Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  Gyulai, with, from the left, 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion, I/Archduke Ernst, and II/ Warasdiner St. George, made painfully slow progress in the baking heat. From Perin’s brigade, Captain Nagy, with his 1st division of IR Reisinger and three companies of II/ Vienna Volunteers, after a hard climb, was able to occupy the northeast exit of the village. The combat here then broke down into a series of small close quarter fights, as the rest of I/IR Reisinger, Major Münzer, climbed the slopes.

  By this time, Prince Ferdinando was becoming concerned by both the weight of the enemy attacks, and the thought that the heavy artillery fire to the west might mean that his brother’s 1st Reserve Division could be pulled in that direction, leaving him isolated. Considering the risk of this to be high, he gave orders for the abandonment of Sommacampagna, and a concentration at la Berettara. Unfortunately, before these could be acted upon, a fresh assault on the village came.

  This move, at about 14:00, finally broke into the village itself, the defenders fighting from house to house. The Piedmontese were slowly driven out of their positions. The retreat was directed towards la Berettara, but II/4th Regiment, together with elements of III/4th, lost their way, as related by Colonel Cucchiari, and ended up on the road to Villafranca, to where they withdrew. Prince Ferdinando, with his artillery, three companies of I/4th Regiment, a platoon of III/4th, and a half-squadron of Novara Cavalry marched towards la Berettara, to get into contact with General Bes. The exhausted men of Perin and Gyulai halted for some rest, and reorganisation.46

  La Berrettara

  Between 10:00 and 11:00, as Gyulai and Perin moved on Sommacampagna, General Bes, commanding the Piedmont Brigade, left there with the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Wehrlin, and half of the 3rd Horse Artillery Battery. Bes reached Cà Nuova, just north of la Berettara, just as Brigade Liechtenstein’s advance guard was approaching. II/Kaiser Jäger, Major Count Castiglione, accompanied by three horse artillery pieces was moving over the heights west of Casazze, while the 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß, closed in from that village. Leaving II/3rd Infantry, Major Barone, to delay the enemy, Bes hurried on to take up a position at la Berettara.

  Barone deployed his battalion with two companies facing Castiglione, and moved the other two around to his left, flanking the advancing Kaiser Jäger. Castiglione, engaged in front, was rolled up from his right by a determined effort. Prince Liechtenstein was forced to move I/IR Franz Carl forward to retrieve the situation. Before this fighting escalated, however, General Bes ordered Barone back to the main force. The battalion was posted at Cà Zenolino, east of la Berettara. Bes also sent patrols towards Monte Godio to attempt to link up with the Duke of Savoy’s First Reserve Division.

  Some time after 13:00, as Liechtenstein observed Gyulai’s moves against Sommacampagna, he too, again moved to the attack. I and II/IR Franz Carl, Major Mayer, assaulted Berettara, while Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß’ 9th Feld-Jäger attacked Cà Nuova. Weiß met determined resistance from I/3rd Infantry Regiment, and made little progress, but Mayer’s regiment stormed his objective, ejecting III/3rd Regiment. At this, Major-General Bes ordered an immediate counter-attack, but this completely failed. Bes now retreated to high ground near Bosco, encountering the troops of Prince Ferdinando, who were themselves withdrawing from Sommacampagna. The two forces together positioned themselves here, defended by a 12 gun battery, composed of elements of the 1st Field and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries. Liechtenstein’s progress was halted.

  Inaction of General De Sonnaz

  Early on the 25th, after the departure of the main body of General Wohlgemuth’s brigade from Borghetto, only I/Oguliner Grenz Regiment, Major Dragollović, and two squadrons of Radetzky Hussars were left to guard the town and bridge. Three of the battalion’s companies, and one squadron, were despatched on a reconnaissance south towards Volta, along the west bank of the Mincio. This force encountered the outposts of 16th Infantry Regiment, and, after a heavy but inconclusive action, it then returned to Borghetto. This skirmish may have caused General De Sonnaz to consider that an attack upon him at Volta might follow.47 In any case, De Sonnaz had organisational and morale issues to address before he could move with any hope of success.

