Having held off the enemy attack, General De Sonnaz now considered the situation. There was no doubt that the enemy had further offensive intentions. Fearing himself isolated and vulnerable, he ordered an evacuation of all positions north of Rivoli. His consequent withdrawal towards Peschiera, ironically kept his two wings in contact, and not separated, as Radetzky had hoped. These withdrawals began at around 02:00 on July 23rd, and the last troops were on the move by 04:00. All of this took place in the pouring rain. The positions designated were, for 16th Infantry Regiment, Cavajon. The 14th Infantry Regiment, 2/1st Bersaglieri, the Piacenza Volunteers, and one section of 4th Field Artillery Battery, were ordered to Calmasino, a little over two kilometres southwest of Cavajon. The Cassinis Company, and the two sections of 7th Field Artillery Battery were to withdraw through Sandrà and Pastrengo. By the time all of these evolutions were completed, a major offensive was taking place between Bussolengo in the north down to Villafranca in the south.
JULY 23RD (see map in colour section)
Austrian Deployment
The main attack was to be made, from Verona, upon the arc of heights west of the city, upon which are the three hilltop villages of, from north to south, San Giustina, Sona, and Sommacampagna. There were also the additional strongpoints of the Sanctuary of the Madonna del Monte, between Sona and Sommacampagna, and that of the Madonna della Salute, between the first named and Sommacampagna. This rough semi-circle, arched towards Verona, some eight kilometres in circumference, was pierced by a number of roads, particularly in the case of the main thoroughfare from Verona. These cuttings were steep, rocky ravines.
The strength of the attacking Austrian Corps on the 23rd of July was as follows:
I Corps, FML Wratislaw
II Corps, FML D’Aspre
Division Carl Schwarzenberg
Division Wimpffen
Brigade Strassoldo
Brigade Friedrich Liechtenstein
3,483 men
3,322 men
Brigade Clam
Brigade Simbschen (Kerpan)
3,404 men
2,726 men
Division Felix Schwarzenberg
Division Schaaffgotsche
Brigade Supplikatz
Brigade Edmund Schwarzenberg
3,867 men
4,246 men
Brigade Wohlgemuth
Brigade Gyulai
2,388 men
4,076 men
Reserve Artillery
Reserve Artillery
381 men
455 men
Corps Total: 13,523 men
Corps Total: 14,825 men
1, 441 horses
1,469 horses8
Dispositions for the attack were as follows:
The right wing, under the command of FML Franz Schaaffgotsche, was composed of the reinforced brigade of Edmund Schwarzenberg, supported the cavalry brigade of Major-General R. Schaaffgotsche, a unit of IV Corps. The cavalry were to threaten the Piedmontese flank, while Brigade Schwarzenberg attacked their positions around S. Giustina, reinforced by I and II/IR Fürstenwärther, troops of the Verona garrison. This advance was intended as a feint. On their left, Brigades F. Liechtenstein, Kerpan, and Gyulai were to attack between Sona and Sommacampagna. Brigades Supplikatz, Strassoldo, and Wohlgemuth were assigned the objective of Sommacampagna itself, whilst on the extreme left, Brigade Clam would threaten the enemy right flank. All of these movements were intended to commence from about 01:00. The weather, however, was uncooperative. Very heavy thunderstorms pounded the whole area, forcing a postponement until morning. Chance, once again, decreed that the weather cleared around dawn.
Sona
Having finally reached the area west of Mancalacqua, as instructed, Gyulai’s brigade formed two attack columns. The first was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Odelga, and the second by Major Desimon. Odelga, with I/IR Ernst, two companies of II/St. George Grenzer, three guns of the brigade battery, a section of uhlans, and some pioneers would attempt to storm the heights south of Sona, by moving through the ravine north of Madonna del Monte. In the meanwhile, Desimon with his own II/IR Ernst, 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion, the other three guns of the brigade battery, a detachment of sappers, and a section of uhlans, would attack Sona head on. In reserve, would remain Rittmeister Asbahs, with the remaining four companies of Grenzer, and the main body of his 2/ Kaiser Uhlans.
The advance began at about 06:30, but progress was painfully slow, up the steep, rock-strewn slopes. Defending the area south of Bosco, as far as Monte Bello, were II/2nd Infantry Regiment, Major Crud, III/2nd Infantry Regiment, Major Chevalier de Regard de Villeneuve, two companies of I/Bersaglieri, and the small Parmesan and Modenese battalions, along with three sections of the 2nd Position Battery, some 2,000 men, and six guns.
