Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  Final Actions in Lombardy

  With the capitulation of Peschiera, outside the Venetian Lagoon only the fortresses of Rocca D’Anfo and Osoppo remained to be taken. Two days after the Armistice, Rocca D’Anfo, defended by the 300 Finanzieri despatched there by Durando, was also surrendered, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. In Venetia, however, the garrison of Ossopo refused to accept the Convention and declined to give up.45

  In addition to the forts, appreciable forces were still under arms in the field. These included the 5,000 regular troops and eight guns of Major-General Giacomo Durando, and approximately 3,000 irregulars under Giuseppe Garibaldi. Major-General Saverio Griffini had another 5,000 men, with 20 guns, and Colonel D’Apice, almost 4,000. For all of these formations the Armistice was also theoretically binding, and news of it provoked differing responses.

  Griffini retreated from Brescia on the 12th of August, heading for the valley of the River Oglio at Edolo, passing through the valley of the River Adda on the 19th, then through Grisons, moving through Swiss territory, and subsequently re-entering Piedmont from the north, his column losing many deserters all along the way.

  Giacomo Durando reached Brescia on the 12th, where he first heard of both the Armistice and of Griffini’s recent departure. During the 13th, he marched his column west, towards Bergamo, entering the town that evening, where he was received by Major-General Edmund Schwarzenberg. Subsequent arrangements were made by the two generals for Durando and his troops to move towards Piedmont, in accordance with the Armistice, and his columns finally crossed the border on the 19th. The withdrawal was, of course, a humiliating and difficult task for all ranks.46

  Garibaldi Refuses the Armistice

  Giuseppe Garibaldi, the popular colossus of the Risorgimento, landed in the City of Nizza (Nice), his birthplace, on June 22nd 1848, to a rapturous welcome. He had been in exile in South America since 1836, where had had amassed a formidable reputation as a freedom fighter. In April 1848, Garibaldi and 63 other men sailed from there to fight, in some form, for the freedom of Italy, having heard of the election of Pope Pius IX, and his liberal outlook.

  From Nizza, he and his men moved on to Genoa, arriving there at about noon on June 29th. The Military Governor of the city, have lodged Garibaldi and his men in a barracks in the city, wrote to the War Ministry that his force comprised 17 officers, 1 surgeon, 6 sergeants, and 145 legionaries, and requested instructions as to what he should do with them. He repeated his request on July 2nd, with specific questions –

  Was General Garibaldi allowed to recruit without official consent?

  If he and his men were to remain in Genoa, should he continue to settle them with the reserve battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, despite eventual increases in their strength?

  Was the Garibaldi column to be considered as a part of the garrison?

  Since the War Ministry did not consider Garibaldi and his men to be a part of the Royal Army, the matter became something of a ping-pong ball between that department and the Interior Ministry. The rigid government bureaucracy, not unknown in our own time, had no system with which to deal with this situation.47 Garibaldi himself was rapidly losing patience, and finally offered his force to the Lombard Government, and was sent to Bergamo, to organise a number of volunteers. Shortly thereafter, came the news of the Salasco Armistice.

  Always driven, if not always focused, Giuseppe Garibaldi now decided to undertake a completely pointless continuation of the campaign. His incredible natural energy and doggedness were all the more remarkable, as he was suffering repeated bouts of malaria throughout this period. Garibaldi had reached Monza, 17 kilometres from Milan, when he first heard of the Armistice. His force, at this point, consisted of four battalions (Anzini, Bergamaschi, Vicentine, and Pavian Bersaglieri), about 3,000 men, two 6 pounder mountain guns, and some 40 horsemen. Utterly appalled at the Convention, and personally insulted by the consequent order to disband his volunteers, he embarked upon what has magnificently described by Professor Trevelyan as a, “…personal and political protest…”48

  From Monza, the Garibaldini withdrew to the northwest, towards Como, 30 kilometres away. Almost immediately, desertions began, by men who now, quite understandably, saw little point in risking their lives. After reaching Como, Garibaldi then again moved further northwest, to Lake Maggiore, on the Swiss border. From the town of Arona, at the southern end of the lake, he commandeered two steamers, and with these, and other small craft, embarked his force, by now down to some 1,300 men, with the two mountain guns, and sailed northeast to Luino, on the eastern shore of the lake, some 30 kilometres distant. Here, the column disembarked on the 14th. The proximity of the Swiss border prompted a fresh wave of desertions, rapidly reducing numbers to around 800.49 Garibaldi ordered his rearmost company to get into the place, and occupy the Beccacia, a strong building, surrounded by walls, bushes, and stacks of wood.

