Initially, the bombardment was not answered by the defenders, to the surprise of the Venetians. The reason was that there was a severe shortage of ammunition at Caorle due to the previous day’s action. Gunner Karl Karoly, of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, was acting gun-captain of the single 12 pounder cannon there. His commander, Lieutenant Hälbig, had a total of 31 rounds for the piece, 26 solid shot, and five case-shot. As the attackers closed, Karoly was given the order to open fire. On his third shot, he hit the powder store of the pinnace Furiosa, Junior-Lieutenant Tomaso Bucchia, which then blew up, killing seven of the nine men aboard, including Bucchia. Persano, after this setback, reassumed command of the operation, and withdrew. Total casualties were 18 dead and 14 wounded.6
Departure of the Neapolitan Squadron and Blockade of Trieste
The waters off Trieste, the major port of the Habsburg Empire, had been patrolled by the Combined Squadron of Albini and De Cosa since May 22nd, bottling up the Austrian warships there. The situation, however, was unclear to all parties. The law of blockade was, to say the least, in its infancy at this time. All of the foreign consuls in Trieste were concerned about any interference with the trade of their respective nations, and made those concerns clear to the admirals.
Ironically, the same day that the Combined Squadron chased Kudriaffsky into Trieste, orders from Naples arrived, recalling De Cosa.7 The Admiral prevaricated for almost three weeks, but on June 11th, receiving unequivocal instructions from King Ferdinando, brought by General Cavalcanti, he was forced to depart for home.8 The naval balance was, however, largely unaffected, as Albini, even without the Venetian squadron, was more than a match for the enemy in its current state.
Although the perceived legality of the matter was uncertain, Turin authorised Admiral Albini, along with the Venetian Rear-Admiral Bua, to impose a formal blockade on the city of Trieste. This was also announced on June 11th to come into force on June 15th for Austrian vessels, and July 15th, for those of other nations. As may be imagined, this move resulted in protests from many quarters. From Frankfurt, on the 20th came a strong protest from the German Confederation, of which Trieste was legally a part. This warned that any attack on the city would be interpreted as an attack upon the Confederation. One month after its imposition, the Venetian Government assured the British Consul that the object of the blockade was only Austrian naval vessels, and that all merchant vessels, including Austrian ones, were free to engage in normal commerce, the only exception being contraband of war.9
Admiral Albini Ordered Home
Only two weeks after the lifting of the blockade of Trieste, Carlo Alberto’s army was defeated at Custoza. As related, the army had retreated to Milan, and after a brief struggle there, the King was forced to ask for, and was granted, an armistice. One of the conditions of the Armistice of Salasco specified that the Sardinian squadron in the upper Adriatic be withdrawn. Admiral Albini, as described, had, like De Cosa before him, found various excuses to remain in the area. Not until September 8th, did he embark the Piedmontese troops in Venice, and move south as far as Ancona. Although Article 4 of the armistice required that Sardinian naval units were to evacuate the Adriatic altogether, the Admiral, following orders, made no effort to do so.
Subsequently, Albini, as instructed, made several forays north, but the winter weather halted these in December, and he wintered in Ancona. Equally, the poor state of the Imperial naval forces, and events elsewhere, precluded Captain Kudriaffsky from taking any advantage of the situation. Any meaningful operations by either side would have to await the onset of Spring.
_______________________
1
Details of the armament of the Bourbon ships differ. Those shown are compiled from many contradictory sources. The starting points are Radogna, Storia della marina militare delle Due Sicilie, and Randaccio, Storia delle marine militari italiane dal 1750 al 1860.
2
A system of artillery, developed by Lieutenant-General William Millar, Inspector-General of the Royal Artillery.
3
Boinek, pp. 226-227.
4
Romiti, pp. 191-192, and Boinek, pp. 271-273.
5
His anchor was subsequently retrieved by Midshipman Saint Bon.
6
Boinek, pp. 275-280, Romiti, pp. 292-293, and Po, Guido, ‘La campagna navale della Marina Sarda in Adriatico negli anni 1848-49’, Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 1928, pp. 66-67.
7
Flagg, Vol. I, p. 403.
8
Romiti, p. 176.
