Events on the Mainland
During the first two weeks of June, as the towns and cities of the Veneto fell or were abandoned one by one, Venice became increasingly isolated. The defection of most of the Neapolitan forces, followed by the shattering defeat at Vicenza, ended any realistic possibility of slowing this process, let alone halting it. Although the Venetians were themselves secure for now, there was little to be optimistic about.
After all of the chaos attending the actions of the Neapolitan Corps, General Pepe, the hero of the hour, finally crossed the River Po, and moving north, arrived in Rovigo on the evening of the 10th of June. His greatly reduced force consisted of a large battalion of Lombard volunteers, two battalions of Neapolitan volunteers, the 2nd Cacciatori Battalion, a field artillery battery, an engineer company, and approximately 50 cavalrymen, in total, barely 2,000 men.5 From these formations, there would be further desertions following on from the inevitable fissures which had opened up within units during the past week, and would also occur later.
Padua Abandoned
As Pepe moved further north, to Padua, he received the news of the disaster at Vicenza. Once there, on the 12th, he received orders from the Provisional Government of Venice to march directly to that city. He complied, taking with him not only his own Neapolitans, but the other volunteer units already present in Padua, altogether perhaps 4,000 men. The feelings of the Paduans may be imagined. The city was reoccupied by elements of Brigade Friedrich Liechtenstein, on the 13th.6
The Bombardment of and Capitulation of Treviso, June 13/14th
On June 12th, two long 12 pound howitzers, two mortars, with 100 shells, and a rocket battery were moved to Spresiano, FML Welden’s Corps Headquarters, and then on to Treviso. Already in position on the main road to the city, were three 6 pounder cannon, under the command of Lieutenant Wedl. The city having refused a summons to surrender, a bombardment began at 06:00 the next morning. At 09:00, one of the mortars joined the shelling from a position close to the Church of Madonna della Rovere. The second one had become wedged, and temporarily stuck. This, when freed, was then also able to engage.
The bombardment caused consternation in the city, and a large number of fires. Many people sought shelter in the crypt of the Cathedral. It was becoming evident to Treviso’s President, Giuseppe Olivi, that resistance could not long be maintained. At about 10:00, he wrote a note to Colonel Zambeccari, the Garrison Commander, which read, “It being that the fall of Padua is very possible, and there being any hope of receiving support nonexistent, I ask you: is a reasonable defence still possible? I beg you to give me a clear and authoritative answer”. Zambeccari replied, “The fall of Padua is certain. I do not have any hope of receiving support. We should resist a little longer, and then surrender.”
At about 20:30 a white flag was observed and fire ceased, as a deputation from the town appeared. A truce was agreed. The next morning, a Council of War of the 22 highest ranking officers was held in Treviso. Of these, 18 voted in favour of surrender. Initially, Welden insisted that the regular troops and volunteers be treated differently, but, finally, the entire garrison was granted the same terms as those given to Durando’s troops in Vicenza.7
Captain Ravioli was sent by General Durando to meet the former Treviso garrison, and conduct them to Ferrara. He described the scene, making a pointed comment upon the capitulation:
On the 20th, General Durando ordered me to go to meet the surrendered garrison, not at Pontelagoscuro, but at Polesella. The garrison was led by Colonel Count Zambeccari, previously commander of Treviso. The garrison was formed with: the Grenadier Regiment (Colonel Count Marescotti); the Alto Reno Battalion, with its own artillery section (Colonel Zambeccari); the Pesaro, Fano, and Gubbio Civic Battalion (Captain Leoni); the Ravenna Civic Battalion (Major Montanari), and other different Venetian units. The total strength of the garrison was of 4,300 men. The dead in the morning’s bombardment were only two, and the wounded, five or six. During the morning of 21st, these units reached Francolino, and then entered Ferrara.8
Pepe reaches Venice, and is given Command
Pepe and his troops reached the Venice on the evening of the 13th, to immense public acclamation. Manin, no soldier, visited him that evening, knowing what needed to be done. Two days later, the 65 year old was formally appointed by the Provisional Government as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the Veneto, which, in practice, now meant the Venetian Lagoon and the fortresses of Palmanova and Osoppo.9 Also awaiting his arrival was a note from the Papal authorities, giving him command of those Roman troops who had made their way to the city. The former army commander, General Antonini, was now somewhat unceremoniously declared Commander of the City and Forts of Venice.
