Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  The entire front, from Mortara Cemetery, east of the town, west to Castel d’Agogna was about 14 kilometres in all, with 1st Division grouped south and east of Mortara, and the Reserve Division extended to the west. In general, the terrain was disadvantageous to the defence, due to the limited field of vision, and also field of fire, although it was also difficult for any attacker, due to the broken terrain and thick belts of trees, with limited scope for manoeuvre. The Piedmontese had not taken the precaution of setting up picket lines, or sending out reconnaissance cavalry patrols, which were instead kept behind the front line in reserve. Only a few cavalry vedettes were posted.6

  At 16:30, the Austrian advance was reported by the pickets of the Nizza Cavalry, a detachment of hussars having been seen east of the Convent of San Albino. Upon following up the Piedmontese, the hussars had one cannon shot fired at them, and then pulled back to report.7

  At this point, FML D’Aspre, who was, as he commonly did, riding with the vanguard, ordered Archduke Albrecht to make an immediate attack with his division. Therefore, the Archduke formed four attack columns. These were:

  A.

  Colonel Weiler, on the right flank, with two companies of the 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, and his own I and II/IR Franz Carl.

  B.

  Colonel Benedek was north of the Garlasco-Mortara Road, with two companies of the 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion, his I and II/IR Gyulai, and three guns of the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery.

  C.

  South of that same road, were deployed, under Major-General Stadion, two companies of the 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion, I and II/IR Paumgarten, and the other half of the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery.

  D.

  Major-General Kolowrat’s column formed the left flank, with four companies of the 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion, and I and II/IR/Kaiser.

  The 4th Foot Artillery Battery took position on the road itself; and the cavalry was left in the rear, around Remondò. None of these preparations were observed by the Piedmontese. While the Archduke was deploying for the main attack, the Corps Commander hurried forward Count Schaaffgotsche’s division. Typically, he did not wish any delay to occur to the advance.

  Just before 17:00, the Austrian batteries already in place began their bombardment. A particular target was the 9th Infantry Regiment, astride the main road, and which was hit hard. II/9th Regiment, Major Roggero, was unfortunate enough to be the battalion directly across the road. 5/9th Regiment, Captain Corradi was particularly pounded, and gave way, taking elements of 4th and 6/9th with them. Major Roggero, with his officers, and the personal assistance of General Trotti, was able to rally most of the battalion, but it was now posted behind the firing line.8 The resulting gap was covered by repositioning III/9th, Major Carcassi, and bringing forward II/10th Regiment, Major Plocchiù.

  Generals La Marmora, Durando, and Trotti made a point of being seen to observe the progress of the battle for 45 minutes, fully realising the psychological effect of this upon the exposed troops. Durando, who could initially have switched the 9th Regiment for the 10th, deployed behind them, chose not to do so, probably correctly considering that the 9th would be more likely to rally behind a solid unit, and, no doubt, that there was little point in subjecting a fresh unit to an unnecessary ordeal.

  Counter battery fire, now urgent, to say the least, was slow to appear. Six guns of the 6th Field Artillery Battery opened fire reasonably quickly, but only two sections of the 4th Field Battery came forward in support, one of them, that under the command of Sergeant Rubiano, sent directly by order of General La Marmora.9

  After an hour of preparation, at around 18:00, as the light began to fade, Archduke Albrecht began his assault. The artillery was ordered to increase its fire in support. On the Austrian right, Colonel Weiler advanced alongside a canal, north of the main road, encountering General Lovera’s Aosta Brigade in the dusk. Weiler’s columns came under fire from the two forward deployed battalions of the 5th Infantry Regiment, and halted to exchange musketry. Weiler’s advance stopped here, and, as darkness fell, the firing gradually died away.

  In the centre, Benedek and Stadion advanced on either side of the main road. As Benedek approached, he unexpectedly found, on his centre left, Major Plocchiù’s II/10th Regiment, sent forward by General Trotti. Plocchiù opened a brisk fire on the advancing Austrians, halting their advance, and causing them to waver. Ironically, Benedek’s salvation also came from his left.

