Amidst the chaos, Carlo Alberto asked General Chrzanowski and the War Minister, General Cadorna, what action should be taken. Chrzanowski replied that nothing could be done. Cadorna’s silence reinforced the point. As there at present appeared no other choice, the King sent General Cassato to Marshal Radetzky to ask for terms. Cassato’s initial meeting was with FML Hess. Although no specific terms were discussed, reference was made of an Austrian occupation of Piedmont east of the River Sesia, an occupation of the great fortress of Alessandria, withdrawal of the Piedmontese naval squadron once again in the Adriatic, and the undertaking of preliminary peace talks.27
Upon receipt of this information, Carlo Alberto did not hesitate, but ordered the reconvening of the War Council for that same evening. Cadorna found himself conversing only with the King. His same regrets were given with the same sincerity, but Carlo Alberto gave the same answer – that he could not accept the conditions set out by the Marshal. He repeated the word “Impossible, Impossible”, over and over again.28
The meeting took place in the unpretentious setting of the Bellini Palace. Unrealistically, to say the least, the King proposed a march upon Alessandria, where battle could be offered once again. This was universally rejected by those present, not least because the only road actually open was to the north, towards the Alps. At last realising that no more could be done, Carlo Alberto then, with great dignity, abdicated in favour of Prince Vittorio Emanuele. Later that night, General Chrzanowski issued orders for a general retreat northwards. Carlo Alberto left Novara in a carriage, accompanied by only two retainers. He moved west, along the Vercelli Road, travelling under the name of the Count de Barge. Passed through the Austrian outposts without incident, the former King made his way to exile in Portugal. He would die there, only just over four months later, on July 28th.
As King, Vittorio Emanuele sent Cossato and Cadorna as his own emissaries to Radetzky. This was fortunate, as a bombardment had commenced early the next morning, and was not halted until it was certain that the Piedmontese had, indeed, evacuated Novara. Subsequently, the Marshal and the new King met near Vignale, north of the city.
As a gesture, Radetzky returned to Vittorio Emanuele his stable of horses, which had been captured at Mortara, thee days earlier. Although the meeting was amicable, considering the circumstances, the terms remained the same as those previously offered. Of the 12 clauses, the most important stipulated that 18,000 Austrian infantry, and 2,000 cavalry were to occupy the area between the Sesia and Ticino Rivers, and 3,000 Austrian troops would be included in the garrison of Alessandria. The Sardinian warships in the Adriatic were to be recalled within two weeks, and the King’s Army was to be immediately placed upon a peace-time footing. Steps were to be taken to conclude a definitive peace treaty. The document was signed by the two commanding generals.29 The two armies would not again meet in battle for 10 years.
While these events occurred, the Piedmontese retreat itself was conducted amidst widespread looting, and worse. Della Rocca was scathing about the continued disorder:
The day after, as well as on the following days, some soldiers became furious and, in protesting against the War, did many wrongs and injustices to their fellow-citizens. They threatened to pillage, stating that they had not received the food yet. During the battle, and mainly after the defeat, their exasperation increased and they not only began to sack, but also threatened to burn and destroy the city. They were so full of hatred for the civilians that they certainly would have accomplished their horrible plans, if they had been in Milan, instead of in Novara. The task of calming them down proved very difficult, and it was necessary to call for the cavalry, which charged them, killing some. The same spectacle was repeated, for three-four days, in every town and village in which there were stragglers or fugitive soldiers; many civilians were forced to take measures against them.30
As the retreat continued, the inevitable consequences of the chaos after the battle were felt. As the Duke of Genoa’s division withdrew, on the 26th it halted for the night, and four men were tried and executed for desertion.31
Austrian losses in the nine hour struggle at Novara were as follows:
Killed
14 officers and 396 NCOs and men
Wounded
Two generals, 101 officers, and 1,747 NCOs and men
Prisoners
Two officers and 78 NCOs and men
Missing
One officer and 876 NCOs and men
Total
120 Officers and 3,097 NCOs and men.
The regiment with the highest loss was IR Kinsky, with a total of 19 officers and 339 NCOs and men. For individual battalions, II/Vienna Volunteers lost nine officers and 235 NCOs and men, and the seemingly omnipresent 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, 11 officers and 173 NCOs and men.32
The Royal Army’s losses, also given by Hilleprandt, were as follows:
Killed
Two generals, 37 officers, and 1,046 NCOs and men
Wounded
96 officers and 1,758 NCOs and men
Prisoners
Two officers and 2,387 NCOs and men
The number of missing is given as 20,000, but many of these were stragglers. As to the wounded, the Piedmontese Military Sanitary Corps reported attending over 2,500 on the battlefield. However, this figure was subsequently altered to 3,008.33 Le Masson put Piedmontese losses at 4,000 killed and wounded, with a further 2,000 taken prisoner.34 One flag of the Pinerolo Brigade was lost, together with 12 guns.
The defeat was complete and overwhelming. Four years later, Friedrich Engels, in a letter to a friend in New York, described it as, “…without doubt the most brilliantly fought affair in Europe since Napoleon’s day...”.35 It was a catastrophe that would haunt the Italian officer corps for a century.
A very well satisfied Field Marshal issued a proclamation to his army on the 25th. It read:
Headquarters, Novara, 25th March
Soldiers! You have you have well redeemed your word; you have undertaken a campaign against an enemy with superior numbers, and have finished it victoriously in five days. History will not deny that there was no braver, no truer army than that which my Lord and Sovereign, the Emperor, appointed me to command. Soldiers! In the name of the Emperor and the Fatherland, I thank you for your brave deeds, your devotion, and your truth. With sadness, my eyes look upon the graves of our brothers, the glorious dead, and I cannot declare the expression of my gratitude to the living without giving a heartfelt remembrance to the dead. Soldiers! Our most constant enemy, Carlo Alberto, has descended from the throne. With his successor, the young King, I have concluded an armistice, which guarantees us a swift conclusion of peace. Soldiers! With joy, you were witness to this – with joy, the inhabitants of the country have everywhere received us, seeing in us, far from oppressors, their saviours against anarchy. This expectation you must fulfil, and by your strict observance of discipline, show the world that the warriors of Austria’s army are as terrible in war as they are honest and gentle in peace, and that we have come to protect and not to destroy. I am looking forward to seeing the names of the brave, who have distinguished themselves extraordinarily, either to decorate their breasts immediately, with a badge of honour, or to ask His Majesty for the decorations for them. Radetzky, Field Marshal36
Ignorance of the scale of the defeat caused indignation in Turin to continue to fester. Three days later, the King appointed a new government, headed by General Delaunay. Parliament immediately refused to accept Delaunay, and passed a number of measures denouncing the Armistice, and for the continuation of the war. A deputation was appointed to present these proposals to the King.
The seven Deputies waited upon Vittorio Emanuele at 16:30, presenting him with the Chamber’s demands to continue the war. Far more in touch with reality than his parliamentarians, the new King told them simply, “Gentlemen, find me a single soldier who will go into battle, and I will be the second to march.” There simply could be no continuation of the struggle.37
/> One episode of the brief campaign was not overlooked. General Ramorino who had been outmanoeuvred by Radetzky on the first day of hostilities, was court-martialled and sentenced to death. Accused of treachery, he met his death with immense courage and dignity, even commanding the firing squad.38
Insurrection in Brescia
Upon the resumption of hostilities by Carlo Alberto, there had been rumblings of discontent in Bergamo and Brescia. Matters in Bergamo did not escalate beyond this. In Brescia, however, a major rising took place.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the garrison, based in the citadel, consisted of four companies of IR Archduke Ludwig (1, 2, 7 and 8th), all commanded by Captain Leschke. These numbered around 400 men. There was also a major military hospital there, Nr. 2, with some 4,000 sick, wounded, or convalescents.39
Ironically, the revolt erupted on the same day as the Battle of Novara was fought. The garrison was shut up in the citadel, and the patients in the hospital barricaded themselves in, all who could do so, arming themselves. The city authorities, aware of the likely consequences of a rebellion, counselled moderation, but, naturally this was not what the mob wished to hear. A committee was formed, mainly inspired by a lawyer, Filippo Casola, whose fiery rhetoric was more conducive to the current mood.