9
Mariotti, p. 412. and Po, p. 69.
18
From the Salasco Armistice to its Denunciation by Carlo Alberto
Following the humiliating defeat suffered by the Piedmontese Army in July and August of 1848, there had to be political change. However with a series of governments in power between the Armistice and the almost inevitable resumption of hostilities in March of the following year, the civil administration was dysfunctional. There were seven separate administrations between March 1848 and May 1849. These were led by:
Cesare Balbo – 16th March to the 27th July 1848
Gabrio Casati – 27th July to the 15th August 1848
Alfieri di Sostegno – 15th August to the 11th October 1848
General Ettore Perrone – 11th October to the 16th December 1848
Vincenzo Gioberti – 16th December 1848, to the 21st February 1849
General Agostino Chioda – 21st February to the 26th March 1849
Gabriele de Launay – 27th March to the 6th May 1849
Reorganisation of the Army (see Appendix XVIII)
After the debacle of the late summer, it was clear to all, Carlo Alberto included, that the King should not be in field command of the Army. The subject of that command, as a result, was a most delicate one. On the back of the defeat, elements in Parliament and the country at large, doubted the abilities of the Army’s current generals and many pushed for the appointment of a senior foreign officer to lead the Army. To add to these problems, General Bava published two tracts on the conduct of the campaign. In these works, he severely criticised the conduct of almost every senior commander in the Piedmontese Army, also casting a slur on both officers and men.1
There was now no choice, under the circumstances, other than to look abroad for a general. To make matters even worse, though, this proved surprisingly difficult. One after another, the distinguished French generals approached, declined the job; first the legendary Bugeaud, and then Bedaud, Changarnier, Lamoriciére, Oudinot, MacMahon, and Magan. The Swiss, Dufour, likewise refused. It was obvious that the King’s sights needed to be somewhat lowered. Finally, a Polish soldier of fortune, and former Tsarist officer, Wojciech Chrzanowski, was appointed. He had made a name for himself fighting against the Tsar’s troops in the Polish Revolt of 1831, and in reorganising the Turkish Army. The general spoke no Italian, and although this was far from ideal, it was not the towering obstacle which it might at first appear, since, as discussed, French was invariably spoken at Headquarters.
On October 23rd, Carlo Alberto named Bava as General in Chief of the Army, and Chrzanowski as his Chief of Staff. At the same time, Girolamo Ramorino, was named as commander of the Lombard troops in the Army. This latter was a sop to the radical left. Indeed, Ramorino had been chosen by Mazzini to head an invasion of Piedmont from Switzerland in 1833, an endeavour which had ended in a farcical mess, with Mazzini’s expulsion by the Swiss.
Chrzanowski’s arrival was particularly irksome to General Bava. To Della Rocca, he said:
They have sent me a Pole, a perfect monkey, small, ugly, with the voice of a eunuch, as chief of the staff, in case hostilities should be resumed. You, who know what the duties of the head of the staff are, can perhaps tell me what I am to do with a foreigner who does not know the country, the language, the officers, or the men.2
Nevertheless, Bava’s status was still unacceptable to many, and the public clamour finally resulted
in Chrzanowski being appointed as Commander-in-Chief on February 15th, 1849, with Alessandro La Marmora as his Chief of Staff. Bava was shuffled off into the post of Inspector-General. There followed, much discussion as to Chrzanowski’s precise authority. He, himself, was adamant that the presence of the King with his Army was, “an absolute necessity”. After discussion, the King’s First Minister, Vincenzo Gioberti brokered a compromise whereby Chrzanowski was given the title of the ‘Major-General of the Army’, with Carlo Alberto in overall command.3 Through all of this process, one name was never considered – Prince Ferdinando. That the Duke of Genoa was talented, cannot be in doubt. Perhaps, at 26, he was considered too young, or equally, the thought of the King’s second son being in command of the Royal Army might, like Bava, have been considered unacceptable to Parliament and the public at large. If so, it was most unfortunate.