  On the Austrian left, Major-General Kolowrat stormed the key position of the San Albino Convent, defended by I/9th Regiment, Major Rapallo, who was supported by two guns of the 6th Field Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Sangiorgio. Kolowrat’s attack forced Plocchiù to change front, and took the pressure off Benedek, who quickly reformed his men and moved resolutely against the Regina Brigade, which by now was in retreat into the town, only Major Carcassi’s III/9th halting to turn about and fire a few volleys against the attackers.

  Previous orders from General Durando had been issued that, in the event of a withdrawal into Mortara, the town walls were to be defended. However, as the retreating troops entered Mortara, General Trotti at their head, they continued through the streets, and out of the Novara Gate, then moved towards that city. At approximately 19:00, Benedek entered Mortara with II/IR Gyulai, and elements of 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion. Kolowrat’s II/IR Kaiser, Major Medel, and IV/ Kaiser Jäger were also forcing their way in.

  Some 30 minutes earlier, General La Marmora had informed General Lovera that the enemy attack had been directed at the Regina Brigade, and that his support was required. Lovera, with enemy units to his front, and the difficult feature south of his position, which would be difficult to cross in any sort of order, merely made preparations to defend the ravine/ditch in case of attack.10 By now, Durando having become largely a spectator, La Marmora was the soul of the defence

  About 15 minutes before Benedek had entered Mortara, La Marmora ordered Lovera in to defend the town itself. He then personally led some 400 odd men of various units of the Regina Brigade, in an attack, which collapsed, some his own men having fired into the rear of his force, by mistake. Subsequently, he despatched an aide to order Lovera’s Brigade into Mortara. Nothing happened.

  At around 20:00, La Marmora ordered a withdrawal from the town, as a prelude to an assault to retake it. Anyone who could be gathered up was assembled, and formed into a large column. In the lead was La Marmora, with 4th Cacciatori Company, III/10th Regiment, Captain Birago. Behind these, came II and III/8th Regiment, sent by the Duke of Savoy to assist La Marmora, four guns of the 6th Field Battery, and various troops from the Regina Brigade. In Mortara, in the meanwhile, Colonel Delfino, with what remained of the First Battalion of his 9th Regiment, had been attempting to cover the retreat. Finally, though, he, too, had retreated with the remnants of his command. He then gallantly joined the new advance.

  La Marmora’s advance started in silence, but once inside the town, the order was given to sound the drums, to intimidate the enemy. Progress was very slow, a wagon and dead horses impeding movement along a street. Entering the main square, the vanguard was fired upon, only the few at the head of the column being able to reply. A platoon, commanded by Captain Dovis, attempted to find a way around this position, but was met with enemy fire at every turn.

  In fact, the Austrian force actually in the town was considerably smaller than La Marmora’s, and Colonel Benedek’s next move involved a gigantic bluff. In the pitch darkness, he called out to the Piedmontese, informing them that they were completely surrounded, and ordered them to lay down their arms. Colonel Delfino, at the head of the column, observing that the troops were disposed to obey Benedek, attempted to discuss terms with him, but failing in this, had no choice other than to surrender. At 21:00, 54 officers and 1,511 other ranks surrendered. Also given up, were the four cannon, which were stuck in the middle of the crush.

  Mortara was now irretrievably lost. The Duke of Savoy was able to retreat unmolested, with his division, other than the tro
ops sent into Mortara, and the Duke’s own stable of horses, which was captured. Prince Vittorio Emmanuele initially had to retreat in the direction of Vercelli, before he could then make for Novara. General Lovera also managed to extract his Aosta Brigade, exchanging fire in the darkness with various Austrian detachments, as explained by Le Masson:

  On the left, during the entire action, the Aosta Brigade had engaged in a desultory skirmisher and artillery exchange. The wide ditch on its right had prevented it from coming to the assistance of the other brigade. At the time of the rout, upon receiving Durando’s order to move to defend the town, it prepared to march, preceded by one battalion, two squadrons, and two guns. This detachment encountered the enemy near Mortara. Under fire and charged by cavalry, it forced its way into the town. However, the Austrians had got there first. Part of the battalion was surrounded and laid down its arms. The two squadrons, likewise surrounded, were able to force their way through. They charged resolutely, and ran down everything in their path, to escape together with a section of artillery, and what remained of the infantry. On learning what had happened, and with no further orders, the brigade commander called off the march on the town, and withdrew along the Novara road.....’11