The most valuable commodity that Pepe brought to Venice, however, was neither his troops, nor himself. It was the group of highly motivated Neapolitan officers, mostly from the artillery and engineers, who had individually followed his lead. These men would prove invaluable in the defence of ‘La Serenissima’, both for their sense of commitment and their considerable professional ability. Nevertheless, Pepe himself was, of course, the darling of both government and people; the hero who had come to save Venice.
One other new unit of high quality volunteers had arrived just before Pepe. This was a Swiss Company, commanded by Captain Johann Debrunner, recruited as a result of Italian emissaries’ beating the drum in the Swiss Cantons. Although few in number, these particular disciplined troops would contribute a very great deal to the defence of the city. The company was initially composed of one captain, one lieutenant, one second-lieutenant, one sergeant-major, one quartermaster, one armourer-sergeant, three sergeants, 10 corporals, one medical orderly, four trumpeter/drummers, one sapper, and 95 men.
With supreme irony, the General Pepe’s first Order of the Day, issued on the day that he assumed command, stressed the need for discipline above all else. Indeed, two days later, he received a letter from the Venetian Minister of Education, Niccolò Tommaseo, which offered very frank concerns on the matter. Tommaseo wrote,
Dear General,
This troop of idle, undisciplined men is more dangerous than useful to Venice. We beseech you to send them away as soon as possible. Form a camp, which is earnestly demanded by everyone. To you is confided our destiny, and perhaps that of all Italy.
It is superfluous to recommend ourselves to you. Adieu, with affection.
Tommaseo
The matters of discipline and adherence to orders would continue to bedevil the defence of Venice throughout the conflict. The general himself, although always concerned to ensure that good order was maintained, often seemed unwilling or unable to actually enforce it. Nevertheless, a programme of troop training was instituted, although little time was left before the enemy would appear. The Porte Grandi raid had graphically demonstrated that such a scheme was badly needed.
Pepe divided the Venetian Lagoon into three military districts. The First, commanded by General Rizzardi, formerly a colonel in the Imperial Service, comprised the city itself, the islands of San Giuliano, San Secondo, San Giorgio in Alga, San Angelo della polvere, and Murano, and the forts of Marghera and Treporti. The Second District, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lanzetta, was composed of the forts of San Erasmo and San Niccolò, with Malamocco. The Third District, under Rear-Admiral Marsich, started at Forts Carroman and San Felice, and extended as far as Brondolo.10
The Close Investment of Venice
As the forces of the Venetian Republic made their defensive plans, the Imperial forces also made their first moves towards a landward blockade of the Lagoon. Two days after the surrender of Treviso, Baron Welden received instructions from the War Ministry to undertake operations for an investment of the Lagoon.
On June 18th, the three brigades of Mitis, Liechtenstein, and Susan moved to occupy Tesera, Mestre, Ponte di Rana, and Malcontenta, probing for the enemy at dawn. A few Venetian vedettes were observed near Fort Marghera, and some shots exchanged. The following m
orning, the 1st division of IR Hrabowsky, Captain Schrutteck, was ordered to recconoitre towards Fusina, at the mouth of the Brenta Canal, south of Fort Marghera. These came into contact with Venetian foragers at about 02:00, and exchanged a heavy fire, without loss to either side, the latter then withdrawing in their boats.
The close cordon, commanded by FML Baron Stürmer, numbered about 7,000 men. On the left flank, between Caorle in the north, and Mestre, commanded by Major-General Mitis, in Mestre, were the following:
I and II/IR Wallachian-Banat Grenz IR – In entrenched positions along the line of the Sile and the Oselino Canal.
III/IR Hohenlohe and III/IR Kinsky – In and around Mestre.
On the right flank, between Mestre, and Cavanella, commanded by Colonel Macchio, were:
Between Ponte della Nana, Fusina, and Malcontenta – I/Vienna Volunteer Battalion
Between Conchè and Cabianca – II/Illyrian-Banat Grenz IR
Between the Adige and Po Rivers – I/IR Hrabowsky
South of the Po, was Major Count Wetter, with six troops of Dragoon Regiment Boyneburg.