  At approximately 11:00, a courier, the Milanese Lieutenant Count Torelli, arrived at the General’s headquarters, and delivered to him the despatch from Baron Bava, which required him to support the main effort that day, by attacking the enemy at Borghetto. De Sonnaz initially simply shrugged, and intimated that his men were too exhausted to move. Torelli, indeed, had himself already noted that some rest and an uplift in morale were certainly needed. Nevertheless, the 38 year old Torelli proceeded to badger, plead, and reason with General De Sonnaz, as to the great need for the latter to take action. A young Lieutenant on II Corps’ own staff, Giuseppe Govone, also urged the general to act. Finally, De Sonnaz sent Torelli back to General Bava, with a message that he would march on Borghetto by 17:00.48

  Brigade Kerpan attacks Monte Arabica and Monte Molimento

  That morning, as his brother requested further probing, Prince Vittorio Emanuele despatched I/2nd Grenadier Regiment, with two sections of the 9th Field Artillery Battery to reconnoitre over Monte Godio. This force saw large numbers of enemy troops advancing from the northwest, and therefore took up positions on Monte Godio itself. The Cuneo Brigade was quickly moved forward in support. I/7th Infantry Regiment occupied Monte Arabica, and II/7th, Monte Molimento, on the right, slightly to the northwest, where a section of the 3rd Field Artillery Battery was also placed. III/7th Regiment was placed in reserve, on heights midway between Custoza and Staffalo. I and III/8th Regiment were also placed in reserve on the Belvedere of Custoza, a major vantage point north of the town. II/8th was assigned to guard the Artillery Park there. The Duke of Savoy then went himself to the Belvedere.

  The Austrian Brigade of Colonel Kerpan, a little over 2,700 strong, after a two hour march that morning, was ordered by FML D’Aspre, just before noon, to clear Monte Godio of the enemy. Eight companies of Szluiner Grenzer swept up the slopes, compelling I/2nd Grenadiers and their supporting battery to withdraw. An attempt by Kerpan to advance further, against Monte Arabica and Monte Molimento, however, was repulsed.

  To support a new effort, from the Corps Reserve, 2nd 12 Pounder Battery and Rocket Battery Nr. 2 were brought forward and placed on Monte Godio, near the position already occupied by Kerpan’s brigade battery. Within rifle range of this position, though, stood the enemy occupied hamlet of Bagolino. To clear the enemy outposts from here, the artillery guard, 1/IR Kinsky, Oberlieutenant Heusser, attacked and captured the place, but was promptly thrown out again. Only with the additional intervention of 4/IR Kinsky, Oberlieutenant Schäfer, was the artillery able to operate safely.

  With the additional gun support, two further attacks were made up the slopes of Monte Arabica and Monte Molimento by the Szluiner and IR Kinsky. Both were repulsed. A third effort, with four reserve companies of IR Kinsky, led by Major Fürst, on the right, with Major Mollinary’s Szluiner on the left, pushed up onto the heights. At this point, I and II/7th Regiment began to give ground, and only the presence of the Duke of Savoy himself, encouraging and leading without regard to his own safety, prevented a disaster. The assault was finally beaten back, the worn out Austrians falling back to Monte Godio, at about 17:00. Another move was promulgated by Major Fürst, and preparations made, but due to a misunderstanding and poor communications, nothing occurred. Any further effort now required reinforcements. 49

  Feniletto, Gardoni, and Ripa (Monte Mamaor)

  At about 10:00, firing began around Monte Mamaor. The Austrian Brigades of Strassoldo and Clam, already on the east bank of the Mincio, were to be joined by those of Wohlgemuth and Supplikatz from the west bank. Wohlgemuth, having left I/Oguliner Grenzer and two squadrons of Radetzky Hussars in Borghetto, moved the rest of his brigade to Valeggio. Likewise, Supplikatz left four companies of II/2nd Banal Grenzer guarding Monzambano Bridge, and took up a position close to the Tirod
ella House, just west of Fornelli. About 12:00, Colonel Wolf’s I and II/IR Haynau (Brigade Simbschen) moved to Clam’s left flank. By about 13:00, these four brigades and two battalions faced the six battalions of the Aosta Brigade and the 1st Guard Regiment.

  The Duke of Savoy directed the Guards to Monte Mamaor along with two sections of the 9th Field Artillery Battery. It was difficult terrain, and the heat, as discussed, pitiless. In addition, the men had not been fed. Despite these problems, Major-General Biscaretti’s inspired leadership pulled his men together, and got the regiment up onto Monte Mamaor. Unfortunately, due to miscommunication, only two sections of the 9th Field Battery accompanied them. Biscaretti was just in time.

  Detaching two companies to his right, Biscaretti moved with the rest of the regiment, to the west, putting pressure on the left flank of Major-General Clam. As General Bava watched the ascent of Monte Mamaor by the 1st Guards Regiment, he decided to attack the left of Wratislaw’s I Corps with units of the Aosta Brigade. Ordering the majority of Major-General Sommariva’s command to remain in position, he moved II/5th Infantry Regiment, Major Mollard, 1 and 2/6th Infantry Regiment, two sections of the 8th Field Artillery Battery, and 5th and 6th Squadrons of the Aosta Cavalry towards Feniletto. These moves began a little after 13:00.