  Word of the arrival of insurgent forces had rapidly reached Varese, where three companies of I/Szluiner Grenz IR, some 180 men commanded by Major Mollinary, were bivouacked. At 06:30 on the 15th, Mollinary set off from there to march on Luino, around 22 kilometres to the north, nearing the place a hard 10 ½ hours later. He approached Luino from the south, along the lakeshore. Leaving half a company to guard a nearby bridge, as a precaution, he approached the village. About 1,000 paces from it, his men saw horsemen, who quickly withdrew into it. In fact, both forces were moving into the place at the same time.

  The Szluiner advance guard entered the Beccacia first, although it was a close run thing. As the combat flared, an assault on the building by Major Marrochetti’s Second Column failed. At this point, most of the First Column, the Pavia Battalion, Major Pegorini, fixed bayonets, and attacked head on. At the same time, one of their companies flanked the Szluiner on their own right. Faced with this threat, and with his men strung out along the road, Mollinary ordered what soon became a disorganised retreat. An attempted pursuit by Garibaldi’s few horsemen, however, was repulsed. Mollinary lost Lieutenant Wolf and five men killed, Oberlieutenant Knezević and 13 men wounded, and 24 men missing. The loss of the Garibaldini is unknown.

  After his success at Luino, Garibaldi moved south to Varese, provocatively nearer Milan, but still close enough to cross into the Swiss Confederation, should the need arise. His small force, however, was now to be confronted by what amounted to a large manhunt. FML D’Aspre’s II Corps started to move towards the area. Faced with such a threat, Garibaldi could only play cat and mouse.

  On the evening of August 26th, Garibaldi and his remaining men, about 200 in number, were surprised at the village of Morazzone, south of Varese, by Major-General Baron Simbschen, with I/IR Kinsky, Lieutenant-Colonel Steinberg, one squadron of Kaiser Uhlans, and two guns. The confused combat began around 18:00, and at 21;00, Simbschen was joined by Major-General Edmund Schwarzenberg with I and II/IR Kaiser, and a horse artillery battery. About 23:00, with Morazzone in flames, Garibaldi himself withdrew, later crossing the Swiss frontier with about 30 men. Austrian losses here totalled two men killed, and two officers and 11 NCOs and men wounded. For all practical purposes, operations in Lombardy were finished. Austrian troops had already entered the Duchies of Parma and Modena.

  _______________________

  1

  Nava, pp, 329-330. The cavalry screen is not explained, as the regiments are all assigned to columns. Perhaps the relevant units of the Cavalry Division were to have marched at the head of the columns, up to the point of their deployment.

  2

  Ibid. He pointedly states that the information is ‘…not even mentioned in Bava’s Relation…’, p. 330.

  3

  Grüll, 410-412, and Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, p. 75. Any other Piedmontese loss is not known. Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol. III, pp. 29-30, mistakenly doubles the number of squadrons. He gives the cavalry loss as nine; one officer killed, one officer and three men wounded, and four men missing.

  4

  B
ava, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Volume I, p. 91, and also in Der Kampf Italiens, p. 59.

  5

  Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 217-218.

  6

  Troubetzkoi, Plan XVI.

  7

  Corselli, p. 150, and Pinelli, p. 614. Bortolotti, p. 311, says 1,500 metres.

  8

  Troubetzkoi, Plan XIV and Nava, pp. 332-335. Troubetzkoi does not give any numbers for the Modena Battalion or the Piacenza Volunteer company.

  9

  Troubetzkoi, Plan XV.