Major Desimon’s column managed to claw its way up towards Sona, pushing in the Piedmontese pickets, forcing them from three farm houses on the slopes. Between 08:30 and 09:00, the two battalions were repulsed in an attack on Sona itself, and the village cemetery, in large part due to the 16 pounders of 2nd Position Battery deployed there. A further push about half an hour later was also held. However, further troops, in the form of Brigades Kerpan and Liechtenstein now moved to join the struggle.9
First, Colonel Bianchi, of IR Kinsky, sent 1/IR Kinsky, Captain Ritter Jacomini, and 2/IR Kinsky, Captain Beckh-Widmannstetter, up the heights to join the attack, shortly followed by 3/IR Kinsky, Captain Oliva. In addition, these were reinforced by 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß, from Brigade Liechtenstein. The latter’s IR Franz Carl also moved in that direction, both units having already taken their objectives further south. During the fighting in the village, men of Colonel Odelga’s regiment were observed to pull rifles from the defenders hands through a loopholed wall, by their muzzles and bayonets.10 Between 10:30, and 11:00, Sona was abandoned by the defenders, on the orders of Colonel Mollard, commanding officer of 2nd Infantry Regiment. Mollard could clearly see that they would otherwise have been completely overwhelmed. The Savoyards withdrew north, towards Bosco, and then west.
Bosco – San Giustina
As the withdrawal from Sona took place, the advance of the reinforced Brigade Edmund Schwarzenberg began. Defending this area were four battalions, the 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel Boyl, and I/2nd Regiment, Major Dulac, along with two sections of 7th Field Artillery Battery, and the Modenese and Parmesan artillery sections. West of Bosco, two squadrons of the Novara Cavalry Regiment were in place. Viewing the enemy advancing from both the east and south, and attacked by the two battalions of IR Fürstenwärther, and the combined Haugwitz Battalion at Bosco, Boyl immediately abandoned the position, and hurriedly withdrew towards Peschiera. Schwarzenberg was engaged by the Savoyard troops on Monte Corno, but these were pushed back by the two battalions of IR Kaiser, with peripheral help from the Combined/IR Haugwitz Battalion. Schwarzenberg followed up the enemy withdrawal as far as Castelnuovo.
Madonna del Monte
South of Monte Bello, the Sanctuary of Madonna del Monte was held by two companies of the 2nd Tuscan Line Regiment, and further south, on a separate height, that of the Madonna della Salute, was occupied by two companies of the 1st Tuscan Line Regiment. Both positions were formidable objectives. In reserve, were a further six companies of the 2nd Tuscan Regiment. The force, numbering 1,200 men, was commanded by Major Ciarpaglini.
Advancing against Ciarpaglini, now came elements of Brigade Liechtenstein. Behind Liechtenstein, Count Wimpffen, the divisional commander, held Brigade Kerpan in reserve. The general had formed his force into two columns. Liechtenstein’s right column comprised 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß, II/IR Franz Carl, and one squadron of Reuss Hussars, with four guns of of the brigade battery, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 2. Ciarpaglini was outnumbered by almost three to one, although in an extremely strong position.
The attack began at around 07:30, as Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß’s men moved on Madonna del Monte. Initially, it was not
thought that the position was occupied, until the Tuscan outposts were encountered. Amazingly, it was then carried in the first rush, after a lively exchange of fire. Now moving north towards Sona, Weiß’ 4th Company, and particularly Lieutenant Schuller, became involved in a celebrated incident.
As the battalion crossed the gorge between Madonna del Monte and Monte Bello, it collided with a small force of 2nd Infantry Regiment, escorting Major-General Menthon D’Aviernoz, the commander of the Savoy Brigade forward on a reconnaissance. In a short action, the General was wounded, and captured by Lieutenant Schuller, as were most of his men. In Captain Ferrero’s diary, the event was described as treachery, as it was alleged that the Austrians advanced with white flags, shouting that they were changing sides. This account was widely taken up, but subsequent evidence, including correspondence between the two commanding generals, appears to firmly reject the allegation. (See Appendix XVII). It nevertheless remained contentious for many years.11
The left column of Liechtenstein’s Brigade, initially three to four hundred paces to the left of the first one, consisted of II/Kaiser Jäger, Major Count Castiglione, I/IR Franz Carl, a hussar squadron, the other two guns of the brigade battery, and two platoons of pioneers. Its advance was directed upon and around the southern flank of Madonna del Monte, but was only lightly engaged, subsequently moving to the northwest.
