Minor operations
In direction of Fusina the Austrian engineers attempted a surprise. On July 29th they floated three incendiary rafts in the Lagoon, which were to burst into flames when they were close to any Venetian vessels moored near the city. However, two were discovered and intercepted before any explosion; the third drifted off, and blew up in a place where it caused no damage.16
On August 10th, at about 17:00, Major Bauernfeld, the Field-Artillery Commander of II Reserve Corps, initiated a bombardment of Fort Marghera. The fort immediately replied, and a three hour cannonade ensued. Three Austrian gunners were wounded, and one piece dismounted. There was no loss amongst the defenders.
Custoza and the Salasco Armistice
Three Royal Commissioners, Major-General Marquis Colli, Count Luigi Cibrario, and the Venetian ‘Albertist’, Jacopo Castelli, arrived in Venice on August 5th, to formally take possession of the city, in the name of Carlo Alberto. This took place on the 7th, when the Royal Standard was raised over the three poles in front of St. Mark’s.
Two days later, FML Welden advised the Venetian Government of the recent heavy defeats which he alleged had been suffered by the Piedmontese Army. In the light of these, he demanded the city’s surrender. This demand was rejected outright. The news of Custoza was, of course, bad enough, but in itself only a military defeat, of which there had been many, as there had been victories, real or imagined, to compensate. Much worse, however, were the tidings of the Armistice of Salasco, of which rumour had preceded it,
On the morning of the 11th, two days after the Armistice was concluded, FML Welden forwarded the details from his headquarters in Padua to Venice, surprising everyone, particularly Carlo Alberto’s Commissioners, for whom the shock was at least as great as to anyone else. Even the rumours had not readied the Venetians for a complete capitulation.
Many among the less well to do in the city were fervent supporters of Manin, and had not favoured Fusion. Now, their mood was ominous. The Italian Circle, a Republican organisation whose members were mainly followers of Mazzini, now agitated against the Royal Government, in conjunction with Niccolò Tommaseo. Manin, no friend of The Circle, stayed aloof, sensing a possible opportunity.
Carlo Alberto’s Commissioners had heard nothing from the King, and only had the same information as everyone else. Of the three, only Castelli, a Venetian, realised what was likely to happen, and contacted Manin, with a view to handing power over to him. That evening, a mob assembled outside the Governor’s Palace, demanding information from the Commissioners. Since they themselves had no information to give, the mood of the mob rapidly worsened. Members of The Circle broke into the Palace, taking the commissioners prisoner. There were cries of, “Down with the traitors! Death to the Commissioners!” With their lives in immediate danger, troops were about to be summoned, when Manin arrived at the Palace.
Manin and Castelli appeared at the Palace window. His presence immediately calmed the crowd. He gave a very short speech, ending with the words, “…I govern!” This was greeted with loud acclamation, and his subsequent request for the people to disperse, and for the Civic Guard to muster were heeded. As the crowd melted away, the self-declared President pondered his new Cabinet. His first immediate appointment was of an initially sceptical Tommasseo, whom he appointed as a special envoy to Paris. He was to seek French intervention in the conflict, which he now considered the only possible means of victory.17
Venice alone
The rule of Carlo Alberto had lasted for 41 days. On August 13th, the Venetian Assembly voted a Triumverate into power in the newly revived republic, its members being Manin, Colonel Giovanni Cavedalis, and Admiral Graziani. The latter two had been included because Manin insisted that he not rule alone. This was all for show, however, and all knew that, in reality, Manin was now a dictator, by public consent.
Piedmontese Admiral Albini received orders to withdraw from the Adriatic on August 21st, and although he vacillated for almost three weeks, finally, after many complaints from FML Welden, the squadron sailed for Genoa on September 9th, with the three Piedmontese battalions embarked.18 Other than the gallant defenders of Osoppo, Venice was now completely on her own, a daunting prospect.
