Radtezky and his staff left Milan on the 18th. By the following day, most of the army was concentrated in the vicinity of Pavia. Only the brigades of Major-General von Görger (I Corps), at Rosale, and Major-General Count Cavriani (III Corps), at Lodi, were still to close up with the main body.
THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 100 HOURS
March 20th
Radetzky Crosses the Ticino
Two bridges were thrown across the river, next to the permanent one, the northernmost being the famous “bridge of boats”. At noon, the Armistice expired, and the assembled Austrians began to cross. Once on the move, it took the Army three hours to march through the streets of Pavia. Radetzky and his staff had already moved off, following the main road. The Army crossed the river onto a wooded island known as the Gravellone, created by an arm of the Ticino, which flowed around the city to the south-west. So as not to warn the enemy, no additional bridges were placed across it until the beginning of the advance, and in some cases, units did in fact wade across the shallow flow.
General Ramorino’s Lombard Division, observing Pavia and the river crossings there, was deployed quite differently to the manner in which General Chrzanowski had ordered. Of Ramorino’s 14½ battalions, only four were placed north of the Po, all the rest of the Division being on the south bank of the river, his own Headquarters being at the town of Casatisma. In addition, he had placed Colonel Belvedere’s Advance Guard Brigade, a further six battalions and a battery, along the Po, even further east. On the north bank, the vital Cava position was defended only by the Lombard Bersaglieri, Major Manara. North of Manara was I/21st Infantry Regiment, near the Ticino, west of Pavia. On Manara’s right were the other two battalions of Colonel Beretta’s 21st. Manara faced virtually the entire Austrian Army.
Crossing from the island, the Austrian advance encountered Manara’s outposts. The regiment of Colonel Benedek, two battalions of IR Gyulai, crossing the bridge, encountered one platoon (25 men) of VI Bersaglieri, commanded by Second-Lieutenant Mangialli. Firing broke out, and as Mangialli fell back, the rest of Captain Dubois’ company came up in support, as did the company of Captain Ferrari, on his right, along with Manara himself. On Benedek’s right, Brigade Kolowrat advanced around the Lombard’s left, Stadion moved on Manara’s right, and still further to his right, Brigade Liechtenstein advanced around the flank. This small force could not hope to delay, let alone hold the massive assault, even when supported by the Student Legion and Colonel Beretta’s II and III/21st Regiment. Finally, the Brigade Commander, Major-General Gianotti ordered a retreat across the Po. Beretta’s First Battalion, cut off by the Austrian advance, retreated to the west.
Austrian casualties totalled 10 men wounded; one from 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, three from IR/Kaiser, and six from IR/Gyulai. Lombard losses totaled four killed, and 15 wounded, all from Manara’s battalion, other than two wounded students. The way was open for the advance of five Austrian Corps towards Mortara. Ramorino had been completely outmanoeuvred. The bridge by which General Gianotti’s troops escaped across the Po to join the rest of his command was then destroyed by the Austrians, effectively marooning the Lombard Division in the short term.10
Carlo Alberto Once Again Crosses the Ticino
As events unfolded to the south, Chrzanowski’s own operations began. It was ordered that the Duke of Genoa’s 4th Division, with the King in attendance, make a reconnaissance in force to Magenta, some six kilometres inside Lombardy. Leaving General Passalacqua’s Piedmont Brigade and three guns of the 9th Field Artillery Battery as a reserve, the rest of the Division started across the Buffalora Bridge at around 13:30, preceded by the 8/ Bersaglieri, Captain Peyron. With the exception of a small number of cavalry vedettes, who exchanged a few shots with the advanced elements, and then withdrew, no Austrian troops were in sight. It seemed as though Radetzky had, indeed withdrawn. Met by sullen indifference from the local Lombards, the Piedmontese found that the main body of Austrian troops had left the previous night, heading in the direction of Pavia.
The King and Chrzanowski returned to Trecate, leaving Prince Ferdinando’s division in position. At 22:00, however, the news arrived at Headquarters, via a courier from General Bes, of the Austrian crossing of the Ticino at Pavia, and their subsequent advance. Also reported, was the isolation of General Ramorino’s forces south of the Po. This information was shortly afterwards confirmed by an officer sent by Ramorino himself. Far from retreating, the old man had stolen a march, and was now moving on the west bank of the Ticino, towards Mortara.