  As Mollard led his men along the southern slopes, the four guns, escorted by the two 6th Regiment companies, he had advanced about 800 paces, before coming under heavy musketry from Feniletto, occupied by men of II/IR Prohaska, The fire was particularly heavy from a large barricaded building, the Venturelli House. The gun crews suffered appreciable loss. This setback caused Bava to commit another Aosta battalion, II/6th Regiment, Major Galateri. With 10 companies, he was able to take the place, and the defenders, along with troops of IR Haynau were pushed back off the heights.50

  As Schneidawind said, “With great determination, the Piedmontese pressed on, scaling the heights of Mamaor, pushing into Feniletto, under fire from three batteries upon the heights of Gardoni and Ripa.” Under this pressure, Clam, in the words of Willisen, “…left Feniletto (on the south slopes of Monte Mamaor) and Riva, making a kind of left wheel to the rear; the right wing stayed at San Zeno, the left wing came back to Monte Vento.”51 Clam’s alignment was now north-south, with his right wing immediately south of Fornelli. It was about 15:00.

  The 1st Guards now pushed westwards. Their advance was targeted against Ripa, a village on the western edge of Monte Mamaor, half-way between Santa Lucia and Fornelli, which was held by II/IR Prohaska. At the same time, the Austrian I Corps commander, Count Wratislaw, had also ordered troops of Brigade Supplikatz forward in support of Clam. III/IR Latour was directed to Ripa, Landwehr/IR Latour, one battery, and a half rocket battery to Upper Gardoni (immediately south of Ripa), and I/IR Latour to Gardoni (below the former).

  As the Guards also neared Ripa, the ten companies of the Aosta Brigade approached Gardoni, which was held by I/IR Haynau. Several assaults on both of these villages, were, however, repulsed. A move was also made to the west by two detached Guards companies. These climbed to the top of Monte Vento, which was occupied by four companies of the 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, which was under the temporary command of Captain Baron Lütgendorf. The Baron swiftly led three of them against the attackers, who were then unceremoniously driven back towards Monte Mamaor. 52

  At around 15:30, orders were issued to halt these attacks, and by 16:00, the 1st Guard Regiment and the 10 Aosta Brigade companies were in retreat from Monte Mamaor, as the intermixed brigades of Clam and Supplikatz advanced over it. Feniletto was retaken by II/IR Prohaska and elements of the Gradiscaner Grenzer, although it had been set alight.

  Just before this setback occurred, at about 15:00, Count Torelli arrived with the King’s entourage with De Sonnaz’ message that he would be in a position to attack Valeggio by 18:00. Initial reactions of disappointment quickly resolved themselves into a determination to hold on. However, word soon arrived from Prince Vittorio Emanuele, in the form of his Chief of Staff, Colonel Della Rocca, who stated that he would be unable to defend the Custoza hills for very much longer against the increasing numbers of enemy troops.

  At this point, all present realised that the battle was lost. Initial orders to the Prince instructed him to hold his positions until 18:00, whether or not any reinforcements reached him. He then protested these in person. It rapidly became clear that only two options remained. Either all the scattered forces between Roverbella and Villafranca should be regrouped and sent forward, in the hope that De Sonnaz’ action would ease the pressure on them, or a withdrawal must be made.

  Sense was now seen, and the King instructed that De Sonnaz be informed that he should not now attack Borghetto. Instead, it was left to his judgement as to whether to withdraw his troops to Goito, while leaving a sufficient number to hold the extremely important position of Volta. If, however, in his judgement, he deemed it absolutely necessary, he was authorised to abandon the latter and concentrate at Goito. This latitude was to prove crucial. The despatch was entrusted to Captain Talleyrand-Périgord, as he recorded in his memoirs, “This order was written in pencil by Colonel Cossato, on a leaf from my portfolio.” The Captain was then assigned, personally by the King, an escort of two Carabinieri, and sent on his way.53

  Cà Zenolino and Cà del Sole

  As seen, after their conquest of Sommacampagna, the brigades of Perin and Gyulai had remained in that area, both to rest and to reorganise. Having done so, between 16:30 and 17:00, they began to advance southwest from there, Perin having left four companies of I/IR Reisinger to hold the village.