Reorganisation of the Army
In the late summer of 1848, the force in the service of the Venetian Republic comprised the following:19
Venetian –
Infantry (regular and irregular)
10,000
Cavalry
200
Artillery
1,800
Other –
Roman
5,000
Lombard
700
Neapolitan (including artillery)
500
Total –
18,200
General Pepe, concerned by the chaotic nature of the Venetian military forces, decided that a complete overhaul of the Army was required. On August 17th, he issued an Order of the Day, specifying the details of the reorganisation which was to take place. To be overseen by himself and Colonel Cavedalis, the scheme addressed the confused and diffuse chain of command, and the varied and sometimes contradictory terminology and nomenclature in use. All infantry units in the service of the Republic of Venice whether regular or volunteer, were to be consolidated within Legions, theoretically based upon the various Venetian provinces. The first units so converted were to be organised as follows:
First Legion
To be formed from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the existing First Legion of the Civic Guard, and provisionally commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Giuseppe Jéhan. The two battalions were commanded by Majors Foglia and Torriani.
Second Legion
To be formed from the 4th Battalion of the existing First Legion of the Civic Guard and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the existing Second Legion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eugenio Vandoni. The two battalion commanders were Majors Dea and Zamboni.
Third Legion
To be formed from the 3rd Battalion of the existing Second Legion, the Vicenza Battalion, the Guard Mobile of Padua, and the companies of Spangaro, Zerman, and Grondoni, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Zaneletto. The battalion commanders were Majors Sartori and Stucci.
Fourth Legion
To be formed with the Treviso Line Battalion, Major Galateo, and the Paduan Crusaders, Major Cavallesto, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel San-Martino.
Fifth Legion
To be formed with the Cacciatori del Sile and elements of the 1st Prato Battalion, commanded by Colonel D’Amigo. D’Amigo’s immediate subordinates were Majors Radonich and Francesconi.
These changes were ‘officially’ imposed, but in fact, little more in the way of rationalisation was achieved, and by the end of the winter, the army’s order of battle still contained a hotchpotch of small, independent units, and much of the earlier nomenclature remained (see Appendix XXIII). In addition, new formations were constantly formed, and disbanded.20 Even so, Pepe and Ulloa were able to introduce a major programme of much needed training. Discipline and obedience, though, would remain a major problem.
For example, the National Guard of Chioggia, at the southern tip of the lagoon, a city always suspicious of Venetian pretensions, although theoretically under Pepe’s command, remained hostile to him, and largely beyond his direct and immediate control.
The General, typically, decided to visit the city, although advised by his Chief of Staff not to do so for his own safety. In the event, Pepe was not only able to review the troops, but also to win them over.
Of great concern to both Welden and Pepe was the health of their men. The change in circumstances for both sides coincided with the late summer and autumn malarial season, before the rains come in November. Unfortunately for both commanders, little could be done to alter the situation, although Welden’s men, constantly engaged in hard physical work in the tidal mudflats, were generally more exposed, and suffered accordingly.
Diversion at Bologna
&
nbsp; As matters in Lombardy were reaching a successful conclusion, Marshal Radetzky gave more thought to operations against Venice. A continuing problem for him was the steady, if not great flow of volunteers from the Papal States across the River Po, to the city. FML Welden was instructed to take measures to stem this flow. Welden decided that this would be best accomplished by an occupation of the city of Bologna, over 50 kilometres south of the Po.
As a result, he sent the Brigade of Interim Commander, Colonel Gerstner, 4,192 men, with six guns, across the river to march south, and occupy the city. Not only was there a political outcry, but Welden had severely underestimated the nature the task in hand. A detailed description of this is outside the scope of this volume, but Gerstner’s attack was repelled by the Bolognesi, with two officers and three men killed, seven officers and 50 men wounded, and 100 men missing. With protests of the blatant violation of Papal territory, Radetzky was forced to recall the expedition, disavowing any authorisation of it.21
New Revolution in Vienna, and War in Hungary
For the third time during the year, revolution once again erupted in Vienna. News of the outbreak reached Venice on October 10th. The scale of this insurrection, however, dwarfed anything which had happened before, and had attracted some of the worst possible elements, completely sidelining moderate opinion. It coincided with the formal declaration by Lajos Kossuth, a radical lawyer, of a Hungarian Republic. Kossuth also despatched a Hungarian military force to support the revolutionaries.