With Marshal Radetzky at the front, command of the forces in Lombardy and Venetia fell to the commander of II Reserve Corps, the ruthless martinet, FML Haynau. Haynau, on the 26th, sent Major-General Nugent, son of FZM Nugent, with one battalion of Roman Banat Grenzer, a half squadron, and two guns towards the city, under a thousand men. At the town of Santa Eufemia, just west of Brescia, this force attacked insurgents there, driving them towards the city.
From Verona, Nugent was reinforced by I and III/IR Baden, Colonel Favancourt, with two additional guns of the Provisional 6 Pounder Battery. During the 30th of March, the insurrectionists were cleared from the outskirts of the city, and preparations made for an attack on it. Haynau resolved to retake Brescia without awaiting the main body of Appel’s III Corps, which was on its way.
The next attack began next morning. Under cover of heavy fog, five columns, some 2,300 men in all, assaulted the five city gates, supported by the fire of the guns in the Citadel. Approximately 2,000 armed insurgents opposed them.40 After heavy fighting, the attackers gained possession of two points of entry. Overnight, the fighting died down.
Early the next day, Sunday, April 1st, the battle was renewed, and bitter street fighting went on until 17:00, no quarter being given from buildings from which fire came. At that hour, Haynau demanded, and obtained an unconditional surrender. The fighting had been bitter, with women and children among the dead. Austrian losses totalled two officers and 50 men killed, one general (Major-General Nugent) mortally wounded, 13 officers and 204 men wounded, and 54 men missing. 2,600 corpses were said to have been found in the city. Haynau also ordered some summary executions, earning him the nickname of “The Beast of Brescia”.
Revolt in Genoa
In an ironic echo of events in Brescia, similar scenes also occurred in the great port city of Genoa. Always at odds with the Turin Government, the city, birthplace of Mazzini, had always been radical by habit. The news of the defeat of the King’s Army at Novara released many varying tensions.
As radical rabble-rousers harangued crowds, and the National Guard (itself radical) was mobilised, the weak Military Governor, General de Asarta, vacillated. Anxious not to inflame the situation, he even allowed revolutionary elements to man some of the city’s defences. Within days, students had occupied the Ducal Palace, and troops of the 5,500 man garrison had begun to desert to the rebels.
Vittorio Emanuele’s situation was critical, now facing open revolt in his own realm. Indeed, the Deputy for the area, Maria Reta, had already declared a Ligurian Republic. Only two effective military forces remained under Royal control. These were the 5th (Lombard) Division, whose commander, General Ramorino, had been shot for treason, and the 6th Division, which had been sent to assist by the Duke of Modena, but had seen almost no fighting. The commander of the latter, Major-General Alfonso La Marmora, could be completely relied upon. The King had no choice but to commit his last reliable force to crush the rebellion. Initially, there were fears the Lombard Division would join the rebellion, but in fact, it largely disbanded itself, with those who still wanted to fight, making their way to defend the new Roman Republic.
La Marmora was ordered by the King, on March 27th, to quell the rebellion in Genoa. He received the order only on the 31st. Pausing only to add the Advance Guard Brigade of Colonel Belvedere, still intact, to his force, he appeared before Genoa on April 3rd, with about 10,000 men. To his disgust, he found that De Asarta’s garrison had completely melted away, he had himself capitulated to the rebels.41 The defensive works around the city were both powerful and extensive, but the disorganised and fragmented rebels had made few preparations for the defence of the city.
La Marmora’s impetuosity and great good luck, combined with his enemy’s disorganisation and lack of vision, enabled him, over the next few days, to take several of the city’s forts, despite the fact that many of his own troops appeared more interested in loot and drink, than victory. His dependence upon his best troops, the Bersaglieri, and the artillery, was notable.42 The appearance of his older brother, Alessandro, also helped to focus matters. Negotiations as to the status of the defeated combatants became a topic of discussion, with neutral Britain and the United States being involved. After numbers of the defenders were allowed to depart, the city was finally taken possession of by the royal forces on April 11th. Genoa was reconquered for the King at a cost of around 1,000 dead altogether.
For now, at least, there was peace in King Vittorio Emanuele’s Kingdom. For the people of Venice, though, the reverse was the case. There, a true siege was about to be undertaken.