___________________________________________
1 See bibliography.
2 Della Rocca, p. 91.
3 Giacchi, Nicolò, La Campagna del 1849 Nell ‘Alta Italia, Rome, 1928.
4 Relazioni e Rapporti Finale sulla Campagna del 1849 nell’Alta Italia, Rome, 1911, pp. 657, 660. The
footnote of the original here gives the strength of the land forces on March 1st as 144,071 men.
5 Ibid, p.661. The original footnote states that this figure does not include the Guard Cacciatori Regiment, the Cacciatori Franchi-Battalion, and the Royal Naval Battalion, because these both had a different organisation, and this they also exclude the Lombard Division of 4 regiments, with a total of 5,860 men enlisted.
6 Ibid, p. 660. There were two other Bersaglieri battalions, the 6th and 7th, both Lombard. The 6th, commanded by Major Luciano Manara, was an excellent unit. These units were not directly affected by the Piedmontese reorganisation. Note that after the 1848 Campaign, Bersaglieri companies were numbered sequentially through the corps.
7 Baldini, p. 158.
8 Stiles, Volume II, p. 235.
9 Hackländer, pp. 17-20, and Schneidawind, pp. 674-679.
10 Capasso, pp. 172-174, Giacchi, pp. 200-206, and Schneidawind, 798-712. Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 74, gives the Austrian loss as nine wounded and 12 missing.
19
The Road to Novara
THE ACTIONS NEAR VIGEVANO AND MORTARA
Reacting quickly to the news that Radetzky was on the west bank of the Ticino, General Chrzanoswki ordered that Lieutenant-General Durando’s 1st Division was to march immediately for Mortara, and Bes’ 2nd Division to Vigevano, the latter also pushing a detachment further south, to Borgo San Siro. The following morning, the Duke of Savoy’s Reserve Division was to follow Durando to Mortara, and support him there. Chrzanowski, with Headquarters, General Perrone’s 3rd, and Prince Ferdinando’s 4th Divisions would advance to Vigevano, in support of Bes. Major-General Solaroli’s 3rd Composite Brigade, currently to the north at Oleggio, was to march south, and cover the Ticino bridges east of Magenta, after the departure of the main army.
In the meanwhile, the advanced Austrian troops had bivouacked for the night. I Corps encamped near Zerbolo, II and III Corps, near Gropello, and IV Corps, near Cava. FML Wocher’s I Reserve Corps camped around the Gravellone, with one cavalry brigade remaining in Pavia that night, as did Radetzky’s Headquarters. The Field Marshal’s prime objective for the following day was the occupation of the town of Mortara, an important road junction. Possession of this fine walled town would cut Piedmontese communications with the fortress of Alessandria, and impede those with Turin, as well as threatening the capital itself.
March 21st
At around 07:30, General Perrone’s division, accompanied by Headquarters, began its march, arriving without incident at Vigevano around 11:00. The Duke of Genoa, always thorough, in the early hours of the 21st, sent three reconnaissance parties along the Milan Road, to ensure that no enemy forces were present there. Towards 06:30, the order was given to assemble the division, and march on Vigevano. Although the movement was executed with celerity, not until about 09:15 were all of the units assembled on the moor at San Martino. A detachment was left behind to guard the bridges over the Ticino, until the arrival of General Solaroli’s brigade. In the later stages of the march, however, progress was greatly slowed by vehicles of 3rd Division, ahead of them, clogging up the road to Vigevano,
and only around 18:00, did the Prince’s division finally assemble there.
Advancing towards Bes was Count Wratislaw’s I Corps. Wratislaw’s orders were to send a force towards Vigevano, whilst moving his main body to Mortara, where Radetzky expected to fight a major engagement. To this end, Lieutenant Colonel Schantz was detached, with a column consisting of his own III/IR Hohenlohe, III/IR Latour, Lieutenant-Colonel Landgraf Fürstenberg, two squadrons of Radetzky Hussars, and three guns of Foot Battery Nr. 1, and directed towards Vigevano.
Intended routes of advance, March 21 1849
Following Schantz, was Wratislaw’s main column, in order of march Brigade Strassoldo, Brigade Clam, Brigade Festetits, and the Corps Artillery Reserve (Brigade Görger had not yet caught up with the main body). Wratislaw had also detached two battalions under Colonel Havliczek, his own II/IR Hohenlohe, and I Landwehr/IR Hohelohe, Captain Rieser, to operate on the right of his column.