Madonna della Salute
The objective of Brigade Supplikatz was the Madonna della Salute, just north of Sommacampagna, defended by two companies of Tuscan regulars of the 1st Regiment. The 7th and 8th companies of II/2nd Banal Grenzer, under interim battalion commander, Captain Gruić, in open order, advanced against the heights immediately north of the objective, whilst a third moved on the Madonna della Salute itself. The other three companies of the battalion followed on in support. Behind these, came I and Landwehr/ IR Latour, Colonel Hahne. Hahne’s other battalion, III/Latour, remained in reserve.
Sommacampagna, July 23rd 1848 (Adam Brothers)
As the lead companies approached, the defenders opened a heavy small arms fire upon them. Captain Gruić was mortally wounded, and Oberlieutenant Perlep killed, stalling the attack. The heroic efforts of the other officers, however, inspired the men, and Colonel Hahne also led three of his own companies of I/IR Latour forward. Together, these five companies stormed the heights. III/IR Latour, Major Fürstenberg, had a difficult time advancing on the left, but was finally able to do so with the support of two howitzers brought forward by Staff Captain Kuhn.12
Once on the top, Colonel Hahne pivoted his line to the left, driving the Tuscans across the gorge, and into Sommacampagna. Ciarpaglini’s six reserve companies were now the target for Supplikatz, and were driven in the direction of San Giorgio in Salici. The two companies from Madonna della Salute pulled back into Sommacampagna.
Sommacampagna
Major-General Wohlgemuth, at about 07:00, started his attack on the village of Sommacampagna. His four battalions were to assault the eastern and southern approaches to the village, which was defended by I/13th Infantry Regiment, Major Bonafox, about 800 men, and two Tuscan field guns, commanded by The Tuscan artillery Captain Ferdinando Della-Seta, who, in another letter to his brother, told of his arrival there:
You already know that all we Tuscans were in Villafranca; on the 21st. The 2nd Infantry Regiment, and I, along with a section of artillery of two pieces, two caissons, and one caisson of infantry ammunition, were ordered to leave Villafranca, and reach Sommacampagna, with a regiment of Pinerolo infantry. I took position on the top of a hill, commanding the whole of the Verona plain. This was a magnificent position. The enemy could not close our line unnoticed, and the artillery could cover all of the village’s gates.13
The Piedmontese Defence of Sommacampagna, July 23rd 1848 (Grimaldi)
Facing the village from the east, Wohlgemuth placed IV/Kaiser Jäger, Lieutenant-Colonel Chielnicky, in column north of the Verona Road, and III/IR Archduke Albrecht, Lieutenant-Colonel Plietz, south of it. The first attack, by 22/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Schindler, and I/Oguliner Grenzer failed against two large, heavily barricaded farmsteads in front of the heights, held by 1/13th Regiment. The next attack, however, was overwhelming, with the two Oguliner battalions attacking from the south, Chielnicky and Plietz from the east, and Major Fürstenberg’s III/IR Latour, coming south from the heights east of Madonna della Salute. Major Bonafox’s command, with the two Tuscan companies, was forced back, Captain Brianza’s company being particularly heavily hit.
Captain Della Seta, who seems to have had a remarkably bad run of luck by any standards, described the day’s events in the same letter. The account is, understandably, a stream of consciousness:
At dawn on Sunday the 23rd, a forest of bayonets was covering the plain. The enemy remained there for several hours, deploying a great number of guns against my own artillery. The little village of Sona was three miles from Sommacampagna, and there, some 3,000 Piedmontese troops, with a battery, were deployed. The Austrians attacked first, and our troops made a brilliant stand. I had only two pieces to counter the fire of 12 or 14 guns! The Austrian torrent rapidly neared our outposts, and the fire of musketry redoubled. Our communications with Sona had been cut off four times, and four times re-established. Piedmontese and Tuscan soldiers did their best, but we had only 1,800 men, and the enemy greatly outnumbered them. After three hours of fighting, while the enemy’s artillery was advancing, we were forced to retreat.14
De Sonnaz Retreats
As the various Piedmontese and Tuscan units and individuals retreated, some clashes took place, as at San Giorgio in Salici. Here, Major Bonafox’s I/13th Regiment, and other scattered units, were pushed on towards the River Mincio by Brigade Liechtenstein. The Tuscans were roughly handled by the Hungarians of IR Franz Carl, and Major Ciarpaglini was killed.