  On the (Austrian) left, Perin advanced II/IR Reisinger, Major Münzer, and 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Major Bauer against the hills of Cà Zenolino, supported by the forward elements of Brigade Gyulai. The defenders, two companies of II/3rd Infantry Regiment, were, after a brief resistance, forced back. They withdrew to Cà del Sole. Gyulai and Perin were given a one hour rest.

  Positioned in Cà del Sole, were I and II/3rd Infantry Regiment, together with three sections of the 1st Field Artillery Battery, Captain Lurago, and two of the 3rd Horse Artillery Battery. In reserve, stood 1, 3, and 4/4th Infantry Regiment, and the other four guns of the 3rd Horse Battery. The defence here was personally led by the Duke of Genoa.

  At around 16:30, the Austrian advance continued. As Perin and Gyulai drove back the Duke of Genoa’s right flank, Prince Friedrich Liechtenstein assaulted the left. His advance was headed by I and II/IR Archduke Franz Carl, Major Mayer. The Austrian advance was greatly hindered by the broken terrain. Attacks and counterattack alternated with firefights. Finally, Mayer’s regiment stormed Cà del Sole, pushing the defenders back down into the deep Staffalo Valley.

  The retreat was gallantly covered by two squadrons of the Novara Cavalry and the 1st Field Artillery Battery:

  When the retreat became unavoidable, only the third gun with Second-Lieutenant Lenchantin and Corporal d’Olivero stood firm to cover the retreat of the battery. Suddenly, a squadron of uhlans advanced and tried to seize the whole battery; but d’Oliviero, imperturbable, aimed the artillery piece and routed the enemy cavalry with grapeshot fire. The gun was thus safe, and managed to join the rest of the battery at Custoza. Here the battery covered itself with glory: three times the enemy surrounded it, but every time the battery stood firm and repulsed the enemy with grapeshot.54

  Prince Ferdinando’s forces retreated on Villafranca. Colonel Wyß, with his small force of two squadrons of Archduke Carl Uhlans, two of Radetzky Hussars, and three guns, was unable to capitalise on the situation, capturing only 52 prisoners, and a caisson. The two available cavalry brigades were not far enough forward to have any impact.

  Final Austrian Assaults at Bagolino and Custoza – Retreat of 1st Reserve Division

  By about 17:30, both sides could observe the arrival of Brigade Edmund Schwarzenberg around Monte Godio. Schwarzenberg’s column had been marching at the double since 12:30, from Cavalcaselle, some three kilometres west of Cas
telnuovo. In the searing heat, about a third of the men had fallen out, and 16 died of heatstroke.55 Nevertheless, these men, many rendered almost insensible by the heat and fatigue, were immediately formed into two attack columns. That on the (Austrian) right consisted of II/IR Kaiser, Major Medel, with I/IR Kaiser to the rear. That on the left comprised I and II/IR Fürstenwärther, Colonel Kleinberg, followed by the IR Haugwitz Battalion. Medel made the direct approach towards Bagolino, while Kleinberg attempted to move around the enemy right, further to the east, up a steep rise. As the advance took place, the Piedmontese were pounded by artillery fire, that of 12 Pounder Battery Nr. 2 being particularly effective.

  The defenders here, I and III/8th Infantry Regiment, already shaken by the bombardment, and facing a bold assault, were routed from Bagolino. Behind them, I and II/7th Regiment, however, held firm on Monte Arabica and Monte Molimento, between the former and Staffalo. Schwarzenberg’s first attack was held here. He quickly organised another.

  This time, Major Medel’s two battalions of IR Kaiser moved on the right, against Monte Arabica and the Belvedere of Custoza. In the centre, were interposed 10 companies of Szluiner Grenzer, of Brigade Kerpan. To the left, I and II/IR Fürstenwärther advanced over the eastern slopes of Monte Molimento. Before this attack, I/2nd Guard Regiment and II/8th Infantry Regiment conducted a very difficult fighting retreat, across the broken terrain. The guns of 3rd Field Battery were under constant fire from the Austrian skirmishers as they withdrew. At one point, a counterattack by 4th Fusilier/II/8th Regiment cost the company its captain and 12 men, but saved the guns from capture. At length, the battery was able to deploy at Custoza.

  The Piedmontese 7th Infantry Regiment, along with I and III/8th Regiment, and II/2nd Guards withdrew from the heights, and marched southeast to Villafranca. In Custoza there still remained the 1st Guard Regiment, I/2nd Guard Regiment, II/8th Infantry Regiment, Captain Lions’ Bersaglieri Company, and two batteries. Schwarzenberg’s relentless advance now came upon these.