  Total losses suffered by Archduke Albrecht’s Division were two officers, and 40 men killed, eight officers and 68 men wounded, and 71 men missing. The highest loss was suffered by Colonel Benedek’s IR Gyulai. Piedmontese casualties totalled 121 killed and wounded, and around 2,000 prisoners and missing. A field hospital, with the sick and wounded was also lost, along with five guns. The Journal de L’Armée belge commented that:

  The Piedmontese position in front of Mortara was excellent, and they had numbers in their favour. However, they manoeuvered so slowly and hesitantly, that these advantages were wasted. Conversely, the Austrians moved swiftly, and with a determination that was unusual in the past.12

  At about the same time as Archduke Albrecht was commencing his assault at Mortara, Marshal Radetzky and his retinue reached the unremarkable village of Trumello, some eight kilometres south-east of there, the cannonade from that direction having been audible to them for the hour or so since it had begun. Army Headquarters was established here for the night. Radetzky, Hess, and Schönhals, stood next to the main road, watching as the columns of II and III Corps marched past, to thunderous cheers from unit after unit.13 At one point, the Marshal was talking to a group of grenadiers, commending them on their bearing, when he noticed one soldier who had no ‘ feldzeichen’ on his cap. Speaking in the familiar, he asked, ‘Hey, you; where do you keep your feldzeichen?! The Marshal then broke off a piece of his own sprig, and gave it to the man, who was visibly moved. He knew how to get the best out of his men.14 Later in the evening, the news of Mortara arrived, buoying spirits, and ensuring that he still had the initiative.

  March 22nd

  Chrzanowski concentrates at Novara

  News of the disaster at Mortara reached Piedmontese Headquarters in Vigevano, at 01:00, the report delivered to General Chrzanowski, by two General Staff officers, Captain Battaglia, and Captain Falcò. The Major-General was dumbfounded. He at once went to inform the King, whom he found sound asleep, amongst the Savoy Brigade, wrapped in a cloak, gesturing and mumbling to himself in his sleep. The tidings of disaster from Mortara had no visible effect upon him. The information that there was no news on his eldest son, merely elicited an, “Oh”. Chrzanowski quickly outlined the possible options, amongst which was a proposal to launch an attack on Mortara. This, the divisional commanders did not at all welcome. Chrzanowski strongly advised a concentration of the Army at Novara, where, united, they could give battle. This advice was accepted by the King, and work on preparing the relevant orders commenced.15

  First to march was General Perrone’s 3rd Division, followed by General Bes, with 2nd Division. Last to move, and acting as rearguard, followed Prince Ferdinando’s Reserve Division. The 3rd Composite Brigade of General Solaroli, was also pulled from the area of Magenta to join in the general concentration. Orders were sent to General Durando and the Duke of Savoy, to conform to these movements.

  Chrzanowski moved in advance of his troops, and on arrival in Novara that afternoon, he found Durando’s division already there. This was good news indeed, and Durando was able to report that Prince Vittorio Emmanuele’s division would arrive that evening. From a potential disaster, Chrzanowski appeared to have achieved a near miracle.

  Austrian Moves

  At Mortara on the 22nd, II Corps broke camp at around 11:00. There was no urgency attached by Radetzky to the day’s march, since the objective was to ascertain the precise location of the enemy concentration. This, the Marshal was fairly certain, would be at Novara.

  At 15:00, III Corps followed II Corps along the main road towards Novara. D’Aspre encamped for the night near Vespolate, with Baron Appel to his right rear, and Count Thurn’s IV Corps en echelon on the left. I Corps lay north of Mortara, roughly on a level with Vigevano, and Wocher’s I Reserve Corps spent the night north of Mortara. Brigade Strassoldo, of I Corps, was detached to a position east of Vespolate, as a flank guard.

  On balance, both commanders were content with the day. Both Radetzky and Chrzanowski had completed their concentrations where they wished them to be. Unless one of them now had a fundamental change of mind, they could now do little more than trust in the judgment of their subordinates, and the courage and discipline of the officers and men.