  10

  Corselli, p. 150, and Grüll, p. 415. The prisoners are described as, “…mostly Savoyards.”.

  11

  The next morning, an Austrian and a Savoyard were found dead, having bayoneted one another. Grüll, p. 417, and other accounts.

  12

  Figures from Troubetzkoi, Plan XV.

  13

  These deployments are from Nava, pp. 338-341.

  14

  Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, p. 85.

  15

  For both actions, Grüll, 413-418, Kriegsbegebenheiten, Part 3, pp. 79-86, Nava, pp. 329-345, and Corselli, pp. 148-151.

  16

  Garnier-Pagès, Vol. VI, p. 459.

  17

  Pinelli, p. 630, Garnier-Pagès, p. 544, and Bava, p. 60.

  18

  Schneidawind, Der Feldzug…, p. 563.

  19

  Grüll, pp. 423-424, and Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, pp. 157-159.

  20

  KA AFA, July 1848, Document 486.

  21

  Corselli, p. 151, and Pinelli, pp. 619-620. The latter, however, refers to “…more than 200…” missing.

  22

  Memorie Inedite, p. 406, Le Masson, Custoza, p. 146, Ferrero, pp. 117-118, and Pinelli, p. 620.

  23

  Bava, Relazione storica, says 17:00.

  24

  Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 222-223. Quite what the King was thinking is puzzling. Having already admitted defeat to his adversary by asking for an armistice in the first place, it is difficult to imagine Radetzky subsequently changing his mind. The Field-Marshal now held all the cards. It has often been suggested that Carlo Alberto feared a Republican cry of treason in Milan, should he fail to defend the volatile city. Whilst there is much to support this, it is equally possible that the King’s own innate sense of monarchical responsibility propelled him in that direction. Most likely, both factors played a part.

  25

  Corselli, p 151.

  26

  Kriegsbegebenheiten, Part 3, pp. 89-91. The Austrian loss was two wounded. Piedmontese casualties are unknown, although Lieutenant Ferrero, mentions two dead, p. 125.

  27

  Fabris, Vol. III, p. 413, and quoted by Pieri, Storia militare, p. 253.

  28

  Ibid, pp. 423-424.

  29

  The Tuscan column was also in this area.

  30

  Bava, Relazione Storica, Documenti, p. 22. General Sommariva was the Marquis D’Aix de Sommariva.

  31

  Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 225-226.

  32

  Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 225-228. and Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol. III, p. 362.

  33

  Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, pp. 95 and 160, Relazioni e Rapporti, p. 298.

  34

  Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 470-471.

  35

  Grüll, pp. 448-449, and Fabris, p. 475.

  36

  Ibid, and Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol. III, p. 419. The former also reports the capture of two more cannon by 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion and IR Hohenlohe. The loss of these three guns is not mentioned in Piedmontese accounts.

  37

  The Imperial losses are from Kriegsbegenheiten, 1848, Part 3, pp. 161-164, and Grüll, pp. 457-459. The Piedmontese are taken from Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 478-479, where he concludes both sides had “Absolutely insignificant losses…” Considering that Carlo Alberto’s army had been losing stragglers ad deserters at an alarming rate ever since the retreat from Volta, the absence of any figure for men missing must be regarded as highly questionable.

  38

  The Committee of Public Defence was a relic of the former Provisional Government of Milan. Unfortunately for the King, it had, for some reason, not been dissolved at the time of the power transfer to the Royal Government.

  39

  Bava, Relazione storica, pp. 80-87, Costa de Beauregard, pp. 322-338, and Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 251-253. Bava says one Guards battalion.

  40

  Della Rocca, p. 88. Although Della Rocca, a courtier through and through, is not always a reliable witness, this simple observation appears perfectly genuine.

  41

  Sporschil, p. 140.

  42

  Grüll, pp. 470-471.

  43

  Fabris, Volume III, p. 505. Fortunately, this breakdown is only a few pieces short of the Austrian list of ordnance taken when the fortress was surrendered. The shortfall is likely to be guns damaged or dismounted in the bombardments – Grüll, p. 482.