With a view to anticipating more than a mere blockade, overnight on the 20th and 21st of June, on the orders of the Corps Commander, Engineer Major Khautz started work on a battery at Fusina. The battery was constructed, and armed with six 12 pounder cannon, on the night of the 22nd, commanded by Oberlieutenant Haslinger. It was not long before the Venetians reacted. At 03:00, on the 23rd, they launched a raid against it.
The gunboats Pelosa, Calipso, and Medusa, each armed with a 36 pounder carronade, along with a pirogue, opened a heavy and prolonged fire on the battery, to which it answered. The attackers eventually withdrew, the pirogue having been damaged, with two men wounded, one of whom later died. The battery suffered no loss. The next day, the Venetian battery at San Angelo della polvere also fired on the Fusina Battery for much of the day, but without result.
Capitulation of Palmanova
That same day, the 24th, Colonel Kerpan and President Putelli, the latter as representative of General Zucchi, signed the terms of the capitulation of Palmanova. General Zucchi, after the defeat of Vicenza, with the morale of his own troops plummeting, took the opportunity of securing generous terms. The city had finally capitulated, recognised as being “…without hope, although it was well provided with food and means of defence.”11 The surrender took place the following day. Now, only the rock of Osoppo and the islands of the Lagoon, with their bridgeheads, remained to the Venetians, though formidable obstacles in themselves.
Venice Unites with Piedmont
Although military matters seemed to be a catalogue of failure, political affairs had begun to evolve more satisfactorily. The mainland Provinces had made early overtures to Turin about possible fusion with the Kingdom, partly to move away from Venetian domination, and partly out of fear of the pace of FZM Nugent’s advance. Because of the worsening military situation, constitutional affairs proceeded to the point that, on June 28th, after almost all of Venetia had already been re-conquered, the Venetian Provinces of Vicenza, Treviso, Padua, and Rovigo, were declared, as was Lombardy, to be included in the Kingdom of Upper Italy. What, though, of Venice?
The mainland provinces had, effectively, seceded. The city itself had already received help from Carlo Alberto, in the form of Admiral Albini’s squadron, which still prevented most Austrian interference with Venetian trade, other than some inter-coastal traffic. As the military situation continued to deteriorate, and, as noted, the Austrian cordon around Venice itself tightened, the Pro-Fusion faction increased its demand for the city to join the Kingdom.
The Provisional Government came under increasing pressure to convene the National Assembly, this being the only body able to decide such a momentous issue. Pressure grew, and finally, on July 3rd, the 133 members of the Assembly met in the Grand Council Chamber, of the Doge’s Palace. Manin addressed the Deputies, laying out the current situation of the Republic, scrupulously offering both sides of the issue. He then adjourned the session, until the following morning, giving the Deputies time to consider.
The next morning, July 4th, the Deputies reassembled in the Palace, and listened to the reports of several ministers. The first issue to arise was one of immediacy. The Education Minister, Niccolò Tommaseo, firmly opposed to Fusion, spoke eloquently that there was no need to make an immediate decision on the issue, and that Carlo Alberto would surely come to the assistance of Venice from his sense of honour, rather than to aggrandise his kingdom. Next to speak was the Interior Minister, Pietro Paleocapa, a proponent of Fusion. Summarising the war situation, he said that there was, indeed, an urgent need to make a decision. He sat down to loud applause.
Then, President Manin spoke once again, with great dignity. He reiterated his own belief in the Republic, but accepted that others had, in the circumstances, changed their minds on the issue. Two votes were then taken. The first was as to whether or not an immediate decision on the Constitutional status of the Republic should be made. By 130 votes to three, the Assembly voted that the issue must be decided immediately. The second vote was 127 votes to six, in favour of fusion with the Kingdom.
Manin declined to remain in office. A deputation of three representatives was despatched to Carlo Alberto’s headquarters, then in Roverbella, to inform him of the decision. In the meanwhile, Venice was still at war.
Raid on Cavanella, July 7th
By the beginning of July, Pepe felt able to attempt a large sortie, and planned an attack on the village of Cavanella, on the north bank of the River Adige 11 kilometres south of Fort Brondolo, at the southern end of the Lagoon. Located here was a small triangular fort, with work continuing on and around it. The expedition was commanded by General Andrea Ferrari, fresh from the disastrous campaign on the mainland, for which he had been sacked, perhaps unfairly, by the Papal authorities. He was now re-employed by Pepe. The attacking force comprised four battalions, and two 12 pounder field guns of the Field Artillery, in all, some 1,500 men. These were shipped to Brondolo, and the attack set for July 7th.