Throughout all of this political mayhem, the Army was again preparing itself for war, whilst at the same time, not only undergoing a massive expansion, but also a reorganisation. The classes of 1828 and 1829 were called up over the winter. The number of infantry regiments was first increased to 28, and then further, and the number of Bersaglieri battalions from two to five. A Commission later set up to consider the coming campaign as a whole, highlighted the enormous difficulties resulting from this reorganisation. Some of its conclusions on the consequences of these rapid changes during the winter of 184849, were stinging:
However, since we wanted a large army, we were forced to call up new drafts, even calling in advance, the (18)’29 class. Thus, we obtained 35,000 recruits, of whom 13,000 were 19 years old. The small original army of 30,000 men was consequently enlarged to 140,000.4 The infantry, numbering only 20,000 men in the peacetime service, was enlarged to about 96,000.5 During peacetime, the infantry was formed with 58 battalions, whilst in that last (1849) campaign the infantry battalions numbered 119, 81 of the active army and 38 of the reserve. During peacetime there were 1,077 officers, including the supernumerary ones; most of these had been already lost during the first (1848) part of the campaign, and some had been relieved. Now, for the new campaign there was a necessity for 1,657 officers for the active army alone. The army of reserve had a need of a further 750 officers. For this purpose we had initially only 114 Provincial officers, and 180 in the garrisons, but these hardly could be diverted from their duties. Thus were appointed more than 1,000 new officers to the infantry.
The NCOs in the active army were 3,200 during peacetime; of that number, many had been lost (dead, wounded, or sick) during the first campaign, and more than 500 were promoted to commissioned officers; consequently, the number fell to about 2,300; but, the oncoming campaign claimed a total of 6,300 NCOs in the active battalions! Consequently, about 4,000 new NCOs were promoted, mainly from the Ordinance soldiers. The Ordinance soldiers were not many themselves, however; if we assume a number of 25 Ordinance soldiers in each company (and this is clearly an exaggeration) they reached a total of only 5,800; after the above-mentioned promotions, the ordinance soldiers were only a very few men in each company. This enormous increase in the cadres was also due to the formation of a fourth battalion for each regiment; They formed this battalion in order to correct the excessive strength of the companies, and to bring it to a total of 170 men; but a new problem arose; there weren’t enough officers and cadres. However, the difficulties of the army were yet more! Of the 35,000 above mentioned recruits, about 24,000 were despatched at two different times to the infantry barracks for training; only 8,000 went from the barracks to the active battalions during the month of December (400 men for each regiment). The other 16,000 were still in the barracks and depots at the beginning of the month when the war began, and joined their units only by March 5th or 6th. So, about 600 recruits were still reaching their units when the Armistice was denounced. It was only now that the Fourth Battalions were formed; the result was, of course, great turmoil in the officer’s cadres of the companies, and this just as the war was starting! Indeed, we were forced to call some officers from each company, and appoint them to the command of the Fourth Battalions, which also lacked NCOs!
Confusion in the orders of the War Ministry contributed to the mess, because the orders didn’t arrive concurrently with all the regiments. Thus, in some regiments, the 4th Battalion was formed almost entirely with recruits, while in other regiments, the recruits were distributed amongst the regiment itself. Consequently, in the latter regiments, the raw recruits were about 65 per company – that is, more than a third of the regiment’s actual strength, as it was the case of the Savoy and Regina Brigades. Eventually, after the expiration of the Armistice, the formation of a 3rd platoon was ordered, to be attached to the Bersaglieri units. This caused further confusion, because it was necessary to take away the best line soldiers from their units (a third of the actual strength of them), detaching them to a service which required intensive training. They eventually proved to be too numerous and poorly trained for their new duties, and caused serious problems in the field, because they weren’t able to deploy in open order, or even to retreat with order.