Borgo San Siro
General Bes’ advance post, at the village of Borgo San Siro, was composed of five companies of newly levied fourth battalions (three from the 12th Infantry Regiment, Major Varesio and two from the 17th, Captain Candiani), the 4th Section/2nd Position Battery, Quartermaster Defilippi, 6/Bersaglieri, Captain de Biller, and 1/Piedmont Royal Cavalry, Captain Manuel.
Towards 10:00, Bersaglieri pickets reported an Austrian force approaching. In fact, Havliczek’s column was approaching from the left, and Schantz from the right, followed by the main body. Encountering the Piedmontese, Wratislaw deployed Schantz on his own left flank, with Strassoldo’s three remaining battalions in the centre, and Havliczek on the right. In the centre, 5 and 6/10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Captains Kozelli and Lammer respectively, engaged in a lively firefight with the Piedmontese skirmishers in front of the village.
The assault on the place began at about 13:00, from both the left and right, as well as in the centre. Heavily outnumbered, the defenders were rapidly driven back. The village was destroyed by fire during the action. Austrian accounts state that it was burned by the Piedmontese to cover their retreat. The Austrians took three officers, and some 70-80 men prisoner. Some of the fourth battalion captives were only 16 years old.1
To the south, FML Wohlgemuth, at around 13:30, noting the cannon fire from the west, and now having his own fourth brigade on hand, that of Major-General von Görger, lost no time in relieving von Görger of 16 companies of his infantry, and marching of with them, towards the sound of the guns. The Major-General and the rest of his command were left to follow on.
Action of La Sforzesca
After the capture of Borgo San Siro, Count Wratislaw, at about 15:00, directed that Lieutenant-Colonel Schantz should now advance towards the settlement of La Sforzesca. The latter immediately moved off, to support Lieutenant-Colonel Fürstenberg, who was already on the march there. They were both moving against a much greater force than they realised. Strassoldo, though, intuitively aware that his detached subordinates might require assistance, shortly afterwards despatched Havliczek, and I/IR Hohenlohe to support Schantz and Fürstenberg. His good sense would become evident.
Around 16:00, Schantz, in the belief that he was still dealing with the troops which had been ejected from Borgo San Siro, ordered his subordinate forward against La Sforzesca. Fürstenberg advanced with three companies on each side of a stream, the Roggia Sforzesca, which flowed through the village, dividing the battlefield in half. The artillery accompanied the infantry on the west bank. III/IR Hohenlohe and the two hussar squadrons, remained in reserve.
The Piedmontese deployed, to the east of the village, two Bersaglieri companies, the 6th, Captain de Biller and 7th, Captain Cattaneo, backed by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Colonel Mollard’s 17th Infantry Regiment, and two 16 pounders. Mollard’s 1st Battalion, along with two 16 pounders, were further to their left-rear. Colonel Cialdini’s recently raised 23rd Infantry Regiment occupied La Sforzesca itself, with the other four artillery pieces of 2nd Position Battery. West of the village, were two squadrons of the Royal Piedmont Cavalry Regiment.
Mollard advanced his 2nd and 3rd Battalions east of the stream, his left covered by the two Bersaglieri companies. To the west, Cialdini moved one battalion forward immediately east of the Roggia Sforzesca, and his four guns on the opposite bank, level with the cavalry. The other two battalions then advanced between the two, with the horsemen following suit.
Mollard’s resolute advance took the hamlet of San Vittore at bayonet point, and forcing Schantz to send three companies of IR Hohenlohe to bolster the right flank. His left, however, was also in trouble, as Cialdini’s equally powerful thrust made ground. To this flank, two further Hohenlohe companies were despatched, leaving only one as a last reserve. Soon afterwards, this company, too, was committed. Schantz was now in severe trouble, with the Piedmontese cavalry threatening to cut his line of retreat.
Cavalry Skirmish at La Sforzesca, March 21st 1849 (contemporary lithograph)
With no alternative, Schantz led a charge with his two hussar squadrons. This wild attack routed one battalion of the 23rd Regiment, driving them back on their own artillery, and engaging the two Royal Piedmont squadrons, before, in turn, being driven back. The routed infantry had to be rallied with the flat of their officer’s swords, both the regiment’s colonel and the Brigade commander taking part.