That morning, 1, and two platoons of 2/IR Hrabowsky, commanded by Captain Ritter Schindler von Rottenhaag, altogether three officers and 287 men, were working on the fortifications. Also present were detachments of the Deutsch-Banat Grenz IR, bringing the total force up to some 500 men, the whole commanded by Captain Antollić, of the Deutsch-Banater. At about 09:30, their outposts at Santa Anna, roughly half way between the two forts, saw enemy columns advancing upon them. Ferrari’s force advanced in three columns. On the left, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Ulloa, were the Lombard Battalion, Major Novara, and the artillery. In the centre, along the main road, came the Bolognese Battalion, Colonel Bignami, and the Neapolitan Battalion, Major Materazzo, and to their right, the Cacciatori del Sile, Colonel D’Amigo.
The Austrian outposts carried on a 45 minute skirmish with Ferrari, retiring slowly through the wooded sand dunes, before finally pulling back into the fort. One post of a corporal and six men held out against great odds, until relieved. A group of 13 men under the command of Feldwebel Crammer of IR Hrabowsky, maintained a steady flanking fire from the south bank of the river.12 The attack was subsequently called off by Ferrari, who, probably rightly, considered an assault on the fort too dangerous with his inexperienced troops. His men pulled back resentfully, particularly the Lombards, and the entire command withdrew to Brondolo.
Losses to the defenders were very light indeed, one killed, and three wounded, although the attackers claimed much higher figures. Ferrari lost five killed, three mortally wounded, and 41 wounded.13
Ferrari’s troops were long and loud with complaints about the failure of the operation, branding him a coward and a traitor, some among the Lombards actually threatening his life. To quieten the situation, Pepe issued an Order of the Day on the 8th, in which he once again stressed the need for discipline and obedience amongst the troops, although he later attacked Ferrari’s actions in his memoirs. Failure to punish these unruly scenes did not
bode well for the future.
Sorties from Fort Marghera, July 9th and 21st
Another major sortie took place on the morning of July 9 th, this time launched from Fort Marghera. Its purpose was to destroy the entrenchments which were encroaching upon Lunette Nr. 12. Two columns, comprising 80 men of the Swiss company, 200 Roman volunteers, and 200 Line and Neapolitan volunteers, advanced from the fort, under the command of Colonel Belluzzi. Belluzzi vigorously attacked the Imperial outposts on the railway embankment and along the Mestre Canal, one and a half companies of IR Hohenlohe with four cannon, compelling them to withdraw to Mestre. Subsequently, he was counterattacked by I/ViennaVolunteer Battalion, and also in the flank by three companies IR Kinsky, the flanking fire of 16/IR Kinsky, Lieutenant Ueberbacher, being particularly effective. Belluzzi was forced to withdraw under the shelter of the guns of the fort, with a loss of two killed, and 28 wounded, five of them mortally. The Austrian loss is not recorded.
A further raid from Marghera against took place on the 21st, by a company of Neapolitan Cacciatori and some pioneers against the encroaching works. Clashing with the outposts of 13/IR Kinsky, Gefreiter Ussar of that unit lost a hand, and Venetian Engineer Major Chiavacci was wounded.14
Piedmontese Troops arrive in Venice
On July 15th, concrete evidence of the King Carlo Alberto’s word appeared in Venice, in the form of Piedmontese soldiers. Although not first line troops, these men were, to say the least, most welcome, and most were rapidly placed at the front. The three newly arrived battalions numbered a total 2,089 men, and were posted as follows:15
Marghera – 700 men of the 17th Infantry Regiment
Chioggia – 714 men of the 1st Infantry Regiment
In Reserve – 675 men of the 15th Infantry Regiment
Ca Bianca, July 25th
An attack on the Austrian post at Ca Bianca, west of Chioggia, took place on July 25th. A firefight developed between 200 men of the Neapolitan Volunteer Battalion, under Major Materazzi, and pickets of II/Illyrian-Banat Grenzer, commanded by Oberlieutenant Lukić. The Venetian pirogue Elvira, Lieutenant Squaldo, supported the Neapolitans. Squaldo, and one of his men were killed in the skirmish, as was one of Materazzi’s men. The Neapolitans withdrew.
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