___________________________________________
1 Schneidawind, pp. 739 and Kriegsbegebenheiten 1849, Part 1, pp. 21-22.
2 Pinelli, p. 869, and followed by Pieri, Storia militare, p. 303. This was also the estimate of Radetzky at the time. See his initial post-battle report, below.
3 Troubetzkoi, p. 225.
4 ‘Campaign of Novara, 1849’, U.S. General Service and Staff College, 1904, p.2.
5 Pinelli, p. 871. Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 270, says 4,500, but he must have been measuring in an arc, or including outlying units.
6 Ibid, pp. 870-871, wherein he also agrees with Chrzanowski’s concerns. The general’s conduct of the battle must be viewed with this in mind. The King was in close proximity to His ‘Major General’ for much of the day. Captain Talleyrand-Périgord, normally invaluable for information on Headquarters matters, is strangely quiet on details, this day.
7 Schneidawind, Feldzug, p. 750.
8 A total of seven companies, one half squadron, and two guns. 11/IR Paumgarten was not present, being on escort duty for prisoners taken at Mortara. Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 206.
9 Bruna, pp. 190-191.
10 Colonel Baron Bianchi, commander of IR Kinsky, was acting brigade commander.
11 Report of Colonel Jaillet, Relazioni e rapporti 1849, p. 251.
12 Relazioni e rapporti, 1849, p. 97.
13 Strack, pp. 281-282.
14 Le Masson, Campagne de Novare, p. 98, and Scalchi, p. 318.
15 Hubel’s defence of Olengo was highlighted by the Prussian Captain Riese, in his 1858 study, Der Kampf in und um Dörfer und Wälder, p. 45. It also earned him the Ritterkreuz of the Order of Maria Theresa.
16 Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 263, says that two separate attacks were repulsed.
17 Colonel Giacchi, head of the Historical Branch of the Italian General Staff, comments in his book that it might have been the decisive moment, quoting Chrzanowski himself: “I wished to make the best use of my advantage in order to strike with my reserve troops. At Half-past Midday, our first line at La Bicocca had been swept away. Unfortunately, the two divisions which I had, to act
as a reserve as the last resort, could not now be used for this purpose.” Did the general believe it necessary to have two fresh divisions for the decisive moment? La Campagna del 1849 Nell ‘Alta Italia, p. 310.
18 Bruna, p. 195.
19 Only the brigades of Maurer and Alemann were present. Brigade Cavriani had yet to catch up with the main body.
20 Troubetzkoi, p. 235.
21 Colonel Giacchi states that these orders were delivered by Captain Talleyrand-Périgord, p. 314. Oddly, this is not mentioned in the Captain’s memoirs.
22 Four guns of Durando’s 8th Field Artillery Battery, the eight guns of 3rd Position Battery, and the four of the Modena Artillery, the latter two units, from the Artillery Reserve.
23 Bruna, pp.193-194.
24 Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 265.
25 Giacchi, p. 322. The four Austrian batteries are not specified in the accounts. I Reserve Corps possessed six artillery batteries, and one rocket battery. It can be assumed that the 12 pounder battery was despatched, and probably the Reserve 6 pounder battery, and the two infantry brigade batteries.
26 Gavenda, pp 77-78. As already noted, it is very interesting to note that Radetzky, at the time, estimated the enemy force at 50,000.
27 Hackländer, pp. 117-118, and Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, pp. 269-270.
28 Costa de Beauregard, p. 494.
29 Schneidawind, Feldzug, pp. 779-780. Contrary to an abiding legend, Radetzky did not ask Vittorio Emanuele to withdraw the constitution which his father had granted. See McGaw Smyth, H., ‘The Armistice of Novara. A legend of a liberal King’, Journal of Modern History, Chicago 1935.
30 Le Masson, Histoire de la Campagne de Novare en 1849, pp. 105-106.
31 Baldassare, p. 110.
32 Hilleprandt, ‘1849’, p. 268. Viviani considers the number of dead to be higher, 35 officers and 762 men. Note that many of the missing could have been taken prisoner.
33 Relazioni e rapporti, 1849, pp. 648-649. The difficulties of counting the loss of a defeated army are stressed here.
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