  44

  Dandolo, pp. 130-135, Grüll, pp. 476-478, and Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, pp. 114-116.

  45

  Not until the morning of October 9th, would the white flag appear on the ramparts of the fortress, Kriegsbegebenheiten 1848, Part 4, p. 112.

  46

  See Dandolo, pp. 149-158, and 344-354. Durando, a Royal Officer, was very unfairly criticised for not attacking Schwarzenberg’s force, which numbered only 1,500.

  47

  Sardagna, Garibaldi in Lombardia, pp 38-41.

  48

  Trevelyan, Garibaldi’s Defence of the Roman Republic, p. 50.

  49

  Fabris, Vol. III, p. 525, quoting Garibaldi’s own figures.

  16

  Venice at bay,

  June 1848–March 1849

  With the surprisingly rapid re-conquest of most of Venetia by the Imperial forces, crowned by the defeat of Durando’s army at Vicenza, President Manin’s government now had to face the unpleasant prospect of direct action against the bridgehead at Mestre, gateway to the city itself. The effective removal of both the Papal and Neapolitan Expeditionary Forces from the conflict was a major disaster. Even so, some volunteer units, and many individuals, continued to try and make their way to the city. The arrival there of the celebrated figure of the Neapolitan General Pepe was eagerly awaited.

  The Lagoon

  The Venetian Lagoon, about 145 kilometres in circumference, had, in 1848, a population of about 200,000. Of these, about 110,000 resided in Venice, 30,000 in Chioggia, and 1,000 in Burano. The remainder were scattered across the lagoon.1 It was defended by 60 forts and batteries. More would later be constructed. The nearest place on the mainland to the city of Venice itself was Mestre, eight kilometres to the west. A viaduct connected the two, carrying the railway from Venice to Milan. The foremost work defending the city, Fort Marghera, stood on the mainland between Mestre and Venice, immediately north of that line, and had several outworks. At the southern tip of the Lagoon, 37 kilometres from the city, stood Fort Brondolo, protecting the southern approaches, and the city of Chioggia, almost 5 kilometres to the north of it. Brondolo, the second most important of the defending forts, also had supporting works.

  Edmund Flagg considered that the Lagoon had three zones of defence. First, were the batteries of the Lagoon, the canals, the city, and the navy’s gunboats. Second, came the forts and batteries along the Littoral, from Chioggia to the Lido, and then to Tre-Porti, east of Burano.2 Third, stood the works on the western side of the Lagoon, from Tre-Porti, back to Fort Brondolo, and centring upon Fort Marghera. To defend all of this, not only troops were needed, but also a general. As yet, the Provisional Government did not have one, something that President Manin understood only too well.

  Raid on Porte Grandi, June 3rd

  As news had worsened throughout May, the Provisional Government
badly needed to take some action to boost public morale. An Austrian force of one company of the Wallachian-Banat Grenz Regiment, commanded by Captain Petrović was posted in the village of Porte Grandi, on the mainland of the lagoon, some 20 kilometres north-east of Mestre. Little more than a picket, this weak force was an ideal target. At around 06:00 on June 3rd, Colonel Antonio Morandi led a column consisting of men from the Antonini Legion, Grenadiers, Lombard Volunteers, and the Bersaglieri Tornielli to attack the village. Altogether, there were perhaps a thousand men. After a confused struggle lasting five hours, the redoubtable Petrović was finally driven back, having lost eight men and with a further 21 wounded. He withdrew initially to the northeast, towards Capo Sile, and then, bringing two additional platoons, immediately moved back to Porte Grandi, to reoccupy it. Morandi’s loss is not recorded. The column returned in triumph to Venice, where its success was, naturally, greatly lauded, although it had no real significance other than to highlight the need for training and competent officers. The position at Porte Grandi was subsequently strengthened by the Austrians, who clearly did consider it significant, with earthworks and artillery.3

  Another positive move for the Venetian Government was the arrival, on June 6th, of a new French Consul, M. Vasseur, who brought the warmest greetings from his government. This was precisely the sort of influence that was very badly needed.4