At this critical moment, the further troops sent by Strassoldo, and those from Festetits began to arrive on the field, followed by FML Wohlgemuth, with IV/ Kaiser Jäger, 10 companies of Oguliner Grenzer, and three 12 pounder cannon from the Corps Artillery Reserve. These reinforcements stabilised the situation, and though the fighting continued, little more was achieved by either side, before nightfall ended it.2
Action of Gambolò
While these events took place to his right, Count Wratislaw continued his march towards Mortara, via Gambolo, with what was still present of Brigade Strassoldo as his Advance Guard. At about 17:00, this column encountered the enemy just north of Gambolò. Here, behind a ravine, General Perrone had deployed Colonel Jaillet’s 1st Infantry Regiment, covering Bes’s right flank. Supporting Jaillet were the Genoa Cavalry Regiment, Colonel Valfrè di Bonzo, and the eight guns of the 3rd Field Artillery Battery, Captain Grésy. To Jaillet’s left, as mentioned, between him and La Sforzesca, stood Colonel Mudry’s 2nd Infantry Regiment, closer to La Sforzesca, but ready to support either flank. Captain Talleyrand-Périgord, Duke de Dino, who was still, as in the previous campaign, on the Army Staff, witnessed General Chrzanowski personally entrust the position to Colonel Jaillet’s French-speaking Savoyards, to whom, at least, he could speak.“ ‘Gentlemen’, he said, ‘I have placed you here, and I am certain that the Austrians will not move you from this spot”. An encouraging smile lit up the manly faces of the brave boys of Savoy.”3 They would, indeed, reward his trust.
Having detached so many men to the right, Strassoldo now only had 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, two Landwehr companies of IR Hohenlohe, one squadron of Radetzky Hussars, and two guns under his immediate command. A very rash attack by the Hussar squadron, under Major Siller, was repulsed by heavy fire, as was a subsequent formed attack by the Jäger company of Captain Stiller. A counterattack pushed the Austrians back. It being clear that the enemy greatly outnumbered him, Strassoldo showed a bold front with a thick skirmish screen, knowing that he had nothing to back it up with. Worried at the possibility of a trap, the Savoyards withdrew to their previous position, the rank and file grumbling that they had been called back. Captain Talleyrand-Périgord saw this first hand: “I was on the left of this fine regiment when it was attacked, and I followed it until it was back in place. A soldier said to me: ‘Captain, why do you not let us take Gambolò?’ “My friend”, I replied, “it is because we cannot risk the lives of brave fellows such as yourself, without the means to support you.” ‘Does Savoy need support?!’ was his reply. I was touched by such bravado. Such self-assurance is always a good sign at the beginning of a campaign.”4
Strassoldo
’s bluff had worked. Around 18:00, reinforcements from Brigade Clam began to arrive. There was no more fighting at Gambolò. Losses in these various actions were reported as:
Austrian – 25 men killed, 12 officers and 168 men wounded, and one officer and 119 men missing, most of whom were take prisoner. The highest regimental loss was that of IR Latour, which totalled two officers and 59 men.
Piedmontese – 21 killed, 94 wounded, and around 100 missing.5
The fighting in this sector had sputtered out to no-one in particular’s favour. However, heavy cannon fire could still be heard to the west.
The Battle of Mortara (see map in colour section)
While these events were taking place, General Durando’s 1st Division, already at Mortara, had been awaiting the arrival of The Duke of Savoy’s Reserve Division. The Duke’s troops began to march in from 13:00. With Durando deployed across the roads to the town, from the east and south, Prince Vittorio Emmanuele placed his in reserve, to the west.
D’Aspre’s II Austrian Corps was also on the march towards Mortara that morning, followed by III Corps. IV Corps was moving on D’Aspre’s left, and I Reserve Corps to the-rear. As ordered, II and IV Corps had begun their march at 10:00, and II and I Reserve, at 11:00. By 16:00, D’Aspre was approaching the town.
In Novara, General Durando had placed the Regina Brigade squarely across the main road from Pavia, with its right flank anchored on the imposing S. Albino Convent. The Aosta Brigade stood to the left, facing east, its left flank resting on the town cemetery, near the Mortara-Vigevano road. Between the two brigades, was a large ditch, or ravine. The Duke of Savoy had posted the Cuneo Brigade just to the west of the town, and the Guards further in that direction. Both commanders had heard gunfire to the east during the day, but neither was expecting an attack on them that afternoon
Radetzky's Marches Page 44