The fact of a Hungarian Army marching on Vienna was a great boost to Venetian morale, and had the potential to directly affect the military position in Italy. In the event, the Imperial forces, under the command of Field-Marshal Alfred, Prince Windischgrätz, were able to both defeat the revolutionaries and turn back Kossuth’s forces. The conflict in Hungary, however, now took on the nature of a full-scale war, to some degree, a civil war, with Hungarian troops on both sides. Venice accepted into its service a small group of Hungarian deserters and prisoners, under the command of an officer deserter, Lajos Winkler. Neither Winkler nor his men were well thought of by the Venetians.22
The Sortie against Mestre, October 27 1848
Osoppo
As noted, the garrison of Osoppo had refused to be bound by the Salasco Armistice, and had remained in arms against Imperial forces. However, the situation went from bad to worse after the sack and burn of the nearby village of Osoppo, from where the garrison obtained supplies. They were now in dire straights, and internal dissension had begun to appear, with Corporal Valentino Comino killed by a Private Angeli. The inspiring commander of the fort, Lieutenant-Colonel Licurgo Zannini, realised that time was finally short, and obtained generous terms from his besieger, on October 12th. Two days later, he evacuated the fort, with his 340 men, their arms and baggage.23
Raid on Cavallino, 22nd October
Some 500 men of the Cacciatori del Silè, commanded by Colonel D’Amigo were shipped from Tre-Porti to sortie against the small village of Cavallino, almost six kilometres to the east, where an Austrian detachment had recently been established. The sortie, supported by three armed pirogues, in pouring rain, completely surprised the Austrian force, which fled, abandoning two cannon, ammunition, and many provisions. Flagg states that the Austrians had 15 killed and wounded, and the attackers one killed, and one wounded.24
Reconnaissance from Chioggia, 27th October
From Brondolo, General Rizzardi, with 600 men, made a reconnaissance of the area west of Chioggia on October 27th. Upon his return, Rizzardi found Captain Debrunner’s Swiss Company preparing for a similar probe. Having discussed the matter with the General, Debrunner stood his men down. That same day, in the north of the Lagoon, another sortie took place. This however, was on an altogether larger scale, and had a specific objective.
Sortie against Mestre, 27th October
Major Radaelli had been given the task of planning a much larger incursion, in the greatest secrecy. Once the details were finalised, it was important that the operation be launched immediately, to prevent any chance of any leak which might forewarn the enemy.
Overnight on the 26th/27th, three separate columns were put in motion against the Austrian occupied town of Mestre, just inland from Fort Marghera (see map). General Pepe and his staff sailed from Venice to the fort, arriving there at around 02:00 on the 27th, to supervise the operation. Two hours earlier, 450 men of the Cacciatori del Sile, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel D’Amigo, had started the crossing towards Fusina, south of the fort, covered by armed pirogues under (Naval) Captain Basillisco, and had then moved from there towards Mestre.
Upon Pepe’s arrival in the fort, two further columns of troops began to move from Marghera itself towards Mestre. In the centre were 900 Lombard and Bolognese volunteers under the command of Colonel Morandi. Moving on their right were about 650 soldiers from the Alto Reno and Italia Libera battalions, commanded by Colonel Zambeccari.25
The low tide delayed the shipment of the cavalry and field artillery support for the operation, and four guns did not arrive at all, but the thick fog allowed the approach of the centre and right hand columns to be completely unheralded. The troops in and around Mestre that night, were units of I and II Wallachian-Grenz IR. The town was also the Brigade Headquarters of Major-General Mitis. Indeed, Corps Headquarters lay a little to the north of it.
The Fusina column, however, crossing from the city was badly delayed by the fog, and as dawn began to break, and the signal gun for the assault had not sounded, Pepe decided to attack immediately, and ordered the attack. The centre and right columns moved off. 26
The Centre Column, advancing towards the railway station quickly encountered enemy pickets. Initially, the Grenzer outpost line stood fast, but was soon routed by the overwhelming numbers. Soon after, however, Major Rossarol’s vanguard came under fire from two cannon, placed behind a barricade, and the advance stopped. Rossarol’s force became disordered and wavered.
