next four days, and which collectively became known as the Battle of Custoza.
JULY 22ND
Rivoli
Austrian Deployment and Plans
As with IV Corps, there had been some changes in the composition of Count Thurn’s forces, with additional troops coming from the North Tirol. Overnight on July 21st, FML Thurn bivouacked just east of the Val Fredda. His immediate force consisted of two columns. Under the command of Major Nissel were two companies of the 1st Feld-Jäger Battalion (418 men), four companies of IR Wellington (758 men), three companies of III/Vienna Volunteers (480), 150 volunteer Ländesschützen, and Rocket Battery Nr. 6. In the centre, under Lieutenant-Colonel Baron von Hohenbruck, were six companies of IR Archduke Ludwig (918), one company, IR Baden (140), 50 volunteer Ländesschützen, and a half mountain howitzer battery. In reserve, under Colonel Zobel, were six companies, IR Baden (937), one company of Kaiser Jäger (139), and the other half of the mountain battery. Thurn, after clearing the position of Corona, was to advance against the Rivoli Valley through Caprino.
The separate column of FML Lichnowsky was encamped on the west bank of the Adige, near Brentino. Lichnowsky’s command comprised four companies, IR Archduke Ludwig (767), four companies of Kaiser Jäger (571), one and a half squadrons of Liechtenstein Chevauxlegers, half of Rocket Battery Nr. 1, four guns of Foot Battery Nr. 12, and half of the Vorarlberg Battery. Lichnowsky’s task was to advance along the river valley towards Rivoli. Both commands were to march at 02:00 on July 22nd. Thurn’s intention was to push the enemy back into the Rivoli Valley, and then, with the additional room to manoeuvre, flank them on his own right.3
Piedmontese Deployment (see Appendix XV)
The force defending the plateau on the morning of July 22nd, consisted of four infantry battalions, two companies, and four sections of artillery, all commanded by Colonel Damiano, about 3,600 men, and eight guns. In the north, the outposts were II/14th Infantry Regiment, Major San Vitale. San Vitale also had two light mountain guns on hand, under the direction of Sergeant Brera. His men were deployed between Corona and Monte Baldo.4
On the road about two kilometres north of Rivoli, was 2/I Bersaglieri, Lieutenant Prola. Between the two, were posted II/14th Regiment, the four howitzers. A short distance behind these, were deployed I/14th Regiment, a section of the 4th Field Battery, Lieutenant De Roussy, the Piacenza Volunteer Company, Captain Landi, and finally, in the vicinity of Rivoli itself, was III/16th Infantry Regiment, Major Danesi. Also present was a detachment of 20 sappers.
The Action of Rivoli, 22nd July
The Austrians broke camp at about 03:30. The initial clash occurred around 05:00, as Thurn’s Advance Guard, two companies of 1st Feld-Jäger Battalion, and three of Vienna Volunteers bumped into Major San Vitale’s outposts just south of Ferrara di Monte Baldo. These were the 2nd Cacciatori Company of Captain Enrico Cerale, and from them came a heavy small arms fire. Progress in the narrow valley was extremely slow, and not until around 11:00, were the attackers able to push San Vitale’s battalion back, by threatening his left flank. At this point, having concentrated his men, Major San Vitale pulled back towards Rivoli.
Further south, II/14th Regiment unexpectedly came under artillery fire from across the Adige. The previous night, Staff Captain Mollinary had managed to get an 18 pounder cannon, and a 7 pound howitzer emplaced on Monte Pastello, on the east bank of the river, just south of Dolcè.5 In the morning, a battery of rockets was added. These proceeded to bombard the positions of II/14th, defending a barricade across the road from the north. About the same time San Vitale was being forced to withdraw, these troops, under fire from the battery, also pulled back to join I/14th and the other units north of Rivoli.
Count de Sonnaz, having been informed of the attack on his left flank, himself moved towards the threatened point, accompanied by two sections of 7th Field Artillery Battery, quickly followed by the Student Bersaglieri, Captain Cassinis, and, a little later, elements of 16th Infantry Regiment.6 Once on the spot, he made his dipositions to face the next phase of the Austrian operation. By 15:30, he was ready for Thurn’s next move. He had deployed, on heights a few kilometres north of Rivoli, I and II/14th Regiment, screened by Prola’s Bersaglieri. Behind Prola, were the Student Bersaglieri. In support, were the two sections of 4th and 7th Field Artillery Batteries, and the section of short howitzers. The line was backed up by Major San Vitale’s III/14th Regiment, and another section of 7th Field Artillery Battery. In reserve, one company of Major Danesi’s III/16th Regiment was posted on Monte Pipolo, and the other three to the west, across the road. Also on the way, were the additional troops of 16th Regiment, and also the Piacenza Volunteer Company, which was actually arriving as the action began.
About half an hour earlier, FML Thurn had begun to form a battle line. In front, in two wings on the Austrian right, were the two companies of 1st Feld-Jäger Battalion, and one company of Vienna Volunteers. On the left, stood one company of IR Baden, one company of Vienna Volunteers, and the company of Kaiser Jäger. Behind these, a second line was formed. To the west of the road, were three companies of IR Wellington. Astride it, were assembled six companies of IR Archduke Ludwig, and the rockets and mountain guns. The line finished on the left with the reserve, one company of Kaiser Jäger, and six companies of IR Baden. Thurn’s ponderous advance, in the area east of Caprino, finally began a little after 15:30.
As the advance continued, the skirmishers on either side began to exchange fire. The Austrian right moved to flank De Sonnaz, causing him to move two guns of the 7th Field Battery to his left, along with three of Major San Vitale’s companies. As the main opposing lines closed, at about 16:00, the head of FML Lichnowky’s eight company column also appeared, coming from the northeast, on the Piedmontese right-front, near the monument to Napoleon’s great victory at Rivoli in 1797. Reacting quickly, Colonel Cauda pushed elements of II/14th Regiment up onto the heights. These swiftly attacked Lichnowsky’s Advance Guard, 9th K
aiser Jäger division, Captain Baron Pirquet, driving them back onto the main body, which then withdrew in confusion. Pirquet was killed in this encounter, as was one of Lichnowsky’s brigade commanders, Major-General Mátiss. The column’s performance had been very poor.7
To the west, the Student Bersaglieri had been committed in support of 14th Regiment, along with Prola’s company. Their effectiveness was such that Thurn reinforced his line south of Caprino, with three further companies, those of IR Wellington. These attempted a bayonet charge, which failed. During this fighting, Lieutenant Prola was killed. Now, De Sonnaz began to threaten Thurn’s right and centre. Menaced by these moves, and with no sign of Lichnowsky, in frustration, Thurn ordered a withdrawal, and pulled back above Caprino at around 18:00. Lichnowsky had already returned to the area around Preabocco. As Thurn retreated, the reinforcements of 16th Regiment reached Rivoli.
De Sonnaz had held off a larger force with comparative ease, aided by his opponent’s clumsy and ill-coordinated movements. Casualties were not heavy, on either side. De Sonnaz lost three officers and 31 men killed, and six officers (including Major Danesi) and 86 men wounded. Austrian casualties numbered one general, two officers, and 20 men killed, five officers and 128 men wounded, and 33 men missing.
Radetzky's Marches Page 30