In the case of the Bersaglieri, as mentioned above, the drop in quality was particularly noticeable, since the normal level of training was simply not possible in the time allocated. The Commission describing the 1st Bersaglieri Battalion, reported that:
It formed the core around which five battalions were formed, but they were not given the time to drill in the difficult light infantry duties which require courage, ability, and experience. The new Bersaglieri were superior to the first in number, but quite inferior in quality. The performance of these new Bersaglieri in the last campaign, in a uniform which is the symbol of valour, sometimes also made a sad impression on the soldiers of the line. 6
On paper, the total force was stated as being 120,000 men. However, this figure included not only the National Guards, and the Fortress Garrisons, but also the sick. The true number available was nearer 80,000.7
In many ways, the Royal Army, although much larger than the previous year, was less formidable than it had been in the 1848 campaign. Nevertheless, the cavalry and artillery remained good, and, if well handled, it was a force to be reckoned with. In sharp contrast, Radetzky’s army was in fine fettle. This fact was well illustrated by the manner in which the troops reacted to the resumption of hostilities.
The Drift Back to War
In February 1849, after the fall of Gioberti from office, he was replaced by General Chioda, who became Piedmont’s sixth Chief Minister within a year. Although Chioda himself had been certain that a renewal of hostilities with the Empire was inevitable, the General’s appointment clearly showed that Carlo Alberto was increasingly leaning in that direction. Prince Schwarzenberg’s government agreed to send a representative to a conference on the future of North Italy, to be held in Brussels, under French and British auspices, on February 22nd. However, it was announced by the Imperial Government that any negotiations could only be made on the basis of the 1815 Treaty of Vienna. This meant, of course, that there could be no negotiations. All parties in Turin now became united in the cause for war, one which Carlo Alberto saw as ordained by God.
The blind, unreasoning enthusiasm in the Kingdom for the resumption of the war was obvious to foreign observers. The British Minister in Turin, Ralph Abercrombie, wrote to his government on March 8th, that, “The deplorable infatuation which prevails upon the question of the realisation of the Kingdom of Upper Italy, of fighting the Austrians and driving them from Italy, has completely warped judgement and good sense.”8
The Armistice is Denounced in Milan
The document denouncing the Armistice was entrusted to an engineer officer, Major Raffaele Cadorna. He arrived in Milan at about 14:00 on March 12th, and was taken to Radetzky’s Headquarters, in the Villa Reale. His despatch delivered, the Major departed in such haste that he forgot to have it signed for, and was obliged to return. He then declined an invitation to dinner, and once again left. As stipulated in the orig
inal terms, eight days notice was given. Hostilities would commence at midday on March 20th. Amazingly, the denunciation of the Salasco Armistice was received with great satisfaction amongst the rank and file Imperial troops. That evening, an extraordinary impromptu demonstration took place outside the Field Marshal’s headquarters. As word spread through the camps, large groups of soldiers, along with several regimental bands, made their way to the Villa Reale, gathering outside singing and cheering.9
The diplomatic niceties having been observed, General Chrzanowski actually heard the news one hour later than Radetzky. Understandably taken aback by the sudden announcement, he had no choice but to act quickly. Plans were put in hand to advance across the River Ticino with the main army, and advance directly on Milan, in the hope of initiating a Lombard revolt. Although the King, Chrzanowski, and most of the senior officers, assumed that Radetzky would withdraw before the Piedmontese, precisely as he had done almost exactly one year before, the strategic position of the Austrians was now radically different. Lombardy was quiet, and the army concentrated and confident. Far from retreating, Radetzky and Hess intended to take the offensive. Both men realised that the only real obstacle to complete victory in Italy was the Piedmontese Army. Venice, isolated and under siege, could be of no assistance to Carlo Alberto. Equally, the King’s defeat would make the city’s eventual fall inevitable.
Carlo Alberto left Turin on the 14th, arriving at Army Headquarters on the 16th. The advance of the main army, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and Reserve Divisions, against Milan was timed, like the Austrian advance, to start at midday on the 20th. Further south, Ramorino’s 5th (Lombard ) Division was assigned to occupy the high ground around Cava, between the Ticino and Po rivers. Ramorino was to observe the line of the Ticino opposite Pavia, and, should the opportunity present itself, cross the river and occupy the city. In the case of an enemy attack, he was to defend his position around Cava to the utmost, but, if forced back, he was to withdraw to Novara. Far from the seat of war, Major-General Alfonso La Marmora’s 6th Division was preparing to enter Tuscany in support of the Grand Duke. La Marmora would be recalled too late to fight against the Austrians, but would, nevertheless, see some action.
Radetzky's Marches Page 43