Fortunately for the attackers, Colonel Ulloa, along with several other officers, and 100 Gendarmes of the General’s Headquarters quickly sent forward by General Pepe, in the fort, appeared in time to save the situation. Ulloa took command, rallied and reassembled the troops, and launched a bayonet assault. This attack succeeded in storming the barricade, and capturing the two guns there. The defenders were put to flight, and withdrew along the road to Padua. Ulloa now moved to his right, towards Mestre.
Colonel Zambeccari’s Right Column, in the meanwhile, having heard the firing on the left, had moved directly on the town, the thick fog sheltering them until the last moment. The head of the column, led by Captain Orsini, consisted of 63 men of the Alto Reno and 12 engineers, supported by Captain Spaggiari’s company, also Alto Reno. Once again, when observed, the column was fired upon, and wavered. At that moment, Captain Cosenz arrived with some orders. Cosenz and Orsini ran ahead, into the Austrian entrenchments. An adjutant, Captain Fontana, followed and the troops, galvanised by their officers’ example, plunged ahead. A discharge of grapeshot felled 14 men, including Captain Fontana, but the work was taken, the defenders retreating in disorder, some into the town, and others towards Treviso. Zambeccari’s force followed the former into Mestre.
Both columns were now entering the town, fighting in streets, alleyways, and houses. One particular stronghold was the Casa Taglia, a fine house, with a walled garden. Inside were some 200 Grenzer, whose retreat had been cut off. Hailed to surrender, they refused. In the struggle which followed, two guns were brought up, and blew a gap in the garden wall, but even then, the troops were unable to move through it, due to the heavy musket fire from the house. Finally, sacks of straw, soaked with oil were set on fire. An assault was made through the resulting smoke, and the house taken, with many prisoners.
Captain Felice Orsini led his men against another fortified house that night, the Casa Bianchini, as he recalled in his memoirs:
The house was entirely surrounded by a wall at least six yards high, and an iron barred
gate. The first that entered was a Lombard officer belonging to the column commanded by Colonel Noaro: I followed, with my Lieutenant. We scaled the walls under a murderous fire. Our soldiers did the same, and crying ‘Viva l’Italia!’, the garden was filled with soldiers, who soon broke open the front door. We entered with the bayonet, and no quarter was at first given. There were horrible cries, Austrians fell at our sides. Our men were entering now by different doors; the confusion was extreme, terrible the moment, some of our men were wounded by our own weapons. At last, we succeeded in getting the Austrians respected as prisoners of war; shortly after, we beat the retreat.27
The Fusina column, delayed, drove back the small force there, and then advanced as quickly as possible to Mestre. They arrived after the fighting had finished. The whole force then withdrew to Fort Marghera in triumph. Austrian losses are quoted in Grüll and Kriegsbegebenheiten as 30 killed, 25 wounded, and five officers, and 318 men taken prisoner, many of the latter wounded. Six cannon, much ammunition and stores, and the Army Chest were taken. The attackers suffered, according to Jäger, nine killed, 34 mortally wounded, and 55 wounded, a remarkably high death rate. Other estimates vary widely. Pepe himself describes the Imperial killed and wounded at over 600, and his own, over 400, both of which are much too high. Kriegsbegebenheiten comments rather lamely that the Grenzer, weakened by disease and the hard physical work, could not offer a prolonged resistance.28
The victors returned to Venice in triumph. It had been a memorable, and much needed, victory.
The Italian Circle and the Triumvirate
With the restoration of the Republic, Manin’s popularity and status had grown even higher. Although the Lagoon was closely blockaded on the landward side, there was no immediate danger. A morale boosting action had been fought, and the army was undergoing intensive training. The enemy was engaged in a serious war on another front, and was, in any case unlikely to make any major move during the winter,
Radetzky's Marches Page 41