By about noon, all of the Piedmontese and Tuscan troops which had been engaged along the line of the Adige at Bussolengo and Sommacampagna, were in retreat, more or less molested by their attackers, some in disorder. By the evening, they were concentrating around Cavalcaselle. There, they were joined by the troops previously on the Rivoli Plateau. In the late evening, Lieutenant-General De Sonnaz had been able to gather most of his left and centre. His right wing, at Villafranca, 3½ battalions, 4 squadrons, and 16 guns, had crossed south of the Tione River, and then marched west.
Of the units not around Cavalcaselle, the three battalions of the 1st Provisional Regiment were ordered, by General Visconti, to Ponti (I/1st), Monzambano (II/1st), and Borghetto (III/1st), to guard the Mincio River crossings. At Ponti, III/3rd Provisional Regiment was already on hand. Visconti also deployed the Tuscan companies in front of Salionze.
Losses for the Imperial forces on the 23rd were a total of 69 killed, 317 wounded, and 218 missing. However, most of the missing had become separated from their parent units, and were subsequently able to re-join them. The heaviest loss was in 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, which had two officers and nine men killed, two officers and 35 men wounded, and 55 men missing.15
Piedmontese/Tuscan losses are given by Fabris as 26 killed, 79 wounded, and 191 prisoners or missing, including the wounded Major-General D’Aviernoz. However, these figures are most questionable. Colonel Mollard’s report states that his own regiment alone, the 2nd Infantry, lost 25 killed and 60 wounded during the day, with these figures also quoted in Memorie Inedite, with the addition of 312 missing. Captain Brianza’s company of I/13th Infantry Regiment is stated, by no less an authority than Carlo Promis, to have suffered 80 killed and wounded at Sommacampagna. In addition, the Tuscan infantry are described as having significant losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners, the first category including their commanding officer, Major Ciarpaglini.16
Plans and Overnight Dispositions
At Carlo Alberto’s Headquarters, in Marmirolo, just over 15 kilometres south of Valeggio, heavy artillery fire had been audible from the northeast since 07:00. The first news of events arrived from Villafranca at arou
nd 11:00, indicating the great strength of the enemy attack, and its focus on the heights west of Verona. There was a clear imperative to act, even though only the King and General Salasco were present in Marmirolo. By 12:00, plans had been formulated by them for a concentration based on Villafranca, to be followed by an attack upon the Austrian left flank. The orders were very quickly issued. These stipulated that General Headquarters, 1st Reserve Division, the Piedmont Brigade, the Aosta Brigade, and the Cavalry Division should mass at Villafranca. The Regina Brigade was ordered from Governolo north, along the east bank of the River Mincio.
In fact, only the Duke of Savoy’s 1st Reserve Division and Major-General Bes’ Piedmont Brigade were able to reach their jump-off positions that evening. The Brigades of Aosta and Regina only received the instructions in the evening. Major-General Sommariva commenced his march at 23:00 that night, and Major-General Trotti’s Regina Brigade proceeded the next morning. Trotti’s orders, though, were changed by Lieutenant-General Bava, and he was now to proceed north along the west bank of the river. Bava also issued separate orders to Colonel Montale’s 17th Infantry Regiment, directing it to Roverbella, north of Marmirolo, to keep a link between the Aosta and Cuneo Brigades. This order, however, was delayed, and only at 11:00 on the 24th, did Montale arrive there.17
The Austrian forces halted for the night, in the following places. The bulk of II Corps was encamped in and around Castelnuovo, with Brigade Schwarzenberg remaining near Sandrà, as a rearguard. I Corps was concentrated around Oliosi with detachments at Salionze, and near Monzmbano. To the south, Brigade Clam bivouacked around Monte Torre, Monte Mamaor, and Custoza. I Reserve Corps spent the night in and around San Giorgio in Salice, where the Field Marshal also made his headquarters. Finally, the cavalry detachment of Colonel Wyß remained in Calzoni, southeast of Sommacampagna. To cover his left flank, Radetzky would bring forward the large brigade of Major-General Simbschen.
Radetzky's Marches Page 31