  ___________________________________________

  1 Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, pp. 40-41, Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1849, Part I, pp. 9-13, and Giacchi, pp. 226-229. In his report, Captain de Biller mistakenly refers to’…two Reserve Battalions of the 12th Infantry…’, Relazioni e Rapporti Finale sulla Campagna del 1849 nell’Alta Italia, p. 214.

  2 Ibid, plus Schneidawind, pp. 722-723, and Della Rocca, pp 94-95.

  3 Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 307-308.

  4 Ibid.

  5 Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 43, and Giacchi, p. 241. The latter accepts Hilleprandt’s figures. Hilleprandt states that the Piedmontese loss was unknown to him, but that the number of prisoners taken was around 150.

  6 Corselli, p. 271.

  7 Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 140.

  8 Giacchi, p. 250, states only that, “… these raw soldiers, inexperienced under fire, began to give ground.” Corselli, p. 272, says, simply, that the battalion,”… severely hit, suffered serious losses, wavered, and part of it fell back in disorder.” This is surely completely understandable.

  9 Two other available batteries, the 1st Position and 2nd Horse Artillery, were initially held in place, by the Duke of Savoy – Giacchi, p. 251. The lack of an overall commander would bedevil operations.

  10 Le Masson, Histoire de la Campagne de Novare en 1849, p. 85, agrees with Lovera that this obstacle was a serious and time-consuming one to for a full brigade to cross.

  11 Le Masson, Campagne de Novara, p. 85.

  12 Histoire des campagnes d’Italie en 1848 et 1849, Chapter VI, 1852, pp. 208-209.

  13 Hackländer, p. 69.

  14 Schneidawind, pp. 720-721.

  15 Costa de Beauregard, pp. 476-479.

  20

  The Battle of Novara and the End of the Campaign

  March 23rd: The Battle of Novara

  Radetzky’s Plans and Dispositions

  Overnight, reports had come in to FML D’Aspre that only a few thousand enemy troops were in the vicinity of Novara, and that their main force was moving on Vercelli, on the River Sesia and the Turin Road, about 22 kilometres south-west of Novara. As a result of this information, the Marshal altered his dispositions for the following day. Now, only D’Aspre’s II Corps would advance on Novara via Vespolate. III Corps, FML Appel, would follow D’Aspre, as would Wocher’s I Reserve Corps. The latter, however, was almost a full day’s march behind II Corps. Count Thurn’s IV Corps, which previously would also have moved on Novara, would now march west, towards Vercelli. FML Wratislaw’s I Corps would remain in reserv
e.1

  Chrzanowski’s Dispositions

  In fact, on the morning of the 23rd, Chrzanowski had concentrated five divisions at Novara, a force, according to Pinelli, of 45,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 4,000 artillery, engineers, and other troops, with 111 guns. The total numbers available are uncertain.2

  The area over which the battle would be fought is well described in two studies. First, that of a Russian Liaison Officer, Prince Troubetzkoi, who was with Radetzky’s Staff during this campaign. He paid special attention to the large manor houses and villages:

  La Bicocca, a small village with a large church and which crosses the main road to Mortara, forms the high point of the plateau. On its left, directly on the slope down to the valley of the Terdoppio, stands the Fersada manor house. Further forward, in the direction of the village of Olengo, a large farm called Castellazzo. On the far side of the valley of the Arbogna there are a number of houses, the largest of which, the Casa Visconti, is surrounded by an imposing stone wall. Further forward again are Luogoreggio and La Cavalotta. On the opposite slope, there is a large enclosure called Il Luogone. On the plateau itself, but further back, stand other houses, the most important being Ca Pisani, Ca Lavinchi and Ca Rasori. To their right is the village of Citadella and, in the direction of Agogna, the large manor of Corte Novo. Before this, is the little village of Torrione di Quartara.

  The approach to the plateau, between the Agogna and the main road to Mortara, made difficult near the latter by the valley of the Arbogna Valley, is further protected by a canal called Canalazzo, or Cavo di Prina. This runs into the cavo d’Assi which flows at no great distance alongside the Agogna.3